zen vlen ekonomiky bhem druh svtov vlky pinelo americk federln vld mnoho zsadnch vzev. Klovm nstrojem pro zvldnut tohoto nelehkho kolu byla fiskln politika. V tto pevratn dob dolo k etablovn mnoha novch prvk v americk ekonomice i fiskln politice. Nkter z nich jsou patrn dodnes. Clem tto studie je analyzovat a kriticky zhodnotit hlavn trendy ve vvoji vlen ekonomiky a fiskln politiky USA bhem druh svtov vlky. Dl vzkumn otzky se tkaj role federln vldy bhem strukturlnch zmn v hospodstv (...) i vznamu vldy v hospodskm rstu v kontextu dalch vdajovch sloek hrubho nrodnho produktu. V rmci fiskln politiky je zkoumna struktura vdajov strnky federlnho rozpotu s ohledem na dominanci vlench (obrannch) vdaj, rozloen daov zte mezi ekonomick subjekty a pm a nepm dan i zpsob financovn zvench vldnch vdaj. Na zklad metody dekompozice rstu hrubho nrodnho produktu a analzy asovch ad lze tvrdit, e logicky dochzelo k vytlaovn spoteby domcnost a investic firem vldnmi spotebnmi vdaji. Pochopiteln tento zvr plat i pro vsledky strukturln analzy hrubho nrodnho produktu. Regulatorn role federln vldy tedy byla na mnoha dlch trzch zcela zsadn. Co se te fiskln politiky, vlen vdaje vznamn dominovaly vdajov strnce federlnho rozpotu. V sti nevlench vdaj se nejvce prosadily kapitoly obchod a doprava a mezinrodn zleitosti a finance. Na pjmov stran rozpotu se vrazn zvyovaly pm progresivn individuln dan, mrnji pak korportn dan. Prohlubujc se fiskln deficit byl financovn z vce jak poloviny nedluhov, tj. vym daovm vbrem, z men sti pak kumulac dluhu. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

This paper argues that if motivation by rightness de re is praiseworthy, then so is motivation by rightness de dicto. I argue that these two types of moral motivation have been unfairly compared, in light of a widespread failure to appreciate the structural similarities between them. These structural similarities become clear when we think more carefully about the nature of motivation and about moral metaphysics. I then argue that the two types of moral motivation are on a par by discussing (...) a series of minimal pairs. I argue that in good cases, in which the agent succeeds in doing what she is motivated to do, both motivations seem praiseworthy, and that bad cases, in which the agent fails, arise for motivation by rightness de re in precisely the same way as they do for motivation by rightness de dicto. I then offer a way to evaluate the unsuccessful agents, according to which someone's motivations can still be praiseworthy even if her actions and moral beliefs are both blameworthy, and someone can have certain praiseworthy motivations while lacking others. On my view, most of us are deeply flawed agents who nonetheless have some redeeming features—including our moral motivations. (shrink)

Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, including the argument that it is impossible to owe anything to yourself, and the view that an obligation to improve onself (...) is overly 'moralistic'. Robert N. Johnson argues against Kantian universalization arguments for the duty of self-improvement, as well as arguments that bottom out in a supposed value humanity has. At the same time, he defends a position based on the notion that self- and other-respecting agents would, under the right circumstances, accept the principle of self-improvement and would leave it up to each to be the person to whom this duty is owed. (shrink)

Now that mankind has created the capability of destroying itself through nuclear technology, is it still possible to think in terms of a "just war"? Johnson argues that it is, and in the context of specific case studies he offers moral guidelines for addressing such major contemporary problems as terrorist activity in a foreign country, an individual’s conscientious objection to military service, and an American defense policy that requires development of weapons that may be morally employed in case of (...) need. "Remarkable.... A thoughtful and even profound book, which can be warmly recommended."—Adam Roberts, _New Society_ __ "[A] wise, prudential, and moral thesis.... A most important book, one that all Americans who can should read."—George Armstrong Kelly, _Political Science Quarterly_ __ "At its heart, _Can Modern War be Just? _Is a challenge to the common assumption that any modern war must be total—an unrestrained, spasmodic release of one’s entire destructive capacity against the whole of the enemy’s population."—Richard Allen, _Journal of Religious Ethics_ __ "Johnson... seriously attempt[s] to balance principles and respect facts. For this he is to be praised."—Gary Jason, _Chronicles of Culture_ __ "Johnson’s application of just war doctrine to the hardest problems of contemporary warfare is both morally sensitive and intellectually bold. Readers will sometimes disagree with his arguments, but they will be forced to think hard, and they will learn what it is to work within a moral tradition."—Michael Walzer. (shrink)

My thesis is that moral ignorance does not imply a failure to care adequately about what is in fact morally significant. I offer three cases: one in which someone is ignorant of the precise nature of what she cares about; one in which someone does not reflect on the significance of what she cares about in a particular set of circumstances, and one in which someone cares deeply about two morally significant considerations while being mistaken about their relative significance. I (...) argue that these agents all clearly care at least “adequately” about everything morally significant, including the very considerations that in fact make their acts wrong. This creates theoretical room for a way of thinking about culpable moral ignorance that respects the key concerns of those in the voluntarist tradition who have held that moral ignorance is typically blameless, within an approach to thinking about moral responsibility according to which we are blameworthy for that which manifests poor quality of will; caring adequately does not require moral omniscience, but motivated moral ignorance and moral ignorance that reflects indifference to things that matter morally are still blameworthy. My thesis also suggests a fruitful change of direction for quality-of-will theorists: we should articulate the nature and structure of the standards for adequate caring, i.e. those that specify what it is to care “adequately”. I close by offering an initial proposal as to what these standards might look like and identifying four promising avenues for further research on this topic. (shrink)

_The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics_ offers the reader an informed view of how the brain sciences are being used to approach, understand, and reinvigorate traditional philosophical questions, as well as how those questions, with the grounding influence of neuroscience, are being revisited beyond clinical and research domains. It also examines how contemporary neuroscience research might ultimately impact our understanding of relationships, flourishing, and human nature. The _Handbook_ features easy-to-follow chapters that appear here for the first time in print and—written by (...) 61 key scholars and fresh voices—represent the wide range of viewpoints in neuroethics. The volume spotlights new technologies and historical articulations of key problems, issues, and concepts, and includes cross-referencing between chapters to highlight the complex interactions of concepts and ideas within neuroethics. These features enhance the _Handbook_’s utility by providing readers with a contextual map for different approaches to issues, and a guide to further avenues of interest. (shrink)

Pursuing Justice in Africa focuses on the many actors pursuing many visions of justice across the African continent--their aspirations, divergent practices, and articulations of international and vernacular idioms of justice. The essays selected by editors Jessica Johnson and George H. Karekwaivanane engage with topics at the cutting edge of contemporary scholarship across a wide range of disciplines. These include activism, land tenure, international legal institutions, and post-conflict reconciliation. Building on recent work in sociolegal studies that foregrounds justice over and (...) above concepts such as human rights and legal pluralism, the contributors grapple with alternative approaches to the concept of justice and its relationships with law, morality, and rights. While the chapters are grounded in local experiences, they also attend to the ways in which national and international actors and processes influence, for better or worse, local experiences and understandings of justice. The result is a timely and original addition to scholarship on a topic of major scholarly and pragmatic interest. Contributors: Felicitas Becker, Jonathon L. Earle, Patrick Hoenig, Stacey Hynd, Fred Nyongesa Ikanda, Ngeyi Ruth Kanyongolo, Anna Macdonald, Bernadette Malunga, Alan Msosa, Benson A. Mulemi, Holly Porter, Duncan Scott, Olaf Zenker. (shrink)

Many have adopted the view that informal logic is importantly dependent on epistemology . Finocchiaro has raised this issue in the context argumentation theory, as perhaps distinguished from informal logic A recent pair of issues of Informal Logic , guest edited by Christoph Lumer, was devoted to epistemological approaches to argumentation. On the other hand, both Johnson and Blair and Johnson have expressed reservations. In this paper I want to take another look at the relationship between informal logic (...) and epistemology. I will argue that there are reasons for skepticism regarding the Received View that have not been taken into consideration and fully appreciated by those who advocate some form of this view. (shrink)

Dr. Robson Bonnichsen, director of the Center for the Study of the First Americans at Oregon State University in Corvallis, was excavating a 10,000-year-old archeological site in southwestern Montana several years ago when his team discovered that the area was littered with ancient human hairs. The archeologists realized with some excitement that the hairs' DNA content could be studied for clues about the origins of the prehistoric people who once lived there.

Since Einstein’s failure to define a Grand Unified Theory, physicists have pursued a comprehensive theory explaining nature, a Theory of Everything. But because General Relativity, Quantum Field Theory, and Cosmology have little in common, defining one theory is an imposing task, having eluded the best scientists for ninety years. So are we close to defining a Theory of Everything? This analysis, after defining requirements, identifies four possible options for a Theory of Everything. Quotes from prominent physicists express divergent views on (...) each alternative.The leading proposal for a Theory of Everything is String Theory, which has possible issues. It requires supersymmetry, has extra compacted dimensions, and is background-dependent. A second less comprehensive theory is Loop Quantum Gravity, which emphases background-independence based on discrete quantum space. Explaining how theories define relationships between spacetime, quantum space, quantum time, and quantum gravity, positions the role of background-independence in proposed theories. If supersymmetry and extra dimensions are discovered, String Theory or a modified String Theory integrated with Loop Quantum Gravity, may be the option. Or, possibly a radically new theory might be developed. Or, as the last option considers, the answer to the question — Does a Theory of Everything exist? — may be no; if so, nature will always be a mystery. (shrink)

Mary Wollstonecraft was one of the most influential and controversial women of her age. No writer, except perhaps her political foe, Edmund Burke, and her fellow reformer, Thomas Paine, inspired more intense reactions. In her brief literary career before her untimely death in 1797, Wollstonecraft achieved remarkable success in an unusually wide range of genres: from education tracts and political polemics, to novels and travel writing. Just as impressive as her expansive range was the profound evolution of her thinking in (...) the decade when she flourished as an author. In this collection of essays, leading international scholars reveal the intricate biographical, critical, cultural, and historical context crucial for understanding Mary Wollstonecraft's oeuvre. Chapters on British radicalism and conservatism, French philosophes and English Dissenters, constitutional law and domestic law, sentimental literature, eighteenth-century periodicals and more elucidate Wollstonecraft's social and political thought, historical writings, moral tales for children, and novels. (shrink)

Psychologists have traditionally approached phenomenology by describing perceptual states, typically in the context of vision. The control of actions has often been described as 'automatic', and therefore lacking any specific phenomenology worth studying. This article will begin by reviewing some historical attempts to investigate the phenomenology of action. This review leads to the conclusion that, while movement of the body itself need not produce a vivid conscious experience, the neural process of voluntary action as a whole has distinctive phenomenological consequences. (...) The remainder of the article tries to characterise this phenomenology. First, the planning of actions is often conscious, and can produce a characteristic executive mode of awareness. Second, our awareness of action often arises from the process of matching what we intended to do with what actually happened. Failures of this matching process lead to particularly vivid conscious experience, which we call 'error awareness'. These features of action phenomenology can be directly related to established models of motor control. This allows an important connection between phenomenology and neuroscience of action. Third, whereas perceptual phenomenology is normally seen as caused or driven by the sensory stimulus, a much more fluid model is required for phenomenology of action. Several experimental results suggest that phenomenology of action is partly a post hoc reconstruction, while others suggest that our awareness of action represents an integration of several processes at multiple levels of motor processing. Fourth, and finally, studies of the phenomenology of action, unlike those of perception, show a strong linkage between primary awareness and secondary awareness or self-consciousness: awareness of action is specifically and inextricably awareness of my action. We argue that the concepts of agency and of proprioaction are fundamental to this linkage. For these reasons, action represents a much more promising field than perception for attacking the problematic question of the relation between primary and secondary consciousness. Some promising directions for future research are indicated. (shrink)

There is ongoing ethical and legal debate about withdrawing life sup- port for patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Frequently fu- eling the debate are implicit assumptions about the value of life in a state of impaired consciousness, and persistent uncertainty about the quality of life (QoL) of these persons. Yet there are no validated methods for assessing QoL in this population, and a significant obstacle to doing so is their inability to communicate. Recent neuroscientific discoveries might circumvent that problem (...) and help shed light on QoL in DOCs. There is an ethical imperative to prioritize QoL research in this patient population, to provide evidence to inform treatment, research, and end of life decisions. A minimalist and pragmatic model of QoL is proposed, targeting positive and negative affect as domains for which there is po- tential to reach across the communication gap, and restore to these voiceless persons some measure of control. (shrink)

In Biblical Philosophy, Dru Johnson examines how the texts of Christian Scripture argue philosophically with ancient and modern readers alike. He demonstrates how biblical literature bears the distinct markers of a philosophical style in its use of literary and philosophical strategies to reason about the nature of reality and our place within it. Johnson questions traditional definitions of philosophy and compares the Hebraic style of philosophy with the intellectual projects of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Hellenism. Identifying the genetic (...) features of the Hebraic philosophical style, Johnson traces its development from its hybridization in Hellenistic Judaism to its retrieval by the New Testament authors. He also shows how the Gospels and letters of Paul exhibit the same genetic markers, modes of argument, particular argument forms, and philosophical convictions that define the Hebraic style, while they engaged with Hellenistic rhetoric. His volume offers a model for thinking about philosophical styles in comparative philosophical discussions. (shrink)

Gregory R. Johnson argues, contra Barry Vacker, that reductionist thinking and nonlinear aesthetics are not mutually exclusive, and that the passages in The Fountainhead cited by Vacker actually support the mastery of nature thesis. Johnson also addresses some miscellaneous criticisms offered by William Thomas, who wrote a review of Johnson's "Liberty and Nature" (Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Fall 1999) that appeared in Navigator.

Introduction : philosophy and politics in Aristotle's politics -- Aristotle's audiences -- Politics book I -- Aristotle's method in the politics -- The essential nature of the state and specific identities in Aristotle's politics -- Evaluating the goodness of regimes -- Why constitutions differ : causation in the politics -- The citizen and the sovereign office in the politics -- Polity and the middle regime in the politics -- The "best state absolutely".

The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof, currently used in criminal trials, is notoriously vague and undermotivated. This paper discusses two popular strategies for justifying our choice of a particular precise interpretation of the standard: the “ratio-to-standard strategy” identifies a desired ratio of trial outcomes and then argues that a certain standard is the one that we can expect to produce our desired ratio, while the “utilities-to-standard strategy” identifies utilities for trial outcomes and then argues that a certain standard (...) maximizes expected utility. I argue that both strategies fail on their own terms, by requiring us to perform calculations that we simply cannot perform. No version of either strategy can be performed by jurors or legislators in our actual epistemic position, in which, since we do not know which of the defendants in our trial system are genuinely innocent and which are genuinely guilty, we cannot determine the extent to which our trial system tends to produce evidence that misleadingly incriminates the innocent or misleadingly exonerates the guilty. But we would need to determine this in order to perform the calculations required by any possible version of the ratio-to-standard or utilities-to-standard strategies. I then suggest some empirical reasons to be pessimistic about the evidence produced by our actual trial system. The upshot is that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard lacks a clear interpretation and rationale, nor do we have a promising way to identify an alternative. This is the trouble with standards of proof. (shrink)

In Argument, Inference and Dialectic Pinto argues that critical practice can furnish us with the necessary guidance to answer our questions about argument and inference; we do not need to develop a theory of argument/inference. Pinto’s provocative remarks raise questions about the appeal to practice, and recall problems that Toulmin encounters in development of his innovative theory in The Uses of Argument. In this paper, I juxtapose and reflect on these developments.

Christianity, at its heart, is a therapeutic faith. In this companion to Foundations for Soul Care, Eric L. Johnson presents a systematic account of Christianity as divine therapy. A groundbreaking achievement in the synthesis of theology and psychology, this is an indispensable resource for students, scholars, pastors, and clinicians.

Transform your yoga practice into a force for creating social change with this concise, eloquent guide to social justice tools and skills. Skill in Action asks you to explore the deeply transformational practice of yoga as a way to become an agent of social change and work toward a just world. Through yoga practices and philosophy, this book explores liberation for ourselves and others, while asking us to engage in our own agency-whether that manifests as activism, volunteer work, or changing (...) our relationships with others and ourselves. To provide a strong foundation to begin this work, Michelle Cassandra Johnson clearly defines power and privilege, oppression, liberation, and suffering, and invites you to make changes in your life that promote equality and freedom for all. Each chapter ends with a breathwork, asana, meditation, or interpersonal relational practice to help you incorporate this wisdom into your daily life. Each of the practices extend beyond the individual to offer resources and tools to shift institutional policies and procedures in a culture that has left all of us negatively impacted by white supremacy and social inequity. We must awaken to the injustice and suffering of marginalized communities, and we must use our voices and actions toward the liberation of all people. (shrink)

Some philosophers think that if someone acts wrongly while falsely believing that her act is permissible, this moral mistake cannot excuse her wrongdoing. And some think that this is because it is morally blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non‐moral facts of which one is aware, such that mistakenly believing that one's act is permissible when it is in fact wrong is itself morally blameworthy. Here I challenge the view that it is blameworthy to fail to appreciate (...) the moral significance of non‐moral facts of which one is aware. This view seems okay if we focus on examples of people mistakenly believing that their wrongful acts are permissible. But it is not remotely plausible when we consider other varieties of moral mistake – such as believing that one's action is required when it is in fact supererogatory, believing that one's action is wrong when it is in fact permissible, and believing false things about the moral properties of others’ actions and of merely possible actions. The upshot is that those who maintain that moral mistakes cannot excuse are sent back to the drawing board; we need a new explanation of why this would be the case. (shrink)

We often describe actions as good, bad, right, wrong, fair, unkind, deserved, disrespectful, a bit much, and so on. This article asks: Do these terms describe facts about our actions? And do those facts tell us to perform certain actions and refrain from performing others? If so, what exactly does that mean? And, if not, what are we doing when we describe actions in these various ways?

It has been almost eighty years since Paul Dirac delivered a lecture on the relationship between mathematics and physics and since 1960 that Eugene Wigner wrote about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences. The field of cosmology and efforts to define a more comprehensive theory have changed significantly since the 1960s; thus, it is time to refocus on the issue. This paper expands on ideas addressed by these two great physicists, specifically, the ultimate effectiveness of mathematics to (...) describe nature. After illustrating how theoretical physic predicted discoveries, the concepts of established theories are summarized. Then, the “world equation” which combines all key physics theories is conceptually described. As the possible last piece of the puzzle, String Theory is briefly defined. And last, a cursory overview of an extreme proposal is presented — the world as a mathematical object. However, there is no fundamental reason to believe that math will allow mankind to completely comprehend nature. If math does not provide a comprehensive theory, nature will retain her secrets. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 46-49.

This book offers a sustained engagement with the political philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and demonstrates both the significance of the political in his own thinking throughout his career, and how his understanding of the political offers something valuable to current discussions of issues in political philosophy.

Since Einstein’s failure to define a Grand Unified Theory, physicists have pursued a comprehensive theory explaining nature, a Theory of Everything. But because General Relativity, Quantum Field Theory, and Cosmology have little in common, defining one theory is an imposing task, having eluded the best scientists for ninety years. So are we close to defining a Theory of Everything? This analysis, after defining requirements, identifies four possible options for a Theory of Everything. Quotes from prominent physicists express divergent views on (...) each alternative.The leading proposal for a Theory of Everything is String Theory, which has possible issues. It requires supersymmetry, has extra compacted dimensions, and is background-dependent. A second less comprehensive theory is Loop Quantum Gravity, which emphases background-independence based on discrete quantum space. Explaining how theories define relationships between spacetime, quantum space, quantum time, and quantum gravity, positions the role of background-independence in proposed theories. If supersymmetry and extra dimensions are discovered, String Theory or a modified String Theory integrated with Loop Quantum Gravity, may be the option. Or, possibly a radically new theory might be developed. Or, as the last option considers, the answer to the question — Does a Theory of Everything exist? — may be no; if so, nature will always be a mystery. (shrink)

This panel considered the uses of and prospects for the stakeholder theory/approach. After 20 years of popularity, the stakeholder concept has still notemerged as a true theory. However, it offers some unique perspectives on business organizations and there is plenty of room to develop stakeholder theory and research. These session notes are offered to further the scholarly discussion.

The purpose of this study is to determine after a one year program, the effects of Philosophy for Children on critical thinking skills of a select group of 22 second graders at Saginaw Elementary. These students have had no previous study in Philosophy for Children and met for 170 days, bi-weekly for at least 30-minutes with no more than three sessions missed. It was anticipated there would be a significant positive difference of critical thinking skills of second graders as observed (...) and noted by the teacher, in a recorded journal, prior, during and after the study. The teacher used Rebecca plus the teacher's manual for the basis of instruction. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivist Model Building: Empirical Examples From Mathematics Education” by Catherine Ulrich, Erik S. Tillema, Amy J. Hackenberg & Anderson Norton. Upshot: I concur with Ulrich et al. that second-order models can be powerful tools for investigating students’ mathematical learning. I argue for a role that a dynamic, learner-centered perspective on context could play in constructivist model building.