What formulas are tense-logically valid depends on the structure of time, for example on whether it has a beginning. Logicians have investigated what formulas correspond to what physical hypotheses about time. Analogously, we can investigate what formulas of modal logic correspond to what metaphysical hypotheses about necessity. It is widely held that physical hypotheses about time may be contingent. If so, tense-logical validity may be contingent. In contrast, validity in modal logic is typically taken to be non-contingent, as reflected by (...) the general acceptance of the so-called “rule of necessitation.” But as has been argued by various authors in recent years, metaphysical hypotheses may likewise be contingent. If, in particular, hypotheses about the extent of possibility are contingent, we should expect modal-logical validity to be contingent too. Let “contingentism” be the view that everything that is not ruled out by logic is possible. I shall investigate what the right system of modal logic is, if contingentism is true. Given plausible assumptions, the system contains the McKinsey principle, and is thus not even contained in S5. It also contains simple and elegant iteration principles for the contingency operator: something is contingent if and only if it is contingently contingent. (shrink)

In their recent article, Brown et al analyse several ethical aspects around immunity passports and put forward some recommendations for implementing them. Although they offer a comprehensive perspective, they overlook two essential aspects. First, while the authors consider the possibility that immunological passports may appear to discriminate against those who do not possess them, the opposite viewpoint of immune people is underdeveloped. We argue that if a person has been tested positive for and recovered from COVID-19, becoming immune to it, (...) she cannot be considered a hazard to public health and, therefore, the curtailment of her fundamental rights is not legitimate. Second, they omit that vaccine distribution will create similar problems related to immunity-based licenses. Vaccine certificates will de facto generate a sort of immunity passport. In the next phases of the pandemic, different immunity statuses will be at stake, because the need to identify who can spread COVID-19 is unavoidable. If a person does not pose a threat to public health because she cannot spread the infection, then her right to freedom of movement should be respected, regardless of how she acquired that immunity. (shrink)

The idea that states and the international community have a responsibility to protect populations at risk has framed internationalist debates about conflict prevention, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and territorial administration since 2001. This book situates the responsibility to protect concept in a broad historical and jurisprudential context, demonstrating that the appeal to protection as the basis for de facto authority has emerged at times of civil war or revolution - the Protestant revolutions of early modern Europe, the bourgeois and (...) communist revolutions of the following centuries and the revolution that is decolonisation. This analysis, from Hobbes to the UN, of the resulting attempts to ground authority on the capacity to guarantee security and protection is essential reading for all those seeking to understand, engage with, limit or critique the expansive practices of international executive action authorised by the responsibility to protect concept. (shrink)

O presente artigo representa o esforço por parte do seu autor de nos apresentar, de forma coerente e sucinta, o significado do que seja uma verdadeira Teona Económica, teoria esta que no caso presente se baseia em resultados obtidos pelo autor ao longo da sua vida de investigador no âmbito das ciências económicas e que fundamentalmente se referem à estrutura e à natureza das próprias construções teóricas comprovadamente funcionais no âmbito da economía. Nesse sentido, o presente contributo consiste numa formulação (...) atenta e num exame cuidadoso de quais possam, ou devam, realmente ser as questões filosóficas suscitadas pela Teoria Económica ou simplesmente pelos factos da economia. Entre outros aspectos, a posição subjacente ao artigo é a de que urna interrogação filosófica acerca da economia não se pode dispensar do esforço de articular de modo claro, preciso e inteiramente coerente com a realidade do que seja o saber científico acerca da actividade económica no seu conjunto as questões que neste caso realmente fazem sentido e, por isso, merecem realmente ser tidas em conta. This article results from the authors effort to present us, in a coherent and succinct way, the meaning of what may be considered as a true Theory of Economics; a theory which, in this case, is based on the results gathered by the author throughout his life as researcher in the field of economics, and which, basically, concerns the structure and the nature of the theoretical constructions themselves, which have proved to be functional in the realm of the science of economics. Having that in mind, the article consists in an attentive definition, and in a careful examination, of that which can or should really be identified as proper philosophical questions suggested by the Theory of Economics or rather, simply, by the facts of the economic life. Among other aspects, the author's position converges on the idea that a philosophical interrogation concerning economics cannot avoid the effort of articulating the issues which, in this case, really make sense and, because ofthat, deserve to be seriously taken into account. Moreover, for the author of the article, such an effort needs to be done in a clear, precise and entirely coherent way with the reality ofthat which is recognized as scientific knowledge in economics as a whole. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Ideal Form of Mutual Recognition Hegel's State of Nature De Facto Authority De Jure Authority Legitimate Authority Constitutional Authority Conclusion Notes References.

Raz holds that necessarily all legal authorities, even de facto authorities, make a claim to legitimate authority. He does not say that legitimacy is a necessary property of law. This view, which I call the claim view, constitutes my focal point in this paper. Many commentators have criticized this view. I discuss and dismiss three critiques of the claim view: the verification critique (the claim view is not empirically confirmed), the legalistic critique (law claims legal authority, not (...) moral authority), and the semantic critique (legal obligations are semantically distinct from moral obligations). I submit that Raz equates the meaning of legal duties with that of moral duties and yet denies that legal statements entail moral propositions. In other words, I distinguish the semantic identity thesis from the semantic entailment thesis. Instead of a semantic interpretation of the claim view, I defend a presuppositional ascription of a general claim to moral authority to authoritative duty‐imposing and normatively committed uses of legal language by official spokesmen. I show that law’s claim to authority does not prove the truth of the sources thesis, because conceptual confusion or insincerity can affect the epistemic reliability of the propositions embodied in the claim, and because blatant immorality can altogether cancel law’s pragmatically presupposed claim to moral authority. I also argue that the claim view can only warrant two qualified versions of exclusive legal positivism, one of which is almost tautological, the other self‐contradictory. Finally, I suggest that exclusive legal positivism cannot be defended on conceptual grounds. (shrink)

Ludvig Beckman’s The Boundaries of Democracy offers a sophisticated account of the boundary problem, developing a version of the all-subjected principle understood to involve relations of ‘de facto authority’. I explain the central claims of the book, raise some problems, and suggest some ways in which I think the account could be fruitfully further developed.

Expertise is commonly viewed as a professionalized competence in a specific field. Expert professional identities are produced and reproduced through professional training and other socialization mechanisms, which work to generate for a specific group of individuals a specific set of expert skills and knowledge. In this paper, I examine participants’ orientations to their distinct expert professional identities from the perspective of deontic authority. Drawing on 15 video-recorded church workplace meetings between pastors and cantors as data, and conversation analysis as (...) a theoretical and methodological framework, I analyze situations where a non-expert participant makes a proposal that the expert participant orients to as reasonable to comply with. Specifically, I demonstrate how the expert participants respond to these proposals with displays of deontic authority, arguably in an attempt to maintain their expert identities in the face of their de facto compliance with the proposals. In these situations, the expert participants are shown to invoke a past decision of their own, a future decision of their own, or a pattern that is beyond both participants’ control. Each of these practices involves the expert participant balancing resistance and compliance by minimally acknowledging the content of the non-expert participant’s proposal, while excluding the non-expert from those who have deontic authority in the matter. In so doing, the expert speaker implies that the non-expert proposal speaker lacks procedural knowledge about the specific matters about which it is relevant to make proposals to experts and access to the distinct experiential perspective that characterizes expert perception of things. It is thus argued that, in this context, the mere claims of deontic authority, produced without any substantial displays of expert knowledge, can serve the maintenance of expert professional identities. (shrink)

Joseph Raz’s _Argument from Authority_ is one of the most famous defences of exclusive positivism in jurisprudence, the position that the existence and content of the law in a society is a wholly social fact, which can be established without the need to engage in moral analysis. According to Raz’s argument, legal systems are _de facto_ practical authorities that, like all _de facto_ authorities, must claim _legitimate_ authority, which itself entails that they must be _capable_ of being an (...) class='Hi'>authority. Further, once we properly understand what constitutes practical authority, as captured by Raz’s _service conception_, we realise that the directives of any authority (including the law) must be wholly identifiable without recourse to moral analysis. While the argument has previously been criticised on the grounds that the law does not claim legitimate authority, and further that the service conception of authority itself is inadequate, we argue here that the argument is actually in a worse position than these concerns recognise, for it relies upon the mistaken principle that a sincere belief or claim that _p_ guarantees _p_’s conceptual possibility. (shrink)

This book provides a general theory of democratic inclusion for the present world. It presents an original contribution to our understanding of the democratic ideal by explaining how democratic inclusion can apply to individuals in a variety of contexts: the workplace, social clubs, religious institutions, the family and, of course, the state. The book explores the problem of democratic inclusion, what it means to be subject to de facto authority, how this conception translates into legal systems and the (...) relationship between territorial claims by the state, and law's claim to legitimate authority. The volume will be of interest to scholars and researchers of politics, especially political theory and democracy. (shrink)

When is a de facto authority not entitled to be considered a `government' for the purposes of International Law? International reaction to the 1991-4 Haitian crisis is only the most prominent in a series of events that suggest a norm of governmental illegitimacy is emerging to challenge more traditional notions of state sovereignty. This challenge has dramatic implications for two fundamental legal strictures: that against the use or threat of force against a state's political independence, and that against (...) interference in matters `essentially' within a state's domestic jurisdiction. Yet although human rights advocates have begun to speak of state sovereignty as an `anachronism', with some expansively proclaiming the emergence of an international `right to democratic governance,' international law literature lacks systematic treatment of governmental illegitimacy. This work seeks to specify the international law of collective non-recognition of governments, so as to enable legal evaluation of cases in which competing factions assert governmental authority. It subjects the recognition controversies of the United Nations era to a systematic examination, informed by theoretical and comparative perspectives on governmental legitimacy. The inquiry establishes that the category of `illegitimate government' now occupies a place in international law, with significant consequences for the legality of intervention in certain instances. The principle of popular sovereignty, hitherto vague and ambiguous, has acquired sufficient determinacy to serve, in some circumstances, as a basis for denial of legal recognition to putative governments. This development does not imply, however, the emergence in international law of a meaningful norm of `democratic governance,' nor would such a norm serve the purposes of the scheme of sovereign equality of states embodied in the United Nations Charter. (shrink)

Resumen Debido a la polisemia que la complejidad exhibe, se pretenden exponer las distintas posturas, definiciones, descripciones y debates acerca de esta, a la luz de lo descrito por Carlos Maldonado, Edgar Morin, Ilya Progogine, Murray Gell-Mann, Leonardo Rodríguez y Julio Aguirre, quienes comportan un principio dialógico y translúcido, que integraría la lógica clásica teniendo en cuenta sus límites de facto y de jure, que además llevaría en sí el principio de la Unitas Multiplex, que escapa a la unidad (...) abstracta por lo alto y por lo bajo. Luego de la presentación de las posturas de los autores mencionados se pasa a describir los encuentros y desencuentros que de estos aparecen sobre este concepto; y finalizar al proponer una definición y caracterización personal de la complejidad.Due to the polysemy of Complexity, it is intended to expose different postures, definitions, descriptions and debates about It, in the light of what was described by Carlos Maldonado, Edgar Morin, Ilya Prigogine, Murray Gell-Mann, Leonardo Rodríguez and Julio Aguirre. For them it implies a dialogical and translucent principle that would integrate classical logic considering its de facto and de jure limits, and that in addition would take in himself the principle of Unitas Multiplex that escapes to the abstract unity by the high and by the low. After the presentation of the positions of the mentioned authors the paper goes on to describe encounters and disagreements about this concept finally proposing a definition and characterization of complexity. (shrink)

Una revisión somera de la teorí­a contemporánea de la democracia ofrece el siguiente panorama: por un lado, una valoración positiva de la forma efectiva de la democracia, es decir, la democracia liberal y representativa porque provee estabilidad, se respetan las libertades y tienen altos niveles de legitimidad; y, por el otro, una crí­tica de la democracia por ineficiente, representativa y no participativa y por liberal en oposición a social. El problema, evidentemente, es el siguiente: la democracia, ¿podrí­a ser como deberí­a (...) ser o sólo puede ser como de hecho es? Evidentemente, no se puede ofrecer a esta pregunta una respuesta definitiva y, en su lugar, se revisan los argumentos de aquellos autores que defienden a la democracia liberal y representativa como la única forma de gobierno posible en el mundo moderno con la intención de determinar si tienen o no razón, es decir, si la democracia representativa y liberal es, en efecto, la única forma de democracia posible. Dos ejemplos clásicos de esta tesis se encuentran en las obras de Publius y Alexis de Tocqueville."œThe conditions of a possible democracy: The Federalist and Tocqueville"A superficial review of the contemporary theory of democracy ofers the following panorama. On the one hand, a positive appraisal of the efective form of democracy, that is, liberal and representative democracy because it provides stability, freedom is respected and there are high levels of justice. On the other, a criticism of democracy for being ineficient, representative and non-participatory, and for being liberal in opposition to social. Obviously the problem is the following: could democracy be what it should be or can it only be de facto? Obviously a definite answer cannot be given to this question and, instead, the arguments of those authors who defend liberal and representative democracy as the only possible form of government in the modern world are revised with the intention of determining whether they are right or not, that is, if representative and liberal government is, in efect, the only form of possible government. Two classic examples of this thesis are found in the works of Publius and Alexis de Tocqueville. (shrink)

Several contemporary philosophers have argued that democracy earns its moral keep in part by rendering political authority compatible with social or relational equality. In a recent article in this journal, Alexander Motchoulski examines these relational egalitarian defenses of democracy, finds the standard approach wanting, and advances an alternative. The standard approach depends on the claim that inequality of political power constitutes status inequality (the ‘constitutive claim’). Motchoulski rejects this claim on the basis of a theory of social status: once (...) you see what social status is, Motchoulski thinks, the constitutive claim is a non-starter. In its place, Motchoulski suggests that relational egalitarians can and should content themselves with a defense of democratic institutions on the basis of a causal-instrumental link between equality of political power and equality of social relations. In this reply, I advance three main claims. First, relational egalitarians have good reason to hope for a defense of the constitutive claim, since that claim is required if relational equality is to vindicate the intrinsic value of democracy. Second, Motchoulski’s argument against the constitutive claim fails, because it depends on conflating one species of social status for the genus as a whole. Finally, I argue that the constitutive claim is trivially true for one kind of status, namely de facto authority, but, since equality of that kind of status is not intrinsically valuable, this does not amount to a defense of the intrinsic value of democracy. (shrink)

The tension between Kant’s egalitarian conception of persons as ends in themselves and his rejection of the right of revolution has been widely discussed. The crucial issue is more fundamental: Is Kant’s defense of absolute obedience consistent with his own principle of legitimate law, that legitimate law is compatible with the Categorical Imperative? Resolving this apparent inconsistency resolves the subsidiary inconsistencies that have been debated in the literature. I argue that Kant’s legal principles contain two distinct grounds of obligation to (...) obey political authority. One lies in his metaphysical principles of law, according to which there is only a duty to obey legitimate law or fully legitimate authorities. Another lies in his moral-pragmatic principles. He believes that membership in the state helps improve one’s character by counter-balancing one’s immoral inclinations. This is his ultimate ground for obedience to de facto, imperfectly legitimate states. On this ground, the duty to obey an actual state is conditional. Kant’s strong statements about the duty to obey actual states is explained by the ease with which he thinks the relevant condition is met by extant states. The apparent ambiguities in his discussion of obedience point to some important philosophical and historical shortcomings of his analysis of the division of govemmental powers and of judicial competence which hamper his analysis of the duty to obey the state. (shrink)

The tension between Kant’s egalitarian conception of persons as ends in themselves and his rejection of the right of revolution has been widely discussed. The crucial issue is more fundamental: Is Kant’s defense of absolute obedience consistent with his own principle of legitimate law, that legitimate law is compatible with the Categorical Imperative? Resolving this apparent inconsistency resolves the subsidiary inconsistencies that have been debated in the literature. I argue that Kant’s legal principles contain two distinct grounds of obligation to (...) obey political authority. One lies in his metaphysical principles of law, according to which there is only a duty to obey legitimate law or fully legitimate authorities. Another lies in his moral-pragmatic principles. He believes that membership in the state helps improve one’s character by counter-balancing one’s immoral inclinations. This is his ultimate ground for obedience to de facto, imperfectly legitimate states. On this ground, the duty to obey an actual state is conditional. Kant’s strong statements about the duty to obey actual states is explained by the ease with which he thinks the relevant condition is met by extant states. The apparent ambiguities in his discussion of obedience point to some important philosophical and historical shortcomings of his analysis of the division of govemmental powers and of judicial competence which hamper his analysis of the duty to obey the state. (shrink)

This essay explores the relation between democracy and social equality. It critically evaluates the relational egalitarian view that democracy is necessary for full social equality and that democracy is an important constituent of social equality. On such a view, inequalities in power an de facto authority are taken, in certain circumstances, to constitute a form of social inequality. On the basis of a series of cases, I argue that such a view is mistaken, and that political inequalities are, (...) at best, empirically and contingently related to social inequality. I argue that what is primarily wrong with inequalities in power and de facto authority is not that, in certain circumstances, they constitute a form of social inequality, but rather that they can be used to extract greater consideration for those with greater power. (shrink)

Moderata Fonte's dialogueThe Worth of Women(1600) contains stinging critiques of marriage and the dowry system as well as of women's inequality. I argue that Fonte's critique of male dominance, particularly in marriage, employs a modern method of argument, which anticipates the later contractarian critiques of political authority. Given that women are naturally men's equals, Fonte argues that men's de facto authority over women is illegitimate and based on force. Moreover, by treating marriage as an artificial institution rather (...) than as a natural institution, Fonte anticipates later feminist arguments that criticize the modern contract tradition for its failure to extend its critique of other forms of authority to patriarchal marriage, instead positing a natural basis for women's subordination to men. In light of this history, Fonte's critique of patriarchy is especially interesting: it challenges the patriarchal family structure and the institutions that collude to diminish women's agency, and this challenge to male authority is similar to later (male) challenges to de facto political authority. (shrink)

This dissertation applies the method of Platonic recollection to the legitimacy of political power: the reason for it, what distinguishes political power from other kinds of power, the sovereign's right to political power, and the scope of the sovereign's authority. My aim is to disclose the subject in its essential, intrinsic determinations. ;I begin with an historical situation in which a crisis of legitimacy precipitated by disagreements over the kind of warrant that is necessary and sufficient to establish a (...) particular sovereign's authority motivated philosophical reflection on the legitimacy of political power. One faction insisted that sovereigns only acquire de jure legitimacy by legitimate succession. A second faction asserted that subjects have a moral obligation of allegiance to any sovereign who can impose order. A third faction argued that a government whose legitimacy rests on the consent of the people has legitimacy on de jure grounds. I develop the consequences of opposed assumptions behind these opinions with a view to combining the truths expressed in them in an account of political power. ;This dissertation focuses on Locke's opinion that consensus populi is the only effective principle for establishing the power of those that govern and determining the obedience of subjects. The question is, What condition must a consensus populi fulfill to provide a reason sufficient to legitimize a sovereign's de facto authority? A people associated through a consensus which is a unifying cause of a body politic has the right to form a political association and establish a government to preserve it. A consensus populi which expresses the common element that reconstitutes a multitude into a political community is a unifying cause of a body politic. People who have become conscious of being related by a common will to bring about in human affairs a true conception of justice have in their consensus an authoritative consensus populi. ;I argue that Locke gives an apologia for a political community formed from an authoritative consensus populi, and thus leads philosophers to a genuine insight into the legitimacy of political power. (shrink)

Resumen Debido a la polisemia que la complejidad exhibe, se pretenden exponer las distintas posturas, definiciones, descripciones y debates acerca de esta, a la luz de lo descrito por Carlos Maldonado, Edgar Morin, Ilya Progogine, Murray Gell-Mann, Leonardo Rodríguez y Julio Aguirre, quienes comportan un principio dialógico y translúcido, que integraría la lógica clásica teniendo en cuenta sus límites de facto y de jure, que además llevaría en sí el principio de la Unitas Multiplex, que escapa a la unidad (...) abstracta por lo alto y por lo bajo. Luego de la presentación de las posturas de los autores mencionados se pasa a describir los encuentros y desencuentros que de estos aparecen sobre este concepto; y finalizar al proponer una definición y caracterización personal de la complejidad.Due to the polysemy of Complexity, it is intended to expose different postures, definitions, descriptions and debates about It, in the light of what was described by Carlos Maldonado, Edgar Morin, Ilya Prigogine, Murray Gell-Mann, Leonardo Rodríguez and Julio Aguirre. For them it implies a dialogical and translucent principle that would integrate classical logic considering its de facto and de jure limits, and that in addition would take in himself the principle of Unitas Multiplex that escapes to the abstract unity by the high and by the low. After the presentation of the positions of the mentioned authors the paper goes on to describe encounters and disagreements about this concept finally proposing a definition and characterization of complexity. (shrink)

Resumen Debido a la polisemia que la complejidad exhibe, se pretenden exponer las distintas posturas, definiciones, descripciones y debates acerca de esta, a la luz de lo descrito por Carlos Maldonado, Edgar Morin, Ilya Progogine, Murray Gell-Mann, Leonardo Rodríguez y Julio Aguirre, quienes comportan un principio dialógico y translúcido, que integraría la lógica clásica teniendo en cuenta sus límites de facto y de jure, que además llevaría en sí el principio de la Unitas Multiplex, que escapa a la unidad (...) abstracta por lo alto y por lo bajo. Luego de la presentación de las posturas de los autores mencionados se pasa a describir los encuentros y desencuentros que de estos aparecen sobre este concepto; y finalizar al proponer una definición y caracterización personal de la complejidad.Due to the polysemy of Complexity, it is intended to expose different postures, definitions, descriptions and debates about It, in the light of what was described by Carlos Maldonado, Edgar Morin, Ilya Prigogine, Murray Gell-Mann, Leonardo Rodríguez and Julio Aguirre. For them it implies a dialogical and translucent principle that would integrate classical logic considering its de facto and de jure limits, and that in addition would take in himself the principle of Unitas Multiplex that escapes to the abstract unity by the high and by the low. After the presentation of the positions of the mentioned authors the paper goes on to describe encounters and disagreements about this concept finally proposing a definition and characterization of complexity. (shrink)

According to Joseph Raz's sources thesis, the existence and content of authoritative directives must be identifiable by resort to the social fact of their provenance from a de facto authority, without regard to any of the normative considerations that the authority in question is supposed to rely on in its judgment. This article argues that the sources thesis fails to account for the role of jurisdictional considerations (namely, considerations about the scope of a de facto (...) class='Hi'>authority's power) in the identification of valid law. It examines a legal system with a legislature and courts and a practice of constitutional review of legislation by the courts for its conformity with fundamental rights and argues that the special normative status of (at least some) authoritative directives in this legal system depends on respect for jurisdiction. An assessment of whether an authority has stayed intra vires involves recourse to the normative considerations that it is the authority's job to weigh up. This criticism of the sources thesis highlights the importance of incorporating jurisdiction into our philosophical accounts of legal authority. (shrink)

Recently, social epistemologists have sought to establish what the governing epistemic relationship should be between novices and experts. In this paper, I argue for, and expand upon, Helen De Cruz’s expert-as-teacher model. For although this model is vulnerable to significant challenges, I propose that a specifically extended version can sufficiently overcome these challenges (call this the “extended-expert-as-teacher” model, or the “EEAT” model). First, I show the respective weaknesses of three influential models in the literature. Then, I argue the expert-as-teacher model (...) can overcome its weaknesses by adding what I call the "Authority Clause", "Advisor Clause", and "Ex Post Facto Clause" of the EEAT model. After developing a robust account of these clauses, I entertain three major objections. First, I respond to the charge that the EEAT model is little better than the expert-as-authority model. Second, I respond to a double-counting objection. Lastly, I respond to a pragmatic objection from complexity. (shrink)

Augustine and female homoeroticism in the early Middle Ages: A Foucaultian idea-historical interpretation. Taking his reading of Romans 1:26–27 and Genesis 19 as its hermeneutical key, an idea-historical interpretation of the views of the Western church father Augustine of Hippo (354–430) on female homoeroticism is presented in this article. The accentuation of French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–1984) on the overall significance of Augustine in the Western history of sexuality, in his posthumous Histoire de la sexualité 4 ( Les aveux de (...) la chair, under editorship of Frédéric Gros, 2018 ), is used to contextualise Augustine’s views on sexual desire as the ‘form of the will’, here positioned specifically within a female homoerotic context. Drawing on the substantial studies of John Boswell (in 1980) and Bernadette Brooten (in 1996), which, although relatively dated, are still without equal in Medieval research, the article subsequently explores Augustine’s views on intimate relations between women, both in monasteries and in secular society. It is shown that intimate relations between women must have transpired in fifth-century monasteries and that female homoeroticism was for the next two centuries dealt with with restraint rather than with forms of exclusion and punishment, despite the negative portrayals of same-sex relations by some of Augustine’s patristic contemporaries (particularly John Chrysostom [ca.347–407]), yet precisely on the basis of Augustine’s understated approach. Although Augustine renounced homoerotic relations as a form of ‘unnatural’ (for him, expressly, all ‘non-procreative’) sex, he dealt with the incidence of female same-sex relations with understatement. Given his general authority in the early Middle Ages, one effect of Augustine’s non-homophobic approach was that female homoeroticism was de facto bypassed as a ‘moral problem’ in the fifth and sixth centuries, until handbooks of penance, that prohibited all forms of same-sex relations, started circulating at the end of the sixth century. Contribution: This article contributes to the ongoing study of Medieval female sexuality, and particularly of female homoeroticism in late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages, by exploring Augustine’s views on same-sex relations between women around the early fifth century, while concurrently contributing to ongoing analyses of Michel Foucault’s interpretation of the church and desert fathers in the (edited) fourth volume of Histoire de la sexualité ( Les aveux de la chair ), published in 2018. (shrink)

Conventionalism as a distinct approach to the social contract received significant attention in the game-theoretic literature on social contract theory. Peter Vanderschraaf’s sophisticated and innovative theory of conventional justice represents the most recent contribution to this tradition and, in many ways, can be viewed as a culmination of this tradition. In this article, I focus primarily on Vanderschraaf’s defense of the egalitarian bargaining solution as a principle of justice. I argue that one particular formal feature of this bargaining solution, the (...) baseline consistency requirement, may stand in tension with other features of conventionalism as an approach to the social contract and limit the scope of Vanderschraaf’s theory to societies in which de facto an egalitarian sense of justice evolves. It limits the scope of Vanderschraaf’s theory in the face of moral diversity. A similar limitation applies to Vanderschraaf’s theory of democratic political authority. Despite these minor limitations, Vanderschraaf’s theory can only be seen as a major success and significant contribution to social contract theory. (shrink)

This paper explores Mencius' political theory of international relations and the morality of war from the perspective of Confucian moralpolitik. It argues that while acknowledging the possibility of international justice among the feudal, yet de facto, independent states during the Warring States period, Mencius subscribed to the idea that international morality (and justice) can be best maintained under what I call 'Confucian international moral hierarchy' among the states. By upholding international moral hierarchy, Mencius attempted to achieve an international community (...) in which big/strong and small/weak states are mutually connected to each other for the common welfare of the people. The paper then turns to Mencius' ideas on just war and investigates how Mencius rationalized the punitive expedition in the virtual absence of a symbolic institutional authority representing the Mandate of Heaven, the metaphysical ground for the morality of war, by presenting its visible alternatives. It closes by critically revisiting Daniel Bell's interpretation of Mencius's ideas of a just war. (shrink)

There is no arguing the impact of Inoue Tetsujirō on the development of philosophy in Japan from the Meiji Restoration through the end of the Pacific War. He was the first Japanese to receive a doctorate in philosophy from Germany and the first native-born chair of the philosophy department at Tokyo Imperial University, the training center for almost all the major Japanese philosophers who graduated before 1915. Inoue was instrumental in making German idealism the Western philosophy of choice for Japan, (...) but he also appreciated Asian traditions as well, having no qualms about claiming there was true philosophy in India, China, and premodern Japan. He set the foundation for academic philosophy in Japan not so much through his own rather simplistic personal philosophy, but especially through his contributions to the organization of the field. This article focuses mainly on Inoue’s troubled relation with Confucianism. On one hand, in seeking a premodern philosophy to serve as the bedrock for modern Japan, Inoue looked to the Edo-period Confucian traditions originating in China. He divided them into Shushigaku, Yōmeigaku, and what he named Kogaku, the school focusing on classical texts preceding neo-Confucian developments and interpretations. In many respects, like so many others of his generation, Inoue was by training and personal preference a Confucian. That is not the whole story, however. Inoue understood Confucianism’s primary purpose as cultivating the social values and order that would ensure an efficient society of human flourishing, stability, and harmony. Yet, he also likely suspected that the people of the new Japan, with its modernization and plethora of Western ideas, would not unquestioningly accept the authority of the Confucian classics, nor be willing to undertake the rigors of textual study that are the hallmark of the Confucian scholar. In Edo-period Japan, that study had been the responsibility of the samurai class, but in their democratization program, the Meiji reformers had abolished the old class system. Education of the young would now shift from the Confucian academies to the new public school system. Always cooperative with the government to the point of being obsequious, Inoue took a leading role in the National Morality program and its installment in the nationwide school curriculum. That curriculum combined a Shinto-based reverence for the sacred nature of the emperor in the kokutai ideology along with practical moralistic values that could be loosely called Confucian. Yet, if schooling for most was limited to the elementary level and if there was no longer a samurai class to oversee the moral behavior of the society, who could nurture and enforce the moral order? Through a set of fortuitous events, Inoue “discovered” bushidō, the Way of the warrior. If there were no longer a samurai warrior class, perhaps all Japanese could become de facto samurai—at least in their mindset. Most may no longer have the scholarly skills and time to glean their spiritual and moral insights from Confucian texts. Yet, they could find the virtues of loyalty, sincerity, filiality, and compliance with seniority within the distinctively mindful heart and spirit of ancient Japan carried within the Japanese bloodline. What happened to the Confucianism of Inoue Tetsujirō? Some of its values were absorbed into bushidō and National Morality, but the praxis of the Confucian scholar and the ideal of the kunshi seem to have been lost, much to Japan’s detriment. (shrink)

This article starts, on the one hand, with a consideration of the paradoxical way in which, namely when he wanted to evoke those intellectual figures that have decidedly contributed to the revelation of the "true Pascal", i. e., of the Pascal that had known the good usage of reason, Fortunat Strowski comes to the idea of putting side by side Pierre Duhem and Leon Brunschvicg. On the other, a reference is made to the fact that Duhem only published two articles (...) and a preface on Pascal while Brunschvicg is the author of a major work on the great figure of the XVIIth -Century. Hence, the question raised is about the consideration that shall be given to a paradoxical affirmation that seems to place on equal terms the few pages that Duhem has written on Pascal with the imposing contributions of Brunschvicg. For the author of the article, it would not be very consequent to take such affirmations as if they were unreflected ones, since it is clear that Strowski knew exactly what he was writing as we can see from the very good knowledge he had of the writings of both Blaise Pascal and Pierre Duhem. Indeed, and more than anyone else, Strowski was in a very good position to enlighten us about these two thinkers and to write about them in the terms he effectively did. The goal of the article, therefore, is to justify that assertion, which on its face is quite paradoxical, by showing in concrete terms the extent to which Pierre Duhem was truly influenced by Blaise Pascal. ––– O presente artigo começa por realçar o modo paradoxal como, uma vez que ele se dá ao trabalho de evocar aqueles autores que contribuíram para a revelação do verdadeiro Pascal, ou seja, daquele que conheceu o bom uso da razão, Fortunat Strowski não hesita em colocar o nome de Pierre Duhem lado a lado com o de Léon Brunschvicg. O facto, porém, é que Pierre Duhem não fez mais do que publicar dois artigos e um prefácio sobre Blaise Pascal, ao passo que Brunschvicg lhe dedicou uma obra que haveria de ficar famosa. O problema, portanto, consiste em saber qual o valor que se deve atribuir a uma tal afirmação desconcertante, a qual parece simplesmente equalizar as poucas páginas de Duhem sobre Pascal com as imponentes contribuições de Brunschvicg. Nesse sentido, a estratégia do autor do artigo consiste em não tomar de forma ligeira uma tal afirmação, como se Strowski não tivesse considerado bem as consequências e o alcance daquilo que escrevia, pois a verdade é que ele conhecia não só a obra de Pascal mas também a de Duhem. Ou seja, mais do que ninguém, ele estava perfeitamente à altura de nos comunicar algo de substancial acerca de cada um destes pensadores e de escrever a seu propósito aquilo que ele efectivamente escreveu. Em suma, o presente artigo não tem outra pretensão que não a de justificar essa afirmação aparentemente paradoxal segundo a qual Pierre Duhem foi um verdadeiro pascaliano. (shrink)

O objectivo primário do presente artigo é estudar algumas das implicações, sobretudo epistemológicas, associadas com o auto-intitulado movimento da Física Ariana (Deutsche Physikj, movimento esse que aqui se considera como tendo sido iniciado pelos físicos, laureados com o Prémio Nobel, Philipp Lenard e Johannes Stark. Assim, em primeiro lugar, procura-se analisar questões como a da ligação entre ciência e raça, a da função do método experimental e do método dedutivo nas descobertas das ciências naturais, bem como a da relação entre (...) matemática e natureza, já para não mencionar a dimensão histórica da ciência. Em vez de recorrer a conceitos supostamente puros do que sejam ciência ou racionalidade em ordem a instaurar um tribunal da história, cujo veredicto seria a condenação da Física Ariana como irrisória anomalia epistemológica no corpo histórico da ciência, os autores do presente artigo procuram, antes de mais, traçar a origem do movimento a partir das biografias de Lenard e Stark, acreditando que o carácter profundamente conturbado de ambos, coadunado com a conflituosa situação política que antecedeu a ascensão de Hitler ao poder na Alemanha em 1933, seriam razões suficientes para a formação das doutrinas que atacavam a Física Teórica. Nesse sentido, depois de expor os princípios e as ideias defendidas pelos físicos arianos, os autores procuram evidenciar até que ponto uma análise restrita ao campo da física e dos seus documentos não é suficiente para uma compreensão cabal de tal movimento. Ao mesmo tempo, procuram mostrar também por que razão é necessário considerar que algumas objecções levantadas contra a física teórica se constituíam como problemas verdadeiramente relevantes, sendo que alguns deles foram também formulados por autores que não pactuavam com as convicções políticas de Lenard e Stark. Finalmente, o artigo comporta uma análise das posições defendidas por Werner Heisenberg em ordem a mostrar a seriedade com a qual as críticas dos físicos arianos foram recebidas por este autor, nelas reconhecendo algo digno de ser respondido, e isso não meramente por razões políticas, mas antes porque constituíam dilemas reais instalados na prática das ciências naturais. Ou seja, recorrendo aos argumentos esgrimidos por Werner Heisenberg, os autores do artigo pretendem demonstrar que a Física Ariana não merece atenção apenas na sua qualidade de aberração histórica, mas também pelo facto de ela ter levantado questões ainda hoje epistemologicamente relevantes. /// The primary aim of the present article is to study some of the implications, particularly the epistemological ones, associated with the movement of the so called German Physics (Deutsche PhysikJ, a movement that in this article is mainly associated with the work of the physicists, and Nobel laureates, Phillip Lenard and Johannes Stark. The article begins by analyzing questions related to the connection established between science and race, as well as to the function of the experimental and deductive methods in the discoveries of the natural sciences, not to mention the problems associated with the relation between mathematics and nature as well as the historical dimension of science. The goal, therefore, is not to take supposedly pure concepts about what science and rationality might be and establish them as judges in the tribunal of history, whose verdict would be the condemnation of the German Physics as an insignificant epistemological anomaly within the historical body of science. Rather, the authors of the article want to trace the origin of the movement of the German Physics by reading the biographies of Lenard and Stark, whereby it is assumed that the problematic character of these physicists together with the political situation that anteceded Hitlers ascension to power in Germany in 1933 would be reason enough for the formation of doctrines directed against theoretical physics. In this sense, after expounding the principles and the doctrines defended by the Arian physicists, the authors of the article show that an analysis circumscribed to the domain of physics would not be sufficient for a global understanding of this movement. At the same time, however, the authors also want to show the reason why it is necessary to consider some of the objections raised against theoretical physics as serious problems, even though some of them were also formulated by authors that did not share the political convictions of Lenard and Stark. Finally, the article contains an analysis of the positions defended by Werner Heisenberg in order to demonstrate the seriousness with which the criticisms of the Arian physicists were received by this most important author, so much so that he recognized in them something worth a response, and this not only for political reasons, but also because he recognized the problems raised as a dilemma situated at the very heart of the practice of the natural sciences. In other words, by a close reading of the arguments presented by Werner Heisenberg, the authors of the article want to demonstrate that the movement of German Physics is worth attention not only in its quality as an historical aberration, but also due to the fact that it raised questions that are still epistemologically relevant. (shrink)

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, it is timely to ask what continuing role, if any, the concept of sovereignty can and should play in the emerging "new world order." The aim of _Law, Power, and the Sovereign State_ is both to counter the argument that the end of the sovereign state is close at hand and to bring scholarship on sovereignty into the post-Cold War era. The study assesses sovereignty as status and as power and (...) examines the issue of what precisely constitutes a sovereign state. In determining how a political entity gains sovereignty, the authors introduce the requirements of de facto independence and de jure independence and explore the ambiguities inherent in each. They also examine the political process by which the international community formally confers sovereign status. Fowler and Bunck trace the continuing tension of the "chunk and basket" theories of sovereignty through the history of international sovereignty disputes and conclude by considering the usefulness of sovereignty as a concept in the future study and conduct of international affairs. They find that, despite frequent predictions of its imminent demise, the concept of sovereignty is alive and well as the twentieth century draws to a close. (shrink)

"[W]e must focus on what legalism, per se, means, and then ask why is it a good thing to have. Not less importantly, however, we must also realize that legalism can be excessive. Even if the rule of law is a good thing, too much of it may be bad. So the challenge for a theory of the rule of law is to articulate what the rule of law is, why is it good, and to what extent." "[T]he essense of (...) the ideal of the rule of law is that people ought to be governed by law. This general ideal has at least two main components. First, it requires that governments, namely, de facto political authorities, should rule, that is, guide their subjects' conduct, by law. Second, it requires that the law by which governments purport to rule should be such that it can actually guide human conduct." "The idea that governments should rule by law must be premised on the assumption that rule by law, regardless of the laws' specific content, is to be preferred to governance by other means of social control. And this immediately brings us to the second component of the rule of law, namely, that the law must be such that it can actually guide human conduct, and the further assumption that these necessary features of law embody certain virtues. In other words, unless we can first articulate what is unique about legal means of social control, and explain why those features promote certain goods, we cannot ground the idea that governments should rule by law." Discusses ways, following mainly Fuller, one can fail to make law. Notes that these are functional goods for the regulation of human behavior. They may have a connection to other things we value. We should not assume, though, that greater instantiation of these ideals is always better - sometimes ideals conflict such that more of one means less of another and "because such values, on their own grounds, set only a rough standard wherby gross deviations from it would be wrong." "Compliance with the generality-relevance principle is crucially important in safeguarding against such unjustified favoritism since it requires that the norm's subjects be those who qualify as such only on the basis of the reasons for enacting the norm in the first place." Though, we must recognize teh possibility of bad law in the sense of unjust discrimination. "It is part of the concept of law that the law purports to affect human behavior by introducing new norms and changing old ones. The concept of a norm and conduct-guidance by norms is an essential aspect of what the law is. Norms, as such, necessarily purport to provide reasons for action. A norm cannot provide a reason for action, however, unless its subjets are aware of the norm and regard it as a reason for action." Justifies some retroactivity in terms of the need for flexibility in any functioning legal system. "Legal positivism can accept the claim that law is, by its very nature or its essential functions in society, something good that deserves our moral appreciation. Nor is legal positivism forced to deny the plausible claim that wherever law exists, it must have a great many prescriptions which coincide with morality. There is probably a considerable overlap, and perhaps necessarily so, between the actual content of law and morality.". (shrink)

The author's aim is to prove that certain moral principles will always be etched into laws when the interest of society demands it and when morality as a set of norms guiding behavior no longer functions in an expected manner outside the system of law. In this paper, it is argued that morality is constituted within the law in a more profound way as well as in a way which is also much more difficult to identify than, for example, conventional (...) instructions concerning professional ethics may indicate. The main thesis is that de facto there are no particular professional ethics of lawyers beyond or above the ethical principles binding all people. (shrink)

The rule against bias is a central tenet of English law and it also impacts on collegiate courts which typically exercise appellate/review jurisdictions over their professional or student members. This is true of the Bar Standards Board which has established the adjudicatory bodies to enforce its regulatory framework and has vested the procedure of fair trials upon the Council of the Inns of Court which is responsible for appointing the Disciplinary Tribunal panels that conduct hearings for professional misconduct. The COIC (...) has been exposed for ‘irregularities’ in the findings of guilt against barristers who have been adjudged by non-qualified judges. In R v Visitors to the Inns of Court and Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 1630, the Court of Appeal ruled that a disciplinary tribunal or a panel of visitors appointed from barristers or lay representatives outside its pool of enrolled judges would still ensure independence and guarantee freedom from outside pressure. The impugned tribunal members who were not entitled to sit nevertheless had authority to act as de facto judges. This part of the ruling reinforces the regulatory bodies inherent power to appoint its own tribunal to adjudicate and it needs a more rigorous application of natural justice principle on the part of the BSB. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik, Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte by Manfred GawlinaHenry E. AllisonManfred Gawlina. Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik, Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 128. Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996. Pp. ix + 345.This work is the first full scale study of the controversy between Kant and the Wolffian philosopher Johann August Eberhard. The controversy was launched by Eberhard’s publication in 1788 of the first part of the first volume of the Philosophisches (...) Magazin, a journal which he and a handful of associates created specifically as an organ for attacking the Kantian philosophy from the standpoint of Leibniz and Wolff. The central claim was that whatever is true in the Kantian philosophy is already contained in Leibniz, and where Kant differs from Leibniz (such as in the denial of knowledge of things in themselves or “true things”) he goes astray. Kant reacted strongly to this [End Page 632] critique, first in a pair of letters to Reinhold (May 12 and 19, 1789) and then in his own published response, with the sarcastic title: Über eine Entdeckung. nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll1 From Eberhard’s side the controversy continued through three more volumes of the Philosophisches Magazin (1790–92), and two volumes of its successor, Philosophisches Archiv (1792–95). Although Kant himself did not respond directly to these subsequent attacks, he contributed material to Johann Schulz for his review of the second volume of the Philosophisches Magazin.Gawlina analyzes the controversy at both the pragmatic and philosophical levels. The former includes a consideration of the motivations of the protagonists and the various strategies and tactics adopted in an attempt to convince the philosophical public of the correctness of their respective positions. Eberhard, for his part, was particularly concerned with the threat which the Critique, which Kant himself describes as the “Medusa head” (hence the title), posed to the survival of Leibnizian-style metaphysics, while Kant’s primary concern was with the misrepresentation of his own philosophy that he saw in Eberhard’s attack. At the philosophical level, the controversy is presented as a clash between two conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable philosophical paradigms: the first being the ontological orientation of Leibniz (defended by Eberhard) according to which pure (contradiction-free) thought mirrors being (this entails that logic has ontological significance), and the epistemological-transcendental orientation of Kant, according to which the fundamental questions concern the conditions of human knowledge and the justification of its claims. The author is well aware that there are epistemological elements in Leibniz and ontological ones in Kant (most notably the claims about space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic), but he argues persuasively that these are grounded in the philosopher’s respective ontological and epistemological standpoints.This general thesis serves to illuminate virtually all of the main points of the controversy, including the question of why Eberhard refuses to admit either the significance or novelty of the analytic-synthetic distinction, while Kant insists on both. Of particular interest in this regard is the author’s discussion of the distinction between Schranken (limits) and Grenzen (boundaries), which Kant himself draws in the Prolegomena (§58). This distinction becomes relevant to the controversy because of Eberhard’s frequent appeal to the fact that Leibniz recognizes the Schranken of human knowledge as part of his attempt to show that Leibniz anticipated Kant in providing a “critique of pure reason.” As Gawlina notes, however, the limits of knowledge, as understood by Leibniz, are merely de facto constraints on the extent to which finite minds are capable of grasping things from the eternalistic perspective of God, whereas the boundaries insisted on by Kant are principled restrictions, grounded in the positive conditions of the possibility of cognition for finite knowers. [End Page 633]Although Gawlina thus clearly indicates the ways in which Eberhard misunderstood and misrepresented Kant’s position, he refuses to declare Kant the victor in the controversy. This is partly on historical and partly on philosophical grounds. Historically, the reason is that in spite of all of its limitations, Eberhard’s critique of Kant did succeed in raising questions among Kant’s followers regarding the coherence of the... (shrink)

The first half of the paper consists of a philosophical reflection upon a historical exchange. I discuss Buber’s famous letter, and another letter by J. L. Magnes, to Mahatma Gandhi, both challenging the universality of the principle of ahiṃsā. I also touch on Buber’s interest and acquaintance with Indian philosophy, as an instance of dialogue de-facto across cultures. Gandhi never answered these letters, but his grandson and philosopher extraordinaire Ramchandra Gandhi ›answers‹ Buber, not on the letter but about the (...) ideal of dialogue at large, and the interconnection of dialogue and ahiṃsā. The second half of the paper focuses on the work of Daya Krishna, another ›philosopher of dialogue.‹ from within Daya Krishna’s vast philosophical corpus, I underscore one of his last projects, in which he sketches the outlines of what he refers to as »knowledge without certainty,« contrary to common and traditional ways of perceiving the concept of knowledge. I argue that the pramāṇa, means and measure of knowledge, in the intriguing case of »knowledge without certainty,« depicted by Daya Krishna as open-ended, dynamic, constantly evolving, is inevitably dialogue, and I aim to disclose the meaning and salience of dialogue in Daya Krishna’s oeuvre. However, not just the content, but also the form, or the ›how,‹ matters in my paper. I use different materials across genres and disciplines to rethink, in dialogue with Buber and Daya Krishna, the possibilities and impossibilities of dialogue. These ›materials‹ include Milan Kundera and Richard Rorty, Krishna and Arjuna, Vrinda Dalmiya who works with the notion of care as bridging between epistemology and ethics, Wes Anderson on seeing through the eyes of the other, and Ben Okri on hospitality in the realm of ideas. As author of the present paper I am moderating an imagined a multi-vocal dialogue between these ›participants‹ on dialogue as concept, as craft and especially, as a great necessity in the world in which we live. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Background The Philosophy of Right : New Essays, New Insights Note Abbreviations References. -/- Hegel's Philosophy of Right presents a collection of new essays by leading international philosophers and Hegel scholars that analyze and explore Hegel's key contributions in the areas of ethics, politics, and the law. The most comprehensive collection on Hegel's Philosophy of Right available Features new essays by leading international Hegel interpreters divided in sections of ethics, politics, and law Presents significant new (...) research on Hegel's Philosophy of Right that will set a new standard for future work on the topic. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of the relation between Francesco Patrizi and John Amos Comenius, especially in the regard to the metaphysics of light and its concept panaugia. It is without doubt that Comenius adopted the basic principles of his conception of the metaphysics of light from Patrizi. The light is crucial not only for the metaphysics of both authors; it also figures as a central part of their epistemological conceptions, which are de facto identical. Although Patrizi and (...) Comenius deal with the concept panaugia and understand the metaphysics of light in the same sense, they differ in their further handling of it. While Patrizi focuses on the natural-philosophical aspect of panaugia, Comenius further elaborates the epistemological and panorthotical aspect of the metaphysics of light. (shrink)

After his refutation of the doubts concerning Proposition I.7, Ibn al-Haytham mentions three possible ways in which circles may intersect, submitting them to the following “intuitive” argument: one part of one of the two circles is situated inside of the other circle, and its other part is situated outside of it. One is therefore tempted to believe that the commentator accepts the principle of continuity in the case of circles, since his argument has the following meaning: if a circle is (...) divisible into two parts, one of which is situated inside the other circle, and the other outside of it, then the two circles cut one another. The author of this article proposes to establish the limits of this belief, on the basis of the following reflections: 1). It will be noted first of all that what could be called the ‘principle of the intersection of circles’ does not constitute ipso facto a principle in the mind of Ibn al-Haytham: no allusion is made to it in the commentary on Proposition I.1, among others. 2) It will be established later on that if one accepts that a line is the result of the movement of a point, the principle of continuity should be considered by him as something which is obvious by itself, without being stated. This conclusion will be based on an analysis of the notion of continuity in its classical meaning, and on Ibn al-Haytham’s commentary on Proposition X.1. 3) On the other hand, we should note the presence of a ‘sketch’ of topological language, which Ibn al-Haytham develops for the notion of a circle : one could say in this context that his reflection constitutes an important, if not principal, stage in the process which was to lead to the explicit formulation of the principle of continuity. (shrink)

The European Court of Justice’s recent ruling that the new techniques for crop development are to be considered as genetically modified organisms under the European Union’s regulations exacerbates the need for a critical evaluation of those regulations. The paper analyzes the regulation from the perspective of moral and political philosophy. It considers whether influential arguments for restrictions of genetically modified organisms provide cogent justifications for the policies that are in place, in particular a pre-release authorization requirement, mandatory labelling, and de (...) facto bans (in the form of withholding or opting out of authorizations). It is argued that arguments pertaining to risk can justify some form of pre-release authorization scheme, although not necessarily the current one, but that neither de facto bans nor mandatory labelling can be justified by reference to common arguments concerning naturalness, agricultural policy (in particular the promotion of organic farming), socio-economic effects, or consumers’ right to choose. (shrink)

This article challenges the idea that Hobbes presents a negative anthropology and shows, to the contrary, that there is a thick web of social relations in his state of nature and laws of nature. It considers the contradiction between human natural equality claimed by Hobbes, and female subjection that de facto characterizes most of his passages on gender relations. The key to this puzzle is found in comparison of the notions of conquest and consent, and of acquisition and institution, (...) comparisons that establish a similarity between paternal authority and despotic dominion. A step towards the solution is provided by the hypothesis that the divide between “vainglorious” and “moderate” is gendered, with women more disposed to moderation than men. This can be explained by the idea that, “for society’s sake,” women in the state of nature appreciate more the advantages of long-term cooperation, even at the price of some subordination. (shrink)

The concept of clinical equipoise restricts the use of placebo controls in clinical trials when there already exists a proven effective treatment. Several critics of clinical equipoise have put forward alleged counter-examples to this restriction—describing instances of ethical placebo-controlled trials that apparently violate clinical equipoise. In this essay, we respond to these examples and show that clinical equipoise is not as restrictive of placebos as these authors assume. We argue that a subtler appreciation for clinical equipoise—in particular the distinction between (...) de facto and de jure interpretations of the concept—allows the concept to explain when and why a placebo control may be necessary to answer a question of clinical importance. (shrink)

The article is a philosophical response to the oped of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas Krieg und Empörung, published by him in the Süddeutsche Zeitung in April 2022. The oped demonstrates the philosopher’s view on ideological disputes and political debates or “indignation” (Empörung) in public sphere in both Germany and the EU concerning an attempt to develop a unanimous policy to help Ukraine with weapons against Russia’s military aggression. The authors presume that Habermas published the accountable message of a responsible (...) citizen that means it should be also taken as based on his theoretical achievements. The article consists of two parts. The first part sets out the main arguments of the philosopher’s newspaper article, which ends with a recommendation of compromise and partnership negotiations with the aggressor de facto due to the losses of Ukraine. The second part is an attempt by the authors to clarify the main preconditions and premises of Habermas’s communicative philosophy, which demonstrate the fundamental limitation of its explanatory power for this type of radical dissent, which is war. First of all, the authors suggest, it is the idea of pacification in interethnic relations, which forms the intellectual mood after World War II and finds its philosophical expression in the discovery of a priori foundations of understanding (Apel, Habermas) and ideas of developing formal pragmatics of communication. Attention to the latter allows the authors to demonstrate how consistent analysis of a priori (counterfactual) conditions of communication is considered by Habermas primarily in the historical perspective of positive dimensions of social integration - democratic equality, freedom, justice for participants of communicative interaction. The article concludes with a detailed analysis of the significance of the concept “lifeworld” as one of the central concepts within communicative theory and an analogue of “form of life” and “culture”. The authors argue the idea of perspective creating a common lifeworld for all in the processes of communication is fundamental to the works of the philosopher. The article concludes that the regulative idea of the single world as a basic ontological assumption of communicative theory does limit its explanatory capacity in terms of a war situation as a clash of different cultural worlds. (shrink)

The dissertation seeks to characterize the style of government embodied in Adam Smith's vision of civil society. It is composed of two parts. The first, preparatory part develops a framework for offering a historically sensitive interpretation of Smith's works by drawing on and criticizing the treatment of the eighteenth century in the work of several contemporary political theorists and historians of political thought. Part II gives the full-fledged interpretation of Smith's thought, based on both detailed textual interpretation and broad contextual (...) juxtaposition. Smith's highly systematic knowledge of the governance of conduct in civil society forms an innovative response to a political problem first articulated in sixteenth-century raison d'etat, reformulated in seventeenth-century natural jurisprudence, the eighteenth-century discourse of polite sociability and its Mandevillean critique, and posed in acute form by Hume. The problem was how to secure the survival, and enhance the strength, of the political order under conditions both of international military-commercial competition and potentially devastating internal social conflict that could eventuate in the kinds of civil wars that wracked the seventeenth century. ;Accepting Hume's reduction of civil society to an immanent plane devoid of providential guarantee of social harmony, Smith shows, in a first moment, how individuals in civil society are able to govern themselves freely and naturally, and how social order is produced and reproduced naturally. The sympathetic sociability and the natural development of the individual's conscience and sense of duty depicted in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the commercial society depicted in the Wealth of Nations seem to obviate the need for invasive political governance. To this extent, Smith's "system of natural liberty" entails a minimal style of governance, oriented around the negative activity of administering justice, that is, of protecting individuals' rights by preventing and punishing injustice. However, Smith observes that the contemporary form of civil society necessarily produces among those he calls "the labouring poor," who constitute "the great body of the people," the very forces of "faction" and "fanaticism" that threaten to destroy political authority and social tranquillity. In response, Smith theorizes a more minute, controlling style of governance, oriented around the positive activity of forming and reforming the unruly lower ranks through habituation to a condition of orderliness, discipline and moderation. Smith takes up a series of existing practices for moderating conduct and forming character---practices embodied in educational, military, religious, manufactory and even recreational institutions---and projects them into an overall governmental strategy, theoretically unifying them by means of the jurisprudential category of police. Commerce, polite sociability, the self-governing individual, the practice of justice, the stability of government---in short, civil society as such---turn out to be dependent on the effective subjection of the great body of the people to police institutions. In Smith's comprehensive picture of civil society and government, justice and police represent not an ideal for civil society and its unfortunate but merely de facto subversion, respectively, but rather two ideals of civil society which exist in a relationship of uneasy complementarity. (shrink)

Istraživanje demonstriranja »pravde« u Homerovoj Odiseji od strane kraljeva ili sudaca u stvarnim situacijama toga doba, pokazalo je da je riječ o postupcima u partikularnoj formi, a ne o apstraktno pojmljenim principima. Ovi su postupci rješavali uvijek konkretne i specifične ad hoc situacije, a nisu primjenjivali depersonalizirane i općevažeće zakone, te se njihova uloga iscrpljivala u pregovaračkom postupku i nagodbi rivalskih strana. Namjera im je bila da nanovo uspostave destabiliziranu ustaljenost življenja običajnosne zajednice, pa se može reći da je spomenuta (...) procedura de facto predstavljala »pravdu« koja se primjenjivala u danom kontekstu. Zaključak autora jest da ovako shvaćena »pravda« nije bila ništa drugo do odgovarajuća metodologija, tj. pravilo konzerviranja postojećih običaja, ili naprosto korekcija narušenog modusa egzistiranja u nekom polisu.Research of demonstration of “justice” in Homer’s Odyssey by kings or magistrates in actu­al situations of the time, showed that these were particular procedures rather than abstractconcepts, always applied to resolve concrete and specific ad hoc situations and never to thedepersonalized and general laws, so their role was being exhausted in the course of negotiati­ons and settlement of rival parties. Their intention was to reestablish destabilized continuity ofmorality-based community, therefore it can be said that the mentioned procedure de facto repre­sented “justice” applied to a given context. The author concludes that the concept of “justice”in this sense was merely a suitable methodology, i.e. the rule of conservation of existing mores,or simply a correction of a violated mode of existence in a certain polis. (shrink)

Istraživanje demonstriranja »pravde« u Homerovoj Odiseji od strane kraljeva ili sudaca u stvarnim situacijama toga doba, pokazalo je da je riječ o postupcima u partikularnoj formi, a ne o apstraktno pojmljenim principima. Ovi su postupci rješavali uvijek konkretne i specifične ad hoc situacije, a nisu primjenjivali depersonalizirane i općevažeće zakone, te se njihova uloga iscrpljivala u pregovaračkom postupku i nagodbi rivalskih strana. Namjera im je bila da nanovo uspostave destabiliziranu ustaljenost življenja običajnosne zajednice, pa se može reći da je spomenuta (...) procedura de facto predstavljala »pravdu« koja se primjenjivala u danom kontekstu. Zaključak autora jest da ovako shvaćena »pravda« nije bila ništa drugo do odgovarajuća metodologija, tj. pravilo konzerviranja postojećih običaja, ili naprosto korekcija narušenog modusa egzistiranja u nekom polisu.Research of demonstration of “justice” in Homer’s Odyssey by kings or magistrates in actu­al situations of the time, showed that these were particular procedures rather than abstractconcepts, always applied to resolve concrete and specific ad hoc situations and never to thedepersonalized and general laws, so their role was being exhausted in the course of negotiati­ons and settlement of rival parties. Their intention was to reestablish destabilized continuity ofmorality-based community, therefore it can be said that the mentioned procedure de facto repre­sented “justice” applied to a given context. The author concludes that the concept of “justice”in this sense was merely a suitable methodology, i.e. the rule of conservation of existing mores,or simply a correction of a violated mode of existence in a certain polis. (shrink)

For many, Thomas Beauchamp and James Childress have elaborated moral reasoning by using the four principles whereby all substantive problems of medical ethics (and of ethics more generally) can be properly analysed and cogent philosophical solutions for the problems can be found. It seems that their ‘principlism’ gets updated, with better features being added during the course of the six editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Nonetheless, Beauchamp and Childress seem to have been losing their way when it comes to (...) the common-morality justification, which is the epistemological (and perhaps metaphysical) backbone of their method, and this is shown more vividly in their most recent (2009) edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics. The author points out what he calls the problem of ‘thick in status, thin in content’ in principlism. The problem exists because principlism cannot adequately explain how the prescriptive sense of common morality it supports is consistent with the existence of what Beauchamp and Childress call the ‘legitimate moral diversity in the world’. Because of this problem, first, the practical end that principlism allegedly accomplishes (ie, providing practical moral guidelines in a relatively ‘thick’ content, based on common morality) is frustrated, and, second, principlism makes itself the method of common morality de jure and of moral pluralism de facto. (shrink)

Objectivo do presente artigo é mostrar de que modo John Locke, sobretudo nas obras An Essay concerning Human Understanding e Two Treatises of Government, se revela um dos principais pensadores do liberalismo, especialmente no que se refere às raízes antropológicas do mesmo. Com efeito, partindo do nominalismo, o qual Ihe permite fazer a distinção entre essências reais e essências nominais, Locke faz do seu Ensaio urna grandiosa tentativa de descrever a natureza humana, processo esse em que sobressai não só o (...) significado de urna existência persistentemente mantida nos mais distintos tempos e lugares, mas também, ou sobretudo, a ideia de que o elemento mais profundo da identidade humana se encontra precisamente na liberdade. Além disso, o artigo mostra também de que modo Locke reconhece na razão a faculdade que permite ao ser humano aceder ao conjunto das leis naturais, bem assim aos correspondentes direitos, entre os quais se destaca o direito à propriedade privada, direitos e deveres esses que compete, antes de mais, à sociedade civil, ou seja, à política, servir e preservar. Nesse sentido, o artigo evidencia também de que modo, sobretudo de acordo com os Treatises, e dado que os seres humanos, por si sós, se revelam incapazes de garantir a vigência das leis da natureza que à sua convivência se aplicam, e para melhor as poder salvaguardar, os indivíduos, de forma voluntária, se constituem em Estado. Mostra-se ainda de que modo, para Locke, a sociedade deve ser governada de acordo com a lei da maioria, e o que por esta se entende. Finalmente, o artigo chama ainda a nossa atenção para o facto de, segundo John Locke, a expressão máxima da vontade da sociedade política se encontrar no poder legislativo, poder esse que, dotado como está da missão de salvaguardar a propriedade privada, tem sobretudo a responsabilidade de eleger o poder executivo, nele delegando a tarefa executar, ou fazer cumprir, as leis que dele próprio possam emanar. The aim of this article is to demonstrate how John Locke, chiefly in his works An Essay concerning Human Understanding and Two Treatises of Government, reveals himself one of the major thinkers of liberalism, especially concerning its anthropological roots. In fact, starting from nominalism, which allows himself to distinguish between real essences and nominal essences, Locke makes in his Essay a grand attempt at descnbing human nature, a process in which stands out not only the meaning of an existence persistently maintained in the most distinguished times and places, but also, and chiefly, the idea that the most profound element of human identity resides in its freedom. The article also demonstrates how Locke recognizes reason as the capacity which permits human being to accede to the set of natural laws, and to the corresponding rights, among which the right to private property stands out; and it belongs, before anything else, to the civil society, that is, to politics, to serve and preserve those rights and duties. In this way, and considering that human beings, by themselves, are incapable of guaranteeing the validity of natural laws which are applied to living in society, the article, mainly following the Two Treatises, also makes evident how individuals voluntaríly constitute the State, precisely in order to safeguard those laws. Moreover, the author also demonstrates how, according to Locke, society should be governed by the law of majority and how this law is properly understood. Finally, the article also calls our attention to the fact that, according to Locke, the utmost expression of the will of political society is to be found in the legislative power, the one that, endowed as it is with the mission of protecting prívate property, has the major responsibility of electing the executive power and delegating in it the task of executing the laws eventually issued by itself. (shrink)

In various contexts, it is thought to be important that we reason together. For instance, an attractive conception of democracy requires that citizens reach lawmaking decisions by reasoning with one another. Reasoning requires that reasoners survey the considerations that they take to be reasons, proceed by a coherent train of thought, and reach conclusions freely. De facto reliance on experts threatens the possibility of collective reasoning by making some reasons collectively unsurveyable, raising questions about the coherence of the resulting (...) train of thought. De jure reliance on experts threatens the possibility of collective reasoning by seeming to make some conclusions irreversible. The paper argues that collective reasoning that relies on experts would nonetheless be possible if the unsurveyable reasons "mesh," if the expert considerations are at least in principle publicly recoverable, and if de jure authority of expert decision is always subject to appeal. (shrink)