This study takes up the discussion held by Philippe Sabot in Foucault, Sade and the Enlightenment when it came the Marquis de Sade's work uses in studies conducted by Michel Foucault from Madness and Civilization to The Will to Knowledge. What interests us know of this relationship? This is the main question that guided our study.

Les rapports de la pensee critique et de la reflexion anthropologique seront etudies dans un ouvrage ulterieur. C'est sur cette note que s'achevait la breve Notice historique que Michel Foucault avait place en tete de l'edition de sa traduction de l'Anthropologie de Kant (Vrin 1964). La note annoncait sans aucun doute l'ouvrage a venir, d'abord caracterise, des 1963, comme le livre sur les signes, et qui paraitra en avril 1966: Les mots et les choses, une archeologie des sciences humaines. En (...) realite, la courte notice historique, de trois pages, en ouverture de la traduction du texte de Kant ne proposait qu'un extrait fort reduit de ce qui avait constitue l'element principal de la These complementaire soutenue en Sorbonne le 20 mai 1961: Introduction a l'anthropologie de Kant, et dont Jean Hyppolite etait le rapporteur. Si la these complementaire, intitulee Genese et structure de l'anthropologie de Kant, etait restee inedite (a l'exception de la traduction de Kant), ce n'est pas que Foucault en eut ete insatisfait: suivant les conseils des membres du jury, il allait bientot, des l'automne 1963, en faire le materiau central de son grand livre a venir. D'ou l'interet considerable de la presente edition qui donne pour la premiere fois l'Introduction complete, Genese et structure de l'anthropologie de Kant, et qui permet ainsi au lecteur d'entrer dans l'atelier d'un penseur dont l'oeuvre entier aura ete nourri par un debat critique avec Kant: qu'est-ce que l'homme? Qui sommes-nous? Comment se constituent le sujet epistemique et le sujet ethique? (shrink)

Foucault's previously unpublished doctoral dissertation on Kant offers the definitive statement of his relationship to Kant and to the critical tradition of philosophy. This introduction and commentary to Kant's least discussed work, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, is the dissertation that Michel Foucault presented in 1961 as his doctoral thesis. It has remained unpublished, in any language, until now. In his exegesis and critical interpretation of Kant's Anthropology, Foucault raises the question of the relation between psychology and anthropology, (...) and how they are affected by time. Though a Kantian “critique of the anthropological slumber,” Foucault warns against the dangers of treating psychology as a new metaphysics, explores the possibilities of studying man empirically, and reflects on the nature of time, art and technique, self-perception, and language. Extending Kant's suggestion that any empirical knowledge of man is inextricably tied up with language, Foucault asserts that man is a world citizen insofar as he speaks. For both Kant and Foucault, anthropology concerns not the human animal or self-consciousness but, rather, involves the questioning of the limits of human knowledge and concrete existence. This long-unknown text is a valuable contribution not only to a scholarly appreciation of Kant's work but as the first outline of what would later become Foucault's own frame of reference within the history of philosophy. It is thus a definitive statement of Foucault's relation to Kant as well as Foucault's relation to the critical tradition of philosophy. By going to the heart of the debate on structuralist anthropology and the status of the human sciences in relation to finitude, Foucault also creates something of a prologue to his foundational The Order of Things. Michel Foucault is widely considered to be one of the most important academic voices of the twentieth century and has proven influential across disciplines. (shrink)

Notes prises par Jacques Lagrange lors du cours d'anthropologie donné par Michel Foucault en 1954-1955 à l'École Normale Supérieure.

As a transformative thinker of the twentieth century, whose work spanned all branches of the humanities, Michel Foucault had a complex and profound relationship with literature. And yet this critical aspect of his thought, because it was largely expressed in speeches and interviews, remains virtually unknown to even his most loyal readers. This book brings together previously unpublished transcripts of oral presentations in which Foucault speaks at length about literature and its links to some of his principal themes: madness, language (...) and criticism, and truth and desire.The associations between madness and language--and madness and silence--preoccupy Foucault in two 1963 radio broadcasts, presented here, in which he ranges among literary examples from Cervantes and Shakespeare to Diderot, before taking up questions about Artaud's literary correspondence, lettres de cachet, and the materiality of language. In his lectures on the relations among language, the literary work, and literature, he discusses Joyce, Proust, Chateaubriand, Racine, and Corneille, as well as the linguist Roman Jakobson. What we know as literature, Foucault contends, begins with the Marquis de Sade, to whose writing--particularly La Nouvelle Justine and Juliette--he devotes a full two-part lecture series focusing on notions of literary self-consciousness.Following his meditations on history in the recently published Speech Begins after Death, this current volume makes clear the importance of literature to Foucault's thought and intellectual development. (shrink)

Michel Foucault's The History of Sexuality-the first volume of which was published in 1976-exerts a vast influence across the humanities and social sciences. However, Foucault's interest in the history of sexuality began as early as the 1960s, when he taught two courses on the subject. These lectures offer crucial insight into the development of Foucault's thought yet have remained unpublished until recently. This book presents Foucault's lectures on sexuality for the first time in English. In the first series, held at (...) the University of Clermont-Ferrand in 1964, Foucault asks how sexuality comes to be constituted as a scientific body of knowledge within Western culture and why it derived from the analysis of "perversions"-morbidity, homosexuality, fetishism. The subsequent course, held at the experimental university at Vincennes in 1969, shows how Foucault's theories were reoriented by the events of May 1968; he refocuses on the regulatory nature of the discourse of sexuality and how it serves economic, social, and political ends. Examining creators of political and literary utopias in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from Sade to Fourier to Marcuse, who attempted to integrate "natural" sexualities, including transgressive forms, into social and economic life, Foucault elaborates a double critique of the naturalization and the liberation of sexuality. Together, the lectures span a range of interests, from abnormality to heterotopias to ideology, and they offer an unprecedented glimpse into the evolution of Foucault's transformative thinking on sexuality. (shrink)

On May 27, 1978, Michel Foucault gave a lecture to the French Society of Philosophy where he redefines his entire philosophical project in light of Immanuel Kant's 1784 text, "What Is Enlightenment?" Foucault strikingly characterizes critique as the political and moral attitude consisting in the "art of not being governed in this particular way," one that performs the function of destabilizing power relations and creating the space for a new formation of the self within the "politics of truth." This volume (...) presents the first critical edition of this crucial lecture alongside a previously unpublished lecture about the culture of the self and three public debates with Foucault at the University of California, Berkeley in April 1983. There, for the first time, Foucault establishes a direct connection between his reflections on Enlightenment and his analyses of Greco-Roman antiquity. However, far from suggesting a return to the ancient culture of the self, Foucault invites his audience to build a "new ethics" that bypasses the traditional references to religion, law, and science. (shrink)

C'est sur cette note que s'achevait la breve Notice historique que Michel Foucault avait place en tete de l'edition de sa traduction de l'Anthropologie de Kant (Vrin 1964).

This chapter begins with an exposition of Foucault's genealogical account of critique as an untheorized attitude and mode of existence, that of being critical. Foucault finds the sources of philosophical critique in practices of resistance to politicized forms of pastoral power transposed from Hebraic and Christian traditions at the time of the Protestant Reformation. The next section explores Foucault's identification of the first theoretical formulation of this attitude of being critical in Kant's essay “ What is Enlightenment?”. The ensuing section (...) sketches Foucault's reading of Kant's piece, with an eye to the distinction between the transcendental version of critique practiced in the three Critiques, and critique as Enlightenment, the attitude characterized by the will not to be poorly or excessively governed. Finally, Foucault's analysis of modernity is presented as a model of practicing the self, a “limit attitude” emblematic of the exercise of freedom. (shrink)

la82 12.00 Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Este ensaio tem por tema a perspectiva de uma ética relacionada à concepçáo de modernidade em Michel Foucault. Ele trata da leitura que Foucault faz do texto de Kant sobre o Aufklärung. Investiga o âmbito específico das condições de uma ontologia do indivíduo na qual busca mostrar a articulaçáo entre o diagnóstico do presente e a reconstruçáo da tradiçáo crítica em torno da idéia de autonomia. Procura demonstrar (...) na concepçáo da “atitude de modernidade” a força histórica da herança do Aufklärung encontrada na perspectiva crítica de uma problematizaçáo ética da atualidade, a partir de uma concepçáo de autonomia, estabelecida na proposta de uma “estética da existência”. (shrink)

This paper problematizes the claim that Michel Foucault's work is normatively lacking and therefore possesses only limited political relevance. While Foucault does not articulate a traditional normative framework for political activity, I argue that his work nonetheless reflects certain normative commitments to, for example, practicing freedom and improving the state of the world. I elucidate these commitments by sketching out Foucault's notion of critique as a mode of existence characterized by practices of the self, arguing that such practices possess political (...) significance within the context of what Foucault refers to as a way of life, and analyzing points of intersection and departure between Kant's and Foucault's respective responses to the question `What is Enlightenment?' in order to clarify the connection Foucault makes between self-practices and freedom. Through this analysis I also show that Foucault reconceptualizes normative concepts such as obligation, freedom, autonomy and publicity in non-normalizing, politically compelling ways, and argue that his work opens onto a similar reconceptualization of the notion of political unity. I conclude with a preliminary investigation into the political efficacy of Foucault's ethos by discussing its relevance specifically for feminist politics. (shrink)

Foucault est fasciné par l’essai de Kant « Réponse à la question : qu’est-ce que l’ Aufklärung? » (1784) et s’y confronte à plusieurs reprises. Selon lui, l’essai représente une « charnière » entre les « trois Critiques » et son présent (l’actualité). Il contient « l’esquisse » de l’attitude de la modernité, que Foucault décrit comme attitude de la critique. Contre Foucault, l’article soutient que Kant, dans le cadre de sa réflexion sur le présent, tient des propos qui (...) prétendent à une validité intemporelle. Ensuite, l’essai s’adresse à un public érudit pour lequel les idées qu’il défend sont compréhensibles sans aucune connaissance relevant des domaines de la philosophie transcendantale et de la métaphysique. Enfin, l’attitude de la modernité est mieux décrite par le concept de « penser par soi-même » [ Selbstdenken ] que par celui de critique. Penser par soi-même vise l’état de majorité et « l’autoconservation de la raison » (Kant). (shrink)

O artigo busca evidenciar os pontos de contato entre as análises de Foucault e Kant sobre o Iluminismo. Ademais, cumpre explicitar a relação ambivalente da filosofia contemporânea com a razão esclarecida, ora considerada responsável por práticas de dominação, ora como condição de possibilidade para a autonomia e liberdade. Partindo da declaração de Foucault sobre seu trabalho situar-se na tradição crítica kantiana, trata-se de compreender como os dois filósofos problematizaram o processo de saída do homem de sua menoridade.

Cet article revoit la notion de la volonté chez Foucault en la resituant entre ses réflexions sur la modernité et ses travaux plus tardifs sur l’éthique et la subjectivité dans le monde gréco-romain. Le problème de la critique sert de prétexte pour reconsidérer l’étroitesse des rapports entre les philosophies kantienne et foucaldienne. L’article présente d’abord le concept de la volonté dans la morale ancienne et chez Kant, pour y confronter ensuite le problème de la critique, tel que Foucault en rend (...) compte dans un texte de 1978 (« Qu’est-ce que la critique? »), et effectuer enfin un dernier retour vers l’éthique. Ce mouvement de va-et-vient entre l’éthique et la critique suit un second cercle de compréhension qui éclaire l’un par l’autre les discours de Kant et de Foucault, en mêmetemps que les problématiques historiques qu’ils partagent. La volonté y est présentée chaque fois comme une activité du sujet qui a à se constituer lui-même en tant qu’être libre. Or, ce dernier a aussi à se positionner dans la modernité en rapport à une a utorité qui fonctionne de plus en plus comme un « gouvernement des âmes ». Le rapport à Foucault saisit d’une part l’historicité de la question kantienne de l’autonomie. Le rapport inverse reconnaît d’autre part un aspect peut-être indépassable de toute subjectivité éthique : l’espace transcendantal que la raison pratique articule chez Kant entre les notions de volonté, d’autonomie et de liberté. (shrink)

Cet article revoit la notion de la volonté chez Foucault en la resituant entre ses réflexions sur la modernité et ses travaux plus tardifs sur l’éthique et la subjectivité dans le monde gréco-romain. Le problème de la critique sert de prétexte pour reconsidérer l’étroitesse des rapports entre les philosophies kantienne et foucaldienne. L’article présente d’abord le concept de la volonté dans la morale ancienne et chez Kant, pour y confronter ensuite le problème de la critique, tel que Foucault en rend (...) compte dans un texte de 1978 , et effectuer enfin un dernier retour vers l’éthique. Ce mouvement de va-et-vient entre l’éthique et la critique suit un second cercle de compréhension qui éclaire l’un par l’autre les discours de Kant et de Foucault, en mêmetemps que les problématiques historiques qu’ils partagent. La volonté y est présentée chaque fois comme une activité du sujet qui a à se constituer lui-même en tant qu’être libre. Or, ce dernier a aussi à se positionner dans la modernité en rapport à une a utorité qui fonctionne de plus en plus comme un « gouvernement des âmes ». Le rapport à Foucault saisit d’une part l’historicité de la question kantienne de l’autonomie. Le rapport inverse reconnaît d’autre part un aspect peut-être indépassable de toute subjectivité éthique : l’espace transcendantal que la raison pratique articule chez Kant entre les notions de volonté, d’autonomie et de liberté. (shrink)

Este artigo investiga como o diálogo de Michel Foucault - em sua última fase - com Immanuel Kant, sobre a questão da Aufklärung, permite uma reavaliação da perspectiva do pensador francês sobre conceitos como poder, liberdade e autonomia. Propõe sumariamente que a divisão entre "ontologia do presente" e "ontologia de nós mesmos" seria similar à distinção realizada na Metafisica dos Costumes, entre Doutrina do Direito e Doutrina da Virtude.

In this paper, I set out to consider the extent to which Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the transition from Kant's philosophy to key features of the novels of the Marquis de Sade in the Second Excursus of their Dialectic of Enlightenment can be viewed as a fragment of the ‘history of philosophy’ and to explain this account in a way that allows us to ask whether it succeeds in establishing a necessary connection between Kant's philosophy and Sade's novels. In (...) connection with, a particular problem emerges. This problem concerns the role played by a non-instrumental form of reason in Horkheimer and Adorno's attempt to establish an essential connection between Kant's theoretical philosophy and Sade's novels, in which the practical implications of the theoretical employment of reason allegedly become explicit. It will be shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, an employment of reason of the relevant type is not identified by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out to consider the extent to which Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the transition from Kant's philosophy to key features of the novels of the Marquis de Sade in the Second Excursus of their Dialectic of Enlightenment can be viewed as a fragment of the ‘history of philosophy’ and to explain this account in a way that allows us to ask whether it succeeds in establishing a necessary connection between Kant's philosophy and Sade's novels. In (...) connection with, a particular problem emerges. This problem concerns the role played by a non-instrumental form of reason in Horkheimer and Adorno's attempt to establish an essential connection between Kant's theoretical philosophy and Sade's novels, in which the practical implications of the theoretical employment of reason allegedly become explicit. It will be shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, an employment of reason of the relevant type is not identified by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

Lecture de la thèse complémentaire de Foucault : " Introduction à l'anthropologie de Kant ". L'anthropologie philosophique des deux philosophes| le rapport à la métaphysique| le rapport de Foucault à la généalogie de Nietzsche, à sa théorie de l'interprétation, ainsi qu'à Marx et à Freud.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kant without SadeFrancis SparshottErmanno Bencivenga’s discussion of “Kant’s Sadism” rests on a misrepresentation of Kant’s enterprise. 1 It presents Kantian morality as a matter of motivation, so that reason has to be pitted against desire. But Kant’s whole point is that, because the psychological causes of one’s actions can never be ascertained, they are irrelevant to morality. Morality is entirely a matter of the reasons for one’s actions, no (...) matter what one’s feelings. It is true that moral questions arise, morality exists, only for finite rational beings, who have inclinations that are relatively independent of the dictates of reason. But that independence does not mean that one should always act against one’s inclinations.The morality of an action depends on the agent’s “maxim”—the subjective practical principle on which one acts, the reasons one has and can give for thinking that what one is doing is right. Kant’s whole discussion is in terms of maxims. The word does occur twice in Bencivenga’s paper, but his account makes no use of it. When he says that “It is the motives of the action, the motives the person actually has—never mind what evidence we have for them—that confer moral content on the action” (p. 41), he does so in flat contradiction of Kant.The confusion underlying Bencivenga’s misunderstanding is most familiar to English-language Kantians from Schiller’s joke: “Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. / Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person. // —Surely, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely, / and then with aversion do what your duty enjoins you.” 2 Both participants in the exchange think [End Page 151] the morality of an action depends on its psychological causes, not on the reasons the agent has for thinking the action right and doing it. Both are wrong.What is revolutionary in Kant’s position is his contention that all a maxim requires to be moral is that agents should really make it their principle at the time of action—that the agent should really stand by it. That means, obviously, that at that moment the agent should be able consistently to will that everyone should act on it. Kant argues that it also means, less obviously, that doing the right thing should be one’s paramount principle, which involves treating humanity and human freedom as an end in itself—ultimately, treating oneself and others as “law-making members of a kingdom of ends.” Thus, for Kant, morality is entirely a matter of rational consistency.Since rational consistency is all that morality requires, morality lays down no plan of action, but presupposes the familiar world in which people already have plans and purposes. What one wills is always some particular thing. Morality has to do with the principles to be followed in pursuing these objectives. 3 Bencivenga’s contention that “making the well-being of some other human, or of one’s own community, or of humankind the goal of one’s action would be relegating rationality to (at best) an instrumental role, and thus denying any ethical value to that action” is wrong. Kant insists that finite rational beings inevitably pursue happiness, 4 and it is their duty to do so for others and (in a sense) for themselves. 5 A leading contention of the Critique is that happiness, like duty, is a component of the summum bonum. Making a principle of maximizing happiness does not destroy the autonomy of the will; the principle is a principle and subject to the critique of consistency, like other principles. Kant explicitly denies what Bencivenga asserts, that it is merely an empirical matter that humans are desirous as well as rational. On the contrary, it belongs to their essence. 6 What is empirical, as Kant explains at some length, is the specific content of a person’s desires.Neither of Bencivenga’s examples tends to show that morality is opposed to inclination. It is true that if the reason moral agents treat people well is really only that, on each occasion, this is... (shrink)

_Resumo_: este artigo analisa a interpretação de Foucault sobre Kant com o foco na complexidade das relações entre o trabalho filosófico, em geral, e o mundo concreto. O escopo do artigo é delimitado por esta análise de Foucault, especialmente, sobre dois textos de Kant: _O que é o iluminismo? _e _Antropologia de um ponto de vista pragmático_. Investiga-se a possibilidade de um acesso a um espaço anterior a qualquer orientação ética específica, deslocando-se, assim, do conjunto de elaborações éticas da tradição (...) filosófica. Primeiramente, destacam-se os diferentes posicionamentos possíveis assumidos pelos filósofos, em geral, em seu trabalho perante o mundo concreto. A seguir mostra-se a existência de uma ambigüidade latente no trabalho filosófico, a qual permite concluir que há sim um espaço prévio, dentro do qual o filósofo pode ou não compreender a sua situação histórica e o seu lugar no mundo. Todos estes elementos são expostos mediante o acompanhamento da análise realizada por Foucault. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The Marquis de Sade’s Juliette—well-known as an outrageously murderous, hedonistic anti-heroine—captured the attention of some of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Most of these engagements with Sade have received some critical attention. However, Foucault’s distinctive remarks on Juliette in The Order of Things have gone overlooked. I situate Foucault’s interpretation of Juliette alongside and against Adorno’s and Lacan’s: exploring his positioning of her as a liminal figure, situated in the Classical age on the cusp of modernity, (...) and his allusion to the way in which her “solitary—and endless” “prosperities” exceed our grasp. (shrink)

This study presents the theoretical apparatus of Foucault's early historical analyses as a version of Kantian criticism. In an initial textual exposition, the author attempts to distill a unified discursive practice from Kant's theoretical writings, arguing for Foucault's proximity to Kant on the basis of this reconstruction, by showing that his studies are modeled on this way of thinking. By recasting it in this framework, an unorthodox version of Foucault's work is generated, one that is at odds with the tendency (...) to emphasize a certain skepticism about the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge in his writings, and to mistake it for irrationalism and a hostility to the practice of theory. By drawing attention to the structural parallel between Foucault's practice and Kantian criticism, this study belies this picture. (shrink)

A tradução de Foucault da Antropologia de Kant, realizada como tese complementar à História da loucura na idade clássica e publicada pela primeira vez em 1964, é precedida, na edição que ora vem a lume (Vrin, 2008), de uma longa introdução originalmente apresentada à comissão julgadora e posteriormente omitida pelo autor – que contraria assim a recomendação da banca e prefere considerá-la como uma espécie de esboço preparatório ao dito “livro dos signos”, publicado em 1966 com o título de Les (...) mots et les choses – une archeologie des scienes humaines.1 Os anos que separam de sua publicação a redação desse estudo não puderam mitigar o valor das considerações de Foucault, que têm o duplo interesse de esclarecer a trajetória de seu pensamento no decorrer dos anos 60 e de instigar o interessado por Kant a quem sabe adotar novas perspectivas no estudo de sua filosofia. (shrink)

Foucault’s main thesis in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology is that the meaning of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View can only be entirely grasped in the light of certain notes concerning the human being, assembled in the Opus Postumum. He asserts that the discourses held on human beings in the Anthropology and the introduction to the Logic are temporary – though necessary – moments in the transition from the critical to the transcendental philosophy: the latter is the accomplishment (...) of Kantian philosophy, to which the former was only a Propädeutik. In this paper I call this a ‘teleological reading’ of the Anthropology, one which certainly has the merit of integrating this book in the evolution of Kant’s thought, but which can also be misleading, since it rarely considers the book Anthropology in itself. Hence, Foucault carries out what is more of a study of ‘Kant’s philosophy from an anthropological point of view’ rather than a study of the Anthropology. In the end, I also indicate the way in which this method enables us to distinguish his philosophical position both from Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant and from Sartre’s humanism. (shrink)

While increasing attention has been paid in recent years to the relation between Foucault’s conception of critique and Kant’s, much controversy remains over whether Foucault’s most sustained early engagement with Kant, his dissertation on Kant’s Anthropology, should be read as a wholesale rejection of Kant’s views or as the source of Foucault’s late return to ethics and critique. In this paper, I propose a new reading of the dissertation, considering it alongside 1950s-era archival materials of which I advance the first (...) scholarly appraisal. I argue that Foucault manifests a fundamental ambivalence to Kantian anthropology, rejecting it in theoretical terms while embracing its practical (‘pragmatic’) conception of the subject. Furthermore, I take these texts to collectively evidence Foucault’s attempt to situate himself within the anthropological-critical tradition rather than extricating himself from it. If we interpret Foucault to reject this tradition’s appeal to an essentialized, theoretical conception of subjectivity, what remains of anthropology is its inherent practical reflexivity in structure. Thus, I situate Foucault’s conception of ethics as one’s relation to oneself in continuity with this tradition. (shrink)

This article deals with the importance that Foucault attributes to the Critic of Pure Reason, in his book, The Order of Things . According to Foucault, the Critic occupies a symbolic place because of the problematic of finitude that this work inaugurates in the history of philosophy. First of all, Kant thinks about finitude from itself, and this differentiates him from Descartes, to whom this concept is referred to the infinite. Then, the Kantian finite transcendental subject is not an empirical (...) one, in contrast to the modern analyses of finitude, which confuse the empirical with the transcendental. In this respect, the Critic does not belong to the Classical Age any longer, because it bypasses the representation. But it cannot be included in the modern analyses of finitude either, such as those of the naturalistic positivism, the dialectic, and the phenomenology. Foucault thus suggests that the Critic brings with itself the possibility of an anthropology, in the sense it is a thought that imparts a transcendental value to the empirical contents, even if it does not belong to them. (shrink)

In this article we address Foucault’s interpretation of Kant’s anthropology as a whole, i.e. beyond Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View . I expose Foucault’s three most important thesis, which concern firstly the faithfulness of this book to the critical work that preceded it; secondly, the need of reading the Introduction to the Logic and the Opus postumum in order to draw crucial aspects of Kant’s anthropology; and thirdly, the importance of reviving a critical gesture , so as to (...) demystify the pretensions of the post-kantian anthropological discourse. This way the difference between Foucault and Heidegger on the one side, and Foucault and Sartre on the other side, becomes clear: against the latter he adopts an anti-humanist perspective, and unlike the former he uses the Opus postumum to distinguish false anthropology from Kant’s anthropology.Neste texto analisamos a leitura que Foucault fez da antropologia kantiana no seu conjunto, isto é, para além da Antropologia de um ponto de vista pragmático . As três teses foucaultianas mais importantes são, primeiro, a da fidelidade deste livro à obra crítica que o precedeu; segundo, a da necessidade de ler a Introdução da Lógica e o Opus postumum para penetrar aspetos essenciais da antropologia de Kant; terceiro, a da importância de retomar um certo gesto crítico , para desmistificar as pretensões do discurso antropológico pós-kantiano. Neste percurso, torna-se nítido o modo como Foucault se distingue tanto de Heidegger quanto de Sartre: se se opõe a este por via do anti-humanismo teórico, também se diferencia de Heidegger pela forma como se serve do Opus postumum, que Heidegger praticamente ignorou. (shrink)

The article discusses Foucaults reading of Kants "Anthropology" (in French).

O que se buscará com o seguinte artigo é recriar, e analisar, o trajeto filosófico que tem sua origem no conceito kantiano de Aufklärung, e cuja evolução nos levará até o conceito foucaultiano de “ontologia crítica”. Em 1784, Kant diria num artigo do jornal alemão Berlinische Monatsschrift que a Aufklärung seria uma saída da minoridade do homem, e por minoridade podemos entender o fato do homem não ser capaz de fazer uso do seu próprio entendimento, ficando assim dependente (...) da razão de tutores. A partir disto, Foucault, em 1984, diria que a originalidade desta resposta de Kant está exatamente em não propor um método ou uma doutrina, mas antes, em incitar uma ação: propriamente a ação de saída [Ausgang]. Assim, Foucault nos apresentaria sua “ontologia crítica”; que diferentemente da ontologia tradicional que busca capturar os acontecimentos numa doutrina, o papel da ontologia foucaultiana seria exatamente o de tornar o sujeito incapturável por qualquer doutrina que apreende os acontecimentos num SER exclusivo. O que Foucault faria, desta forma, seria levar o conceito de Kant mais além, propondo mesmo um trabalho infinito, não apenas mais para sair, mas para igualmente permanecer fora do estado de minoridade. (shrink)

In this study I suggest ways of thinking through issues of intimacy that have emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in the USA. I propose a state of intimaphobia in education. However, I move beyond exposing this state of intimaphobia to offer particular readings of two philosophers of intimacy: Michel Foucault and the Marquis de Sade. I argue that these two philosophers provide alternative models of thinking through the problems and potentials of and for intimacy. While Foucault (...) has been taken up within education in any number of ways, his concept of the ‘homosexual’ is utilized to offer insights into intimacy. Sade, while the stranger philosopher to engage, offers challenges to contemporary educational practices through the lessons of the libertine. Foucault and Sade offer, to put it simply, promises for pedagogical pleasures that challenge the current fears around intimacy in education. (shrink)

Este artigo propõe relacionar as filosofias da história de Kant e de Hegel às bases do pensamento de Foucault, em História da loucura na idade clássica. Buscamos reconhecer, não indícios de uma história cosmopolita ou universal, mas em que medida o pensamento crítico e a filosofia como ciência das essências puras comparecem na inteligibilidade histórica de Foucault. A reunião de uma diversidade de experiências sob o conceito de desatino , fio condutor da obra, sugere uma proximidade com a tradição. Por (...) outro lado, a falta de um critério intrínseco, o qual justifique a referência de tal multiplicidade à alcunha da loucura, faz com que o fio condutor se restrinja a um aspecto negativo e que, positivamente, Foucault estabeleça para seu trabalho um primado empírico, na forma de uma constelação de imagens. O procedimento de História da loucura, que, junto ao interesse pela desrazão, inaugura o privilégio dado pelo filósofo francês à análise das descontinuidades nos leva a reconhecer a razão com base nos casos que solapam aos seus limites, às essências por ela própria discernidas, e com base nas práticas por ela promovidas e justificadas. This article proposes to relate Kant's and Hegel's philosophy of history to the basis of Foucault's History of Madness in the Classical Age. We are not attempting to recognize the presence of a cosmopolitan or universal history, but trying to understand how critical thinking and philosophy as the science of pure essences appear in Foucault's historical intelligibility. The challenge of bringing together a diversity of experiences under the concept of unreason , which is the common thread of the book, suggests an attachment to tradition. However, the absence of an intrinsic criterion justifying the reference of that multiplicity to madness motivates a negative aspect to that concept and, positively, makes Foucault establish for his work an empirical primacy, in the form of a constellation of images. The procedure of the History of Madness that, with its interest in unreason, inaugurates the privilege given by the French philosopher to the analysis of discontinuities, leads us to recognize reason based on cases that escape its limits and the essences discerned by itself. (shrink)