Continental Philosophy: Topics

En este escrito de ontología-trascendental reflexiono en términos heideggerianos sobre la voz ontológica, es decir, sobre el lenguaje interior que habla al oyente-escucha y que, desde ese decir ontológico, le revela lo que es. Dicha voz, al ser correctamente escuchada, dará paso a un auténtico apalabrar y decir, lo que develará una palabra-concepto ontológico transformador. Éste, al ser fruto de una auténtica ontología-trascendental, devendrá en un nuevo paradigma de la acción humana.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 67 Heft: 2 Seiten: 251-264.

Introdction to a special issue on philosophical notebooks and diaries, written in the surrounding of the Vienna Circle.

The case of Kafka stands at the very centre of Adorno’s articulation of modernist mimesis. His main study of Kafka is the long and complex essay “Notes on Kafka” (1953), which he republished in the collection Prisms (1955). But numerous references to Kafka are found throughout his unfinished masterpiece, Aesthetic Theory (first published in 1970) and in the four part collection of essays, Notes to Literature.

Il concetto di Reale non coincide con la realtà; se l’atteggiamento dell’empirismo tradizionale nei confronti della realtà è infatti un ingenuo realismo, l’empirismo radicale è riuscito, invece, a pensare in maniera rivoluzionaria l’origine trascendentale dell’esperienza ordinariamente intesa e, dunque, la natura virtuale di quell’evento del tutto particolare che, soprattutto con Gilles Deleuze e Jacques Lacan, è il Reale. Più dettagliatamente, l’obiettivo dell’intervento consisterà nell’individuare, nelle prospettive aperte dall’empirismo radicale tra Ottocento e Novecento, una forma di temporalità atopica e “utopica”, che (...) non risponde alla scansione cronologica e all’accumulazione di istanti omogenei, poiché essa si distingue quale condizione di possibilità del tempo che scorre, o per meglio dire, di ciò che nel tempo trascorre. Si tenterà quindi di vedere in che modo, in tale prospettiva, si possa pensare un tempo quale presente assoluto (il tempo bizzarro di quell’evento reale che giunge a coincidere con una vita intera) scisso dalla kinesis aristotelica; un tempo, cioè, quale limite od origine trascendentale dell’esperienza: un presente assoluto in quanto atto in atto del vivente che vive o forse - si tratterà di capirlo attraverso una proposta di riflessione - quella terza sintesi del tempo quale forma pura e vuota del tempo medesimo, così come ebbe a scrivere Gilles Deleuze nel 1968 in Differenza e ripetizione. (shrink)

John Maraldo’s Crossing Paths with Nishida assembles the life’s work of one of the leading voices in Nishida scholarship. Spanning over three decades, this brilliant collection of essays charts the path not just of Nishida’s philosophy, but also the path of deep inquiry of one of his most incisive commentators. In thirteen insightful essays, each reprinted with a new introduction by the author, Maraldo delves into the most critical issues in Nishida scholarship while rendering his philosophy germane to a host (...) of contemporary issues, such as environmentalism, nationalism, cognitive science, and phenomenology. A variety of systematic topics are explored, ranging from Nishida’s notions of “absolute nothingness” and “enactive intuition” to questions of religion, politics, and Nishida’s relation to Heidegger. This volume is essential reading for the specialist and for any reader with an interest in the most important thinker of the Kyoto School of Japanese philosophy. (shrink)

Discussione a partire dal libro di Giorgio Agamben "Karman. Breve trattato sull'azione, la colpa e il gesto", Bollati Boringhieri, 2017.

Barash's work is both a philosophical work and a history of ideas. The one offers a conceptual account of collective memory, and the other a narrative of changing conceptions and ideological uses of “memory.” In both cases, he argues that careful attention to the border between memory and history is politically significant for criticising appeals to mythical bases of political unity.The main contention of the book is this: collective memory designates a restricted sphere of past references.

This book approaches work by Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou through their shared commitment to multiplicity, a novel approach to addressing one of the oldest philosophical questions: is being one or many? Becky Vartabedian examines major statements of multiplicity by Deleuze and Badiou to assess the structure of multiplicity as ontological ground or foundation, and the mathematical procedures these accounts prescribe for understanding one in relation to multiplicity. Written in a clear, engaging style, Vartabedian introduces readers to Deleuze and Badiou's (...) key ontological commitments, including the mathematical resources underpinning their accounts of multiplicity and one, and situates these as a conversation unfolding amid political and intellectual transformations. (shrink)

This out-of-print collection on animal rights, applied ethics, and continental philosophy includes readings by Martin Heidegger, Karin De Boer, Martha Nussbaum, David De Grazia, Giorgio Agamben, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, David Morris, Michael Thompson, Stephen Jay Gould, Sue Donaldson, Carolyn Merchant, and Jacques Derrida.

This monograph has three purposes. It attempts first to describe in general terms methods of investigation proper to strict phenomenology and to new rhetoric. Second, it describes certain recent developments by the author that lead to a de-projective approach to phenomenology and which are of potential significance in a variety of areas of study, including new rhetoric. Finally, suggestions are made with a view to bringing portions of rigorous phenomenology into close connection with certain of the basic concerns of new (...) rhetoric. (shrink)

The search for an answer to the question that constitutes the title has led to some insightful results concerning Kurt Gödel’s critical reception of major philosophical works. It shows how he uses philosophical argumentations of classical authors and turns them into new aspects for his own philosophical argumentation. In the case at hand a classical argument by Aristotle for the immaterialness of the soul is used by Gödel in order to add considerations to his own reasoning for the inexhaustibility of (...) mathematics, the mind-bodyproblem and his considerations about God; and vice versa to give new insights into an argument with a long history of reception. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 62 Heft: 2 Seiten: 231-238.

Postmodern thinking puts severe stress on the project of legal theory. The philosophical critique of grand narratives, coupled with the radically pragmatic return to localized practices, has rendered theorizing suspect. Theory appears to be a quaint vestige of previous "bad faith" refusals to accept the finitude of human existence. But the postmodern position is even more complex, because postmodern anti-theorists tend to employ perplexing jargon and wield sophisticated and obscure concepts in their work. The postmodern puzzle is whether one can (...) challenge theory without theorizing. Is theory defined by its practical effects, or by its refusal to become complicit in everyday practices? Is the urge to theorize a product of modernist ideology that leads us astray, or our openness to enlightenment? Although postmodern thinking has made these questions particularly pressing, they are timeless. Therefore, it should not be surprising that contemporary readings of Aristotle can provide a helpful guide for uncovering the possibilities of postmodern legal theory. I address the postmodern puzzle regarding the nature of theory and its relationship to practice by drawing from the contemporary appropriations of Aristotle's practical philosophy by Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Joseph Dunne. My goal is to outline the role that critical legal theorists can play in light of the neo-Aristotelian account of theory that emerges from this discussion. Although this account reinforces the postmodern critique by revealing that the image of the sovereign theorist who stands as expert commentator to the side of legal and social practices is an ideological myth, this does not mean that theory is irrelevant. Once theory is reconceived as a disposition within practice, its unavoidable significance becomes clear. The practical demand for judgments, combined with the normative injunction to do justice, makes law a particularly important venue for investigating the entwinement of theory and practice. I conclude by suggesting that critical legal scholarship by Bill Eskridge and Kathryn Abrams provide examples of this dynamic of theory and practice. (shrink)

Everyone knows that "postmodernism" implies pluralism, anti-foundationalism, and, generally,a postnormative view of the self and reality. While many embrace it, few bother to tell us what is wrong with modernity. What are the problems that brought about its crisis and ultimate demise as a philosophical and cultural movement? What are the lessons for the postmodern movement that can he drawn from them? James Mensch here explains why modernism failed as a viable philosophical enterprise and how postmodernism must be understood if (...) it is to serve as a defensible intellectual project in its stead. The heart of Mensch's argument is a reversal of the modernist view of the unitary subject as a ground of epistemological and ethical normativity. He substitutes for modernism a view, beholden to Aristotle but adapted to for our present age, that sees subjectivity as temporality in a world where subject and object are interactive. The result is a pluralism of forms of subjectivity corresponding to the different modes of temporality brought about by the world. In a series of analyses on the nature knowing, Mensch shows how we can embrace both the perspectivism of postmodernism while avoiding the skepticism and relativism that have constantly threatened to undermine its insights. (shrink)

I have sketched the well-known distinction between facts and evidence not to defend or attack it , but rather as a preface to a key episode in the history of the conceptual categories of fact and evidence. My question is neither, “Do neutral facts exist?” nor “How does evidence prove or disprove?” but rather, “How did our current conceptions of neutral facts and enlisted evidence, and the distinction between them, come to be?” How did evidence come to be incompatible with (...) intention, and is it possible to imagine a kind of evidence that is intention-laden?It is my claim that partial answers to these questions lie buried in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature on prodigies and miracles. I shall argue that during this period prodigies briefly became the prototype for a new kind of scientific fact, and that miracles briefly exemplified a form of evidence patent to the senses and crucially dependent on intention. Both conceptions diverge sharply not only from current notions of facts and evidence, but also from medieval views on the nature of prodigies and miracles. Prodigies were originally closely akin to portent, divine signs revealing God’s will and things to come; miracles were more intimately associated with the private experience of grace than with the public evidence of the senses. Prodigies were transformed from signs into nonsignifying facts, and miracles into compelling evidence, as part of more sweeping changes in natural philosophy and theology in the mid-seventeenth century. Lorraine Daston is professor of history of science at the University of Göttingen, Federal Republic of Germany. She is the author of Classical Probability in the Enlightenment and is currently at work on a history of scientific objectivity. (shrink)

Rav et Leitgeb défendent la thèse de l’autonomie des preuves informelles par rapport aux systèmes formels de preuve. Azzouni, au contraire développe une explication qui réduit les preuves informelles à un réseau de systèmes formels sous-jacents. L’objectif principal de cet article est de démontrer la possibilité d’une position tierce médiane mettant en avant une explication quasi formelle de la méthode de preuve dans les Éléments. L’explication est quasi formelle, plutôt que formelle, en ce qu’elle donne au contenu géométrique un rôle (...) irréductible dans les preuves d’Euclide en ce que ce rôle est sujet à des contraintes formelles. Les inférences qui sont basées sur concepts géométriques ont une occurrence à l’intérieur d’un cadre formel précisément défini.Rav and Leitgeb argue for the autonomy of informal proofs from formal systems of proof. In contrast, Azzouni develops an account which reduces informal proofs to a network of underlying formal systems. The general aim of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility of a third, middle position with a quasi-formal account of Euclid’s proof method in the Elements. The account is quasi-formal, rather than simply formal, in that it gives geometric content an irreducible role in Euclid’s proofs. It is quasi-formal, rather than simply informal, in that this role is subject to formal constraints. Inferences which are based on geometric concepts occur within a precisely defined formal framework. (shrink)

The aim of the present essay is to contribute to a phenomenological concept of Europe, taking as its starting point the idea of Europe developed by Jan Patŏcka as “Post-Europe.” Following the phenomenological account of self-transformation as the infinite task and eternal care for the soul, the essay discusses critically the phenomenological account of the self-differentiation of identity, which in turn introduces Hölderlin’s and Heidegger’s respective conceptions of “becoming in dissolution” to this discussion. It shows that the dialectic of identity (...) and difference is inadequate to conceive the philosophical question of contemporary Europe. Instead it insists that Europe is an “intervocal” rather than an equi-vocal concept. The essay proposes the concept of “intervocity [Zwischendeutigkeit]” and an open “in-betweeness” as key to an understanding of Europe as a philosophical task. (shrink)

This study is not an attempt to render an account of Heidegger's history of Being; that history is not a story and cannot be retold as one. This book is concerned with the insight that introduces us to the history of Being and the transformation in our re.

It has become nearly a truism for contemporary theorists of democracy to understand the democratic space as agonistic and contested. The shadow that haunts thinkers of democracy today, and out of which this assumption emerges, is the specter of totalitarianism with its claims to a totalizing knowledge in the form of ideology and a totalizing power of a sovereign will that claims to be the embodiment of the law. Caught up in these totalizing claims, the citizenry becomes elated. The only (...) remedy to totalitarianism is a democratic space wherein no one can claim to know the truth, no one can claim to occupy the space of power, and no one can claim to embody the law. The problem with this remedy is that it fails entirely to take account of what Arendt understands to be the fundamental condition of totalitarianism, namely, the institution of a "lying world order" whereby reality is replaced with a lie. For Arendt therefore the remedy for totalitarianism and its elated citizenry depends first and foremost upon the existence of factual truth. Following Arendt as well as Shoshana Felman's work on testimony, I argue that bearing witness to factual reality is the ground of the democratic public space and the remedy to an elated citizenry caught up in a lying world order. (shrink)

This paper intends to invoke the spirit of Hegel as the éminence grise behind analytical and continental philosophy. Both movements can be seen to originate in, or to receive a strong impetus in their development from, a repudiation of Hegel. Even Russell's quest for a systematic logical analysis of language may be seen as an attempt at a quasi- or anti-Hegelian systematicity. The collapse of this systematicity has led to the celebration of difference in both the analytical and continental schools. (...) Another feature of contemporary philosophy is the priority given to invention and creativity over discovery. In this respect, Nietzsche is the master-figure underlying all contemporary allegiance to, and indeed, obsession with, the twin idols of creation and difference. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to explore and understand the relationships between secularism, pluralism, and the post-secular public sphere in the thought of Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and William Connolly. The three authors develop a thorough critique of secularism which implies a radical break with the dogmatic idea of removing religion from the public sphere. My main objective is to show that this critique is related to a normative understanding of our post-secular situation and requires a rethinking of (...) the boundaries of the public sphere in relation to the predicament of pluralism. Arguing against the post-metaphysical conception of secularism, Taylor develops a critique of Habermas’s “institutional translation proviso”, and Connolly stresses the agonistic dimension of the post-secular public sphere. I take these criticisms into account, while arguing that Taylor and Connolly are unable to provide a sound basis for the legitimacy of our institutional settings. In contrast to Taylor and Connolly, I propose a reading of Habermas’s theory based on the internal relationship between universal justification and the everyday contexts of pre-political solidarity. I conclude with a focus on the need to take into account the agonistic dimension of the post-secular public sphere. (shrink)