Edited by Matt Farr (Cambridge University)
|Summary||Bertrand Russell argued that causation is “a relic of a bygone age,” famously comparing it to the British monarchy in that each survives “only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm”. Russell’s contention is that fundamental physics simply does not concern itself with anything suitably related to our everyday notion of cause. Though he later grew more accepting of causal terms in science, his early eliminativist attitude has proven popular among philosophers of science. A contemporary variant of this position, known as 'neo-Russellianism' is the view that causation is a non-fundamental, higher-level phenomenon, sharing with Russell the view that there are no fundamental causal facts, e.g. in the domain of fundamental physics.|
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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