With reference to Polish logico-philosophical tradition two formal theories of language syntax have been sketched and then compared with each other. The first theory is based on the assumption that the basic linguistic stratum is constituted by object-tokens (concrete objects perceived through the senses) and that the types of such objects (ideal objects) are derivative constructs. The other is founded on an opposite philosophical orientation. The two theories are equivalent. The main conclusion is that in syntactic researches it is (...) redundant to postulate the existence of abstract linguistic entities. Earlier, in a slightly different form, the idea was presented in [27] and signalled in [26] and [25]. (shrink)

An entity x is said to be generically dependent on a type F if x cannot exist without at least one entity of type F existing. In this paper several varieties of generic dependence are distinguished, differing in the nature of the relationship between an entity and the instances of a type on which it generically depends, and in the light of this, criteria of identity for generically dependent entities are investigated. These considerations are then illustrated in detail in (...) a series of three case studies, covering shapes, linguistic entities such as letters, words and sentences, and collectives. Each case study examines how far the entities involved have robust identity criteria, and to the extent that they do not it is questioned whether they can be regarded as bona fide examples of generic dependent entities. Finally, in the light of this, a number of possible accounts that may be given of the ontological status of such entities are considered. (shrink)

In this entry I present one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary analytic philosophy regarding the nature of fictional entities and the motivations that might be adduced for and against positing them into our ontology. The entry is divided in two parts. In the first part I offer an overview of the main accounts of the metaphysics of fictional entities according to three standard realist views, fictional Meinongianism, fictional possibilism and fictional creationism. In the second part (...) I describe two main kinds of arguments for or against positing fictional entities into our ontology. The first kind is traditionally inspired by the linguistic data coming from our talk about fictional characters. The second kind is more recent and it builds on genuine ontological considerations. (shrink)

Many linguists and philosophers of language explain linguistic meaning in terms of truth conditions. This book focuses on the meanings of expressions that escape such truth-conditional treatment, in particular the concessives: but , even if , and although . Corinne Iten proposes semantic analyses of these expressions based on the cognitive framework of relevance theory. A thoroughly cognitive approach to linguistic meaning is presented in which linguistic forms are seen as mapping onto mental entities, rather than (...) individuals and properties in the real world. Researchers and advanced students in pragmatics will find this account lucid, clear and accessible. (shrink)

Linguistic representations are taken by some to be representations of something, specifically of Standard Linguistic Entities, such as phonemes, clauses, noun phrases etc. This perspective takes them to be intentional. Rey (2021) further argues that the SLEs themselves are inexistent. Here I argue that linguistic representations are simply structures, abstractions of brain states, and hence not intentional, and show how they nevertheless connect to the systems that use them.

Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual (...) state we regularly enter as a result of being stimulated by the wave forms we regularly produce when we execute our intentions to utter such tokens (a view I call “Folieism”). In his Ignorance of Language, Michael Devitt objects to this view, arguing that, “On Rey’s view, communication seems to rest on miraculous guesses.” I argue here that my view is not prey to his objections, and actually affords a scientifically more plausible view than his “empiricist” alternative. Specifically, I reply to his objections that my view couldn’t explain the conventionality of language and success of communication (§2.1), that I am faced with intractable difficulties surrounding the identity of intentional inexistents (§2.2), and that, contrary to my view, SLEs can be relationally defined (§2.3). Not only can Folieism survive Devitt’s objections, but (§3) it also provides a more satisfactory account of the role of linguistic intuitions than the “empirical” account on which he insists. (shrink)

The first question to be addressed about fictional entities is: are there any? The usual grounds given for accepting or rejecting the view that there are fictional entities come from linguistic considerations. We make many different sorts of claims about fictional characters in our literary discussions. How can we account for their apparent truth? Does doing so require that we allow that there are fictional characters we can refer to, or can we offer equally good analyses while (...) denying that there are any fictional entities? (shrink)

Meta-ontology (in van Inwagen's sense) concerns the methodology of ontology, and a controversial meta-ontological issue is to what extent ontology can rely on linguistic analysis while establishing the furniture of the world. This paper discusses an argument advanced by some ontologists (I call them unifiers) against supporters of or coincident entities (I call them multipliers) and its meta-ontological import. Multipliers resort to Leibniz's Law to establish that spatiotemporally coincident entities a and b are distinct, by pointing at (...) a predicate F () made true by a and false by b . Unifiers try to put multipliers in front of a dilemma: in attempting to introduce metaphysical differences on the basis of semantic distinctions, multipliers either (a) rest on a fallacy of verbalism, entailed by a trade-off between a de dicto and a de re reading of modal claims, or (b) beg the question against unifiers by having to assume the distinction between a and b beforehand. I shall rise a tu quoque, showing that unifiers couldn't even distinguish material objects (or events) from the spatiotemporal regions they occupy unless they also resorted to linguistic distinctions. Their methodological aim to emancipate themselves from linguistic analysis in ontological businesses is therefore problematic. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to discuss a metaphysical framework within which to understand “standard linguistic entities” (SLEs), such as words, sentences, phonemes, and other entities routinely employed in linguistic theory. In doing so, I aim to defuse certain kinds of skepticism, challenge convention-based accounts of SLEs, and present a series of distinctions for better understanding what the various accounts of SLEs do and do not accomplish.

P.F. Strawson has been a major and influential spokesman for ordinary language philosophy throughout the late twentieth century, studying the relationship between common language and the language of formal logic. This reissue of his collection of early essays, Logico-Linguistic Papers, is published with a brand new introduction by Professor Strawson but, apart from minor corrections to the text, these classic essays remain original and intact. Logico-Linguistic Papers contains Strawson's major essay, 'On Referring', in which he disputed Bertrand Russell's (...) theory of definite descriptions, distinguishing between referring to an entity and asserting its existence. The book contains twelve essays in all, grouped by subject matter. The first five are concerned with the topic of singular reference and predication and the last three are all responses to J.L. Austin's treatment of the topic of truth. Strawson disputes the correspondence theory of truth, maintaining that facts are what statements state. The remaining papers deal with meaning, speech acts, logical truth and Chomsky's views on syntax. (shrink)

The paper deals with the concept of the model of the word. It concerns a pre-linguistic stage of language acquisition, descriptive content of proper names and interpretation by means of a conceptual system. The model of the world comprises all aspects of being conscious. It is a system, a unity, a background of our conscious life; perception, language, notions, concepts, are its aspects. The more we know about cognitive processes, functions and structure of the mind, the be$er we understand (...) the nature of language; the more we know about language, the better we understand the nature of the mind. Linguistic meaning as it was shown by the studies of language and categories acquisition, has its origin in the aforementioned model. That is why linguistic meanings are not ready-made contents, ideas, semantic entities, etc. but rather systems of procedures that constitute sense of speech acts. The approach to linguistic meaning as a part of an individual conceptual system, a system of information that mirrors cognitive, linguistic and non-verbal experience of an individual, is much of help in understanding efficacy of language, forming of beliefs, convictions, and also introducing new meanings. (shrink)

How is linguistic communication possible? How do we come to share the same meanings of words and utterances? One classical position holds that human beings share a transcendental “platonic” ideality independent of individual cognition and language use (Frege 1948). Another stresses immanent linguistic relations (Saussure 1959), and yet another basic embodied structures as the ground for invariant aspects of meaning (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Here we propose an alternative account in which the possibility for sharing meaning is motivated (...) by four sources of structural stability: 1) the physical constraints and affordances of our surrounding material environment, 2) biological constraints of our human bodies, 3) social normative constraints of culture and society, and 4) the local history of social interactions. These structures and constraints interact in dynamical ways in actual language usage situations: local dialogical and social dynamics motivate and stabilize the profiling of a conceptual space already highly structured by our shared biology, culture, and environment. We will substantiate this perspective with reference to recent studies in experimental pragmatics and semiotics in which participants interact linguistically to solve cooperative tasks. Three main cases will be considered: The dynamic grounding of linguistic categories, the construction of conceptual models to relate entities in a scene, and the construction of shared conceptual scales for assessing and appraising subjective experiences. (shrink)

This volume is a comprehensive, up-to-date, and readable introduction to linguistic meaning. While partial to conceptual and typological approaches, the book also presents results from formal approaches. Throughout, the focus is on grammatical meaning -- the way languages delineate universal semantic space and encode it in grammatical form. Subjects covered by the author include: the domain of linguistic semantics and the basic tools, assumptions, and issues of semantic analysis; semantic properties of entities, events, and thematic roles; language (...) and space; tense, aspect, and the internal structure and temporal ordering of events; modality, negation, and the epistemology of the speaker; and modification and attribution. In contrast to most current treatments of semantics, this book is accessible to the beginning student of semantics and linguistics and also useful to the advanced practitioner. A textbook and reference work in a single volume, it can be used in a number of disciplines: psychology, computer science, and anthropology as well as linguistics. (shrink)

Chomsky and others have denied the relevance of external linguistic entities, such as E-languages, to linguistic explanation, and have questioned their coherence altogether. I discuss a new approach to understanding the nature of linguistic entities, focusing in particular on making sense of the varieties of kinds of “words” that are employed in linguistic theorizing. This treatment of linguistic entities in general is applied to constructing an understanding of external linguistic entities.

Now the thesis that the universal redness is the linguistic type ⋅red⋅ has the ring of absurdity. There are several ways in which this discomfort can be expressed I shall open my argument by formulating an objection which, by cutting deeper than most, leads to a firm foundation for a restatement and defense of the thesis.

The study investigates the manifestation of the “IDEA-IS-AN-ENTITY” metaphor across the linguistic and manual modalities by the use of the object gesture in daily conversation, to understand the relationship between metaphorical conceptualization and the context of use. Two types of the entity metaphor were distinguished: “cross-modal entity metaphor” and “gesture-only entity metaphor.” For the former, the metaphor was expressed by metaphorical speech and the object gesture simultaneously. Among all of the 67 cross-modal instances, a wide variety of idea was (...) represented as referring, characterizing, and quantifying referents in speech. Manually, the object gesture was configured in numerous ways. The way the object gesture was configured reveals the facet of the metaphorical conceptualization the speaker focuses on during speaking, and the details about the real-time thinking of a metaphorical object in discourse. For the gesture-only entity metaphor, it was manifested in the single modality of gesture. Among all of the 73 gesture-only instances, the object gesture depicted a stretch of talk as discrete object mainly by configuring a spatial boundary with curled fingers. Metaphor of this type attests that the thinking of phrasal-clausal ideas as entities is as common as that of lexical ideas as entities in conversation. Importantly, the object gesture bears out the emergence of a phrasal or clausal idea being conceptualized as object in natural discourse. Together, the findings demonstrate the inseparability of metaphorical conceptualization from cognition and the context of use. (shrink)

Various arguments have recently been put forward to support the existence of vague or fuzzy objects. Nevertheless, the only possibly compelling argument would support, not the existence of vague objects, but indeterminately existing objects. I argue for the non‐existence of any vague entities—either particulars or properties ‐ in the mind‐independent world. Even so, many philosophers have claimed that to reduce vagueness to semantics is of no avail, since linguistic vagueness betrays semantic incoherence and this is no less a (...) problem than is ontological incoherence. After spelling out why there are fewer essentially vague concepts than usually thought. I claim that only the linguistic competence of the whole speaking community for each word can draw the sharp boundaries for its concept, even if these are unknowable in practice and still leave a precise range of indetermination. This could explain both the existence of boundaries and our non‐removable ignorance of them, fulfilling the intuitions of the epistemic theory of vagueness with the supervaluationist's indeterminacy. (shrink)

Various arguments have recently been put forward to support the existence of vague or fuzzy objects. Nevertheless, the only possibly compelling argument would support, not the existence of vague objects, but indeterminately existing objects. I argue for the non‐existence of any vague entities—either particulars or properties ‐ in the mind‐independent world. Even so, many philosophers have claimed that to reduce vagueness to semantics is of no avail, since linguistic vagueness betrays semantic incoherence and this is no less a (...) problem than is ontological incoherence. After spelling out why there are fewer essentially vague concepts than usually thought. I claim that only the linguistic competence of the whole speaking community for each word can draw the sharp boundaries for its concept, even if these are unknowable in practice and still leave a precise range of indetermination. This could explain both the existence of boundaries and our non‐removable ignorance of them, fulfilling the intuitions of the epistemic theory of vagueness with the supervaluationist's indeterminacy. (shrink)

While we typically think of culture as defined by geography or ethnicity (e.g., American culture, Mayan culture), the term also applies to the practices and expectations of smaller groups of people. Though embedded in the larger culture surrounding them, such subcultures have their own sets of rules like those that scientists do. Philosophy of science has as its main object of studio the scientific activity. A way in which we have tried to explain these scientific practices is from the actual (...) ontological commitments that scientists do through their scientific theories. Certainly, we know scientific theories through some specific scientific language, which is, in its turn, a subset of the natural language developed by a particular culture. This study is conducted to explore and evaluate some of the most important epistemological consequences of these ontological commitments, specially the so-called ‘truth-commitment’ and its relation with a linguistic-cultural framework. There is an interesting debate between advocates and opponents of scientific realistic view of the natural world. Some lines of scientific realism argumentation assure that: (i) Mature scientific theories are approximately true. (ii) There are entities and organisms in the world that correspond with the ontology presupposed by the best scientific theories within a specific domain of scientific research and (iii) The new acceptable scientific theories should explain why past theories were successful predecessors (Colyvan 2008, Cocchiarella 2007 & Laudan 1981). Contrary, anti- realist positions ensure against the realist’s true - claim that is a semantic commitment - that the purpose of scientific theories to found the truth it is simple an unattainable goal, especially if the kind of truth they are looking for is a corresponding relation between scientific theories and the ontology of the world. Anti-realist positions held that this relation could be circular and unknowable. I do believe that there is a deep confusion between the way in which we accede to the knowledge of the constitutive structures, entities and organisms of the world (which is an epistemological matter) and the way these structures, entities and organisms are (which is an ontological matter). It seems that there is a bridge between the epistemological and ontological aspect in need for conceptual clarification. I do propose that the type of link between the two extremes have to be linguistic in nature. (shrink)

Michael Dummett famously holds that the “philosophy of thought” must proceed via the philosophy of language, since that is the only way to preserve the objectivity of thoughts while avoiding commitments to “mythological,” Platonic entities. Central to Dummett’s case is his thesis that all thought contents are linguistically expressible. In this paper, I will (a) argue that making the linguistic turn is neither necessary nor sufficient to avoid the problems of psychologism, (b) discuss Wayne Martin’s argument that not (...) all thought-contents are linguistically communicable, and (c) present another, stronger argument, derived from Husserl’s early account of fulfillment, that establishes the same conclusion. (shrink)

Humans are complex systems, ‘macro-entities’, whose existence, behaviour and consciousness stem out of the configurations of physical entities on the micro-level of the physical world. But an explanation of what humans do and think cannot be found through ‘tracking us back’, so to speak, to micro-particles. So, in explaining human behaviour, including linguistic behaviour on which this paper focuses, emergentism opens up a powerful opportunity to explain what it is exactly that emerged on that level, bearing in (...) mind the end product in the form of the intra- and inter-cultural diversity. Currently there is a gap in emergentism research. On one hand, there are discussions in philosophy of the emergent human reality; on the other, there are discussions of social, cultural, or individual variation of these emergent aspects of humanity in the fields of anthropology, sociology, linguistics or psychology. What I do in this paper is look for a way to ‘trace’ some such diversified emergents from what is universal about their ‘coming to being’, all the way through to their diversification. My chosen emergent is human time, my domain of inquiry is natural-language discourse, and the drive behind this project is to understand the link between ‘real’ time of spacetime on the micro-level from which we emerged and the human time devised by us, paying close attention to the overwhelming diversity in which temporal reference is expressed in human languages. The main question is, where does this diversity fit in? Does understanding of this diversity, as well as of what lurks under the surface of this diversity, aid the emergentism story? My contribution to this volume on ‘the nature of structure and the structure of nature’ thus takes the following take on the title. The structure of human communication is at the same time uniform, universal, and relative to culture, in that it is emergent as a human characteristic, and as such compatible with the micro-level correlates in some essential ways, but also free to fly in different directions that are specific to societies and cultures. I explore here the grey area between the micro-level and the linguistic reflections of time—the middle ground that is emergent itself but that tends to be by-passed by those who approach the question of human flowing time from either end: metaphysics and the philosophy of time on the one hand, and contrastive linguistics, anthropological linguistics and language documentation on the other. I illustrate the debate with examples from tensed and tenseless languages from different language families, entertaining the possibility of a conceptual universal pertaining to time as degrees of epistemic modality. Needless to say, putting the question in this way also sets out my (not unassailable) methodology. (shrink)

Some entities, such as fictional characters, propositions, properties, events and numbers are prima facie promising candidates for owing their existence to our linguistic and conceptual practices. However, it is notoriously hard to pin down just what sets such allegedly “language-created” entities apart from ordinary entities. The present paper considers some of the features that are supposed to distinguish between entities of the two kinds and argues that, on an independently plausible account of what it takes (...) to individuate objects, the criteria let in more than friends of the strategy might be happy with. (shrink)

Like Aristotle, Wittgenstein’s leitmotif was action. Wittgenstein saw action (or behaviour) as the root, manifestation and transmitter of meaning. He repeatedly demonstrated the regress manifest in seeing the proposition, or any kind of representation, as a necessary precursor to thought and action, or at least he pointed out the superfluity of such shadowy inner precursors when instinct and practices can easily be seen to be at the base of all our thought: ‘In philosophy one is in constant danger of producing (...) a myth of symbolism, or a myth of mental processes. Instead of simply saying what anyone knows and must admit’ (Z, §211). Where Aristotle warns us that Plato had been misled by the uniform appearance of a word in different contexts into believing that it had a uniform meaning across uses, Wittgenstein urges us to see the differences in meaning that are often hidden by the uniform appearance of language, insisting that meaning is dependent on use or context. Just as Aristotle in the Categories gave Plato’s forms a linguistic status, so, Wittgenstein took a linguistic turn from his predecessors, giving metaphysics a grammatical reading: both showed that concepts are not entities existing in isolated splendour in some metaphysical realm but simply abstractions from sentences in use. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to address a longstanding concern about the linguistic ‘relativ- ity’ of ontological categories, and resulting limitations in the scope of ontological theo- ries. Given recent evidence on the influence of language on cognitive dispositions, do we have empirical reasons to doubt that there are ontological categories that have uni- versal scope across languages? I argue that this is the case, at least if we retain the stan- dard ‘inferential’ approach within analytical ontology, i.e., (...) if we evaluate ontological interpretations of L-sentences relative to certain material inferences in L. Research in linguistic typology suggests that types of entities postulated for the domain of Indo- European languages cannot capture the ontological commitments of the (much larger group of) non-Indo-European languages. Ontological category theory thus seems to have three options. The first option is to abandon the standard ‘inferential’ approach to ontological category theory. Alternatively, if we stay with the inferential approach, we face the following choice. Either ontology must let go of its ambitions to provide general domain descriptions for any language and settle for the more modest project of reconstructing the ontological commitments of a group of natural languages. Or else analytical ontologists should turn to linguistic typology in order to accommodate the diversity of inferential structures embedded in natural languages. I recommend and ex- plore this third option, illustrating a strategy for how to construct a domain theory that can be used across languages. In a first step I show how linguistic research on the se- mantics of verbs and nouns (studies on so-called “Aktionsarten” and “Seinsarten”) can be used to identify the inferential patterns of ten basic concepts of modes of existence in time and space. In a second step I show how these inferential data can be inter- preted ontologically within General Process Theory, an ontological framework based on nonparticular individuals (“dynamics”). -/- . (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

At Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) 2.227–8, Sextus Empiricus argues that certain entities which his adversaries hold to be one and the same for different individuals are in fact not. This he does by, among other things, considering the truth-value of sentences of which the subject is a common noun, thereby drawing an interesting connection between metaphysics and semantics. In this article, I provide a careful analysis of Sextus’ arguments at PH 2.227–8 and explore the origins and limits of such (...) a connection. In particular, I argue that Sextus’ argument at PH 2.227 probably reflects a Stoic argument against Aristotelian essences, thereby relying on specifically Stoic doctrines about universals and common nouns, whereas his next argument at PH 2.228 targets accidents. If this is true, it follows that the overall structure of PH 2.227–8 fits well with the typically Aristotelian distinction between essence and accident. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show that human persons belong, ontologically, in social ontology. After setting out my views on ontology, I turn to persons and argue that they have first-person perspectives in two stages (rudimentary and robust) essentially. Then I argue that the robust stage of the first-person persective is social, in that it requires a language, and languages require linguistic communities. Then I extend the argument to cover the rudimentary stage of the first-person perspective as (...) well. I conclude by enumerating ways in which human persons differ from nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars wrote: all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness of abstract entities -- indeed, all awareness even of particulars ~ is a linguistic affair. 1 This passage from Sellars' famous essay, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" has caused, I suspect, some philosophers to view Sellars as committed to linguistic idealism -the view that all awareness is linguistically mediated.

Objects and substances bear fundamentally different ontologies. In this article, we examine the relations between language, the ontological distinction with respect to individuation, and the world. Specifically, in cross‐linguistic developmental studies that follow Imai and Gentner (1997), we examine the question of whether language influences our thought in different forms, like (1) whether the language‐specific construal of entities found in a word extension context (Imai & Gentner, 1997) is also found in a nonlinguistic classification context; (2) whether the (...) presence of labels per se, independent of the count‐mass syntax, fosters ontology‐based classification; (3) in what way, if at all, the count‐mass syntax that accompanies a label changes English speakers' default construal of a given entity?On the basis of the results, we argue that the ontological distinction concerning individuation is universally shared and functions as a constraint on early learning of words. At the same time, language influences one's construal of entities cross‐lingistically and developmentally, and causes a temporary change of construal within a single language. We provide a detailed discussion of how each of these three ways language may affect the construal of entities, and discuss how our universally possessed knowledge interacts with language both within a single language and in cross‐linguistic context. (shrink)

Objects and substances bear fundamentally different ontologies. In this article, we examine the relations between language, the ontological distinction with respect to individuation, and the world. Specifically, in cross‐linguistic developmental studies that followImai and Gentner (1997), we examine the question of whether language influences our thought in different forms, like (1) whether the language‐specific construal of entities found in a word extension context (Imai & Gentner, 1997) is also found in a nonlinguistic classification context; (2) whether the presence (...) of labelsper se, independent of the count‐mass syntax, fosters ontology‐based classification; (3) in what way, if at all, the count‐mass syntax that accompanies a label changes English speakers' default construal of a given entity?On the basis of the results, we argue that the ontological distinction concerning individuation is universally shared and functions as a constraint on early learning of words. At the same time, language influences one's construal of entities cross‐lingistically and developmentally, and causes a temporary change of construal within a single language. We provide a detailed discussion of how each of these three ways language may affect the construal of entities, and discuss how our universally possessed knowledge interacts with language both within a single language and in cross‐linguistic context. (shrink)

This article undertakes a comparison between Wittgenstein's philosophy of the early and late periods with the musical theories of Wittgenstein's contemporary, Heinrich Schenker, an influential Viennese theorist of tonality, as well as those of their contemporary Arnold Schoenberg. Schenker's reductive analytical procedure was designed to unveil fundamental and uniform ways in which all works of music function, unfolding a deep structure constituting their essence. Schoenberg deplored this line of thought, and for reasons strikingly parallel to those that led Wittgenstein back (...) to what he called the ‘rough ground’ in his Philosophical Investigations. Ultimately, for Wittgenstein, the abstracted picture of the musical work as a platonic entity is nourished by grammatical conflations as well as by the Platonic and Cartesian legacies. (shrink)

Few would disagree that P. F. Strawson and W. V. O. Quine have been the leading figures in Anglo-American philosophy during the second half of the twentieth century. This book brings together a number of Strawson’s widely-scattered previously-published essays from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The unity of the collection is partly provided by the internal connectedness of the essays to Strawson’s most important books Individuals, The Bounds of Sense, Logico-Linguistic Papers, and Subject and Predicate in Grammar and Logic. (...) But its unity principally lies in Strawson’s consistent and vigorous opposition to Quine’s extreme extensionalism. The extensionalist says that the meanings of terms and sentences in natural languages or logical systems are strictly determined by the objects they refer to; and the Quinean extensionalist also says that those objects are ultimately whatever the natural sciences tell us they are. The intensionalist, by contrast, says that meanings in natural language and logic are underdetermined by the functions of reference and have irreducible, autonomous structures that include primitive features of generality and modality; and the Strawsonian intensionalist says that those irreducible, autonomous structures are grounded in the person-oriented world of ordinary speech-transactions and everyday common sense. In the Introduction, Strawson helpfully divides the essays into seven groups or clusters: two on identity and universals; two on quantification and properties; three on singular reference and beliefreports; two on logical form; one on epistemic modality; two on pragmatics; and four on Kant. The essays on Kant are primarily exegeticalcritical, but also have a deeper import. For Strawson’s metaphysical commonsensism and personalism can be fairly neatly derived from Kantian metaphysics by logically detaching Kant’s plausible conception of “empirical realism” from his questionable doctrine of “transcendental idealism”, and by similarly detaching Kant’s plausible conception of a self-conscious embodied empirical subject and her a priori cognitive and practical capacities from his questionable conception of a noumenal self. It is of course impossible in a very short review even to summarize all sixteen essays, far less to explicate or criticize them. So to maximize available resources I will concentrate the rest of my remarks on what seems to me to be the most important paper. In “Logical Form and Logical Constants”, Strawson addresses a fundamental and lingering problem in the philosophy of logic: How precisely to define the logical constants and to justify their introduction into a logical theory? All logicians agree that logical constants are just those terms in a formal or natural language which hold their meanings fixed under the variable interpretations of all other terms, which enter essentially into logical truths and deductions, and which are “topic-neutral”—indifferent to all special subject-matters. But these notions do not get us very far, since the meaning of any term can be held rigidly and topic-neutrally fixed over a language and also held to enter essentially into logical truths and deductions, by sheer stipulation. Strawson’s approach to solving the problem has two basic steps. First, he joins a line of thought shared by Kant, Boole, and early Wittgenstein: “[l]ogic reveals the general essence of all thought and all language”. Secondly, he borrows and exploits Wittgenstein’s idea that all the logical constants are packed into the general form of a proposition, which is simply “this is how things are.” This leads to the proposal that we can “think of standard logic as something in principle excogitatable... by pure reflection on the general nature of statement, on what is the least that is necessarily involved in the making of empirical informative statements”. Such a line of reasoning— rather like Kant’s discovery of his “table of judgments” in the first Critique —runs backward from the notion of an empirical statement to the root logical notions of general term and singular term, of compatibility and incompatibility, and of “identifiable linguistic forms or devices with conventional forces or meaning” ; and from there by gradual steps to the notions of contradiction and entailment, the truth-functions, logical truth, first-order quantification, and so forth. I have a worry about this way of excogitating logic, however. While it neatly accounts for standard logic, I cannot see how it will be able to account for nonstandard logic—whether in the form of conservative extensions of standard logic or in the form of deviant logics. In other words, the starting point for logical reflection must be something more comprehensive than the empirical statement. Now the notion of an analytic a priori statement seems like the obvious candidate: no system, standard or nonstandard, will wholly lack logical laws or logical truths. If so, then Strawson’s disinclination to deploy the notion of analyticity directly may be a concession to Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. On this pivotal issue, in fact, Strawson’s intensionalism has lost out to Quine’s extensionalism—the Grice-Strawson reply to “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” from ordinary-language considerations has not generally prevailed. But we are very fortunate that Strawson has been both willing and so brilliantly able to resist the Quinean juggernaut for five decades.—Robert Hanna, University of Colorado at Boulder. (shrink)

I-Language introduces the uninitiated to linguistics as cognitive science. In an engaging, down-to-earth style Daniela Isac and Charles Reiss give a crystal-clear demonstration of the application of the scientific method in linguistic theory. Their presentation of the research programme inspired and led by Noam Chomsky shows how the focus of theory and research in linguistics shifted from treating language as a disembodied, human-external entity to cognitive biolinguistics - the study of language as a human cognitive system embedded within the (...) mind/brain of each individual. The recurring theme of equivalence classes in linguistic computation ties together the presentation of material from phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics. The same theme is used to help students understand the place of linguistics in the broader context of the cognitive sciences, by drawing on examples from vision, audition, and even animal cognition.This textbook is unique in its integration of empirical issues of linguistic analysis, engagement with philosophical questions that arise in the study of language, and treatment of the history of the field. Topics ranging from allophony to reduplication, ergativity, and negative polarity are invoked to show the implications of findings in cognitive biolinguistics for philosophical issues like reference, the mind-body problem, and nature-nurture debates.This textbook contains numerous exercises and guides for further reading as well as ideas for student projects. A companion website with guidance for instructors and answers to the exercises features a series of pdf slide presentations to accompany the teaching of each topic. (shrink)

Neurosemantics is not yet a common term and in current neuroscience and philosophy it is used with two different sorts of objectives. One deals with the meaning of the electrical and the chemical activities going on in neural circuits. This way of using the term regards the project of explaining linguistic meaning in terms of the computations done by the brain. This book explores this second sense of neurosemantics, but in doing so, it will address much of the first (...) as well, for we believe that the capacity of neural circuits to support linguistic meaning, hinges on their peculiar role in coding entities and facts of the world. It is an enterprise at the edge of the available state-of-the-art knowledge in neuroscience and specifically, in the growing understanding of brain computational mechanisms. We conceive neurosemantics, however, as the natural evolution of a long standing project that began in the early days of Boole’s logic, the idea that semantics can be construed and explained in mathematical terms. Classical formal semantics, for a very long time, excluded from the analysis of language any account of mental processes, which on the contrary, became the central focus during the cognitive turn. Cognitive semantics, however, failed to provide a rigorous mathematical framework for semantic processes. Today, it is possible to begin explaining language by way of a new mathematical foundation, one that is empirically grounded in how the brain computes: neurosemantics. The way this book intends to contribute is twofold. One is to present a series of existing examples of neurosemantics in practice: early models addressing aspects of linguistic semantics purely in neurocomputational terms. The other is to try to identify the principles upon which models of this kind can be constructed, and their corresponding neural bases. (shrink)

Where do we recruit novel and unconventional conceptual materials from when we speak, think and act metaphorically, and why? This question has been partially answered in the cognitive linguistic literature but, in my view, a crucial aspect of it has been left out of consideration or not dealt with in the depth it deserves: it is the effect of various kinds of context on metaphorical conceptualization. Of these, I examine the following: (1) the immediate physical setting, (2) what we (...) know about the major entities participating in the discourse, (3) the immediate cultural context, (4) the immediate social setting, and (5) the immediate linguistic context itself. I suggest that we recruit conceptual materials for metaphorical purposes not only from bodily experience but also from all of these various contexts. Since the contexts can be highly variable, the metaphors used will often be variable, novel, and unconventional. The phenomenon can be observed in both everyday forms of language and literary texts. (shrink)

In natural language processing (NLP), named entity recognition (NER) and semantic classification are essential tasks. NER is a fundamental task, that identify named entities in text such as people, organizations, and locations. In Legal domain, NER is particularly important due to the variety of named entities that appear in legal documents and are important for legal analysis whereas Semantic classification is the process of giving each sentence in a text a semantic label, such as ”fact,””arguments,” or”judgement”. Both NER (...) and Semantic classi- fication are critical component of many NLP applications such as Knowledge base construction and semantic search. Semantic searching of legal documents is a powerful technique that can be used to quickly find the information that you need. By combining NER and semantic classification, one can identify the key elements of a legal document and search for documents that are related to a particular topic or contain a particular type of information. This paper proposes a novel approach to NER and Semantic classification in legal domain using Long short-term memory (LSTM) model. The proposed approach is evaluated on a corpus of legal text and the result of this study suggest that LSTM models are a promising approach for NER and Semantic classification in legal domain and can be used to improve the performance of semantic searching of legal documents. (shrink)

Terms such as 'wisdom' or 'happiness' are commonly held to refer to abstract objects that are properties. On the basis of a greater range of linguistic data and with the support of some ancient and medieval philosophical views, I argue that such terms do not stand for objects, but rather for kinds of tropes, entities that do not have the status of objects, but only play a role as semantic values of terms and as arguments of predicates. Such (...) ‘non-objects’ crucially differ from objects in that they are not potential bearers of properties. (shrink)

Can the abstract entities be designated? While the empiricists usually took the positive answer to this question as the first step toward Platonism, in his ``Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’’ [Carnap 1950], Carnap tried to make a reconciliation between the language referring to abstract entities on the one hand, and empiricism on the other. In this paper, firstly, I show that the ingenuity of Carnap’s approach notwithstanding, it is prone to criticism from different aspects. But I also show how, (...) even without leaving the empiricist research program, the shortcomings could be amended. Following Carnap’s 1950 outset, and adding some apparently untasteful (Meinongian) ingredients, I will sketch a refined way for dealing with the problem of existence of abstract entities within the framework of the philosophy of empiricism. (shrink)

Despite the growing popularity of nonrepresentationalist approaches to cognition, and especially of those coming from the enactivist corner, positing internal representations is still the order of the day in mainstream cognitive science. Indeed, the idea that we have to invoke internal content-carrying, thing-like entities to account for the workings of mind and cognition proves to be particularly resilient. In this paper, my aim is to explain at least partially where this resilience of the reified notion of representation comes from. (...) What I want to show is that, crucially, positing inner representations isn’t so much warranted by the scientific practice itself – as is commonly held – but much more motivated by nonscientific and pre-theoretical elements that largely stem from, what I will call, linguistic contingencies. Otherwise put, much of what makes the reified notion of representation an attractive posit can be explained, not by the science, but by the way we, including cognitive scientists, speak. What I want to do here, then, is first, rehearse what reification means in the context of representationalism and, second, specify which linguistic contingencies can account for why the idea of positing representations remains for many not only a viable option, but an indispensability for anyone interested in explanations of mind and cognition. (shrink)

We reconstruct “the classical transformational theory” of Chomsky, and fit it into the structuralist theory of science. We describe both the formal and the empirical features of this classical account, so that one basic hypothesis of this theory – where central notions are used – can be formulated, and in which Chomsky’s “classical” distinction between surface structure and deep structure is clarified. In the empirical claim of this theory are words, sentences and high-structured entities in an inseparable way intertwined. (...) We claim that the formal structure of a natural language is not approximately the same as that of an empirical theory in general. We clarify two special points which affect the structure of the notion of an empirical theory, namely: the delineation of intended applications and the fit between data and models. We hold that the concept of the empirical claim for a linguistic theory should be generalized in comparison with the “standard” structuralist approach. (shrink)

I argue that it is not acceptable to restrict the claim that linguistic types are concrete entities (type-concretism) to some categories of linguistic types (such as words or proper names), while at the same time conceding that other categories of linguistic types (such as sentence types) are abstract entities. Moreover, I suggest a way in which type-concretism can be extended to every linguistic type, thereby responding to the so-called productivity objection to type-concretism, according to (...) which, whenever tokens of a type t are produced in different, causally isolated circumstances, then t needs to be identified by a certain form or structure. This extension of type-concretism detaches type-concretism from so-called originalism and gives rules a prominent role in type-concretism. (shrink)

We discuss the role of linguistic metaphors as a cognitive frame for the understanding of genetic information processing. The essential similarity between language and genetic information processing has been recognized since the very beginning, and many prominent scholars have noted the possibility of considering genes and genomes as texts or languages. Most of the core terms in molecular biology are based on linguistic metaphors. The processing of genetic information is understood as some operations on text – writing, reading (...) and editing and their specification (encoding/decoding, proofreading, transcription, translation, reading frame). The concept of gene reading can be traced from the archaic idea of the equation of Life and Nature with the Book. Thus, the genetics itself can be metaphorically represented as some operations on text (deciphering, understanding, codebreaking, transcribing, editing, etc.), which are performed by scientists. At the same time linguistic metaphors portrayed gene entities also as having the ability of reading. In the case of such “bio-reading” some essential features similar to the processes of human reading can be revealed: this is an ability to identify the biochemical sequences based on their function in an abstract system and distinguish between type and its contextual tokens of the same type. Metaphors seem to be an effective instrument for representation, as they make possible a two-dimensional description: biochemical by its experimental empirical results and textual based on the cognitive models of comprehension. In addition to their heuristic value, linguistic metaphors are based on the essential characteristics of genetic information derived from its dual nature: biochemical by its substance, textual (or quasi-textual) by its formal organization. It can be concluded that linguistic metaphors denoting biochemical objects and processes seem to be a method of description and explanation of these heterogeneous properties. (shrink)

We discuss the role of linguistic metaphors as a cognitive frame for the understanding of genetic information processing. The essential similarity between language and genetic information processing has been recognized since the very beginning, and many prominent scholars have noted the possibility of considering genes and genomes as texts or languages. Most of the core terms in molecular biology are based on linguistic metaphors. The processing of genetic information is understood as some operations on text – writing, reading (...) and editing and their specification (encoding/decoding, proofreading, transcription, translation, reading frame). The concept of gene reading can be traced from the archaic idea of the equation of Life and Nature with the Book. Thus, the genetics itself can be metaphorically represented as some operations on text (deciphering, understanding, codebreaking, transcribing, editing, etc.), which are performed by scientists. At the same time linguistic metaphors portrayed gene entities also as having the ability of reading. In the case of such “bio-reading” some essential features similar to the processes of human reading can be revealed: this is an ability to identify the biochemical sequences based on their function in an abstract system and distinguish between type and its contextual tokens of the same type. Metaphors seem to be an effective instrument for representation, as they make possible a two-dimensional description: biochemical by its experimental empirical results and textual according to the cognitive models of comprehension. In addition to their heuristic value, linguistic metaphors are based on the essential characteristics of genetic information derived from its dual nature: biochemical by its substance, textual (or quasitextual) by its formal organization. It can be concluded that linguistic metaphors denoting biochemical objects and processes seem to be a method of description and explanation of these heterogeneous properties. (shrink)

As figurational sociologists and sociolinguists, we need to know that we currently find support from other fields in our efforts to construct a sociocultural science focused on interdependencies and processes, creating a multidimensional picture of human beings, one in which the brain and its mental and emotional processes are properly recognized. The paradigmatic revolutions in 20th-century physics, the contributions made by biology to our understanding of living beings, the conceptual constructions built around the theories of systems, self-organization and complexity, all (...) these implore that we reflect on social sciences paradigms in the light of the great changes in these other disciplines. The application of metaphors or theoretical images of complexity and figurational sociology in understanding language and socio-communication phenomena is of great use, since language is not an ‘object’, but a ‘complex’; it exists simultaneously in and among different domains. ‘Languaging’ and interaction are co-phenomena. The former exists within the latter, and the latter within the former. By visualizing, for instance, the different levels of linguistic structure not as separate entities but rather as united and integrated within the same theoretical frame, by seeing their functional interdependencies, by situating them in a greater multidimensionality that includes what for a long time was considered ‘external’ – the individual and his or her mind-brain, the sociocultural system, the physical world, etc. – and expanding in this way our classical view, we should be able to make important, if not essential, theoretical and practical advances. (shrink)

We discuss the role of linguistic metaphors as a cognitive frame for the understanding of genetic information processing. The essential similarity between language and genetic information processing has been recognized since the very beginning, and many prominent scholars have noted the possibility of considering genes and genomes as texts or languages. Most of the core terms in molecular biology are based on linguistic metaphors. The processing of genetic information is understood as some operations on text – writing, reading (...) and editing and their specification (encoding/decoding, proofreading, transcription, translation, reading frame). The concept of gene reading can be traced from the archaic idea of the equation of Life and Nature with the Book. Thus, the genetics itself can be metaphorically represented as some operations on text (deciphering, understanding, code-breaking, transcribing, editing, etc.), which are performed by scientists. At the same time linguistic metaphors portrayed gene entities also as having the ability of reading. In the case of such “bio-reading” some essential features similar to the processes of human reading can be revealed: this is an ability to identify the biochemical sequences based on their function in an abstract system and distinguish between type and its contextual tokens of the same type. Metaphors seem to be an effective instrument for representation, as they make possible a two-dimensional description: biochemical by its experimental empirical results and textual based on the cognitive models of comprehension. In addition to their heuristic value, linguistic metaphors are based on the essential characteristics of genetic information derived from its dual nature: biochemical by its substance, textual (or quasi-textual) by its formal organization. It can be concluded that linguistic metaphors denoting biochemical objects and processes seem to be a method of description and explanation of these heterogeneous properties. (shrink)

En el contexto de este artículo denominaremos mentalismo a la conjunción de dos tesis diferentes: (i) para que las expresiones lingüísticas tengan significado es necesario que haya entidades de carácter mental; (ii) tales entidades mentales son suficientes para fijar el significado de las expresiones correspondientes (es decir, lo determinan). Es característico deI segundo Wittgenstein el rechazo a ambas tesis. Pero son sus argumentos contra (ii), especialmente a partir de las consideraciones sobre seguir una regla, los que han concentrado casi toda (...) la atención. En este trabajo presento el argumento principal de Wittgentein contra (i), diferenciándolo de sus objeciones a (ii).In this article mentalism will be used to denominate the conjunction of two thesis: (i) it is a necessary condition for linguistic expressions having meaning the existence of mental entities; (ii) these mental entities are sufficient to fix the meaning of the corresponding expressions (they determine it). The two thesis are rejected by the later Wittgenstein. Most of the attention, though, has been paid to his arguments against (ii), especially based on discussions of rule-following. In this paper I work out Wittgenstein’s main argument against (i), and I distinguish it from his objections to (ii). (shrink)

En el contexto de este artículo denominaremos mentalismo a la conjunción de dos tesis diferentes: (i) para que las expresiones lingüísticas tengan significado es necesario que haya entidades de carácter mental; (ii) tales entidades mentales son suficientes para fijar el significado de las expresiones correspondientes (es decir, lo determinan). Es característico deI segundo Wittgenstein el rechazo a ambas tesis. Pero son sus argumentos contra (ii), especialmente a partir de las consideraciones sobre seguir una regla, los que han concentrado casi toda (...) la atención. En este trabajo presento el argumento principal de Wittgentein contra (i), diferenciándolo de sus objeciones a (ii).In this article mentalism will be used to denominate the conjunction of two thesis: (i) it is a necessary condition for linguistic expressions having meaning the existence of mental entities; (ii) these mental entities are sufficient to fix the meaning of the corresponding expressions (they determine it). The two thesis are rejected by the later Wittgenstein. Most of the attention, though, has been paid to his arguments against (ii), especially based on discussions of rule-following. In this paper I work out Wittgenstein’s main argument against (i), and I distinguish it from his objections to (ii). (shrink)