This article aims to explain the declining efficacy of California’s Agricultural Labor Relations Act over the past quarter century. It argues that the origins, terms, and outcomes of the Act emerged from an interplay between state and society: between the capacity of the state to initiate and implement social reform policy and the capacities of key social classes to tilt outcomes to their benefit. In contrast to both “state-centered” and “society-centered” views of the relationship among social classes, state structures, and (...) public policies, an historical-institutional theoretical frame reveals that social forces and political institutions are reciprocally constitutive, and that policy outcomes emerge from their interaction. Whereas labor union decline and policy failure are usually attributed to shifts in the political climate, in this case shifts in class leverage effected by the strategic choices of the farm labor union movement were at certain points more influential. (shrink)

1 INTRODUCTION Above the other titles he might justly have claimed, Charles S. Peirce prized the title 'logician'. He expressed in several places his ...

Deepfakes are realistic videos created using new machine learning techniques rather than traditional photographic means. They tend to depict people saying and doing things that they did not actually say or do. In the news media and the blogosphere, the worry has been raised that, as a result of deepfakes, we are heading toward an “infopocalypse” where we cannot tell what is real from what is not. Several philosophers have now issued similar warnings. In this paper, I offer an analysis (...) of why deepfakes are such a serious threat to knowledge. Utilizing the account of information carrying recently developed by Brian Skyrms, I argue that deepfakes reduce the amount of information that videos carry to viewers. I conclude by drawing some implications of this analysis for addressing the epistemic threat of deepfakes. (shrink)

In this well-researched, comprehensive study of J.S. Mill, Professor Habibi argues that the persistent, dominant theme of Mill's life and work was his passionate belief in human improvement and progress. Several Mill scholars recognize this; however, numerous writers overlook his 'growth ethic', and this has led to misunderstandings about his value system. This study defines and establishes the importance of Mill's growth ethic and clears up misinterpretations surrounding his notions of higher and lower pleasures, positive and negative freedom, the status (...) of children, the legitimacy of authority, and support for British colonialism. Drawing from the entire corpus of Mill's writings, as well as the extensive secondary literature, Habibi has written the most focused, sustained analysis of Mill's grand, leading principle. This book will be useful to college students in philosophy and intellectual history as well as specialists in these fields. (shrink)

An apparent ethical dilemma arises when physicians consider enrolling their patients in randomized clinical trials. Suppose that a randomized clinical trial comparing two treatments is in progress, and a physician has an opinion about which treatment is better. The physician has a duty to promote the patient's best medical interests and therefore seems to be obliged to advise the patient to receive the treatment that the physician prefers. This duty creates a barrier to the enrollment of patients in randomized clinical (...) trials.1-10 Two strategies are often used to resolve the dilemma in favor of enrolling patients in clinical trials. (shrink)

This investigation examines ‘teasing’ of non-combatant children by US military service personnel in occupied Iraq and Afghanistan. The majority of existent investigations of teasing and related practices place significant conceptual importance on the intentions of the teaser – such that a target can understand that the tease is not true. However, in data examined here it appears that targets do not understand the language in which the teasing is undertaken. Drawing from publicly available video footage posted on the video sharing (...) website Liveleak, we provide an ethnomethodological and conversation analytic informed examination of how persons initiating teasing strategically exploit asymmetries in the sequential and preferential organization of interactions when tease recipients do not have sufficient English skills to redress the negative assessments being made of them. Three types of candidate teasing practices are identified: soldier initiated negative other-assessments; target parroting negative other-assessments; and offer-withdrawal games. Analysis examines how such interactions effectively fail as teases and explores how children can resist soldiers’ pursuit of degrading responses. (shrink)

Demands of generality pervade contemporary moral philosophy. For example, both Samuel Scheffler and Shelly Kagan demand a general justification for certain agent-centered features of morality. I argue, however, that these demands are often unjustified. My aim is to level the playing field between our more specific and our more general moral convictions, allowing neither to win by default. ;I begin by distinguishing generality from universality and consistency, and go on to identify several common motivations for generality in ethics. For each (...) such motivation, I articulate and evaluate the demands to which it gives rise. First, I consider and reject arguments that the origins of our more specific moral convictions taint them beyond credibility and that insufficiently general moral beliefs may be biased in favor of those holding them. Second, I consider more prominent arguments for generality, connected with a concern about justification. I show that some foundationalists are committed to the view that moral justifications must terminate in very general principles, and that some coherentists are committed to a simplicity demand which is, in effect, a demand for generality as well. I argue that these approaches share a common motivation in the view that insufficiently general moral propositions are true, if at all, only for further reasons--a claim I vigorously dispute. Third, I consider various pragmatic justifications for generality. I argue that the pragmatic value of highly general principles is overrated, and that what pragmatic value they do have must often be weighed against our substantive moral concerns. I conclude that generality in ethics, although important, is not as important as it has seemed to be. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have developed an extensive literature on social ontology that applies methods and concepts from analytic metaphysics. Much of this is entirely abstracted from, and unconcerned with, social science. However, Epstein (2015) argues explicitly that analytic social metaphysics, provided its account of ontological ‘grounding’ is repaired in specific ways, can rescue social science from explanatory impasses into which he thinks it has fallen. This version of analytic social ontology thus directly competes with radically naturalistic alternatives, in a way that (...) helps to clarify what makes some metaphysics genuinely scientific (that is, part of the scientific enterprise and worldview). I consider this competition, marshal considerations against the value to social science of analytic metaphysics, and sketch a contrasting scientific metaphysics for understanding the implications of revisionist social ontology in unified scientific ontology. (shrink)

Most philosophical accounts of the foundations of economics have assumed that economics is intended to be an empirical science concerned with human behaviour, though they have, of course, differed over the extent to which it has been or can be successful as such an enterprise. A prominent source of dissent against this consensus is Alexander Rosenberg. In his recent book, Rosenberg summarizes and completes his statement of a position that he has been developing for some time. He argues that although (...) economists evaluate one another's work according to shared and rigorous standards of adequacy, these standards are strictly internal, like those of mathematics, instead of being derived from discoveries about contingent relationships between theoretical statements and empirical facts. Economics, that is to say, is essentially conceptual rather than empirical inquiry. In the following discussion, I will provide grounds for resisting Rosenberg's conclusion. The point of this criticism, however, is not mainly negative. Most of the historical preoccupations of the philosophy of economics, like those of the philosophy of science in general, have been epistemological. Careful attention to Rosenberg's argument, however, redirects our attention to ontological questions about the objects of economics, and this redirection, I will maintain, is to be welcomed. I will argue that while the majority of philosophers of economics is correct, as against Rosenberg, in regarding economics as an empirical science, the conventional view as to the identity of its empirical objects should be substantially revised under the pressure of Rosenberg's criticisms. My critical analysis of the implications of Rosenberg's work for the ontological commitments of economics is intended to furnish one line of argument towards my own conception of the objects of economics. This conception, which is still preliminary in many respects, will be briefly sketched toward the end of the present paper; a detailed account of it is given in Ross and LaCasse. (shrink)

Postphenomenology, in a complementary role with other science studies disciplines, remains within the trajectory of those theories which reject early modern epistemology and metaphysics, including rejection of ‘subject’–‘object’ distinctions, and holds, instead, to an inter-relational, co-constitutive ontology. Here the critiques which sometimes echo vestiges of such early modern epistemology are counter-challenged.

ABSTRACT Although much effort has been expended by researchers in trying to maintain a consistent belief base in formalizing commonsense reasoning, there is some evidence that the nature of commonsense reasoning itself brings inconsistencies with it. I will outline a number of sources of such inconsistencies, and discuss why they appear unavoidable. I will also suggest that, far from being a roadblock to effective commonsense, (detected) inconsistencies are often a reasoner's best guide to what to do next.

Thomas Polger has argued in favor of the mind-brain type-identity theory, the view that mental states or processes are type-identical to states of the central nervous system. Acknowledging that the type-materialist must respond to Kripke's modal anti-materialist argument, Polger insists that Kripke's argument rests on dubious assumptions concerning the identity conditions of brain states. In brief, Polger claims that one knows that x and y are non-identical when one knows the identity conditions for both x and y. Replace x and (...) y with 'brain states' and 'sensations' and it follows that one can know that brain states and sensations are non-identical only if one knows the identity conditions for brain states. But, according to Polger, we do not know the identity conditions for brain states. Hence, we should not be so confident that brains states and sensations are non-identical after all. But Polger's account is terribly flawed. Ironically, if Polger's skepticism is warranted, then Polger himself has no good reasons to be a type-materialist. But more importantly, Polger's skepticism regarding the identity conditions of brain states is deeply defective. We do, I submit, understand the identity conditions of brain states. In the end, I submit, Kripke is safe from Polger. (shrink)

In his Mathesis rationis Leibniz discounted out of hand four categorical propositions that would have considerably broadened the resultant syllogistic logic. He did this despite the facts both that he had devised a suitable manner for expressing the latent quantification over terms, and that he had reasoned adequately to determine which of the syllogisms in the resulting broadened logic were valid. Leibniz's reasons for discounting these non-standard propositions are shown to be inadequate, and the resultant syllogistic logic is outlined.

The problem of necessity is fundamentally a problem of knowledge: how can we know not just that something is so but that it must be so, not just that a statement is true but that it must be true? The problem arises the moment we make two fairly familiar assumptions: that all knowledge comes, in the end, from experience; and that experience can tell us only that something is so and not that it must be so. From these it follows (...) immediately that there can be no knowledge of necessary truths. Yet obviously we do have such knowledge: we know that bachelors must be unmarried and that the angles of a Euclidean triangle must total 180°. It seems equally obvious that we do not learn such facts from experience, from observing bachelors and triangles, so it seems clear which of the assumptions is mistaken. Whatever may be the success of Locke's attack on innate knowledge, it seems undeniable that we do have knowledge which does not come from experience. We do possess some a priori knowledge, viz. knowledge of necessary truths. (shrink)

This book aims to recast the way we think about ethics by defending an alternative to more conventional approaches and illustrating its plausibility through detailed discussions of several important cases. The book is styled as an attack on “Plato’s Thesis”.

Government policies and practices can exert significant influence on ethical behavior in a society. Many governments still rely ona long-standing prerogative of sovereigns, the defense of sovereign immunity, to avoid public inquiry about acts that are clearly immoral. However, the basic theory and frequent practice of invoking sovereign immunity cannot be ethically justified. Moreover, such practices model conduct based on power rather than reason, fairness, or justice, and invite both nations and individuals to view politics and business as a power (...) game to be played and won, rather than as a process of buiIding communities that emphasize reciprocity and commitment to moral principles. (shrink)

BRICS has philosophical significance. It creates new pressure on cross-cultural skill. This is analysed here as requiring transduction: a variety of defeasible practical reasoning. This replaces a simplistic model of the relation between knowledge and action with a more realistic and contemporary model. The transduction format has utility in cross-cultural training.

Socrates’ refutational method in the Charmides is deliberately designed to allow non-experts to test proposals, even if those proposals are put forward by experts. As such, it cannot produce definitive refutations, but it can produce refutations that are worth taking seriously. This is important to Socrates because he thinks that non-experts have not only a right, but a duty to examine self-professed experts before entrusting themselves or their loved ones to them. So if the rulers in a polis are a (...) cognitive elite—as Critias seems to suggest with his Delphic analysis of temperance—it will be equally important to Socrates for commoners to put their rulers to the test before entrusting matters of state to them. If it is a democratic principle that the legitimacy of political authority depends upon the consent of the governed, then we can say that Socrates defends a democratic principle. (shrink)

This essay contends that reality is a creative evolutionary process by which the virtual is transformed into the actual and argues that our critical conception of realism in literature needs to be altered to reflect this purposive and progressive living reality in contrast to the static and dead actuality assumed by the conventional notion of realism as mimesis. Realist fiction writers who are profound creators have strategically employed metaphysically dipolar and ethically earnest literary genres in tandem with mimetic realism, resulting (...) in complexly interactive alternative and prophetic realisms that function as catalytic agents for progressive change in our world. (shrink)

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] Many countries are adopting computing in schools, for pupils from 5 years of age. Educational philosophies that such curricula might be based on are not clear in curriculum documentation. Many Western countries’ curricula are based on developmental concepts of cognitive constructivism, with activities progressing through sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational stages. Social constructivism and constructionism add new dimensions to this learning framework, both fundamentally important for developing computing practices. We review (...) selected learning theories, and investigate features that should underpin computing curricula if practices and outcomes are to develop computing practitioner competencies of a software developer. (shrink)