‘Of course laniabor is not a name.’ Thus very recently Cristiano Castelletti in a discussion of this notorious acrostic, which he associates with Aratean ἄρρητον and Virgilian MA VE PV. If, however, laniabor is itself ‘not a name’, the aim of the present annotatiuncula is to argue that it is an etymological play on a ‘name’. Laniabor spans the description of Amycus’ cave, which is adorned with the dismembered limbs of his victims: Amycus himself will shortly suffer the (...) same fate at Pollux’ hands. The name ‘Amycus’ was etymologized from ἀμύσσω, which exactly matches lanio. Hence by a cutely etymological jeu onomastique ‘Tearer’ says ‘I'll be torn’. (shrink)

This article proposes a cost-benefit analysis of argumentation, with the aim of highlighting the strategic considerations that govern the agent's decision to argue or not. In spite of its paramount importance, the topic of argumentative decision-making has not received substantial attention in argumentation theories so far. We offer an explanation for this lack of consideration and propose a tripartite taxonomy and detailed description of the strategic reasons considered by arguers in their decision-making: benefits, costs, and dangers. We insist that the (...) implications of acknowledging the strategic dimension of arguing are far-reaching, including promising insights on how to develop better argumentation technologies. (shrink)

The brief life of the Accademia del Cimento (1657–1667), the first known society with a purely experimental programme,1 is entangled with the most surprising advancements in the history of scientific instruments of that century, from the telescope to the microscope, the thermometer to the barometer, the hygrometer to the pendulum as a time-regulator, and more. The making of instruments at the Florentine court shows the interaction of princely, scholarly and artisanal actors. This paper explores this collaboration and shows how the (...) supposed “invisibility’ of artisans depended on their proximity to the academicians and princes, who mainly communicated verbally with them, directly or through middlemen. The visibility of artisans increases proportionally to their physical distance from the Court. In this essay I unveil the identity of the artisans of the Cimento and, finally, attempt to attribute five instruments (some lost and others still extant) to specific makers, shedding light also on relations between the artisan and his patron. (shrink)

In _Jesuit Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity_ Cristiano Casalini collects eighteen contributions by renowned specialists to track the existence and distinctiveness of Jesuit philosophy during the first century since the inception of the order.

This paper presents a systematic analysis of the various steps of goal-processing and intention creation, as the final outcome of goal-driven action generation. Intention theory has to be founded on goal theory: intentions require means-end reasoning and planning, conflict resolution, coherence. The process of intention formation and intentional action execution is strictly based on specific sets of beliefs (predictions, evaluations, calculation of costs, responsibility beliefs, competence, etc.). The origin of an intention is not necessarily a “desire” (which is just a (...) kind of goal). Intention is a two-layered goal-structure: the intended action(s) to be executed, and the intended outcome motivating that action—with two distinct kinds of “failure”. This belief-goal perspective also allows to examine two stages/types of intention, and the relations and differences between intention “in agenda” (future directed) and intention under execution (intention in action). I will argue that the will is much more than the intention driving an intentional action. I will also claim that intentions are not there just for motivating and regulating intentional actions (from the motor level to more complex behaviors), but that they play also several other important roles. (shrink)

Cognitive Grammar postulates two modes of cognitive processing for the structuring of complex scenes, summary scanning and sequential scanning. Generally speaking, the theory is committed to basing grammatical concepts upon more general cognitive principles. In the case of summary and sequential scanning, independent evidence is lacking, but Langacker argues that the distinction should nonetheless be accepted as it buys us considerable theory-internal explanatory power. For example, dynamic prepositions, to-infinitives and participles (e.g., into, to enter, entered ) are distinguished from finite (...) and bare verbs in terms of summary vs. sequential scanning. In this paper, we try to show that various theory-internal and theory-external arguments do not seem to support the two scanning modes. In particular, we offer a detailed examination of causatives (e.g., get, make ) and argue that their complementation patterns are difficult to reconcile with differences in scanning. We conclude that the status of, and need for, summary and sequential scanning in (Cognitive) grammar is doubtful, especially if grammar is approached from the viewpoint of the language learner/user. It follows also that the parcelling of some form-function mappings may prove less clear-cut than previously assumed. (shrink)

Butler’s idea of evolution was developed over the publication of four books, several articles and essays between 1863 and 1890. These publications, although never achieving the success expected by Butler, proposed a psychological elaboration of evolution, called ‘unconscious memory’. This was strongly in contrast with the materialistic approach suggested by Darwin’s natural selection. Starting with a historical introduction, this paper aspires to ascertain the logic, meaning and significance of Butler’s idea of ‘unconscious memory’ in the post-Darwinian physiological and psychological Pan-European (...) discussion. Particular attention is devoted to demonstrating that Butler was not only a populariser of science but also an active protagonist in the late Victorian psychological debate. (shrink)

This work presents the case of the Yanomami indigenous people from Brazil that were the object of US ethnography initiated in the 1960s. The research brought harmful repercussions to the life of the Indigenous people of Brazil for several decades, and it took more than 40 years until the beginning of a process of reparation involving the Brazilian government and American universities. Objective: to discuss the meaning of the return of Yanomami blood samples, as well as contributions from the epistemologies (...) of traditional Indigenous knowledge to the debate about research ethics and the structuring of means for the social control of researchers and the protection of participants in scientific studies, having as an example the Yanomami indigenous people from Brazil, subjected to noxious ethnography in the 1960s and the 1970s. This work used data reports recorded in secondary sources. In this article we argue that Bioethics needs to further diversify its epistemological foundations and to consider epistemologies and cosmologies beyond the frontiers of Western science, as the case of the abusive research involving the Yanomami indigenous people in Brazil reveals. We argue that traditional knowledge, such as those of indigenous and quilombolas, with their epistemologies and cosmologies, are fundamental for the election of less colonized and more efficient principles of research ethics, regarding the protection of the participants' rights in scientific studies. Traditional indigenous populations can teach us a great deal about doing research. (shrink)

Neste texto apresentamos considerações sobre o agendamento midiático-esportivo realizado em relação aos Jogos Pan-americanos Rio/2007, enfatizando aspectos teórico-conceituais da teoria do agendamento (agenda-setting), bem como evidenciando algumas estratégias utilizadas pela mídia no tocante ao evento, como a utilização de elementos da identidade nacional e a figura dos ídolos esportivos.

The decolonial theory understands that Western Modernity keeps imposing itself through a triple mutually reinforcing and shaping imprisonment: coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, and coloniality of being. Technical design has an essential role in either maintaining or overcoming coloniality. In this article, two main approaches to decolonizing the technical design are presented. First is Yuk Hui’s and Ahmed Ansari’s proposals that, revisiting or recovering the different histories and philosophies of technology produced by humankind, intend to decolonize the minds of (...) philosophers and engineers/architects/designers as a pre-condition for such decolonial designs to take place. I call them top-down approaches. Second is some technical design initiatives that, being developed alongside marginalized/subalternate people, intend to co-construct decolonial sociotechnical solutions through a committed, decolonizing, and careful dialog of knowledge. I call them bottom-up approaches. Once that is done, the article’s second half derives ontological, epistemological, and political consequences from the conjugation of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Such consequences challenge some established or not yet entirely overcome understandings in the philosophy of technology and, in so doing, are meant to represent some steps in PT’s decolonization. Even though both top-down and bottom-up approaches are considered, the article’s main contributions are associated with decolonial technical design practices, whose methodologies and outcomes are important study cases for PT and whose practitioners can be taken as inspiring examples for philosophers who want to decolonize/enlarge PT or make it decolonial. (shrink)

Thesis: Macro-level social phenomena are implemented through the (social) actions and minds of the individuals. Without an explicit theory of the agents' minds that founds, agents' behavior we cannot understand macro-level social phenomena, and in particular how they work. AntiThesis: Mind is not enough: the theory of individual (social) mind and action is not enough to explain several macro-level social phenomena. First, there are pre-cognitive, objective social structures that constrain the actions of the agents; second, there are emergent, unaware or (...) non-contractual forms of cooperation, organisation, and intelligence. Synthesis: The real challenge is how to reconcile, cognition with emergence, intention and deliberation with unknown or unplanned social functions and social order . Both objective structures and unplanned self-organising complex forms of social order and social function emerge from the interactions of agents and from their individual mental states; both these structures and self-organising systems feedback on agents' behaviors through the agents' individual minds. (shrink)

In this paper we analyse the concepts of Promise and Threat and their inter-relations. Our objective is to study the uses of P and T in persuasion and to shed some light on related concepts such as requesting, ordering, giving prizes, punishing, etc. First, we show that some Ps and Ts are used for persuasion and some are conditional in nature. Using general definitions of P and T and a broad notion of persuasion, four different typologies of P and T (...) are introduced. They are distinguished on their conditional/non-conditional dimension and on their influencing/non-influencing aim. We then focus on Conditional Influencing Ps and Ts used in persuasion. CIPs and CITs are incentive-based influencing actions rooted on dependence and power relations. Moreover, in the CIP and CIT classes the concepts of threat and promise are closely connected: the CIP is always accompanied by a CIT, and vice versa. Next, we discuss the issue of why CIPs and CITs are credible. We also identify — beyond their surface, rhetorical form — a deeper difference: a ‘substantial’ threat consisting in a choice between two losses compared with a ‘substantial’ promise where the choice is between a gain and a missed-gain. In the article we present a pre-formal model as a basis for a computational treatment of these concepts. (shrink)

This article attempts to bring some questions proposed by Hegel on the philosophy of Leibniz, in view of the considerations of this with respect to Principles of Philosophy or Monadology. Specifically, the question to be addressed is about reading proposed by Hegel around the whole notion of Monad in order to clarify some thoughts on this concept and how this comes within the second part of the Science of Logic, namely, the Doctrine of the Concept. The question posed is affiliated (...) with two separate issues: the principle of sufficient reason and principle of identity. We should consider ultimately the thought of Leibniz proposes a philosophy for the reasoning of the individual, and the experience of identity and difference are still, albeit insufficient author Monadology. (shrink)

I will first discuss how social interactions organize, coordinate, and specialize as “artifacts,” tools; how these tools are not only for coordination but for achieving something, for some outcome (goal/function), for a collective work. In particular, I will argue that these artifacts specify (predict and prescribe) the mental contents of the participants, both in terms of beliefs and acceptances and in terms of motives and plans. We have to revise the behavioristic view of “scripts” and “roles”; when we play a (...) role we wear a “mind.” No collective action would be possible without shared and/or ascribed mental contents. This is also very crucial for a central form of automatic mind-reading (mind ascription). Second, I will argue that often what really matters is the ascribed/prescribed, worn, mind not the real, private one. We have to play (like in the symbolic play) “as if” we had those mental contents. This social convention and mutual assumption makes the interaction work. The ascribed beliefs and goals are not necessarily explicitly there; they might be just implicit as inactive (we act just by routine and automatically) or implicit as potential. The coordination and social action works thanks to these “as if” (ascribed and pretended) minds, thanks to those conventional constructs. Our social minds for social interactions are coordination artifacts and social institutions. (shrink)

Decolonial approaches to technical design are part of a broader category of design methodologies, which actualize unfulfilled sociotechnical potentialities. In this paper, I present some decolonial theory concepts and discuss three decolonial approaches to illuminate philosophical debates that: 1) Can find in them clear traces of a third set of elements that shape every design/technology, along with the well-analyzed technical-scientific and ethical-political ones. In dialogue with Walter Vincenti and some others, I call these elements structured procedures, imagery lexicon, and aesthetical (...) values, which constitute the central aspects of Eugene Ferguson’s art of engineering; 2) Identify, starting from some Gilbert Simondon’s and Andrew Feenberg’s ideas, any invention as triply situated ; 3) Can be taught by these decolonial approaches about some of the mainstream philosophy of technology’s colonial limitations, becoming thus able to widen it. (shrink)

Andrew Feenberg is an essential author in the field of philosophy of technology. His ideas are particularly relevant in revealing the political dimension of technology, be it shaping society or being shaped by society. However, current Feenberg’s reflection fails to consider the internal domain of technical disciplines more rigorously. Indeed, he usually stops his analysis in the border between lifeworld (where the democratizing mobilizations occur and new/different requirements or values arise) and the technical disciplines. To identify and overcome this failure, (...) I articulate some elements from Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Yuk Hui. I also present the example of three decolonial (or empowering) technical interventions, which illustrate: how what Santos and Hui theorize is already being developed by some technical interventions in the Global South, and the impacts of such interventions on the technical teams (and, through that, also on the technical disciplines). (shrink)

What insights into Church teaching can be drawn from the biblical account of Abraham and Sarah’s experience with surrogate pregnancy? When Sarah’s maid, Hagar, conceives Abraham’s son Ishmael, negative conse­quences ensue. Hagar’s contempt for Sarah incites Sarah’s jealousy. Sarah’s abuse of Hagar leads Hagar to run away. Abraham is forced to banish Hagar and his son Ismael. These unhappy repercussions arise from the fact that surrogacy violates God’s plan for marriage and for the dignity of the human person. Although reproductive (...) technologies continue to advance, human nature remains the same. The lessons learned from Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, Hagar, and Ishmael’s experience with surrogacy can be profitably applied to Church teaching on marriage and reproductive technologies. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 443–451. (shrink)

The ongoing process of revising and rethinking the foundations of economic theory leads to great complexities and contradictions at the heart of economics. ‘Economics of innovation’ provides a fertile challenge to standard economics, and one that can help it overcome its many criticisms. This authoritative book from Cristiano Antonelli provides a systematic account of recent advances in the economics of innovation. By integrating this account with the economics of technological change, this exceptional book elaborates an understanding of the effects (...) of the introduction of new technologies. This excellent, comprehensive account from respected expert Antonelli will be much appreciated within the innovation economics community, yet it is also a book that should be read by all those with either a private or professional interest in economic theory. (shrink)

Among the research that nowadays deals with the impact of digital technologies on attention, little is concerned with problematizing the theoretical premises about the nature of this cognitive faculty. Hence, even highly credited studies on digital distraction draw their conclusions from underexamined models of attention, despite them not being the only ones available. In our article we intend to focus on this problem, starting by discussing two case studies in the field of cognitive psychology and trying to show their theoretical (...) shortcomings when compared with an alternative model of attention. We will thus explore the account that a contemporary phenomenologist, Paul Sven Arvidson, has provided of attention and distraction. Finally, we will try to question the conclusions of the empirical studies by reframing them within Arvidson’s model, suggesting the importance of sharpening the definition of attention and distraction as preliminary work for investigating how the digital relates to them. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre is often portrayed as a philosopher whose ethics would inevitably have subjectivist or relativist outcomes. Yet, even in Sartre’s early works there are several stances that blatantly belie this image, relying rather on an objectivist conception of value that he notably draws from Max Scheler. The aim of this paper is thus to investigate the influence of Scheler’s moral reflection on Sartre, arguing how it can represent an original and fruitful starting point to approach Sartrean ethics. To this (...) aim, we will first report on and discuss some passages from Sartre’s early works where this debt is most noticeable. Then, we will provide an overview of the Schelerean legacy, arguing how it represents for Sartre the very opening of the ethical issue addressable in phenomenological terms, avoiding the dead end of Hume’s and Kant’s more classical positions, while at the same time being consistent with other peculiar themes of Sartrean philosophy, namely existence and historicity. (shrink)

The general aim of this work is to show the importance of the adressee's mind as planned by the author of a speech act or of a norm; in particular, how important are the expected motivations for goal adoption. We show that speech acts differ from one another for the different motivations the speaker is attempting to obtain from the hearer. The description of the participants' social positions is not sufficient. Important conflicts can arise which are not relative to what (...) to do, but to the different motives requested by the speaker. This view is applied to norms, pointing out that what is required by a norm is not only a behaviour but also a mental attitude, and that the prescribed mind might be even more important than the prescribed behaviour. Norms don't want just behavioural conformity, but also that this conformity implies an acknowledgement and a reinforcement of both the authority and the norm itself. Norms ask for submission. Any form of norm is aimed at influencing the addressee by changing his or her mind. (shrink)

Leibniz é um contumaz crítico das filosofias da tradição e de seus contemporâneos. No que se refere à questão do conhecimento, existe na filosofia leibniziana uma oposição clara às gnosiologias mais influentes e determinantes de seu tempo, no caso do cartesianismo, do empirismo e até mesmo do intuicionismo espinoseano. O ecletismo de Leibniz tomou forma a partir de suas críticas, que, segundo algumas interpretações, intentavam conciliar os mais diletos pontos de vista. No entanto, o pensamento de Leibniz envereda por outros (...) campos na questão do conhecimento, assim como o fez reconhecidamente na física, na matemática e na metafísica? Nos propomos a discutir alguns pontos desta questão demonstrando que a ideia de invenção de Leibniz constitui-se em um movimento contra a filosofia da tradição e já reflete a insatisfação do pensador acerca dos rumos tomados pelas ciências em geral no seu tempo. Tendo como base o embate contra o método geométrico, alicerçando-se sobretudo no método matemático, Leibniz estabelece um pensamento que concilia a um só tempo a luz da descoberta e o rigor da demonstração, tendo em vista poder voltar a navegar efetivamente no ‘oceano das ciências’ e em busca da felicidade humana. (shrink)

O tema “predicado no sujeito” (praedicatum inest subjecto) constitui-se em um importante fundamento na filosofia de Leibniz, na medida em que esta noção organiza do ponto de vista lógico, várias questões da filosofia leibniziana, como a lógica, a linguagem, a epistemologia e a metafísica. Nesse texto, trataremos dessa noção a partir de uma leitura metafísica da substância em Leibniz, que busca dar o máximo de realidade possível aos seres criados por Deus. O ser, na dimensão do sujeito e de suas (...) qualidades, não apenas são o resultado do decreto divino, mas se apresentam ao mundo em uma configuração racional, que ao mesmo tempo, garante e, sua ontologia, a sua identidade e sua diferença. Nossa investigação envereda pela leitura do praedicatum inest subjecto nesse caminho. (shrink)

Este texto trata da reflexão heideggeriana sobre o conceito de mônada em Leibniz e suas determinações. Os apontamentos de Heidegger sobre o ser a partir do pensamento leibniziano promovem uma abertura fundamental da mônada, trazendo entre outras conseqüências, o perspectivismo e a idéia do ente enquanto pulsão. A limitação ontológica da mônada e sua capacidade de movimentar-se a partir de si mesma resultam em uma noção de representação e delineiam os contornos do ente. Esta discussão intenta demonstrar as possibilidades de (...) compreensão do conceito de mônada partindo das reflexões de Heidegger sobre A determinação do Ser do Ente segundo Leibniz. (shrink)

This article attempts to bring some questions proposed by Hegel on the philosophy of Leibniz, in view of the considerations of this with respect to Principles of Philosophy or Monadology. Specifically, the question to be addressed is about reading proposed by Hegel around the whole notion of Monad in order to clarify some thoughts on this concept and how this comes within the second part of the Science of Logic, namely, the Doctrine of the Concept. The question posed is affiliated (...) with two separate issues: the principle of sufficient reason and principle of identity. We should consider ultimately the thought of Leibniz proposes a philosophy for the reasoning of the individual, and the experience of identity and difference are still, albeit insufficient author Monadology. (shrink)

O trabalho de definir o que é a fenomenologia, desde a Fenomenologia da percepção, suscitou uma tomada de partido em relação ao pai da fenomenologia. A crítica ao idealismo de Husserl, o papel da ambiguidade, a impossibilidade de redução completa, entre outros grandes temas, personalizam a fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty em relação ao mestre. O objetivo do ensaio é mostrar como, na descrição do “método” fenomenológico, Merleau-Ponty se afasta dos conceitos fundamentais de Husserl, sem deixar de retornar continuamente a ele.

Chronology of Samuel Butler -- Introduction -- 1. Butler and the science of the mind: a pan-European discussion -- 2. Evolution: from literature to science and back again -- 3. The rise and fall of Butler's fame -- 4. An amateur among the professionals -- Conclusion: another story to tell.

ABSTRACT: Since the 1980s, technical-scientific knowledge, instrumental and cognitive values as well as ethical-political values are acknowledged as constitutive parts of technology and its development. However, a fourth category of elements that shapes design continues to be largely neglected or unknown: image collections, aesthetical values, and structured procedures. Disregarding such elements impose limits on the technical development. In this manuscript, I present this fourth category elements, its impact on the designing practice, and a way of pluralizing its contents. I also (...) sketch two of the most successful approaches for democratizing the technical development. Then, I discuss: some limits and potentialities of democratizing technology; an actualization of part of Simondon’s understanding of technical development; the theoretical and practical necessity of decolonizing (or continuing the decolonization of) the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Contrary to a long-lasting caricature, which depicted the Jesuits as prone followers of the pedagogical dictate of Aristotle, the Jesuits were among the firsts to challenge his established order of books and questions. In the second half of the Sixteenth century, some Jesuit professors of philosophy, such as Benet Perera, the Coimbrans, and Francisco Suárez, consistently and purportedly modified the traditional order of discipline for dealing with philosophical issues, according the rational order of doctrine. In particular, this paper presents the (...) case of Benet Perera, by following his pedagogical paths both in classes and published writings. (shrink)

Lynceorum Historia: Le ‘Schede Lincee’ di Martin Fogel is a significant contribution to the scholarly understanding of the Lyncean Academy (Accademia dei Lincei) and its reception in Europe during...

We develop a conceptual and formal clarification of notion of surprise as a belief-based phenomenon by exploring a rich typology. Each kind of surprise is associated with a particular phase of cognitive processing and involves particular kinds of epistemic representations (representations and expectations under scrutiny, implicit beliefs, presuppositions). We define two main kinds of surprise: mismatch-based surprise and astonishment. In the central part of the paper we suggest how a formal model of surprise can be integrated with a formal model (...) of belief change. We investigate the role of surprise in triggering the process of belief reconsideration. There are a number of models of surprise developed in the psychology of emotion. We provide several comparisons of our approach with those models. (shrink)

In this article we strive to provide a detailed and principled analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing—that is, the cognitive transition that leads from a mere desire to a proper intention. The resulting model of belief-based goal processing has also relevant consequences for the analysis of intentions, and constitutes the necessary core of a constructive theory of intentions, i.e. a framework that not only analyzes what an intention is, but also explains how it becomes what it is. (...) We discuss similarities and differences between our approach and other standard accounts of intention, in particular Bratman’s planning theory. The aim here is to question and refine the conceptual foundations of many theories of intentional action: as a consequence, although our analysis is not formal in itself, it is ultimately meant to have deep consequences for formal models of intentional agency. (shrink)