This is a survey paper on the descriptive set theory of hereditary families of closed sets in Polish spaces. Most of the paper is devoted to ideals and σ-ideals of closed or compact sets.

Western European liberal democracies have recently enacted laws that prohibit the diffusion of fake news on social media. Yet, many consider that such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression. In this paper, I argue that democratic governments have strong pro tanto reasons to prohibit fake news, and that doing so is compatible with free speech. First, I show that fake news disrupts a mutually beneficial form of epistemic dependence in which members of the public are engaged with journalists. Second, (...) I contend that laws against fake news enhance rather than thwart personal autonomy. If these suggestions are plausible, then the same considerations about truth and autonomy that underpin the value of free speech give us reasons to prohibit fake news. (shrink)

If citizens are to make enlightened collective decisions, they need to rely on true factual beliefs, but misinformation impairs their ability to do so. Although some cases of misinformation are deliberate and amount to propaganda, cases of inadvertent misinformation are just as problematic in affecting the beliefs and behavior of democratic citizens. A review of empirical evidence suggests that this is a serious problem that cannot entirely be corrected by means of deliberation.

Vous menez depuis plusieurs années des enquêtes sur le personnel politique en France, avec l’ambition de reconsidérer la notion de « professionnel » de la politique et par extension les ressorts d’une « professionnalisation » de la vie politique en France. Un point de départ, semble-t-il, de votre réflexion porte sur le fait que ces termes servent souvent (à l’instar du vocable péjoratif de « politicien » auquel ils se substituent souvent) à dévaloriser le personnel politique. Ils avaient pourtant été (...) conçus par les sciences sociales pour mettre à distance tout jugement de valeur à propos des élus. On pense bien sûr à Max Weber, mais aussi aux travaux fondateurs de Daniel Gaxie ou Jacques Lagroye, notamment. Comment vos propres travaux se situent-ils par rapport à la dimension normative inévitablement attachée à cet objet qu’est le « métier » de député? Il est vrai que je mène une critique des « professionnels de la politique », mais pas tout à fait dans le sens de celle qui domine... (shrink)

Les travaux d'Alexandre Matheron sur Spinoza et sur la philosophie de l'âge classique représentent un des points forts de l'école française d'histoire de la philosophie. Après Individu et Communauté chez Spinoza et Le Christ et le salut des ignorants, ces études complètent la vision du spinozisme et de son contexte, de ses racines et de sa signification historique. Elles traitent de tous les domaines du rationalisme classique : métaphysique, théorie de la connaissance, analyse des passions, éthique, politique et religion. (...) La méthode qui anime ces textes est celle d'une analyse structurale de la pensée philosophique : il s'agit de prendre au sérieux le caractère conceptuel des doctrines, leurs enchaînements argumentatifs, la rigueur et la cohérence de leurs catégories. Mais la considération de l'architecture d'un monument théorique ne se conçoit pas sans la biographie non de l'auteur mais de l'oeuvre : comment Spinoza est devenu Spinoza ; en d'autres termes, comment il a forgé sa pensée en traversant les arguments et les concepts de Machiavel, de Hobbes ou de Descartes pour arriver à des formulations de plus en plus spinozistes de son ontologie de la puissance. Le rationalisme absolu apparaît ainsi non seulement comme contenu des pensées étudiées mais aussi comme méthode d'histoire de la philosophie. Une démarche qui a donné des outils intellectuels à plusieurs générations de chercheurs et qui indique aujourd'hui le chemin pour pénétrer dans l'univers de la pensée classique. La seule façon rigoureuse de nous demander ce qui pour nous, de ces philosophies, est vrai. (shrink)

A biological function is supposed to be performed adequately, and hence may fail to do so: this is dysfunction. This raises two questions. One is how to make explicit the way in which function can be discriminated from dysfunction without confusing dysfunction with non-function. The second question is how what is “right” and “wrong” can be legitimated by natural regulatory norms. A function can be viewed as a quality to which at least one variable with a definite set of values (...) is associated. Accordingly, function and dysfunction are the same quality of the same trait, but differ in the values associated to this variable. Dysfunction occurs when the associated set of values does not match this normal state. Biological systems have the epistemic singularity that their existence is the consequence of two distinct causal regimes, the so-called “proximate” and “ultimate” causes, whose convergence defines a system’s prescriptive normality. Each cause imposes restrictive rules that limit the possible ways these systems can putatively exist. When a system is insensitive to ultimate cause, it is determined by proximate causation alone, and hence escapes its own prescriptive norms. In conclusion: The normality of a biological system is defined by the convergence of proximate and ultimate causes. A function is a variable-associated quality whose values are defined relative to the norms of the system. Dysfunction occurs when the set of values of the same variable does not match the normality of the system, which can occur when the system is insensitive to ultimate causation. (shrink)

Résumé La question des fondements d’un revenu garanti n’est pas une question d’experts, réservée aux spécialistes du capitalisme historique ou de la crise de l’État-providence. Par delà la caution élégante ou l’habillage théorique qu’elle peut fournir, la philosophie de Spinoza, en tant qu’elle se formule comme projet d’augmentation de la puissance d’agir, permet à la fois de comprendre tout ce peut nous apporter un revenu garanti dans la conjoncture actuelle, et de problématiser un certain nombre de débats, propositions, critiques, qui (...) se font jour autour de cette revendication. La petite fantaisie métaphysique que se permet le défenseur du RG quand il lit Spinoza l’amène à problématiser deux choses : la justification du RG, de manière générale, à partir des transformations sociétales les plus récentes (théorie du postfordisme), et, plus particulièrement, sa justification en termes de revenu primaire rémunérant l’activité au-delà du travail directement productif. (shrink)

“Aleatory materialism” does not merely constitute that which, in an overly linear perspective, one would call the “fourth Althusser”. Even if, in the last decade of his life, Althusser did indeed attempt to construct a “new philosophy”, seen as an alternative to “dialectical materialism”, one should rather perceive, behind the past arguments, so assertive and sharp, advanced by the previous Althusser, something like a discreet practical layer, self-conscious or not, wherein such arguments would have found their true point of anchorage. (...) What is at stake in this philosophy “starting from nothing” is what has always been the most necessary and the most unthinkable question, that of political subjectivation. (shrink)

Kant’s discussion of the highest good is subject to continuous disagreement between the proponents of two interpretations of this concept. According to the secular interpretation, Kant conceived of the highest good as a political ideal which can be realized through human agency alone, albeit only from the Critique of the Power of Judgement onwards. By way of contrast, proponents of the theological interpretation find Kant’s treatment of the highest good in his later works to be wholly coherent with the discussions (...) of this concept found in the second Critique. In their view, however, Kant never conceived of the highest good as a political ideal, and some go as far as to argue that it is the work of God alone. In this article, I defend a theologico-political account of the highest good that avoids the pitfalls of both readings. (shrink)

Spinoza, according to common opinion, could only have written lamentable platitudes on sexual love, narrowly inspired by the prejudices of his time and without serious philosophical foundation: that for which, in the past, he has been congratulated,1 he is now reproached; or, at best, excused. He would even have, some believe to be able to add, increased the pervading puritanism: sexuality, as such, would give rise in him to a deep repulsion and women would horrify him. The second of these (...) two assertions, if one sticks to the manifest content of the texts, actually rests on nothing; if one calls upon their latent content, it would require, to be established with a minimum of rigor, a study of which we will not dispute the theoretical possibility, but which, in fact, has not yet been undertaken. The first, on the other hand, has all the appearance of the obvious: that men love women for their beauty and do not support their attachment to someone else,2 that they desire them more the more admirers they have,3 that the jealousy of the male is exacerbated by the representation of the pudenda and of the excrementa of his rival,4 that sensual attachment is unstable and conflictual,5 that it often turns to obsession,6 that Adam loved Eve because of their similarity of nature,7 that he who remains insensitive to the generosity of a courtesan does not offend by ingratitude,8 that only free men and free women can marry one another and only if they want children,9 well, it seems, that isn’t anything sensational; now these eight passages, if the two definitions of the libido are added to them,10 are the only, if I’m not mistaken, that Spinoza expressly devoted to the question! He would therefore, apparently, only have drawn up a report of deficiency. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to conceptual ethics, Joshua Habgood-Coote argues that philosophers should refrain from using the term “fake news,” which is commonly employed in public discussions focusing on the epistemic health of democracies. In this short discussion note, I take issue with this claim, discussing each of the three arguments advanced by Coote to support the conclusion that we should abandon this concept. First, I contend that although “fake news” is a contested concept, there is significant agreement among contemporary (...) philosophers about its key feature. Second, I argue against the claim that “fake news” is an unnecessary concept by underlying that it is not reducible to other terms we customarily use to describe the epistemic dysfunctions of democracies. Lastly, I suggest that using the term “fake news” need not serve propagandistic aims, and that philosophers can use this concept without engaging in epistemic policing, that is, commanding their interlocutors not to believe specific news stories or sources. (shrink)

We consider a two-patch epidemiological system where individuals can move from one patch to another, and local interactions between the individuals within a patch are governed by the classical SIRS model. When the time-scale associated with migration is much smaller than the time-scale associated with infection, aggregation methods can be used to simplify the initial complete model formulated as a system of ordinary differential equations. Analysis of the aggregated model then shows that the two-patch basic reproduction rate is smaller than (...) the 1 patch one. We extend this result to a linear chain of P patches . These results are illustrated by some examples for which numerical integration of the system of ordinary differential equations is performed. Simulations of an individual based model implemented with a multi-agent system are also carried out. (shrink)

Quel rapport entre l'existence d'une oeuvre d'art et celle d'un être vivant? Entre l'existence de l'atome et celle d'une valeur comme la solidarité? Ces questions sont les nôtres à chaque fois qu'une réalité est instaurée, prend consistance et vient à compter dans nos vies, qu'il s'agisse d'un morceau de musique, d'un amour ou de Dieu en personne. Comme James ou Deleuze, Souriau défend méthodiquement la thèse d'un pluralisme existentiel. Il y a, en effet, différentes manières d'exister, et même différents degrés (...) ou intensités d'existence : des purs phénomènes aux choses objectivées, en passant par le virtuel et le " sur-existant " dont témoignent les œuvres de l'esprit ou de l'art, tout comme le fait même de la morale. L'existence est polyphonique, et le monde s'en trouve considérablement enrichi et élargi. Outre ce qui existe au sens ordinaire du terme, il faut compter avec toutes sortes d'états virtuels ou fugaces, de domaines transitionnels, de réalités ébauchées, en devenir, qui sont autant d'" intermondes ". Servi par une érudition stupéfiante qui lui permet de traverser d'un pas allègre toute l'histoire de la philosophie, Souriau donne les éléments d'une grammaire de l'existence. Mais son enquête se veut aussi une introduction à " la pratique de l'art d'exister ". A quoi nous attachons-nous précisément lorsque nous aimons un être? A quoi nous engageons-nous lorsque nous nous identifions à un personnage de roman, lorsque nous valorisons une institution ou adhérons à une théorie? Et finalement, quel(s) mode(s) d'existence(s) sommes-nous capables d'envisager et d'expérimenter pour nous-mêmes? Questions métaphysiques, questions vitales. Cette nouvelle édition est précédée d'une présentation d'Isabelle Stengers et Bruno Latour intitulée " Le sphinx de l'œuvre ". Elle inclut également un article d'Étienne Souriau, " Du mode d'existence de l'œuvre à faire " (1956). (shrink)

First published in French in 2010, _Equaliberty_ brings together essays by Étienne Balibar, one of the preeminent political theorists of our time. The book is organized around _equaliberty_, a term coined by Balibar to connote the tension between the two ideals of modern democracy: equality and liberty. He finds the tension between these different kinds of rights to be ingrained in the constitution of the modern nation-state and the contemporary welfare state. At the same time, he seeks to keep (...) rights discourse open, eschewing natural entitlements in favor of a deterritorialized citizenship that could be expanded and invented anew in the age of globalization. Deeply engaged with other thinkers, including Arendt, Rancière, and Laclau, he posits a theory of the polity based on social relations. In _Equaliberty_ Balibar brings both the continental and analytic philosophical traditions to bear on the conflicted relations between humanity and citizenship. (shrink)

ArgumentIn recent decades, through the work of Jane Goodall and other ethologists, the practice of giving personal names to nonhuman animals who are the subjects of scientific research has become associated with claims about animal personhood and scientific objectivity. While critics argue that such naming practices predispose the researcher toward anthropomorphism, supporters suggest that it sensitizes the researcher to individual differences and social relations. Both critics and supporters agree that naming tends to be associated with the recognition of individual animal (...) rights. The history of the naming of research animals since the late nineteenth century shows, however, that the practice has served a variety of purposes, most of which have raised few ethical or epistemological concerns. Names have been used to identify research animals who play dual roles as pets, workers, or patients, to enhance their market value, and to facilitate their identification in the field. The multifaceted history of naming suggests both that the use of personal names by Goodall and others is less of a radical break with previous practices than it might first appear to be and that the use of personal names to recognize the individuality, sentience, or rights of nonhuman animals faces inherent limits and contradictions. (shrink)

Precisely as he was repoliticizing his philosophy and criticizing his “theorist deviation”, Althusser wrote in 1967 that he did not know, after all, what was politics. In 1978, in Marx in his limits, he wrote that the classic Marxism “has never yet provided the beginning of an analysis answering the question : what can politics be about ?”. This article attempts to reconstruct the positivity of such remarks, on the basis of a sketch devoted in 1961 to the “Marxist conception (...) of politics”. In asking the question of what politics would look like in a communist regime, the “mature” Althusser undermines all Marxist conceptions of politics, starting with that of class struggles aiming at seizing State power - and even of class struggle per se. Moreover, he shakes Althusserianism even as it is barely taking shape. In his mention of “a zone which is not located in theoretical concepts, and which will be precisely the zone liberated by the end of classically conceived politics”, Althusser shows that politics can only take place when it is not located in any predetermined space. This non-situationability of politics takes its positive dimension when Althusser studies the “strange shaking of theory” operated in Machiavelli’s work. (shrink)

Today, Louis Althusser’s work knows a singular destiny. Relatively unknown until the 1992 publication of his autobiography, The Future Lasts Forever, his work has since been enriched by several volumes of previously unpublished texts, and the re-edition of works that have long been unavailable. All the conditions therefore, as suggested by the numerous works, articles and conferences dedicated to Althusser, seem to be in place for a critical reexamination of his thought. For many reasons, however, this has not been the (...) result at all. Beyond the slightly sterile polemics concerning the respective status of the “legitimate work” and the posthumous work, beyond the particularly sensitive question of the relation between biography and theory, beyond the quarrels of inheritance and the resentment towards both the man and the master, beyond the detours of a psychiatric commentary as little indifferent to the reality of the texts as of the “case,” we must admit a well-established fact: today, the field of Althusserian studies has not yet been constituted. Within the field of French philosophy, one cannot find a single profound study on the place of Althusser in the history of Marxism, the history of philosophy or epistemology. This is because this type of study more or less implicitly supposes a certain global evaluation of the kind that the work of Althusser seems particularly designed to discourage. How do we evaluate works that have not ceased to destroy themselves? How do we evaluate works so heterogeneous, in which flashes of brilliance inhabit the same space as shocking theoretical indignities? How do we bring together texts as stimulating as the celebrated, “Ideology and the Ideological Apparatus of the State,” with the rather unsettling, “On the Reproduction of the Relations of Production,” of which it is in certain details but a fragment? If the form of academic commentary seems impossible from the start, perhaps one can say the same of the project of separating the wheat from the chaff, of distinguishing “what is living and what is dead” in the work of Louis Althusser. Difficult to inscribe within the continuity of history, Althusser’s work is, in fact, irremediably enigmatic. All that passes this way, behind such fiercely proclaimed revelations, has itself formed a profoundly aporetic structure marked by the general uncertainty of any attempt at reading. For Althusser progressively destroys the theories that he could have advanced. Already troubling by itself, this phenomenon hides another even more disturbing one: there is without a doubt not a single Althusserian concept that, in its foundation, is not immediately affected by its opposite. Here we seek to show, through several limited examples, that such is the fundamental gesture of Althusser, and that it is in principle indistinguishable from his grandeur and misery. (shrink)

A conclusion drawn after a conference devoted (in 1995) to the “arrow of time” was the following: “Indeed, it seems not a very great exaggeration to say that the main problem with “the problem of the direction of time” is to figure out exactly what the problem is supposed to be !” What does that mean? That more than 130 years after the work of Ludwig Boltzmann on the interpretation of irreversibility of physical phenomena, and that one century after Einstein’s (...) formulation of Special Relativity, we are still not sure what we mean when we talk of “time” or “arrow of time”. We shall try to show that one source of this difficulty is our tendency to confuse, at least verbally, time and becoming, i.e. the course of time and the arrow of time, two concepts that the formalisms of modern physics are careful to distinguish. (shrink)

Par habitude, par nécessité ou en raison de la faiblesse de notre intelligence dépassée par le tsunami des savoirs et des informations, nos façons ordinaires de nourrir la vie des idées consistent à la découper en secteurs, à la compartimenter en disciplines, à l'atomiser en petites spécialités étiquetées bien comme il faut. Il s'agira ici de suivre le chemin inverse, de briser les enclos, s'encanailler, provoquer des courts-circuits au petit bonheur la chance et, si possible, des étincelles. D'associer des éléments (...) trop souvent séparés dans les analyses : physique et philosophie, pensée et action, réalité et imagination, hasard et destin, infini mathématique et engagement existentiel, intelligence analytique et courage physique, Einstein et Rolling Stones, image et mirage, langage et impesanteur, raison et déraison... Mettons le nez dehors, inventons une chimie nouvelle, bâtissons des molécules littéraires à partir d'atomes disciplinaires! É. K."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L'anthropologie de Merleau-Ponty déplace la question de l'humanité en direction d'un questionnement de type ontologique, ayant vocation à redéfinir les catégories de l'expérience, et d'une philosophie de la nature qui seule peut rendre compte du phénomène humain.

With several never-before published writings, this volume gathers Althusser's major essays on psychoanalytic thought----documenting his intense and ambivalent relationship with Lacan, and dramatizing his intellectual journey and troubled personal life.

At a time when bioethical issues are at the top of public and political agendas, there is a renewed interest in representations of the embryo in various religious traditions. One of the major traditions that have contributed to Western representations of the embryo is the Jewish tradition. This tradition poses some difficulties that may deter scholars, but also presents some invaluable advantages. These derive from two components, the search for limits and narrativity, both of which are directly connected with the (...) manner in which Jewish tradition was constructed in Antiquity. The article accomplishes three goals: • To introduce some central elements in ancient Rabbinic literature on the subject of the embryo and its representation; • To present this body of literature as clearly as possible, noting some of the difficulties encountered by scholars who engage in its study; • To explain how the literature’s textuality came about, examining the particular sociopolitical circumstances of Judaism at that time, including the reasons for the delay in the production of scientific texts, transmitted as such, as compared to other philosophical or religious traditions. The claim is that these circumstances engendered a tradition peculiarly relevant for the study and teaching of medical ethics today. (shrink)

This article focuses on the connections between prayer and indulgence established in the 13th and 14th centuries. Since the Early Middle Ages, practices of prayer played a significant role in the ecclesiastical system of penance. They were supposed to provide salvation by redeeming the devotee from sins. With the advent of indulgence, the salvific value of prayer became more closely entangled with the authority of the papacy and the bishops. Generally speaking, papal indulgences were very standardized, and thus only few (...) practices of prayer are mentioned in the respective documents. Episcopal grants of indulgence, on the other hand, were influenced more strongly by their recipients and can thus be more detailed. Two types of prayer indulgences were especially successful: first, indulgences for venerating the Veronica and other holy images, and secondly, indulgences granted to those praying for the King’s salvation. (shrink)