Walter Benjamin a suggéré de voir dans le fascisme une « esthétisation de la politique ». Avant lui, ce même diagnostic était appliqué non pas aux régimes autoritaires, mais, au contraire, aux régimes démocratiques. De Platon à Carl Schmitt, la philosophie a dénoncé la démocratie comme une multitude inconsistante et « bigarrée », qui préfère le jeu à l’ordre. Rebentisch estime que derrière ce jugement dépréciatif, les ennemis de la démocratie ont en fait parfaitement saisi quelques-uns de ses traits distinctifs (...) qu’il s’agit aujourd’hui de défendre dans une culture démocratique. La démocratie ne peut se passer de la mise en scène, car c’est sur scène qu’elle peut figurer le visage qu’elle veut se donner collectivement, consciente de l’écart qui subsiste toujours entre les identités actuelles et les identités possibles. (shrink)

The commons is a concept increasingly used with the promise of creating new collective wealth. In the aftermath of the economic and financial crises, finance and money have been criticized and redesigned to serve the collective interest. In this article, we analyze three types of complementary currency systems: community currencies, inter-enterprise currencies, and cryptocurrencies. We investigate whether these systems can be considered as commons. To address this question, we use two main theoretical frameworks that are usually separate: the “new commons” (...) in organization studies and the “common good” in business ethics. Our findings show that these monetary systems and organizations may be considered as commons under the “common good” framework since they promote the common interest by creating new communities. Nevertheless, according to the “new commons” framework, only systems relying on collective action and self-management can be said to form commons. This allows us to suggest two new categories of commons: the “social commons,” which fit into both the “new commons” and the “common good” frameworks, and the “commercial commons,” which fit the “common good” but not the “new commons” framework. This research advances a new conceptualization of the commons and of the ethical implications of CCs. (shrink)

La question de la religion - de son essence, de sa fonction, de son origine - a été centrale dans la sociologie et l'anthropologie classiques. Pour la tirer des impasses et de la stagnation où elle est reléguée de nos jours, Camille Tarot propose ici un bilan critique des œuvres des meilleurs comparatistes, à travers leurs théories si contradictoires de la religion. Huit auteurs principaux sont soumis à examen : Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Mircéa Eliade, Georges Dumézil, Claude Lévi-Strauss, (...) René Girard, Pierre Bourdieu et Marcel Gauchet. L'important en la matière est d'abord d'esquiver les faux irénismes comme les querelles stériles ou haineuses, pour confronter les doctrines en profondeur et systématiquement. Ensuite, de déceler l'impensé et les refoulements que produit chaque cadre théorique, pour proposer le modèle ou l'idéal-type de la religion qui paraît le mieux fondé. Au fil de cet examen, il apparaît que l'essence du fait religieux est à rechercher à l'intersection du symbolique et du sacré, à comprendre à partir des fondations d'Emile Durkheim et de Marcel Mauss, complétées par les apports de René Girard. La possible fécondité du modèle qui se dégage ainsi s'atteste par sa capacité à relire les sources et à renouveler en profondeur les vieux problèmes des fonctions de la religion, qui n'avaient guère avancé depuis Emile Durkheim. (shrink)

Review of Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God , (Harvard University Press, 2013), 180 pages.

It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between an expressivist account of normative discourse and a realist conception of normativity: more precisely, that expressivism and realism offer conflicting explanations of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a (...) minimalist approach to the relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, expressivism is compatible with any explanation that would be acceptable as a general criterion for realism. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

How can we distinguish between quasi-realist expressivism and normative realism? The most promising answer to this question is the “explanation” explanation proposed by Dreier (2004), Simpson (2018), and others: the two views might agree in their claims about truth and objectivity, or even in their attributions of semantic content to normative sentences, but they disagree about how to explain normative meaning. Realists explain meaning by invoking normative facts and properties, or representational relations between normative language and the world, the thought (...) goes, while expressivists appeal instead to desire-like mental states in their explanations of meaning. However, I argue that, if we adopt a deflationary approach to representation and other related notions, there need be no such explanatory divide between expressivism and anything recognizable as a plausible notion of normative realism. Any alleged explanatory criterion for realism will either be incompatible with deflationism, or it will fail to capture some standard versions of normative realism. I conclude that, in a deflationary framework, expressivism is compatible with genuine realism. (shrink)

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.

Suppose that there are objective normative facts and our beliefs about such facts are by-and-large true. How did this come to happen? This is the reliability challenge to normative realism. As has been recently noted, the challenge also applies to expressivist “quasi-realism”. I argue that expressivism is useful in the face of this challenge, in a way that has not been yet properly articulated. In dealing with epistemological issues, quasi-realists typically invoke the desire-like nature of normative judgments. However, this is (...) not enough to prevent the reliability challenge from arising, given that quasi-realists also hold that normative judgments are truth-apt beliefs. To defuse this challenge, we need to isolate a deeper sense in which normative thought is not representational. I propose that we rely on the negative functional thesis of expressivism: normative thought does not have the function of tracking normative facts, or any other kind of facts. This thesis supports an argument to the effect that it is misguided to expect an explanation of our access to normative facts akin to the explanations available in regions of thought that have a tracking function. We should be content with explanations of our reliability that take for granted certain connections between our psychology and the normative truths. (shrink)

Over the last decade, personalized medicine has become a buzz word, which covers a broad spectrum of meanings and generates many different opinions. The purpose of this article is to achieve a better understanding of the reasons why personalized medicine gives rise to such conflicting opinions. We show that a major issue of personalized medicine is the gap existing between its claims and its reality. We then present and analyze different possible reasons for this gap. We propose an hypothesis inspired (...) by the Windelband’s distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methodology. We argue that the fuzzy situation of personalized medicine results from a mix between idiographic claims and nomothetic methodological procedures. Hence we suggest that the current quandary about personalized medicine cannot be solved without getting involved in a discussion about the complex epistemological and methodological status of medicine. To conclude, we show that the Gadamer’s view of medicine as a dialogical process can be fruitfully used and reveals that personalization is not a theoretical task, but a practical one, which takes place within the clinical encounter. (shrink)

This book brings together an introduction to the social sciences of religions - intended for the general public, which generally ignores them - in a critical essay in order to update them in the face of a current situation that strongly challenges them and will continue to do so. Indeed, the news of globalization imposes the confusing spectacle of a world of religions caught between the two extremes of forms so exclusivist that they justify violence, even terrorism, and such irenic (...) forms that they seek a spirituality fit to go beyond all borders, even religious ones. The place given to Islam in this way is explained, among other things, because during the conflicts of Salafist jihadist and certain branches of Sufism, it illustrates this contradiction in a particularly strong, but by no means exclusive way. (shrink)

Cet article se donne pour objectif de réfléchir à ce que la crise mondiale du Covid-19 a révélé de nos manières d’habiter les lieux où nous vivons, et parmi celles-ci, la pratique de la danse. La démarche adoptée ici est celle d’un dialogue entre trois courants philosophiques spécifiques : la phénoménologie, le pragmatisme et l’écoféminisme, au sujet de leur conception de l’expérience somatique, à la fois vécue, complexe et ordinaire. Nous cherchons ici les lignes communes à ces trois mouvements philosophiques, (...) dans le but d’esquisser une compréhensions nouvelle du corps, et par extension, une nouvelle approche de la danse par temps de crise pandémique. (shrink)

Cet article se donne pour objectif de réfléchir à ce que la crise mondiale du Covid-19 a révélé de nos manières d’habiter les lieux où nous vivons, et parmi celles-ci, la pratique de la danse. La démarche adoptée ici est celle d’un dialogue entre trois courants philosophiques spécifiques : la phénoménologie, le pragmatisme et l’écoféminisme, au sujet de leur conception de l’expérience somatique, à la fois vécue, complexe et ordinaire. Nous cherchons ici les lignes communes à ces trois mouvements philosophiques, (...) dans le but d’esquisser une compréhensions nouvelle du corps, et par extension, une nouvelle approche de la danse par temps de crise pandémique. (shrink)

The authors examine the nursing practice of disposing unaltered controlled substances into public water systems as an issue for nurses concerned with the environmental harm it can cause. A summary of the history of controlled substance management reveals inconsistencies in the interpretation of current regulations that have led to disposal policies that vary by institution, according to a benchmarking survey of regional hospitals. Much attention has been given to the phenomenon of conscientious objection in the context of patient care that (...) conflicts with a nurse’s moral integrity. Nurses who are compelled to dispose narcotics down drains may also face this struggle. The authors submit that this disposal method is based on a type of double effect logic where preventing diversion is viewed as a good effect of flushing unused controlled substances that outweighs any harm it may cause, though there is little evidence to support this conclusion. Consequently, the topic deserves further study so that nurse managers and administrators can support and offer alternatives to nurses who object to flushing drugs down the drain. (shrink)

The following scenario seems possible: a community uses concepts that play the same role in guiding actions and shaping social life as our normative concepts, and yet refer to something else. As Eklund argues, this apparent possibility poses a problem for any normative realist who aspires to vindicate the thought that reality itself favors our ways of valuing and acting. How can realists make good on this idea, given that anything they might say in support of the privileged status of (...) our normative concepts can be mirrored by the imagined community? E.g., the realist might claim that using our concepts is what we ought to do if we are to describe normative facts correctly, but members of the other community can claim the same about their concepts, using their own concept of ought. A promising approach to this challenge is to try to rule out the possibility of alternative normative concepts, by arguing that any concepts that have the same normative role must share a reference as well. In this paper I argue that normative quasi-naturalism, a view that combines expressivism about normative discourse with a naturalist metaphysics of normativity, supports referential normativity and solves the problem of alternative normative concepts. (shrink)

It has been argued that there is something morally objectionable about moral realism: for instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong only if a certain moral fact obtains, but it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics in this way. In this paper, I argue that no version of this moral argument against realism is likely to succeed. More precisely, minimal realism―the kind of realism on which realist theses are understood as (...) internal to moral discourse―is immune to this challenge, contrary to what some proponents of the moral argument have suggested, while robust non-naturalist realists might have good answers to all versions of the argument as well, at least if they adopt a certain stance on how to form metaphysical beliefs in the moral domain. (shrink)

The past 10 years have seen considerable developments in the use of narrative in medicine, primarily through the emergence of the so-called narrative medicine. In this article, I question narrative medicine’s self-understanding and contend that one of the most prominent issues is its lack of a clear epistemological framework. Drawing from Gadamer’s work on hermeneutics, I first show that narrative medicine is deeply linked with the hermeneutical field of knowledge. Then I try to identify which claims can be legitimately expected (...) from narrative medicine, and which ones cannot be. I scrutinize in particular whether narrative medicine can legitimately grasp the patient’s lived experience of his or her illness. In the last section of this article, I begin to explore the potential usefulness of this epistemological clarification. This analysis allows for a further understanding of what is really at stake with narrative medicine, and thus to identify when it may be convenient, and when it may not. Furthermore, this clarification opens up promising new possibilities of dialogue with critics of the field. I conclude that narrative medicine finds its proper place as a possible tool available to mediate dialogue, which is at the heart of the clinical encounter in medical practice. (shrink)

Normative naturalism holds that normative properties are identical with, or reducible to, natural properties. Various challenges to naturalism focus on whether it can make good on the idea that normative concepts can be used in systematically different ways and yet have the same reference in all contexts of use. In response to such challenges, some naturalists have proposed that questions about the reference of normative terms should be understood, at least in part, as normative questions that can be settled through (...) normative inquiry. In this paper I have two goals. First, I argue that these naturalist proposals do not yet allow for radical disagreement on normative matters, or at least do not explain how such disagreement is possible. Secondly, I argue that, in order to account for radical disagreement, naturalists should not only treat normative reference as a normative issue but also adopt a non-representationalist account of normative concepts, on which such concepts are individuated through their practical role. I illustrate this point by showing how a view that combines naturalism and expressivism about normative discourse can vindicate the elasticity of normative concepts, their referential stability, and the objectivity of normative truths. (shrink)

Building on their important findings in The Source of the River, the authors now probe even more deeply into minority underachievement at the college level. Taming the River examines the academic and social dynamics of different ethnic groups during the first two years of college. Focusing on racial differences in academic performance, the book identifies the causes of students' divergent grades and levels of personal satisfaction with their institutions. Using survey data collected from twenty-eight selective colleges and universities, Taming the (...) River considers all facets of student life, including who students date, what fields they major in, which sports they play, and how they perceive their own social and economic backgrounds. The book explores how black and Latino students experience pressures stemming from campus racial climate and "stereotype threat"--when students underperform because of anxieties tied to existing negative stereotypes. Describing the relationship between grade performance and stereotype threat, the book shows how this link is reinforced by institutional practices of affirmative action. The authors also indicate that when certain variables are controlled, minority students earn the same grades, express the same college satisfaction, and remain in school at the same rates as white students. A powerful look at how educational policies unfold in America's universities, Taming the River sheds light on the social and racial factors influencing student success. (shrink)

Toutes les cultures ont accordé à la musique un pouvoir surnaturel. Elle fascine le philosophe qui a pu y voir le langage même de l'Idée. Dans l'opéra, elle exalte les grandes figures littéraires auxquelles elle confère la force des mythes. Mais elle est aussi un instrument de fascination des peuples, comme en témoignent son utilisation sous les divers fascismes ou la toute puissance de l'actuel fétichisme musical. Les textes de ce recueil envisagent quatre aspects majeurs de cette fascination musicale. Celle (...) du philosophe qui, de Platon à Nietzsche ou Husserl, parait à la fois enchanté et médusé par le charme de la musique. Celle du poète qui rêve de porter le langage à la limite du dicible, mais redoute, comme Mallarmé, de le voir s'évanouir en musique pure. Celle de l'écrivain qui, tel Hoffmann, Stendhal ou Butor, rivalise parfois avec le compositeur dans l'invention d'une écriture musicale. Celle, enfin, qui nous saisit lorsque l'art lyrique donne à la voix une puissance de séduction démoniaque, où la jouissance esthétique, l'érotisme et la mort se confondent en une expérience sublime. La question de la fascination musicale conduit à s'interroger sur l'essence même de la littérature comme sur les limites de la pensée rationnelle, dans une approche qui unit intimement la poétique et l'éthique, l'esthétique et le politique. (shrink)

The essential qualities of human nature, including faith, trust, repentance, forgiveness, compassion, and mercy, are discussed in this collection of writings by some of the world's great sages, both ancient and contemporary. The advice of prophets Abraham, Moses, and Muhammad, the wisdom of Confucius and Buddha, and the prudence of saints, scholars, and even cyclists provide expert guidance for those looking to improve their spiritual well-being.

Cet article soutient que Ben. 1, 3-4, une célèbre polémique à l’encontre de l’étymologie chrysippéenne, ne devrait pas être lue comme un rejet « en bloc » d’une étymologie philosophique, mais seulement comme un ensemble de conditions restrictives imposées à celle-ci. Cette interprétation nous permet de considérer les nombreuses étymologies du corpus sénéquien, dont une douzaine sont ici réunies et commentées, comme des réflexions philosophiquement intéressantes sur le langage. L’article se concentre sur la manière dont Sénèque utilise l’étymologie comme une (...) stratégie de traduction (baptisée ancrage étymologique) ayant pour but de rendre acceptables pour le lecteur romain, les aspects les plus contre intuitifs et paradoxaux de la philosophie stoïcienne, domestiquant ainsi la doctrine du Portique. Cette stratégie est comparée à l’approche très semblable de Cicéron dans Tusc. 3, 7-11. (shrink)

Historiography realized that the Middle Ages were not the “dark ages” of the European civilization. On the contrary, the period generated a series of ideas and phenomena that are associated with the modern period. At the beginning, the first chiefs of states started by establishing connections with the church authority (through the rituals of crowning, anointing, or through the magic powers attributed to the king’s touch). Gradually, and due to the contribution of some important thinkers (such as Thoma d’Aquino, Dante (...) or Marsilio di Padova), the fundaments of the rational concept of the state organization were settled, in the transition period of the XIIIth- XIVth centuries. The author discusses these ideas (of the natural rights, of the conciliar doctrine) underlining their importance in the formation of the modern paradigm. (shrink)

"Descartes ou la philosophie française : le caractère fondateur qui a été reconnu de droit à Descartes au regard de toute la philosophie moderne a masqué l'importance toute particulière que les penseurs français lui ont toujours accordée, de fait, dans leur propre édification intellectuelle. Descartes fournit en France moins les idées que la trame qui a servi à les ordonner -- ce qui n'est le cas d'aucun philosophe ailleurs. Sartre, toute sa vie durant, fut tenu par le projet de construire (...) une morale. Par la suite, il ne s'est jamais lassé de conclure : « Et j'ai toujours échoué. » Conscient de cet échec où son projet de métaphysique l'a mené, il reconduit les motifs qu'il avait de l'écrire à son enfance : « Ma seule affaire était de me sauver. » Il avait cru être au monde ; il a vécu dans l'imaginaire. Il avait bâti tout une œuvre afin de s'y mettre tout entier. Or ce Moi immortalisé, celui auquel il aspirait, c'était secrètement Descartes, médiateur caché dans la pénombre mais qui lui avait tracé un chemin pour le rejoindre. Sartre ne l'a pas dit. Néanmoins il savait qu'il était en train de récrire les Méditations métaphysiques de Descartes. C'était son secret et le propre du secret est d'appartenir à ce qui relève en chacun non pas de l'inconscient mais de ce « fonds sombre qui refuse d'être dit » -- le vécu. Un tel secret, encore enveloppé et obscur à lui-même, explique également que Sartre ait pu se dire à la fois existentialiste et cartésien. D'un côté, l'existentialisme est le nom que l'adversaire avait donné à la doctrine. Il est la manière objective dont sa pensée s'est extériorisée dans l'histoire, il est la doctrine vue du dehors. De l'autre côté, le cartésianisme est la même doctrine mais telle qu'elle est comprise du dedans par Sartre. Il est la manière subjective dont Sartre a intériorisé sa doctrine dans l'histoire de la philosophie. Deux courants de pensée dont l'un, tout en surface, a recouvert malencontreusement l'autre qui était pourtant le seul qui fût profond."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

L'ambition de ce livre est de fournir à la philosophie de Péguy l'"appareil" capable de manifester le plus fidèlement possible le "profond ordre intérieur" qui tient ensemble la multitude de textes qui a jailli génialement de sa plume. Loin de pointer les contradiction d'un homme, il s'agit alors de suivre la continuité et la cohérence d'un chemin, par-delà toutes les ruptures apparentes, qui se déroule selon un drame chrétien : L'état d'innocence, d'abord, la pureté de son combat socialiste et une (...) jeunesse saisie par l'événement de l'Affaire Dreyfus et tenue par la venue imminente de la cité harmonieuse ; la chute, ensuite, avec l'histoire de la décomposition du dreyfusisme et l'enfer du monde moderne ; le salut, enfin, avec le retour de la foi catholique et les nouvelles ressources que lui prodigue la vertu d'espérance. (shrink)

A revival of the dialogue between phenomenology and psychiatry currently takes place in the best international journals of psychiatry. In this article, we analyse this revival and the role given to phenomenology in this context. Although this dialogue seems at first sight interesting, we show that it is problematic. It leads indeed to use phenomenology in a special way, transforming it into a discipline dealing with empirical facts, so that what is called “phenomenology” has finally nothing to do with phenomenology. (...) This so-called phenomenology tallies however with what we have always called semiology. We try to explain the reasons why phenomenology is misused in that way. In our view, this transformation of phenomenology into an empirical and objectifying discipline is explained by the role attributed to phenomenology by contemporary authors, which is to solve the problems raised by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (shrink)

In this paper, I support a hybrid view regarding the metaphysics of worlds. I endorse Lewisian Modal Realism for possible worlds (LMR). My aim is to come up with a hybrid account of impossible worlds that provides all the plenitude of impossibilities for all fine-grained intentional contents. I raise several challenges for such a plenitudinous hybrid theory. My version of hybrid modal realism builds impossible worlds as set-theoretic constructions out of genuine individuals and sets of them, that is, as set-theoretic (...) constructions from parts and sets of parts of genuine Lewisian worlds. _Structured worlds_ are defined as sets of tuples: structured entities built out of Lewisian ‘raw material’. These structured worlds are ersatz worlds, some of which are impossible. I claim that propositions must be sets of worlds rather than members of sets. Once the construction is in place, I evaluate the proposal and show that my hybrid account is able to supply a plenitude of impossibilities and thus giving the resources to make all the hyperintensional distinctions we are looking for, whilst remaining Lewisian-conservative. (shrink)

BackgroundOver the past decade, the exponential growth of the literature devoted to personalized medicine has been paralleled by an ever louder chorus of epistemic and ethical criticisms. Their differences notwithstanding, both advocates and critics share an outdated philosophical understanding of the concept of personhood and hence tend to assume too simplistic an understanding of personalization in health care.MethodsIn this article, we question this philosophical understanding of personhood and personalization, as these concepts shape the field of personalized medicine. We establish a (...) dialogue with phenomenology and hermeneutics (especially with E. Husserl, M. Merleau-Ponty and P. Ricoeur) in order to achieve a more sophisticated understanding of the meaning of these concepts We particularly focus on the relationship between personal subjectivity and objective data.ResultsWe first explore the gap between the ideal of personalized healthcare and the reality of today’s personalized medicine. We show that the nearly exclusive focus of personalized medicine on the objective part of personhood leads to a flawed ethical debate that needs to be reframed. Second, we seek to contribute to this reframing by drawing on the phenomenological-hermeneutical movement in philosophy. Third, we show that these admittedly theoretical analyses open up new conceptual possibilities to tackle the very practical ethical challenges that personalized medicine faces.ConclusionFinally, we propose a reversal: if personalization is a continuous process by which the person reappropriates all manner of objective data, giving them meaning and thereby shaping his or her own way of being human, then personalized medicine, rather than being personalized itself, can facilitate personalization of those it serves through the data it provides. (shrink)

The agroecological transition of agriculture not only requires changes in practices but also in ways of thinking and in their underlying values. Agroecology proposes broad scientific principles that need to be adapted to the singularities of each farm. This contextualization leads to the identification of agroecological practices that work locally and could serve as evidence-based practices to be transferred to local practitioners. This strategy was tested in a 4-year experiment conducted with dairy-sheep farmers in the South of France. The aim (...) was to collectively engage in the agroecological transition. Our work focused on the creation of a diagnostic tool that was used to analyze local farms and identify virtuous practices to be promoted locally as evidence-based practices. But this strategy came up against the complexity and singularity of the situations to be transformed: not only was no evidence found but the construction of the diagnostic tool itself led to controversy concerning the models of agriculture to be promoted. The experiment then took a pragmatic turn: on-farm workshops were organized to enable farmers to benefit from the professional judgment of peer farmers who were willing to help their colleagues accomplish their agroecological transition. The diagnostic tool, which was designed to be prescriptive, was then used to judge the social acceptability of solutions that made sense in each farmer’s own situation. Our experiment led us to conclude that managing the agro-ecological transition of farmers and their farming system is better conceived as a value-based process than as an evidence-based one. (shrink)

Dancers and dance philosophers report on experiences of a certain form of sense making and bodily thinking through the dancing body. Yet, discussions on expertise and consciousness are often framed within canonical philosophical world-views that make it difficult to fully recognize, verbalize, and value the full variety of embodied and affective facets of subjectivity. Using qualitative interviews with five professional dancers and choreographers, I make an attempt to disclose the characteristics of what I consider to be a largely overseen state (...) of consciousness: embodied reflection. Dancers are familiar with this attentive bodily presence, which constitutes their work mode and heightens their abilities as experts. Detailed descriptions of their daily work at the theatre help us grasp the qualities and understand the enigmas of the absorbed state of bodily thinking. Husserl’s theories on reflection and Merleau-Ponty’s work on motoricity support our understanding of the structures behind embodied reflection. I believe it is a common human resource, and that whether we are experts or not, we all have the ability to reflect non-conceptually through bodily and/or affective activity. (shrink)

De la vie sociale à la vie politique, de la psychiatrie à l'agriculture, la normalisation décide de la forme de la pomme, de la psyché et du monde à travers l'imposition de ses modèles et de ses normes. Ce faisant, elle dessine les contours de la marge et de l'anormalité, monde sublunaire et dégradé. Car si les normes, explicites ou tacites, forment et conforment les êtres, les choses et les mots, c'est toujours accompagnée de son contraire que la norme constitue (...) ses objets. La plupart du temps en effet, les normes s'ordonnent à la logique des oppositions binaires qui déclinent leurs valeurs antagonistes, à commencer par celles du normal et de l'anormal. Nous sommes ainsi constitués par des normes qui, infiltrant tout, commandent notre être au monde, c'est-à-dire comment vivre, travailler, penser ou aimer pour participer à la normalisation générale, être normé, normatif et normal. Vagabondant à la marge, l'anomalie a ainsi très mauvaise réputation. Or, si l'anomalie n'est synonyme d'anormalité, voire de monstruosité que du fait d'une erreur étymologique, ce détournement du sens est le symptôme d'une provenance métaphysique plus profonde, selon laquelle hors des normes, théologiques, ontologiques ou logiques, il n'y a rien qui vaille. Il n'empêche que pour Georges Canguilhem, les anomalies biologiques peuvent correspondre à des mutations réussies, lesquelles instaurent alors une nouvelle normativité, tandis que pour Thomas S. Kuhn, les anomalies scientifiques (apparentées aux changements d'aspects étudiés par Ludwig Wittgenstein) sont à l'origine de réformes ou de révolutions. Avec Michel Foucault enfin, ce sont les anomalies littéraires, actes transgressifs, solitaires et précurseurs, qui anticipent le passage d'une épistèmê à une autre. Pluridisciplinaire, indisciplinée, à l'écart des normes mais aussi entre le normal et l'anormal, la puissance de transformation qui caractérise l'anomalie est donc telle qu'il devenait nécessaire et urgent de forger le concept d'anomalie créatrice. S'il est évident qu'il existe des anomalies esthétiques créatrices, cet ouvrage a ici pris un autre point de départ, cherchant à mettre au jour mais aussi à libérer et activer un concept dont on puisse, tôt ou tard, faire également un usage éthique et politique. (shrink)