Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.

Karl Popper and Paul Feyerabend were among the most influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century. Extensive studies have been dedicated to the development of their controversial relationship, which saw Feyerabend turning from a student and supporter of Popper to one of his harshest critics. Yet, it is not as well known that the rift between Popper and Feyerabend arose mainly in the context of their studies on the foundations of quantum mechanics, which has been the main subject of (...) their discussions for about two decades. This paper reconstructs in detail their diatribe over the foundations of quantum mechanics, emphasising also the major role that their personal relationship played in their distancing. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 The main goal of this paper is to maintain that the skeptical hypotheses in the First Meditation, and especially the doubt about material things, should be interpreted as a kind of mental exercise whose purpose is both to weaken our confidence in the senses and to prepare the reader of the Meditation for the learning of the truths accessible through the light of reason. Thus, the paper purports to show that in the economy of the Meditations skeptical (...) doubts play a positive and constructive role, which is distinct from their role of bringing about philosophical skepticism that prevails in contemporary epistemological debates. The strategy that allowed for this reading consisted in both valuing the emergence of skeptical doubts within a text written in a meditative style and highlighting certain aspects of the intellectual context that were part of the scientific revolution experienced by Descartes. (shrink)

Ultimamente bastante atençáo vem sendo dispensada ao estudo do ceticismo moderado na modernidade. O famoso historiador da filosofia Richard Popkin, em sua História do Ceticismo de Erasmo a Espinosa , cunhou a denominaçáo de ceticismo epistemológico para qualificar os membros desta corrente e nela inseriu os filósofos setecentistas Gassendi e Mersenne, considerando-os seus principais representantes. Além disso, no século XVIII temos o denominado ceticismo mitigado de Hume, que chamou a atençáo dos filósofos modernos para definir os limites do ceticismo. Este (...) artigo procura contribuir para o estudo do ceticismo moderado na modernidade, mostrando náo só que Hume, Mersenne e Gassendi podem fazer parte do assim chamado ceticismo epistemológico ou mitigado, mas também que há certos elementos comuns em suas filosofias destinados a mitigar os argumentos dos céticos de seu tempo. (shrink)

The capability approach developed by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has become an important new paradigm in thinking about development. However, despite its theoretical and philosophical attractiveness, it has been less easy to measure or to translate into policy. This volume addresses these issues in the context of poverty and justice. Part I offers a set of conceptual essays that debate the strength of the often misunderstood individual focus of the capability approach. Part II investigates the techniques by which we can (...) measure and compare capabilities, and how we can integrate them into poverty comparisons and policy advice. Finally, Part III looks at how we can apply the capability approach to different regions and contexts. Written by a team of international scholars, The Capability Approach is a valuable resource for researchers and graduate students concerned with the debate over the value of the capability approach and its potential applications. (shrink)

When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form (...) of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi-political worry about blame is raised. (shrink)

Shape Dynamics is a radical yet soundly based reinterpretation of Einstein's theory of gravity that has opened up new approaches to gravity research. This text offers both a brief introduction and a detailed walk-through of the motivations for the theory, its development from first principles and an in-depth look at its present status.

In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential role (...) in combating epistemic injustice. My response to Goldberg principally concerns my perceptual account of the epistemology of testimony, which I defend as being both well-motivated and best categorized as a species of non-inferentialism. I also explain its relation to the reductionism/non-reductionism contrast, and defend my resistance to casting it as any kind of default view. In response to Hookway, I contrast discriminatory with distributive forms of epistemic injustice, and defend the basic taxonomy I present in the book, which casts testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as the two fundamental discriminatory forms of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? This (...) paper explains how, by showing that the basic role each plays in moral-social life is the same; and that one is conceptually and therefore historically prior to the other. The result is pluralism, with each kind of forgiveness represented as distinctive in both its psychology and its normativity; and yet an ordered pluralism—with Moral Justice Forgiveness revealed as the root kind, and Gifted Forgiveness a culturally contingent iteration. (shrink)

Within the field of systems theory, the term robustness has typically been applied to different contexts such as automatic control, genetic networks, metabolic pathways, morphogenesis, and ecosystems. All these systems involve either man-made machines, or living organisms. In this chapter, we will consider music as a peculiar complex system, involving both the realm of machines and the realm of biology. We will discuss some of the properties of music experience in terms of different attributes of robustness, focusing in particular on (...) stability, the property enabling a complex system to maintain its function against a wide range of external and internal changes. We will provide examples of the human ability of isolating and maintaining stable information within the perceptual flow and despite changes in the external world that reach our perceptions, leading towards a characterization of robustness in music perception as referred both to the search for regularities and to the range of tolerance that perception admits to regularities. Finally, we will list four multiple interaction cycles that typically characterize music experience and that involve both internal properties of the organism and the environment. (shrink)

In this paper we suggest a model of sequential auctions with endogenous participation where each bidder conjectures about the number of participants at each round. Then, after learning his value, each bidder decides whether or not to participate in the auction. In the calculation of his expected value, each bidder uses his conjectures about the number of participants for each possible subgroup. In equilibrium, the conjectured probability is compatible with the probability of staying in the auction. In our model, players (...) face participation costs, bidders may buy as many objects as they wish and they are allowed to drop out at any round. Bidders can drop out at any time, but they cannot come back to the auction. In particular we can determine the number of participants and expected prices in equilibrium. We show that for any bidding strategy, there exists such a probability of staying in the auction. For the case of stochastically independent objects, we show that in equilibrium every bidder who decides to continue submits a bid that is equal to his value at each round. When objects are stochastically identical, we are able to show that expected prices are decreasing. (shrink)

Resumo: As apropriações de conceitos da teoria marxista por parte de teólogos da libertação podem ser consideradas incoerentes, seja pela histórica relação de condenação mútua entre marxistas e clérigos, seja pela distinção entre religião e economia-política, típica da modernidade. Diante disso, o conceito de afinidade eletiva de Weber, na interpretação do sociólogo franco-brasileiro Michael Löwy, possibilita renovar os estudos dos fenômenos sociais nos quais o marxismo e a teologia cristã parecem fundir-se em uma crítica social radical, como teologia da libertação. (...) Esse instrumental analítico permite identificar o sentido no qual algumas categorias marxistas são apropriadas, em forte confluência nos marcos do cristianismo de libertação. Para isso, em uma análise bibliográfica referenciada na obra de Löwy, apresenta-se o desenvolvimento do conceito de afinidade eletiva na tradição webero-marxista, identificando elementos dessa convergência na teologia do cristianismo de libertação. Por fim, buscam-se exemplos desses elementos em textos de diferentes expressões da teologia da libertação. Trata-se de um exercício teórico que almeja colaborar para a consolidação de uma abordagem específica do tema.: The appropriation of concepts of Marxist theory by liberation theologians can be considered incoherent, whether in terms of the historical relationship of mutual condemnation between Marxists and clerics, or in terms of the distinction between religion and political economy that is typical of modernity. However, Weber’s concept of elective affinity, in the interpretation of the Franco-Brazilian sociologist Michael Löwy, makes it possible to renew the studies of social phenomena in which Marxism and Christian theology seem to merge into a radical social critique, as in the case of liberation theology. This analytical approach enables us to identify the sense in which some Marxist categories are appropriated within the framework of liberation Christianity. In a bibliographical analysis that makes reference to Löwy’s work, we present the development of the concept of elective affinity in the Weberian-Marxist tradition and identify elements of its convergence with the theology of liberation Christianity. Finally, we look for examples of these elements in texts from different expressions of liberation theology. (shrink)

O objeto de análise deste artigo é o processo de formação da PJB, isto é, seu método pedagógico e suas opções políticas. A análise se desenvolve a partir de uma contextualização histórica que busca identificar as mudanças ocorridas no método da PJB nas décadas de 1980 e 1990. Conclui-se que, durante os anos 1980, a PJB enfatizava a dimensão política em suas atividades de formação e participava dos diversos movimentos sociais que se organizavam em torno da proposta de redemocratização do (...) Brasil. No entanto, nos anos 1990 ocorre uma reformulação do método, o qual passa a direcionar a formação para as dimensões pessoal e teológica, com uma prática voltada para o interior da Igreja Católica. Contribuíram com essas mudanças fatores internos, como o retorno do movimento pentecostal no cenário religioso católico que dificultou a articulação da PJB com os grupos de jovens paroquiais, e fatores externos, como o advento da cultura pós-moderna na sociedade brasileira que trouxe consigo o predomínio de práticas individualistas, isto é, destituídas de base coletiva/comunitária. Palavras-chave: Religião. Juventude. Catolicismo. Teologia da Libertação. Pastorais da Juventude.: The object of this article is the formation process of the PJB , be it, its pedagogic method and its political options. The analysis is developed from a historical background in order to identify the changes occurred in the PJB method along the 1980 and 1990 decades. We can conclude that, during the 1980s, the PJB emphasized the political dimension in its formation activities and participated in several social movements, which were being organized around the proposal of Brazilian redemocratization. However, along the 1990s a reformulation of the method occurs and it passes to direct its formation to the personal and theological dimensions, having its practice turned to the inside of the Catholic Church. Internal factors, such as the back of Pentecostal movement to the catholic religious scenery, which has represented some drawbacks to the PJB articulation with the parish youth groups, as well as external factors, such as the arrival of the postmodern culture to the Brazilian society, which has brought the predominance for individualist practices, be it, without collective/communitarian basis, both contributed to these changes. Keywords: Religion. Youth. Catholicism. Liberation Theology. Youth Pastoral. (shrink)

Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our (...) lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. (shrink)

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political (...) significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom. (shrink)

African migrants in Brazil suffer the perverse effects of xenophobia, in addition to experiencing racist behaviors. These processes also manifest themselves within the context of kindergarten centers and pre-schools, directly influencing the pedagogical approach, as well as the perceptions and conceptions surrounding being a black African person. In this context, this article aims to present the perception of early education teachers in the city of São Paulo about racialization processes in the sheltering and insertion of black African children of ages (...) between 0 and 5. In order to achieve the aim of this research, interviews were held with early education professionals from both the direct and indirect educational systems, so as to try and comprehend how these agents perceive the sheltering/insertion of migrant black African children. The analysis was made based on theoretical frameworks regarding childhood sociology, studies on migration and race relations. This work intends to enlarge the childhood and migration research fields, as well as research on the processes of racialization of African migrant children aged less than seven. (shrink)

In this paper, we reject commonly accepted views on fundamentality in science, either based on bottom-up construction or top-down reduction to isolate the alleged fundamental entities. We do not introduce any new scientific methodology, but rather describe the current scientific methodology and show how it entails an inherent search for foundations of science. This is achieved by phrasing metaphysical assumptions into falsifiable statements and define as fundamental those that survive empirical tests. The ones that are falsified are rejected, and the (...) corresponding philosophical concept is demolished as a prejudice. Furthermore, we show the application of this criterion in concrete examples of the search for fundamentality in quantum physics and biophysics. (shrink)

En la tradicción jurídica italiana siempre el derecho de la família y el derecho de la responsabilidad civil fueron distintos. Pero ahora la jurisprudencia, y tambien el legislador, estan introducendo los remedios aquilianos en la familia misma, entre marido y mujer y entre padres y hijos. El artículo quiere averiguar si es posible buscar una basis comun para esta nueva responsabilidad de los padres con la responsabilidad de los mismos para los daños que los niños hacen a los terceros.

O pensamento de Hume pode ser comparado ao dos céticos modernos em muitos aspectos. Com relação ao tópico da racionalidade dos animais, Hume parece seguir de perto a leitura de alguns céticos modernos e se afastar consideravelmente da de Descartes. Por outro lado, diferente de filósofos como Montaigne, Charron e La Mothe Le Vayer, Hume não tinha por finalidade colocar a racionalidade humana num nível próximo dos animais para apenas provar a fraqueza do intelecto diante do desconhecido, mas intentava comparar (...) o nosso modo de proceder ao do animal para avaliar, com mais precisão, as suas teorias acerca da natureza humana. Neste artigo analiso o modo como os primeiros céticos da modernidade trataram da questão da razão dos animais e o comparo com as ideias de Hume sobre o assunto, sem deixar de mencionar as contribuições de Descartes e de Pierre Bayle. (shrink)

Richard Popkin, no capítulo VII de sua “História do ceticismo de Erasmo a Spinoza”, apresenta uma tendência predominante na filosofia moderna de rejeitar o ceticismo pirrônico, por ser demasiado destrutivo, e o dogmatismo extremo, por ser questionável. A solução para esses partidários foi a de adotar um ceticismo que Popkin denomina mitigado ou construtivo, isto é, uma teoria que reconheça a impossibilidade de alcançarmos as verdades absolutas acerca da natureza e realidade, mas que admita a possibilidade de um certo conhecimento, (...) que possa ser convincente e provável, embora não metafisicamente inquestionável. Esta espécie de dúvida filosófica ganhou força com o advento da filosofia cartesiana, mas só tornou-se definitivamente respeitável com a sua formulação por David Hume, sustenta ainda Popkin. Neste trabalho mostraremos que os filósofos Pierre-Daniel Huet e Simon Foucher, além de Hume, poderiam entrar nesta categoria, que também pode ser definida de ceticismo acadêmico. (shrink)

The paper contains an axiomatic treatment of the intuitionistic theory of hereditarily finite sets, based on an induction axiom-schema and a finite set of single axioms. The main feature of the principle of induction used (due to Givant and Tarski) is that it incorporates Foundation. On the analogy of what is done in Arithmetic, in the axiomatic system selected the transitive closure of the membership relation is taken as a primitive notion, so as to permit an immediate adaptation of the (...) theory to cases of restricted induction (in particular primitive recursive induction). At the end of the paper several different forms of induction, which play an important role in the development of the theory, are compared. An alternative axiomatization of the theory, which is of intrinsic interest, is also discussed. (shrink)

Interpreting Bernard Williams’s ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical “-isms.” All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which (...) his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought—its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum—still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons, the relativism of distance, and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously underdetermine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams’s ethical philosophy taken as a whole. I label the object of this root conviction ethical freedom, and thus portray Williams as a philosopher of ethical freedom. (shrink)

Resenha de Gramsci em Quadrinhos, de Néstor Kohan e Rep.

A arte hoje não se define mais como aparição sensível da ideia ou da verdade. Ela não diz mais. No máximo, sugere. Isso quer dizer que sua significação é algo que apenas se acena de longe pelos significados postos e propostos pela obra. Ela é antes ausência que presença, antes um balbuciar do que uma fala. Como diz Paul Celan: NENHUMA ARTE DE AREIA MAIS, nenhum livro de areia, mestre nenhum. Nada de lance de dados. Quantosmudos?Dez e sete. Tua pergunta (...) – tua resposta.Teu canto, o que sabe? Fundonaneve, Uonaeve, U – e – e. (shrink)

Eu estava no campinho de futebol da casa dos meus pais, os quero-queros tinham feito ninho e seus três filhotes pequenos estavam aprendendo a comer bicando lá sei eu o quê numa parte mais úmida, onde nas chuvas corria uma fonte. Quando os quero-queros faziam ninho, cessavam todas as peladas. Não havia nem discussão, afinal eles moravam aí antes de chegarem os humanos, o terreno era deles, nós éramos os invasores. Um gato espreitava os filhotes, pronto para dar o bote. (...) Em vez de dar de ombros e dizer “é a lei da natureza”, espantei o gato. (shrink)

Ter uma noção mais clara sobre o que possa ser a verdade é central não só para a ciência, também não só para a filosofia, mas também para a arte. Há uma longa tradição filosófica que diz, com Aquino, que o belo é o resplendor da verdade ou, com Hegel, que o belo é a aparição sensível da ideia. Para o idealismo alemão, a ideia tinha de ser verdadeira, pois se não ela seria apenas um palpite infeliz. Como a verdade (...) permite distinguir o que é justo e correto, o que vale e o que não tem valor, ela também é central para a vida das pessoas, para as grandes decisões que precisam tomar e para a estruturação do seu dia a dia. (shrink)

Appropriate information and consent has been one of the most intensely discussed topics within the context of biobank research. In parallel to the normative debate, many socio-empirical studies have been conducted to gather experiences, preferences and views of patients, healthy research participants and further stakeholders. However, there is scarcity of literature which connects the normative debate about justifications for different consent models with findings gained in empirical research. In this paper we discuss findings of a limited review of socio-empirical research (...) on patients’ and healthy research participants’ experiences and views regarding consent to biobank research in light of ethical principles for appropriate information and consent. (shrink)

In this comment we critically review an argument against the existence of objective physical outcomes, recently proposed by Healey [1]. We show that his gedankenexperiment, based on a combination of “Wigner’s friend” scenarios and Bell’s inequalities, suffers from the main criticism, that the computed correlation functions entering the Bell’s inequality are in principle experimentally inaccessible, and hence the author’s claim is in principle not testable. We discuss perspectives for fixing that by adapting the proposed protocol and show that this, however, (...) makes Healey’s argument virtually equivalent to other previous, similar proposals that he explicitly criticises. (shrink)

We gain information from collective, often institutional bodies all the time—from the publications of committees, news teams, or research groups, from web sites such as Wikipedia, and so on—but do these bodies ever function as genuine group testifiers as opposed to mere group sources of information? In putting the question this way I invoke a distinction made, if briefly, by Edward Craig, which I believe to be of deep significance in thinking about the distinctiveness of the speech act of testimony. (...) The distinction is that between somebody’s functioning as a ‘good informant’ and their functioning merely as a ‘source of information’. The difference between these has, as he remarks, a crucial ethical aspect: What I have in mind is the special flavour of situations in which human beings treat each other as subjects with a common purpose, rather than as objects from which services, in this case true belief, can be extracted. In this paper I shall try to bring out the distinctive nature of the role of good informant in a way that helps to clarify what is at stake in asking whether there can be group testimony in the sense of genuinely collective testimony—that is to say, where the group testifier is a collective and not merely a sum of individuals testifying in one or another form of aggregated chorus. (shrink)

The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. (...) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

This article proposes a 7E model of the human mind, which was developed within the cognitive paradigm in religious studies and its primary expression, the Cognitive Science of Religion. This study draws on the philosophically most sophisticated currents in the cognitive sciences, which have come to define the human mind through a 4E model as embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended. Introducing Catherine Malabou’s concept of “plasticity,” the study not only confirms the insight of the 4E model of the self as (...) a decentered system, but it also recommends two further traits of the self that have been overlooked in the cognitive sciences, namely the negativity of plasticity and the tension between giving and receiving form. Finally, the article matures these philosophical insights to develop a concrete model of the religious mind, equipping it with three further Es, namely emotional, evolved, and exoconscious. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is (...) likely to imitate the structures of social power. A phenomenon of epistemic injustice is explained, and the politicizing implication for epistemology educed. (shrink)

Axel Honneth, em O direito da liberdade, apresenta uma crítica aos elementos problemáticos da liberdade jurídica desde sua primeira formulação, no século XVII, de caráter negativo, até um segundo momento, marcado pela ampliação dos direitos subjetivos, que transforma o espaço privado em um lugar de reflexão ética de onde derivam juízos de “bem” e de “justiça”. Como exemplo desde segundo momento, Honneth se vale do pensamento de John Stuart Mill. Ocorre que, mesmo reconhecendo a importância das teorizações millianas, Honneth insiste (...) em afirmar que a liberdade jurídica implica na constituição do sujeito como ator solitário dotado de objetivos estratégicos. Nossa proposta aqui é sugerir que ao se valer do pensamento de Mill para ilustrar sua reconstrução da noção de liberdade jurídica, e concluir por sua limitação, Honneth não alcança a extensão da proposta de filosofia social do autor inglês. A imbricação entre as noções de liberdade e igualdade em Mill permeia a esfera privada garantida pelos direitos individuais e introduz questões intersubjetivas no momento de reflexão ética. Ou seja, há claros elementos de influência do outro na determinação dos juízos morais legitimadores da ação social milliana. Visando explorar esta questão, procuramos, em um primeiro momento, identificar a crítica à insuficiência do reconhecimento de obrigações recíprocas entre os sujeitos que gozam de seus direitos individuais, para, em seguida, confrontarmos seus argumentos com as formulações de John Stuart Mill sobre o assunto. (shrink)

The standard interpretion of Hume's philosophy presents him both as a radical skeptic regarding rational claims about the adequate foundation of our belief system and as a naturalist who maintained that our beliefs (though rationally ungrounded) cannot be given up in ordinary life, due to natural drives and sentiments. This paper purports to show that Hume's naturalism can and should be interpreted as a method for addessing philosophical concepts (ideas and beliefs,to use Hume's jargon) that incorporates unreflected elements ofordinary life (...) (such as natural sentiments and drives) and assigns to them the same theoretical status that abstract processes such as reasons and arguments have. A philosophy that warrants unreflected mechanisms in the treatment of philosophical problems is what Hume calls a "true philosophy". Such philosophy is compatible with the more radical forms of skepticism, because the unreflected mechanisms that bring about ideas are imune to doubt. To ilustrate the theses put forth here and so as to render my characterization of naturalism more persuasive, I describe briefly and in broad terms at the end of the paper Hume's view of moral agency. (shrink)

[T]he dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our development and even existence.We are perhaps used to the idea that there are various species of oppression: political, economic, or sexual, for instance. But where there is the phenomenon that Nancy Hartsock picks out in saying that the world is “structured” by the powerful to the detriment of the (...) powerless, there is another species of oppression at work, one that has not been registered in mainstream epistemology: epistemic oppression. The word ‘structured’ may be read materially, so as to imply that social institutions and practices favour the powerful, or ontologically, so as to imply that the powerful somehow constitute the world. But for present purposes I am interested only in an epistemological reading, which implies that the powerful have some sort of unfair advantage in “structuring” our understandings of the social world. I will try to present an account of what this initially vague idea involves. I hope thereby to explain an exact sense in which the powerful can have a kind of epistemic advantage that means the powerless are epistemically oppressed. (shrink)

For over three decades, the capability approach proposed and developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum has had a distinct impact on development theories and approaches because it goes beyond an economic conception of development and engages with the normative aspects of development. This book explores the new frontiers of the capability approach and its links to human development in three main areas. First, it delves into the philosophical foundations of the approach, re-examining its links to concepts of common good, (...) collective agency and epistemic diversity. Secondly, it addresses its 'operational frontier', aiming to give inclusive explanations of some of the most advanced methods available for capability researchers. Thirdly, it offers a wide range of the applications of this approach, as carried out by a mix of renowned capability scholars and researchers from different disciplines. This broad interdisciplinary range includes the areas of human and sustainable development, inequalities, labour markets, education, special needs, cities, urban planning, housing, social capital and happiness studies, among others. (shrink)