Recently a new attempt to go beyond QM was performed in the form of so-called prequantum classical statistical field theory (PCSFT). In this approach quantum systems are described by classical random fields, e.g., the electron field or the neutron field. Averages of quantum observables arise as approximations of averages of classical variables (functionals of “prequantum fields”) with respect to fluctuations of fields. For classical variables given by quadratic functionals of fields, quantum and prequantum averages simply coincide. In this paper we (...) generalize PCSFT to the composite quantum system. The main discovery is that, opposite to a rather common opinion, a composite system can be described by the Cartesian product of state spaces (like in classical physics) and not by the tensor product of them (like in conventional QM). A natural interpretation of the quantum pure state for a composite system is proposed: it is the nondiagonal block in the covariance matrix of the random field describing a composite system. The interpretation of a pure state due to Dirac and von Neumann seems to be an artifact of the conventional mathematical description of micro-systems. PCSFT provides a new possibility for interpretation of entanglement. (shrink)

Context: There is an ongoing debate about the possibility of identifying autopoietic systems in non-biological domains. In other words, whether autopoiesis can be conceived as a domain-free rather than domain-specific concept – regardless of Maturana’s and Varela’s opinions to the contrary. In previous parts my focus was, among other matters, on the rules defined by Varela, Maturana, and Uribe (“VM&U rules”). These rules were viewed as a validation test to assess if an observed system is autopoietic by referring to (...) Maturana’s ontological-epistemological frame. I concluded that identifying possible non-biological autopoietic systems is harder than merely identifying self-organized dynamic systems that are provided with boundaries and some observable autonomous behavioral capabilities in a given observational domain. This is because no assessment could be valid without examining such systems’ “intra-boundaries” phenomenology and proving actual compliance with the VM&U component production rules. Problem: Any rigorous approach to investigating possible self-production capabilities within a given dynamic system needs to drill down on the composition and physical conditions of the system’s core dynamics. My aim now is to discuss the problem of choosing the adequate spatial and temporal scales to be applied when observing and describing dynamic systems in general. When trying to detect an autopoietic system in a given observational domain, the observer needs conceptual tools to apply rigorously the VM&U rules and decide on the matter. This is particularly useful when dealing with systems with spatially distributed components interacting through cause-effect couplings that are independent of the distance between them, as is the case of social systems. Results: For observing dynamic systems, the choice of appropriate spatial and temporal scales of description is not a trivial operation. The observer needs to distinguish between “instantaneous” phenomena and phenomena possessing extended “durations.” I argue that the observer can easily extend the notions discussed by Maturana and Varela to observational domains where the system’s components do not constitute an entity showing a topological “form” in physical space. Furthermore, I show that a diachronic perspective must be applied by observers to explain component production/destruction mechanisms as the outcomes of processes involving structure-determined coordination over relatively long time intervals. Finally, these considerations lead to establishing a link with Varela’s fundamental concept of autonomy. Implications: The adequate choice of spatial and temporal scales of observation and description are essential (a) to discuss the problem of a possible identification of social autopoietic systems, and (b) to analyze the possibility of designing virtual simulated autopoietic systems in software domains (“computational autopoiesis”). (shrink)

The primary way that explanations are constructed in cognitive psychology is by methodological functionalism: in short, functionally defined components are proposed in order to explain how inputs are turned into behavior. But despite its close association with cognitive psychology, methodological functionalism is a technique that can be used to describe any natural system. I look at how methodological functionalism has fared when used by other special sciences and what lessons can be learned from these cases. Three explanations of chemical (...) and biological systems that were developed using methodological functionalism are examined: Willis’s explanation of fermentation, Farr’s explanation of cholera, and Mendel’s explanation of inheritance. The discovery of HIV in the early 1980s, an investigation that rejected methodological functionalism early on, is also discussed. The assessment of methodological functionalism is not positive. Th.. (shrink)

The connection of the structure of statistical selection procedures with measure theory is investigated. The methods of measure theory are applied in order to analyze a mathematical description of preparation and registration of physical systems that is used by G. Ludwig for a foundation of quantum mechanics.

The Tableaux Work Bench (TWB) is a meta tableau system designed for logicians with limited programming or automatic reasoning knowledge to experiment with new tableau calculi and new decision procedures. It has a simple interface, a history mechanism for controlling loops or pruning the search space, and modal simplification.

The state-of-art research in the field of life’s organization confronts the need to investigate a number of interacting components, their properties and conditions of sustainable behaviour within a natural system. In biology, ecology and life sciences, the performance of such stable system is usually related to homeostasis, a property of the system to actively regulate its state within a certain allowable limits. In our previous work, we proposed a deterministic model for systems’ homeostasis. The model was based (...) on dynamical system’s theory and pairwise relationships of competition, amensalism and antagonism taken from theoretical biology and ecology. However, the present paper proposes a different dimension to our previous results based on the same model. In this paper, we introduce the influence of inter-component relationships in a system, wherein the impact is characterized by direction (neutral, positive, or negative) as well as its (absolute) value, or strength. This makes the model stochastic which, in our opinion, is more consistent with real-world elements affected by various random factors. The case study includes two examples from areas of hydrobiology and medicine. The models acquired for these cases enabled us to propose a convincing explanation for corresponding phenomena identified by different types of natural systems. (shrink)

The Analytica system is a theorem proving system for 19 th century mathematics written on top of the Mathematica computer algebra system. It was developed in the early 1990’s by X. Zhao and E. Clarke and has since been dormant. We describe recent work to resurrect the theorem prover and port it to newer versions of Mathematica. The new system Analytica 2 can still prove the same theorems, but has been significantly cleaned up. The code has (...) been restructured and documented, the declarative knowledge has been separated from a logical kernel, and the system is being made available as a MathWeb service. (shrink)

We introduce a framework that allows for the construction of sequent systems for expressive description logics extending ALC. Our framework not only covers a wide array of common description logics, but also allows for sequent systems to be obtained for extensions of description logics with special formulae that we call "role relational axioms." All sequent systems are sound, complete, and possess favorable properties such as height-preserving admissibility of common structural rules and height-preserving invertibility of rules.

A cutting-edge survey of formal methods directed specifically at dealing with the deep mathematical problems engendered by the study of developing systems, in particular dealing with developing phase spaces, changing components, structures and functionalities, and the problem of emergence. Several papers deal with the modelling of particular experimental situations in population biology, economics and plant and muscle developments in addition to purely theoretical approaches. Novel approaches include differential inclusions and viability theory, growth tensors, archetypal dynamics, ensembles with variable structures, and (...) complex system models. The papers represent the work of theoreticians and experimental biologists, psychologists and economists. The areas covered embrace complex systems, the development of artificial life, mathematics, computer science, biology and psychology. (shrink)

We discuss some of the experimental motivation for the need for semigroup decay laws and the quantum Lax-Phillips theory of scattering and unstable systems. In this framework, the decay of an unstable system is described by a semigroup. The spectrum of the generator of the semigroup corresponds to the singularities of the Lax-Phillips S-matrix. In the case of discrete (complex) spectrum of the generator of the semigroup, associated with resonances, the decay law is exactly exponential. The states corresponding to (...) these resonances (eigenfunctions of the generator of the semigroup) lie in the Lax-Phillips Hilbert space, and, therefore, all physical properties of the resonant states can be computed. We show that the parametrized relativistic quantum theory is a natural setting for the realization of the Lax-Phillips theory. (shrink)

According to pancomputationalism, all physical systems – atoms, rocks, hurricanes, and toasters – perform computations. Pancomputationalism seems to be increasingly popular among some philosophers and physicists. In this paper, we interpret pancomputationalism in terms of computational descriptions of varying strength—computational interpretations of physical microstates and dynamics that vary in their restrictiveness. We distinguish several types of pancomputationalism and identify essential features of the computational descriptions required to support them. By tying various pancomputationalist theses directly to notions of what counts as (...) computation in a physical system, we clarify the meaning, strength, and plausibility of pancomputationalist claims. We show that the force of these claims is diminished when weaknesses in their supporting computational descriptions are laid bare. Specifically, once computation is meaningfully distinguished from ordinary dynamics, the most sensational pancomputationalist claims are unwarranted, whereas the more modest claims offer little more than recognition of causal similarities between physical processes and the most primitive computing processes. (shrink)

Dissipative systems are described by a Hamiltonian, combined with a “dynamical matrix” which generalizes the simplectic form of the equations of motion. Criteria for dissipation are given and the examples of a particle with friction and of the Lotka-Volterra model are presented. Quantization is first introduced by translating generalized Poisson brackets into commutators and anticommutators. Then a generalized Schrödinger equation expressed by a dynamical matrix is constructed and discussed.

Many philosophers have claimed that intentional ascription is not possible if alien peoples are truly radically different from ourselves. At the same time, many anthropologists have claimed that the people they study think very differently from the way that we do. I claim that it is possible for both the anthropologists and the philosophers to be right. Giving intentional descriptions is problematic for people unlike ourselves, but anthropologists can, and do give good descriptions of alien mental states using descriptions not (...) unlike those given in certain formulations of cognitive psychology. (shrink)

Tomographic approach to describing both the states in classical statistical mechanics and the states in quantum mechanics using the fair probability distributions is reviewed. The entropy associated with the probability distribution (tomographic entropy) for classical and quantum systems is studied. The experimental possibility to check the inequalities like the position–momentum uncertainty relations and entropic uncertainty relations are considered.

The German packaging ordinance is an example of legislated extended producer responsibility (also known as product take-back). Consumers can leave packaging with retailers, and packagers are required to pay for their recycling and disposal. It can be considered to be successful in reducing waste, spurring the redesign of packaging to be more environmentally sustainable, and increasing refilling and recycling. The exception is waste packaging made of plastics, which faces the problems of export due to lack of markets for recycled products (...) within Germany, the lack of capacity for recycling, the allowance for energy recovery within the ordinance, and the manufacturers’ focus on back-to-feedstock rather than back-to-plastics as a solution. This article looks at the ordinance and its effects to consider why this take-back program worked better than others. (shrink)

Thus, despite the di culty of higher-order automated theorem proving, which has to deal with problems like the undecidability of higher-order uni - cation (HOU) and the need for primitive substitution, there are proof problems which lie beyond the capabilities of rst-order theorem provers, but instead can be solved easily by an higher-order theorem prover (HOATP) like Leo. This is due to the expressiveness of higher-order Logic and, in the special case of Leo, due to an appropriate handling of the (...) extensionality principles (functional extensionality and extensionality on truth values). (shrink)

We describe vacuum as a system of virtual particles, some of which have negative energies. Any system of vacuum particles is a part of a keneme, i.e., of a system of n particles which can, without violating the conservation laws, annihilate in the strict sense of the word (transform into nothing). A keneme is a homogeneous system, i.e., its state is invariant by all transformations of the invariance group. But a homogeneous system is not necessarily (...) a keneme. In the simple case of a spin system, where the invariance group is SU(2), a homogeneous system is a system whose total spin is unpolarized; a keneme is a system whose total spin is zero. The state of a homogeneous system is described by a statistical operator with infinite trace (von Neumann), to which corresponds a characteristic distribution. The characteristic distributions of the homogeneous systems of vacuum are defined and studied. Finally it is shown how this description of vacuum can be used to solve the frame problem posed in paper (I). (shrink)

In a new paper in recent issue of this journal (PSTJ), Prof. M. Pitkanen describes a solar system model inspired by spiral galaxies. While we appreciate his new approach, we find it lacks substantial discussion on the nature of vortices and chirality in galaxy. Therefore we submit a viewpoint that Gross-Pitaevskii model can be a more complete description of both solar system and also spiral galaxies, especially taking into account the nature of chirality and vortices in galaxies. In (...) this article, we also hope to bring out some correspondence among existing models, so we discuss shortly: the topological vortice approach, Burgers equation in the light of KAM theory, and the Cantorian Navier-Stokes approach. Of course, this short article is far from being complete. We hope further investigation can be done around this line of approach. Aim of this paper: With this article, we hope to begin a healthy dialogue with Prof. M. Pitkanen, especially on his solar system model, since we also believe that he also support “evidence-based physics.” Limitation: In this paper we only discuss Pitkanen’s solar system model, we don’t discuss his other papers in a recent issue of PSTJ. (shrink)

Traditional philosophical discourse draws a distinction between ontology and epistemology and generally enforces this distinction by keeping the two subject areas separated and unrelated. In addition, the relationship between the two areas is of central importance to physics and philosophy of physics. For instance, all kinds of measurement-related problems force us to consider both our knowledge of the states and observables of a system (epistemic perspective) and its states and observables independent of such knowledge (ontic perspective). This applies to (...) quantum systems in particular. (shrink)

The theory of the organism-environment system starts with the proposition that in any functional sense organism and environment are inseparable and form only one unitary system. The organism cannot exist without the environment and the environment has descriptive properties only if it is connected to the organism. Although for practical purposes we do separate organism and environment, this common-sense starting point leads in psychological theory to problems which cannot be solved. Therefore, separation of organism and environment cannot (...) be the basis of any scientific explanation of human behavior. The theory leads to a reinterpretation of basic problems in many fields of inquiry and makes possible the definition of mental phenomena without their reduction either to neural or biological activity or to separate mental functions. According to the theory, mental activity is activity of the whole organism-environment system, and the traditional psychological concepts describe only different aspects of organisation of this system. Therefore, mental activity cannot be separated from the nervous system, but the nervous system is only one part of the organism­environment system. This problem will be dealt with in detail in the second part of the article. (shrink)

When dealing with a certain class of physical systems, the mathematical characterization of a generic system aims to describe the phase portrait of all its possible states. Because they are defined only up to isomorphism, the mathematical objects involved are “schematic structures”. If one imposes the condition that these mathematical definitions completely capture the physical information of a given system, one is led to a strong requirement of individuation for physical states. However, we show there are not enough (...) qualitatively distinct properties in an abstract Hilbert space to fulfill such a requirement. It thus appears there is a fundamental tension between the physicist’s purpose in providing a mathematical definition of a mechanical system and a feature of the basic formalism used in the theory. We will show how group theory provides tools to overcome this tension and to define physical properties. (shrink)

We study the appearance of genetic information starting from a system where self-reproductive and enzymatic functions are supported by the same sort of molecules. In a first phase, the information must have arisen in the form of rate independent sequences as records of enzymatic functions. Although this stage must have played an important role in evolution, it will be shown how its evolutive capacities were blocked by the impossibility of appearance of geno/phenotype duality. Finally, a logical scheme is proposed (...) for a transition process toward a system with a code offering a simplification of the conditions required from the assumption of a maximum use of the double RNA capacity, both reproductive and enzymatic. (shrink)

Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. This paper presents a framework for studying levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and discuss several applications, some of which refer to descriptive or explanatory levels while others refer to ontological levels. I illustrate the usefulness of this framework by bringing it to bear on some familiar philosophical questions. Is there a hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level (...) at the bottom? And what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? Are there emergent higher-level properties? Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be viewed as one involving levels? And might a levelled framework shed light on the relationship between third-personal and first-personal phenomena? (shrink)

This work is a conceptual analysis of certain recent developments in the mathematical foundations of Classical and Quantum Mechanics which have allowed to formulate both theories in a common language. From the algebraic point of view, the set of observables of a physical system, be it classical or quantum, is described by a Jordan-Lie algebra. From the geometric point of view, the space of states of any system is described by a uniform Poisson space with transition probability. Both (...) these structures are here perceived as formal translations of the fundamental twofold role of properties in Mechanics: they are at the same time quantities and transformations. The question becomes then to understand the precise articulation between these two roles. The analysis will show that Quantum Mechanics can be thought as distinguishing itself from Classical Mechanics by a compatibility condition between properties-as-quantities and properties-as-transformations. -/- Moreover, this dissertation shows the existence of a tension between a certain "abstract way" of conceiving mathematical structures, used in the practice of mathematical physics, and the necessary capacity to specify particular states or observables. It then becomes important to understand how, within the formalism, one can construct a labelling scheme. The “Chase for Individuation” is the analysis of different mathematical techniques which attempt to overcome this tension. In particular, we discuss how group theory furnishes a partial solution. (shrink)

The paper discusses some properties of system descriptions in action language – a recent extension of action language by defined fluents. We give a sufficient condition guaranteeing that states of an system description are fully determined by statics and inertial fluents. In system descriptions satisfying this condition, defined fluents simply facilitate the description of dynamic domains; they are not essential and can be eliminated. We use our sufficient condition to identify a common core of action languages and. (...) This is an expansion of the work of, who identified a common core of languages and. The results presented in this paper are based on the close relationship between action languages and the theory of logic programs under the answer set semantics. (shrink)

The Titius–Bode law for planetary distances is reviewed. A model describing the basic features of this rule in the “quantum-like” language of a wave equation is proposed. Some considerations about the ’t Hooft idea on the quantum behavior of deterministic systems with dissipation are discussed.

Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. In this paper, I propose a unified framework for modelling levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and show that it can accommodate descriptive, explanatory, and ontological notions of levels. I further illustrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some salient philosophical questions: (1) Is there a linear hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the (...) bottom? And what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? (2) Are there emergent properties? (3) Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? (4) Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be viewed as one involving levels? Although I use the terminology of “levels”, the proposed framework can also represent “scales”, “domains”, or “subject matters”, where these are not linearly but only partially ordered by relations of supervenience or inclusion. (shrink)

We show that it is impossible in quantum mechanics to describe two separated physical systems. This is due to the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. It is possible to give a description of two separated systems in a theory which is a generalization of quantum mechanics and of classical mechanics, in the sense that this theory contains both theories as special cases. We identify the axioms of quantum mechanics that make it impossible to describe separated systems. One of these axioms (...) is equivalent to the superposition principle. We show how these findings throw a different light on the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. (shrink)

We provide an application of a sequent calculus framework to the formalization of definite descriptions. It is a continuation of research undertaken in [20, 22]. In the present paper a so-called free description theory is examined in the context of different kinds of free logic, including systems applied in computer science and constructive mathematics for dealing with partial functions. It is shown that the same theory in different logics may be formalised by means of different rules and gives results of (...) varying strength. For all presented calculi a constructive cut elimination is provided. (shrink)

In a recent paper Horsten embarked on a journey along the limits of the domain of the unknowable. Rather than knowability simpliciter, he considered a priori knowability, and by the latter he meant absolute provability, i.e. provability that is not relativized to a formal system. He presented an argument for the conclusion that it is not absolutely provable that there is a natural number of which it is true but absolutely unprovable that it has a certain property. The argument (...) depends on a description principle. I will argue that the latter principle implies the knowability of all arithmetical truths. Therefore, Horsten's argument is either sound but its conclusion is trivial, or his argument is unsound. (shrink)

Could one give expression to a doctrine of essentialism without running afoul of semantical problems that are alleged to beggar systems of quantified modal logic? An affirmative answer is, I believe, called for at least in the case of individual essentialism. Individual essentialism is an ontological thesis concerning a kind of necessary connection between objects and their (essential) properties. It is not or anyhow not primarily a semantic thesis, a thesis about meanings, for example. And thus we are implicitly counselled (...) not to seek for the logical reconstruction of such necessities in theories in which necessity is a de ditto matter. A more natural-seeming target is an understanding of the structure of idioms of de re necessity. Of course, de re necessities may turn out to be special cases of necessities de ditto, with what consequences it is interesting to speculate upon, but it would be preferable if the theory of individual essences were to be prosecuted initially at least without prejudice to this other matter. A theory of individual essences therefore may find it a convenience to recognize a special category of open sentence by means of which to represent de re attributions of necessity. (shrink)

What do we quantify when we attempt to quantify semiotic systems and theories? How sound are potential quantifications in terms of interpretive values within some varieties of semiotic theory? We will make a distinction between formalization and quantification in order to understand what to quantify, how to quantify it and why quantification may be a desirable outcome for semiotic theory. The implications of this stance may be relevant and philosophically interesting in light of the naturalized project of biosemiotics. In this (...) paper we will try to understand some ideas behind the rationale of formalizing and quantifying semiotic phenomena and discuss whether this possibility can or should map to functionalized descriptions of semiosis and the sign. (shrink)