Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.

A proof-theoretical treatment of collectively accepted group beliefs is presented through a multi-agent sequent system for an axiomatization of the logic of acceptance. The system is based on a labelled sequent calculus for propositional multi-agent epistemic logic with labels that correspond to possible worlds and a notation for internalized accessibility relations between worlds. The system is contraction- and cut-free. Extensions of the basic system are considered, in particular with rules that allow the possibility of operative members or legislators. Completeness with (...) respect to the underlying Kripke semantics follows from a general direct and uniform argument for labelled sequent calculi extended with mathematical rules for frame properties. As an example of the use of the calculus we present an analysis of the discursive dilemma. (shrink)

In dialogue with Jürgen Habermas's communicative ethics, Covenant and Communication constructively explores a covenantal-communicative model of Christian ethics. Author Hak Joon Lee analyzes themes of freedom, equality, and reciprocity in Habermas's theory of communication from the perspective of the Reformed Christian doctrines of covenant and the Trinity.

Epistemic justification of non-summative group beliefs is studied in this paper. Such group beliefs are understood to be voluntary acceptances, the justification of which differs from that of involuntary beliefs. It is argued that whereas epistemic evaluation of involuntary beliefs can be seen not to require reasons, justification of voluntary acceptance of a proposition as true requires that the agent, a group or an individual, can provide reasons for the accepted view. This basic idea is studied in relation to theories (...) of dialectical justification in which justification is taken to require ability to justify. Since the reasons offered can in principle always be challenged, there is no ultimate end to the dialectical chain of justification. This makes justification of acceptance, and thus group belief, social and, in a way, contextual, but this does not seem to entail strong forms of epistemic relativism. (shrink)

Martin Luther King, Jr.'s cosmopolitanism -- Communal-political ethics I : vision and norms -- Communal-political ethics II : virtues and practice -- Martin Luther King, Jr., and glocality -- Constructive Kingian global ethics -- Kingian global ethics and world religions -- Kingian global ethics and neoliberal capitalism -- Kingian global ethics and the United States -- Conclusion: March toard the great world house.

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

In philosophical action theory there is a wide agreement that intentions, often understood in terms of plans, play a major role in the deliberation of rational agents. Planning accounts of rational agency challenge game- and decision-theoretical accounts in that they allow for rationality of actions that do not necessarily maximize expected utility but instead aim at satisfying long-term goals. Another challenge for game-theoretical understanding of rational agency has recently been put forth by the theory of team reasoning in which the (...) agents select their actions by doing their parts in the collective action that is best for the group. Both planning and team reasoning can be seen as instances of a similar type of reasoning in which actions are selected on the basis of an evaluation of a larger unit than an individual’s momentary act. In recent theories of collective agency, both planning and team reasoning have been defended against orthodox game theory, but, interestingly, by different authors: Raimo Tuomela has defended team reasoning in his theory of group agency, but he ignores temporally extended planning in this context. Michael Bratman has extended his theory of planning to the case of shared agency, but he does not seem to see a role for team reasoning in understanding shared intentional activities. In this paper, we argue that both accounts suffer from this one-sidedness. We aim to combine the main insights of Tuomela’s we-mode approach and Bratman’s planning approach into a fruitful synthesis that we think is necessary for understanding the nature of group agency. (shrink)

Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...) a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects. (shrink)

This volume offers eleven philosophical investigations into our future relations with social robots--robots that are specially designed to engage and connect with human beings. The contributors present cutting edge research that examines whether, and on which terms, robots can become members of human societies. Can our relations to robots be said to be "social"? Can robots enter into normative relationships with human beings? How will human social relations change when we interact with robots at work and at home? The authors (...) of this volume explore these questions from the perspective of philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, and robotics. The first three chapters offer a taxonomy for the classification of simulated social interactions, investigate whether human social interactions with robots can be genuine, and discuss the significance of social relations for the formation of human individuality. Subsequent chapters clarify whether robots could be said to actually follow social norms, whether they could live up to the social meaning of care in caregiving professions, and how we will need to program robots so that they can negotiate the conventions of human social space and collaborate with humans. Can we perform joint actions with robots, where both sides need to honour commitments, and how will such new commitments and practices change our regional cultures? The authors connect research in social robotics and empirical studies in Human-Robot Interaction to recent debates in social ontology, social cognition, as well as ethics and philosophy of technology. -/- The book is a response to the challenge that social robotics presents for our traditional conceptions of social interaction, which presuppose such essential capacities as consciousness, intentionality, agency, and normative understanding. The authors develop insightful answers along new interdisciplinary pathways in "robophilosophy," a new research area that will help us to shape the "robot revolution," the distinctive technological change of the beginning 21st century. (shrink)

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions for agents fit to be held responsible in a normative sense, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. On the basis of Alfred R. Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility it can be argued that even if robots were to have all the capacities usually required of moral agency, their history (...) as products of engineering would undermine their autonomy and thus responsibility. (shrink)

I will study the concept of solidarity by looking at patterns of practical reasoning leading to behaviour that can be taken to exemplify solidarity. By studying which kinds of premisses are necessary for taking the motivation to display solidarity, in contrast to altruistic or moral motivation, I try to find necessary conditions for solidarity. I will argue that practical reasoning leading to solidary behaviour is a form of we-reasoning in which some of the premisses are in first person plural form (...) and attribute actions or attitudes to a collective. If this is correct, solidarity is a group concept, and intentional solidary behaviour presupposes identification with a group where others have shared goals or interests. This distinguishes solidary motivation and behaviour from altruistic or moral motivation and behaviour. (shrink)

The research presented in this paper is the first wave of a longitudinal study of a Cambodian information and communication for development (ICT4D) project, iREACH, aimed at testing a framework for evaluating whether and how such initiatives can contribute to capabilities, empowerment and sustainability. The framework is informed by Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA), uses a participatory methodology, considers the micro-, meso-, and macro- levels in understanding the role ICT can play in the development process, and adopts a forward-looking longitudinal (...) perspective. Key findings of this research are that the project had contributed to livelihoods and other aspects of well-being in diverse ways, primarily in education, health, and farming. Participants also valued the project because of its contribution to empowerment, particularly gender empowerment. Another way in which participants valued iREACH was of a more intrinsic nature, manifested in a general appreciation of just being part of the world and knowing about events in other parts of Cambodia and beyond. These findings are consistent with the CA’s emphasis on development being about more than economic growth and support the importance of considering external factors, conceptualised here as the meso- and macro- levels, in the conversion of commodities in the form of services provided at iREACH, to capabilities. (shrink)

We reflect on Raimo Tuomela’s philosophy of social action and group action on the basis of our collaboration in his research group over the years. We will give a brief introduction to Tuomela’s career, his research endeavours, and the development of the field of collective intentionality and social ontology in which he was one of the central figures. We will focus on the development of three central themes in his research: we-intentions, we-reasoning, and collective responsibility.

Ethnomethodological studies of work attempt to examine ordinary activities for the ways in which they exhibit observably and accountably competent work practice as viewed by practitioners. Because it is the analyst's task to describe activities as viewed by practitioners,qua practitioners, two methodical problems must be solved. The first problem is how the analyst can know and describe the members' point of view. Because members display their point of view to each other, the problem can be formulated as the question of (...) how the analyst can identify members' displays. This is theproblem of observability. The second problem is how the analyst can make a distinction between activities done by practitioners, qua practitioners, and other activities. How can the analyst for instance, distinguish talkas work from talkat work? This is theproblem of specificity. This paper's aim is to critically examine the ways in which ethnomethodology manages these two problems. First, the concept of the occasioned corpus of setting features is discussed. Next, two examples of ethnomethodological studies of institutional work are examined. It is argued that these studies fail to provide an adequate description of the specificity of the work studied because both disregard practitioners' orientation to the requirements of institutional accounting and reporting. Finally, it is discussed how practitioners' orientations to institutional criteria can be made observable in the analysis. (shrink)

This special section originates from a workshop `New Horizons in Action and Agency’ that we organized in August 2019 at the University of Helsinki, Finland. The aim of the workshop was to provide a...

Research on Confucianism in Honam is in full swing in connection with raising interest in regional studies. However, the independent area of Honam Confucianism is still not very prominent in the overall study of Korean Confucianism. It can be said that the lack of specific research interest in the independent domain of Honam Confucianism is due to the existing arguments related to the setting of the category of Korean Confucian studies mediated by the region. The regional categories related to the (...) study of Korean Confucianism explicitly presented after the mid-1990s were generally structured as Kiho Confucianism and Yeongnam Confucianism, at which time "Honam Confucianism" was defined as a part of Kiho Confucianism. Honam Confucianism was specified as a part of Kiho Confucianism as the school structure related to regional categories, which had been understood by dividing into Kiho and Yeongnam schools until the previous period led to the establishment of a category combining local and Confucian studies in earnest. To some extent it can be said to be appropriate to divide the development of Confucianism in Joseon into the Toegye School and the Yulgok School by paying attention to the academic veins of the development of Confucianism in Joseon according to the scholastic unity that began in earnest from the 17th century. However, the division of the Toegye School and the Yulgok School into the Yeongnam School and the Kiho School in relation to the region has some problems, considering that there lacked a group of scholars with different academic backgrounds in the area. Moreover, organizing the topography of Joseon Confucianism by dividing it into Yeongnam Confucianism and Kiho Confucianism beyond the distinction between the Yeongnam School and the Kiho School is an over-simplification in that it not only overlooks the various academic flows within each region but also simplifies the flow of Joseon Confucianism. In this study, I try to review the problems of the discussions on regional classification presented in the existing research on Confucianism in Korea, and to confirm that an independent area of Honam Confucian research is possible by paying close attention to this classification. In this process, I reveal that the understanding of the uniqueness of Honam Confucianism is not only consistently passed down by various Confucian scholars in the Joseon Dynasty, but also recognized by the Confucian scholars who were active in Honam as a regional background. Even now, the general direction of understanding is to understand and grasp the various Confucian trends and characteristics of Honam as Honam Confucianism, centering on the region called Honam. And based on this point, I review the general contents of the existing research results related to Honam Confucianism. Based on this, I have suggested a pilot plan to derive advanced results of future Honam Confucian research. (shrink)

This paper presents a case study of a psychiatric intervention as an example of an institutional ethnography of psychiatric work. Institutional ethnography, a mode of inquiry outlined by Dorothy Smith (1987), is conceived here as an approach to the analysis of work in institutions as the contingent, local and context-bound insertion of a particular "case" - a patron, a pupil, a client, a patient - into both institutional and other social (e. g. gender, class) relations. The case presented in this (...) paper, shows how a psychiatric factual account is the outcome of a process of the recognition, and/or the production, of "mentionables," followed by the documentary interpretation of mentionables as symptoms. Subsequently it is demonstrated that, and how, the recognition of mentionables depends on non-professional interpretations which by their nature express other social (such as gender, class, etc.) relations. This description of psychiatric diagnostic work is produced by means of a method of discourse analysis that consists of the juxtaposition of the various institutional texts (the two reports) with the transcript of the interview. An analysis of only the interview data would undoubtedly have resulted in some insights about psychiatric interviewing but would have shown neither how the interview functioned as a stage in the institutional process of (re)writing reports nor how ideological evaluations entered the diagnostic process. On the other hand, an analysis of only the two reports would have resulted in some insights about psychiatric reporting but would not have shown how these reports were produced. (shrink)

The robotics industry is growing rapidly, and to a large extent the development of this market sector is due to the area of social robotics – the production of robots that are designed to enter the space of human social interaction, both physically and semantically. Since social robots present a new type of social agent, they have been aptly classified as a disruptive technology, i.e. the sort of technology which affects the core of our current social practices and might lead (...) to profound cultural and social change. -/- Due to its disruptive and innovative potential, social robotics raises not only questions about utility, ethics, and legal aspects, but calls for “robo-philosophy” – the comprehensive philosophical reflection from the perspectives of all philosophical disciplines. This book presents the proceedings of the first conference in this new area, “Robo-Philosophy 2014 – Sociable Robots and the Future of Social Relations", held in Aarhus, Denmark, in August 2014. The short papers and abstracts collected here address questions of social robotics from the perspectives of philosophy of mind, social ontology, ethics, meta-ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics, intercultural philosophy, and metaphilosophy. -/- Social robotics is still in its early stages, but it is precisely now that we need to reflect its possible cultural repercussions. This book is accessible to a wide readership and will be of interest to everyone involved in the development and use of social robotics applications, from social roboticists to policy makers. (shrink)

A broad introduction to Christian ethics based on a covenantal understanding of Christian life rooted in Scripture.

The number of ethical issues that demand a response from Christians today is almost dizzying. How can Christians navigate such matters? With an unflinching yet irenic approach, this volume invites engagement with the biggest ethical issues by drawing on real-life experiences and offering a range of responses to some of the most challenging moral questions confronting the church today.

The aim of this paper is to present a philosophically inspired list of minimal requirements for social agency that may serve as a guideline for social robotics. Such a list does not aim at detailing the cognitive processes behind sociality but at providing an implementation-free characterization of the capacities and skills associated with sociality. We employ the notion of intentional stance as a methodological ground to study intentional agency and extend it into a social stance that takes into account social (...) features of behavior. We discuss the basic requirements of sociality and different ways to understand them, and suggest some potential benefits of understanding them in an instrumentalist way in the context of social robotics. (shrink)

Martin Luther King, Jr.'s cosmopolitanism -- Communal-political ethics I : vision and norms -- Communal-political ethics II : virtues and practice -- Martin Luther King, Jr., and glocality -- Constructive Kingian global ethics -- Kingian global ethics and world religions -- Kingian global ethics and neoliberal capitalism -- Kingian global ethics and the United States -- Conclusion: March toard the great world house.

This collection does not only include articles by Raimo Tuomela and his co-authors which have been decisive in social ontology. An extensive introduction provides an account of the impact of the works, the most important debates in the field, and also addresses future issues. Thus, the book gives insights that are still viable and worthy of further scrutiny and development, making it an inspiring source for those engaged in the debates of the field today.