We introduce a natural generalization of Borel's Conjecture. For each infinite cardinal number $\kappa$, let ${\sf BC}_{\kappa}$ denote this generalization. Then ${\sf BC}_{\aleph_0}$ is equivalent to the classical Borel conjecture. Assuming the classical Borel conjecture, $\neg{\sf BC}_{\aleph_1}$ is equivalent to the existence of a Kurepa tree of height $\aleph_1$. Using the connection of ${\sf BC}_{\kappa}$ with a generalization of Kurepa's Hypothesis, we obtain the following consistency results: 1. If it is consistent that there is a 1-inaccessible cardinal then it is (...) consistent that ${\sf BC}_{\aleph_1}$.2. If it is consistent that ${\sf BC}_{\aleph_1}$, then it is consistent that there is an inaccessible cardinal.3. If it is consistent that there is a 1-inaccessible cardinal with $\omega$ inaccessible cardinals above it, then $\neg{\sf BC}_{\aleph_{\omega}} + (\forall n < \omega){\sf BC}_{\aleph_n}$ is consistent.4. If it is consistent that there is a 2-huge cardinal, then it is consistent that ${\sf BC}_{\aleph_{\omega}}$.5. If it is consistent that there is a 3-huge cardinal, then it is consistent that ${\sf BC}_{\kappa}$ for a proper class of cardinals $\kappa$ of countable cofinality. (shrink)

It is well known that if the nonempty player of the Banach–Mazur game has a winning strategy on a space, then that space is Baire in all powers even in the box product topology. The converse of this implication may also be true: We know of no consistency result to the contrary. In this paper we establish the consistency of the converse relative to the consistency of the existence of a proper class of measurable cardinals.

We show that strong measure zero sets -totally bounded metric space) can be characterized by the nonexistence of a winning strategy in a certain infinite game. We use this characterization to give a proof of the well known fact, originally conjectured by K. Prikry, that every dense \ subset of the real line contains a translate of every strong measure zero set. We also derive a related result which answers a question of J. Fickett.

The Profound Limitations of Knowledge explores the limitations of knowledge and argues that neither reasoning nor direct or indirect observations can be trusted. We cannot even assign probabilities to claims of what we can know. Furthermore, for any set of data, there are an infinite number of possible interpretations. Evidence suggests that we live in a participatory universe--that is, our observations shape reality.

A Critical Introduction to Fictionalism provides a clear and comprehensive understanding of an important alternative to realism. Drawing on questions from ethics, the philosophy of religion, art, mathematics, logic and science, this is a complete exploration of how fictionalism contrasts with other non-realist doctrines and motivates influential fictionalist treatments across a range of philosophical issues. Defending and criticizing influential as well as emerging fictionalist approaches, this accessible overview discuses physical objects, universals, God, moral properties, numbers and other fictional entities. Where (...) possible it draws general lessons about the conditions under which a fictionalist treatment of a class of items is plausible. Distinguishing fictionalism from other views about the existence of items, it explains the central features of this key metaphysical topic. Featuring an historical survey, definitions of key terms, characterisations of important subdivisions, objections and problems for fictionalism, and contemporary fictionalist treatments of several issues, A Critical Introduction to Fictionalism is a valuable resource for students of metaphysics as well as students of philosophical methodology. It is the only book of its kind. (shrink)

It is incorrect to construe Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. Or so I have argued elsewhere. To the contrary, Hume in fact offers a detailed defence of the thesis that the norms of scientific inference, that is, the “rules by which to judge of causes and effects”, arereasonablerules to follow in forming our beliefs. Conforming to these rules in its formation of causal beliefs is astrategythe understanding employs in order to satisfy the end of curiosity (T271). Science is reasonable because, (...) so far as we can, within our fallible limits, discover, it is the strategy of belief formation that is the best means of achieving our end of truth, insofar as the latter is, within our fallible limits, attainable. (shrink)

These essays bring together forty years of work in ontology. Intentionality, negation, universals, bare particulars, tropes, general facts, relations, the myth of the 'myth of the given', are among the topics covered. Bergmann, Quine, Sellars, Russell, Wittgenstein, Hume, Bradley, Hochberg, Dummett, Frege, Plato, are among the philosophers discussed. The essays criticize non-Humean notions of cause; they criticize the notion that besides simple atomic facts there are also negative facts and general facts. They defend a realism of properties as universals, against (...) nominalism; bare particulars; a (qualified) realism with regard to logical form; a Russellian account of relations; and an account of minds and intentionality, which is opposed to materialism, but is also a form of (methodological) behaviourism. In general, the ontology is one of logical atomism and empiricist throughout, rooted in a Principle of Acquaintance. (shrink)

Adorno and Horkheimer critically develop the concept of the “culture industry” in the third chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment. The treatment there has some right to be considered one of the core texts in Critical Theory's philosophy of art. This essay discusses the main claims and arguments of that work, as well as earlier essays in Adorno's music theory and later essays that turn to film aesthetics. Attention focuses on illuminating the basis for Adorno and Horkheimer's views on the culture (...) industry in light of their social ontology and epistemology, their account of aesthetic form, and their conception of commodity as style. (shrink)

This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. (...) In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds. (shrink)

From the time of Reid through Coleridge to T. H. Green, Hume was interpreted as a sceptic and as a wholly negative philosopher. And from their perspective such an interpretation no doubt makes some sense, given the vested interest in religion and the absolute of the idealists: from that perspective it is an essential part of a positive position that it take one beyond the realm of ordinary objects known by sense experience to a realm of entities that transcend that (...) world of everyday life. That interpretation lingers on, like bad jokes, to retail in Philosophy 100 classes. On the other hand, in an age where the demand that one have access to a transcendent entity is less insistent, it has become possible to challenge the orthodox reading of Hume. The first to do this was Norman Kemp Smith, who argued that, while Hume was a sceptic, he in fact also had a positive view, not to be sure that of Reid & Co., but that of anaturalist, that is, one who holds that our beliefs, and our moral commitments, are none of them rational, none of them products of reason, but rather are products of our instinctive and passionate natures. This interpretation continues to have important defenders such as Popkin and Stroud. More recently, however, some scholars have gone further and argued that there are good senses in which Hume is not a sceptic, and that he constructs a case that our instinctual beliefs are not only natural but also rational. Major works defending this reading of Hume as a naturalized epistemologist are those of Livingston and Jones. The Kemp Smith interpretation has, however, found a major new defender in John Wright'sThe Sceptical Realism of David Hume. (shrink)

A motivational system approach to avoidance behavior is presented. According to this approach, a motivational state increases the probability of relevant response patterns and establishes the appropriate or “ideal” consummatory stimuli as positive reinforcers. In the case of feeding motivation, for example, hungry rats are likely to explore and gnaw, and to learn to persist in activities correlated with the reception of consummatory stimuli produced by ingestion of palatable substances. In the case of defense motivation, fearful rats are likely to (...) flee or freeze, and to learn to persist in activities correlated with consummatory stimuli produced by flight from a dangerous place. Defense system activation is distinct from alarm reactions. The latter prepare the animal for probable noxious events, involve relatively intense negative affect and extinguish rapidly in situations where the noxious event no longer occurs. In contrast, defense system activation potentiates innate and modified defense reactions, thus preparing the animal for possible, but not necessarily probable, noxious events; it involves little or no negative affect and extinguishes very slowly when the noxious event no longer occurs. With these assumptions and the resulting model we attempt to resolve several long-standing problems in avoidance learning, including the low correlation between negative affect and avoidance performance, differential rates of extinction for avoidance performance and conditioned emotional responses, and evidence that some avoidance responses are much more easily learned than others. In addition, the model has implications for the study of parallels between appetitive and aversive motivation, sign tracking in aversive conditioning, and orientation of flight responses. Historical antecedents and alternative approaches are discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe evolution and adaptation of journalistic practice in response to discourses taking place in networked and shared media environments and the implications of same have been the focus of much academic attention in recent years. This paper examines the agenda-setting potential of Twitter and considers how this feeds into and affects journalistic output. It does so by applying a Critical Discourse Analysis framework in considering whether reportage on particular news events are re-framed in the aftermath of Twitter campaigns. In August (...) 2016, the Irish media’s framing of the Hawe murder suicide via sourcing, emphasis and agency drew widespread criticism on social media for its perceived ‘omission’ or ‘significant silence’ about one of the victims, Clodagh Hawe, from the narrative in favour of a greater focus on the perpetrator, Alan Hawe. Criticism of the initial coverage of the incident was in large part driven by the #hernamewasclodagh social media campaign. This paper takes an intertextual... (shrink)

La philosophie ne peut se contenter de parler de questions éternelles ou intemporelles. Elle doit apporter sa contribution aux problèmes de son époque. Or, aujourd'hui, comme le souligne Jacques Derrida, " jamais la violence, l'inégalité, l'exclusion, la famine, et donc l'oppression économique, n'ont affecté autant d'êtres humains dans l'histoire de fa terre et de l'humanité ". Alors que, dans le même temps, après l'éclipse des grandes utopies sociales, le capitalisme nous est présenté comme l'horizon indépassable de notre temps. Sur fond (...) de globalisation, l'accélération vertigineuse de nos sociétés brouille les repères et déstabilise ceux qui voudraient changer ce monde traversé par tant de souffrances et de blessures. Un défi se présente alors : comment comprendre ce qui nous arrive, ce qui se déconstruit? Une telle visée ne consiste pas à jeter une vieille grille d'analyse sur la réalité actuelle, mais au contraire, à mieux saisir ce qui advient de radicalement neuf. Il est vrai que notre monde a profondément changé. Il ne s'agit plus, alors, de s'engager pour une cause comme on entre dans un jeu de colin-maillard. La nécessaire générosité achoppe sur la complexité du monde. Il faut penser avec rigueur les bouleversements actuels ; et appréhender, avec davantage d'acuité, les notions de droit, de justice ou de responsabilité éthique. Derrida propose une œuvre originale et passionnante qui aborde d'une manière nouvelle les grands défis de notre existence sociale : qu'est-ce que vivre ensemble? Qu'est-ce qu'un semblable? Ne doit-on vivre ensemble qu'avec des semblables? Ou bien encore, comment articuler la sécurité, la liberté et la paix après le traumatisme du " 11 septembre 2001 "? Dans un style à la fois clair et accessible, ce livre propose une introduction à la dimension sociale, éthique et politique de l'œuvre du philosophe français le plus traduit dans le monde. (shrink)

Ayn Rand's political theory is based on the normative principles that man's life is the standard of value and that concern with his own life is man's primary moral purpose, and the metaphysical facts that reason is his basic tool of survival and that its exercise is volitional and requires the absence of coercion. This chapter first presents Rand's analysis of the nature of government. It then discusses why Rand holds that the proper purpose of government is the securing of (...) individual rights, and why it follows from that that capitalism is the only moral social system. In detailing Rand's defense of capitalism, the chapter also examines why she is an ardent proponent of property rights, and thus why property rights take a central place in her writings on politics. Finally, the chapter describes Rand's defense of intellectual property rights, which she views as core property rights. (shrink)

It appears that utilitarian arguments in favor of moral vegetarianism cannot justify a complete prohibition of eating meat. This is because, in certain circumstances, forgoing meat will prevent no pain, and so, on utilitarian grounds, we should be opportunistic carnivores rather than moral vegetarians. In his paper, ‘Puppies, pigs, and people: Eating meat and marginal cases,’ Alastair Norcross argues that causal impotence arguments like these are misguided. First, he presents an analogous situation, the case of chocolate mousse a-la-bama, in order (...) to argue that we, individually, are not causally impotent. Second, Norcross offers a threshold argument in which he argues that while we may individually be causally impotent, when we adopt moral vegetarianism in concert with others, we become causally potent in preventing harms by factory farming. We argue that Norcross's responses ultimately fail to address the causal impotence objection. The former argument fails because it vastly oversimplifies the world in which we find ourselves. Given the size of factory farming, the reasonable conclusion is that we are in fact powerless to prevent harms to animals in factory farms in many or most cases. The latter argument fails because even if collective action will have an impact on factory farming, this does not provide us with an argument against being carnivores in certain circumstances. (shrink)

This paper proposes a third meditation-category—automatic self-transcending— to extend the dichotomy of focused attention and open monitoring proposed by Lutz. Automaticself-transcending includes techniques designed to transcend their own activity. This contrasts with focused attention, which keeps attention focused on an object; and open monitoring, which keeps attention involved in the monitoring process. Each category was assigned EEG bands, based on reported brain patterns during mental tasks, and meditations were categorized based on their reported EEG. Focused attention, characterized by beta/gamma activity, (...) included meditations from Tibetan Buddhist, Buddhist, and Chinese traditions. Open monitoring, characterized by theta activity, included meditations from Buddhist, Chinese, and Vedic traditions. Automaticself-transcending, characterized by alpha1 activity, included meditations from Vedic and Chinese traditions. Between categories, the included meditations differed in focus, subject/object relation, and procedures. These findings shed light on the common mistake of averaging meditations together to determine mechanisms or clinical effects. (shrink)

"Dancing with Absurdity" explores the limitations of knowledge and argues that neither reasoning nor direct observation can be trusted. Not only are they unreliable sources, they do not even justify assigning probabilities to claims about what we can know. This position, called radical skepticism, has intrigued philosophers since before the birth of Christ, yet nobody has been able to refute it. Fred Leavitt uses two unique methods of presentation. First, he supports abstract arguments with summaries of real-life examples from (...) many and varied fields, which make the arguments much more convincing and compelling. He cites more than 200 studies from psychology, mathematics, chaos theory, quantum mechanics, evolutionary theory, history, the corporate world, politics, the military, and current news reporting. Second, Leavitt's writing is user-friendly, even when dealing with complex issues. Whether answering the telephone, turning on the TV, talking with friends, or munching on an apple, we expect things to happen predictably. These expectations, paired with radical skepticism, exemplify cognitive dissonance at the highest level. Although certain of nothing, other than that we can be certain of nothing, it's certain that readers will come to be intrigued by the problem. (shrink)