ABSTRACTIn Against Democracy, Jason Brennan argues that public ignorance undermines the legitimacy of democracy because, to the extent that ignorant voters make bad policy choices, they harm their own and one another’s interests. The solution, he thinks, is epistocracy, which would leave policy decisions largely in the hands of social-scientific experts or voters who pass tests of political knowledge. However, Brennan fails to explain why we should think that these putative experts are sufficiently knowledgeable to avoid making errors as damaging (...) as those made by voters. Given the strong link between political knowledge and ideological dogmatism, as well as the tendency of social scientists to disagree with one another, the case for epistocracy is deeply implausible, at best. Moreover, given that there are important non-instrumental justifications of democracy—justifications of which Brennan appears to be radically ignorant—the epistocratic alternative would be unnecessary even if it were viable. (shrink)

We all ‘know’ that public opinion came to prominence in the political vocabulary of the late eighteenth century. It may be that this dates its rise a bit late, but it is not relevant to argue the matter here. My concern is rather that we be equally aware of the purposes for which people made use of the concept. Here I wish to consider various possible contexts for speaking or writing of public opinion, or ‘opinion’, as it was usually called (...) prior to the mid-eighteenth century. It may be possible to define, more fully than heretofore, the work that the expression did in eighteenth-century thought. As contemporary students of public opinion have been learning, an answer to this question may not even be wholly irrelevant to the task of specifying the nature of public opinion in our own time. (shrink)

After briefly reviewing some of the empirical and philosophical literature suggesting that there may be an adaptive role for delusion formation, we discuss the results of a recent study consisting of in-depth interviews with people experiencing delusions. We analyse three such cases in terms of the circumstances preceding the development of the delusion; the effects of the development of the delusion on the person’s situation; and the potential protective nature of the delusional belief as seen from the first-person perspective. We (...) argue that the development of the delusional belief can play a short-term protective function and we reflect on the implications that this might have for our understanding of psychotic symptoms, for the stigma associated with mental health issues, and for treatment options. (shrink)

_Beyond Solidarity_ is an impassioned argument for a sharable morality in a world increasingly fractured along lines of difference. Giles Gunn asks how human solidarity can be reconceived when its expressions have become increasingly exceptionalist and outmoded, and when the pressures of globalization divide as much as they unify. He finds the terms for answering these questions in a more inclusive, cosmopolitan pragmatism—one willing to explore fundamental values without recourse to absolutist arguments. Drawing on the work of William and Henry (...) James, John Dewey, Primo Levi, Richard Rorty, and many others, as well as postcolonial writing, Jewish literature of the Holocaust, and the cultural and religious experience of African Americans in slavery, Gunn points pragmatism in a transnational direction and shows how it can better account for the consequences of diversity. _Beyond Solidarity_, then, is a study of the difference that difference makes in a globalized world. (shrink)

From their interpretation of the Australian Citizens’ Jury on genome editing, Scheinerman (2023) concludes that inclusive and diverse deliberative processes of public engagement have salient benefi...

Nursing professionalization is both ongoing and global, being significant not only for the nursing workforce but also for patients and healthcare systems. For this reason, it is important to have an in‐depth understanding of this process and the factors that could affect it. This literature review utilizes a welfare state approach to examine macrolevel structural determinants of nursing professionalization, addressing a previously identified gap in this literature, and synthesizes research on the relevance of studying nursing professionalization. The use of a (...) welfare state framework facilitates the understanding that the wider social, economic, and political system exercises significant power over the distribution of resources in a society, providing a glimpse into the complex politics of health and health care. The findings shed light on structural factors outside of nursing, such as country‐level education, health, labor market, and gender policies that could impact the process of professionalization and thus could be utilized to strengthen nursing through facilitating increased professionalization levels. Addressing gender inequalities and other structural determinants of nursing professionalization could contribute to achieving health equity and could benefit health systems through enhanced availability, skill‐level, and sustainability of nursing human resources, improved and efficient access to care, improved patient outcomes, and cost savings. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore argues that deliberation and the aggregation of citizens' dispersed knowledge should tend to produce better consequences than rule by the one or the few. However, she pays insufficient attention to the epistemic processes necessary to realize these democratic goods. In particular, she fails to consider the question of where citizens' beliefs and ideas come from, with the result that the democratic decision mechanisms she focuses on are insufficiently powerful to justify her consequentialist defense of mass (...) decision making. If “the few” are technocratic experts, Landemore supplies little reason to resist their rule on epistemic grounds, for she does not secure a knowledge base for the citizens that might compete with the knowledge that is often attributed to such “experts.” Aggregating and deliberating about poor information is no substitute for good information. Her book can therefore be seen as a call for a new phase of epistemic political theory that compares the real-world knowledgeability of ordinary citizens and putative experts, but it does not convincingly deliver on its goal to demonstrate the epistemic superiority of the former. (shrink)

The themes explored include political liberty, "legal tyranny," defences of influence in government, recognition of the Opposition, and the development of organic categories of political analysis - the latter in a chapter that explodes the association often presumed between organicism and conservative modes of thought. A chapter on the "Fourth Estate" examines the gradual process of legitimation of "interests," culminating in the influence of the press. Central to the account of new political forces and their recognition is the idea of (...) public opinion, which evolved during this period from the notion of public spirit. Chapters on the classical legacy of the century and on the High-Tories examine two backward-looking aspects of the political cultrure. Tracing the persistent influence of High-Toryism, Gunn questions the conventional wisdom about eighteenth-century ideological consensus in general and Whig solidarity in particular. He demonstrates that theories of government from the seventeenth century survived to a degree not previously admitted by modern scholarship. (shrink)

The following piece is a summary of a talk given to address the subject of women writing about male protagonists and from a male point of view, arguing that in Gunn’s own work traditional male characters are posited at the centre of texts that are actually female in perspective, so allowing for the reader to have the experience of a sort of inversion of reading. She does this by prioritizing female agency: thus the traditional male becomes someone else, the male (...) gaze transported to another kind of looking that instead of containing and exerting power over the women who are seen, rather reflects them back as powerful influential figures. Gunn defines what she calls this “breaking open the gaze,” the fracturing of a singular point of view into a multiple one, a seeing and a being seen, as a key feature of her own fictions, energizing and transforming the roles of both male and female characters in her work. (shrink)

The stir caused in the civilised world by the writings of Bergson, particularly during the past decade, is evidenced by the volume of the stream of exposition and comment which has flowed and is still flowing. If the French were to be tempted to set up, after the German manner, a Bergson-Archiv they would be in no embarrassment for material, as the Appendix to this book - limited though it wisely is - will show. Mr. Gunn, undaunted by all this, (...) makes a further, useful contribution in his unassuming but workmanlike and well-documented account of the ideas of the distinguished French thinker. It is designed to serve as an introduction to Bergson's philosophy for those who are making their first approach to it, and as such it can be commended. (shrink)

It is difficult within the space of an article such as this to do more than indicate the principal features of Renouvier's philosophy, and it is, of course, impossible to give in detail a discussion of the immense wealth of thought and argument contained in his writings. Of his thought before 1854, the most important piece of work was the article on “Philosophie” written for the Encyclopédic Nouvelle. This in some respects shows his own thought developing in the direction.

El autor afirma que la ciencia y la tecnología son hoy dos poderosas instituciones sociales y culturales internacionales que apuntan a producir conocimiento universalmente válido y productos para el consumo mundial. A partir de esto, se interroga sobre el supuesto de que lo cultural es una esfera separada y secundaria, meramente superestructural. Y postula que la cultura es el ámbito en que se producen las ideas por las que regimos nuestras vidas y que ellas penetran la ciencia. Dado el carácter (...) cultural de la ciencia, permite plantear que llegar a ser científicamente desarrollados podría no necesariamente significar volverse como Europa y/o los Estados Unidos. Tras ello se pregunta por las características que debiera tener la tecnología en América Latina. (shrink)

ABSTRACT One of the promises of the internet was its power to unite individual knowers with one another, democratizing knowledge and spurring our collective efforts toward truth. In what sense is our current epistemic life a collective effort? This article examines the idea of the epistemic community. I contrast epistemic community with a collection of individual epistemic agents aiming for truth. I propose that this latter conception of epistemic life permits neglecting our epistemic and moral duties. I argue that healthy (...) epistemic community requires joint commitments to truth and epistemic trust, and where epistemic trust requires conditions of mutual epistemic respect. (shrink)

By examining first-person descriptions of thought insertion I show that thought insertion is a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon. People experiencing this phenomenon have huge difficulty explaining what it is like due to the bizarre nature of the experience. Through careful analysis of first-person descriptions I identify some of the characteristics of thought insertion. I then briefly examine some of the philosophical literature regarding agency, ownership and thought insertion and conclude that the standard account of the basic characteristics of thought insertion (...) is inadequate when we consider the phenomenon as it is experienced. First person descriptions suggest that thought insertion is characterised by a lack of personal ownership and not simply by a loss of agency or authorship. This is an important factor that should inform research and therapeutic intervention. We cannot hope to arrive at appropriate therapeutic intervention or identify underlying neuronal mechanisms for the experience if we cannot say what the experience actually is. I further suggest that more analysis of first-person description is required for an improved account of the phenomenology of thought insertion. (shrink)

Background Delusions are a significant feature of mental illnesses and can occur in many clinical conditions (Maher, 2001) yet the standard clinical definition (American Psychiatric Association. DSM-5 Task Force, 2013) is highly contentious. Much of the literature holds elements such as bizarreness of content and incorrigibility of belief as defining factors of delusion. However, on closer inspection, delusions are not so easy to pin down. The difficulty in defining delusion is not a new one as “…we are all capable of (...) having convictions and it is a universal human characteristic to hold on to our own mistaken judgements.” (Jaspers, 1963, p.63). Objective I intend to highlight some of the difficulties associated with the definition of delusion and perhaps clarify the phenomenology. Methodology I examine some of the philosophical, psychological and psychiatric literature with regard to the definition of delusion. I also consider my experience of my own mental activity and experiences from my therapeutic work. Results/Conclusion I identify that delusions are a heterogeneous group and that there may be more than one ‘class’ of delusion. I also show that delusions are multi-dimensional with characteristics on a continuum with normal beliefs and that further research is needed to clarify the phenomenology. (shrink)

Clinically significant delusion is a symptom of a number of mental illnesses. We rely on what a person says and how she behaves in order to identify if she has this symptom and it is clear from the literature that delusions are heterogeneous and extremely difficult to define. People with active delusions were interviewed to explore what it is like to develop and experience delusion. The transcribed interview data was analysed to identify themes and narrative trajectories that help to explain (...) the phenomenon. Results showed that delusions can sometimes provide pragmatic benefits and that the genesis of some delusions can be characterised in terms of the enactivist notion of affective framing. Affective framing is a term that captures the background emotions that enable know-how in terms of goal directed action and cognition. If a person’s affective frame alters the world is no longer understood and know-how is lost. The way in which a person relates to her environment can be highly anomalous thus requiring her to find an extraordinary explanation. I argue that delusions arise as a result of a breakdown in affective framing and offer a conceptualisation of delusion supported by empirical findings. (shrink)

This article examines Harmony Korine's 2012 film, Spring Breakers. Arguing that Korine's film explores the bankruptcy of ethics in advanced capitalism, the article considers two predominate and contrasting theories of contemporary subjectivity: Slavoj Žižek's psychoanalytically-inspired conception of the subject as radical lack and Deleuze's affirmation of the subject through attention to affect and the virtual. In reference to Kant's radical reformulation of the moral law as an empty and tautological form with the concept of the categorical imperative, this article shows (...) that Korine's allegory of the spring break adventure correlates the subject's eagerness to surmount any and all obstacles toward enjoyment to late stage capitalism's increasing encroachment on the absolute limit of deterritorialization. In so doing, the film suggests that neither Deleuze nor Žižek, affirmation nor lack, offer an effective ethical principle for the subject in the face of the real of global capital. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Jeffrey Friedman’s Power Without Knowledge builds a critical epistemology of technocracy, rather than a democratic argument against it. For its democratic critics, technocracy is illegitimate because it amounts to the rule of cognitive elites, violating principles of mutual respect and collective self-determination. For its proponents, technocracy’s legitimacy depends on its ability to use reliable knowledge to solve social and economic problems. But Friedman demonstrates that to meet the proponents' “internal,” epistemic standard of legitimacy, technocrats would have to reckon with (...) the heterogeneity of people’s ideas, which he presents as one of two aspects of a political anthropology of ideational beings. The other aspect is ideational determinism: the shaping of our conscious actions by our interpretations, and of our interpretations by “ideational exposures”. For the most part, our symposiasts agree with this anthropology or leave it uncontested, but they fall back on democratic theory to point toward alternatives to technocracy. This raises the question, which Friedman does not ask, of whether his political anthropology undermines a certain brand of democratic theory: the liberal brand that attaches respect to people’s opinions as products of “free reflection,” i.e., as underdetermined. (shrink)

It is difficult within the space of an article such as this to do more than indicate the principal features of Renouvier's philosophy, and it is, of course, impossible to give in detail a discussion of the immense wealth of thought and argument contained in his writings. Of his thought before 1854, the most important piece of work was the article on “Philosophie” written for the Encyclopédic Nouvelle. This in some respects shows his own thought developing in the direction.

In Charles Renouvier we have one of the lone, stern, and indefatigable workers in philosophy in the nineteenth century. His powerful mind, moral earnestness, and intellectual vigour command respect and attention and place him high in the ranks of the philosophical thinkers of his century. He differed profoundly from his English contemporary Spencer and his German contemporary Lotze, both of whom have received more attention than Renouvier. His long and immensely active life fell into periods which coincide with, and partly (...) reflect, the political and intellectual fortunes of his country from the Battle of Waterloo, through the Revolution of 1830, the Second Republic of 1848, the Second Empire, the War and the Commune of 1871, into the Third Republic, with its Dreyfus struggles and its Educational and Disestablishment problems in the early years of the present century. (shrink)

In a recent New Yorker cartoon, a man is fixing a sink. His partner, standing nearby skeptically asks, “Do you really know what you are doing, or do you only google-​know?” This cartoon perfectly captures the mixed relationship we have with googling, or knowing via digital interface, particularly via search engines. On the one hand, googling is now the dominant source of socially useful knowledge. The use of search engines for this purpose is almost completely integrated into many of our (...) lives. On the other, the point the cartoon is making resonates with nearly all of us: users often recognize that there are risks and trade-​offs associated with gaining certain kinds of information via online search. These facts about googling make it particularly interesting to the applied epistemologist. Our practices involving search engines not only have a distinctive character, that character puts some traditional epistemic questions in a new light. This chapter will examine two of those questions. The first concerns the extent to which googling raises problems similar to familiar quandaries surrounding testimonial knowledge. The second –​and more radical –​concerns whether googling is a type of distributed or extended knowledge. (shrink)

For most people, the internet is now the most dominant source of socially useful knowledge. Its widespread use has made knowledge more accessible, more widely distributed, and more commonly produced. -/- But the internet is also widely seen—and not just by philosophers—as raising a number of distinct epistemological problems. Some of those problems concern the metaphysics of knowledge—the extent to which knowledge via the internet is understood as outsourced, or even extended, knowledge. Others concern the type of knowledge the internet (...) can give us—whether, for example, the knowledge we gain by using our digital devices is a kind of testimonial knowledge. -/- In this chapter, we will focus on a third issue: how our uses of the internet to gain information affect our epistemic agency—or our capacity to take responsibility for our own epistemically relevant mental states and our wider contributions to our epistemic environment. In the early days of digital technology, the internet was generally seen as increasing our epistemic agency for the simple reason that it made information (and presumably knowledge) more accessible and widespread. But in recent years, such optimism has been tempered due to the rise of fake news, massive amounts of misinformation online, and the average consumer’s seeming credulity with regard to what they read on social media. The chapter will outline these objections and critically examine them, arguing that both our epistemic agency and our ability to responsibly exercise such agency can be undermined by some uses of the internet, even as those same uses increase agency in other ways. (shrink)

This book examines the concept of public interest against the background of English politics from the Civil War to the coming of the Hanoverians. These years witnessed both the rise of the modern notion of the public interest as a part of ordinary political language and the growth of a social philosophy of individualism. The new ideas challenged the _status quo_, based on order, reason of state and national power, in the name of legitimate self-interest and respect for the rights (...) of the private person. In presenting a complex set of ideas in their historical context, the author examines both abstract philosophies and the issues of the day as recorded in press, pulpit and law courts. A chapter devoted to economic thought includes a re-assessment of the social assumptions of mercantilism. (shrink)

The advent of ChatGPT by OpenAI has prompted extensive discourse on its potential implications for science and higher education. While the impact on education has been a primary focus, there is limited empirical research on the effects of large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based chatbots on science and scientific practice. To investigate this further, we conducted a Delphi study involving 72 researchers specializing in AI and digitization. The study focused on applications and limitations of LLMs, their effects on the science (...) system, ethical and legal considerations, and the required competencies for their effective use. Our findings highlight the transformative potential of LLMs in science, particularly in administrative, creative, and analytical tasks. However, risks related to bias, misinformation, and quality assurance need to be addressed through proactive regulation and science education. This research contributes to informed discussions on the impact of generative AI in science and helps identify areas for future action. (shrink)

The problem of Time is one of the most fascinating and yet most difficult of those questions to which the human mind applies itself in philosophical thought. Dean Inge, in his Philosophy of Plotinus, has referred to this problem as ‘the hardest in metaphysics,’ and we know that “from the time of Parmenides and Zeno to that of Mr. Bradley and M. Bergson, there has been no other problem that has seemed so baffling as that of Time.”.

In this paper we take up the issue of near-term artificial intelligence (AI). "Near-term AI" is used to denote artificial intelligence algorithms that are already in place in a variety of public and private sectors, guiding decision that pertain to advertising, credit ratings, and sentencing in the justice system. Our focus here is to contribute to a critical discussion of the ways that AI is already being widely used in decision-making procedures in these areas. We will argue that developers and (...) deployers of AI systems--in senses to be defined--bear a particular kind of responsibility for the moral consequences of near-term AI. We will present a tool to aid developers and deployers in engaging in the moral reflection we argue is required of them, in order both the help them meet their moral obligations and to help address the material risks posed by what we take to be the status quo of actual near-term AI development. This chapter can be understood as a contribution to the field of technology assessment, but instead of suggesting policy revisions, we will propose a framework for ethical analysis that can be used to facilitate more robust ethical reflection in AI development and implementation. (shrink)

This article argues for the use of the queer kenotic theology of Marcella Althaus-Reid as a theological framework for analysing two stories of ambivalence and risk emerging from an ecclesial practice committed to hospitality. Following Natalie Wigg-Stevenson in envisioning theology not as proclamation but as conversation, the article is an example of what theology can look like when ethnographic material is juxtaposed with systematic theology. The empirical material is created using ethnography as a research strategy in the ecclesial practice of (...) the Lutheran church of Our Lady, Trondheim, Norway. In 2007, this church reopened as an ‘open church’ for people who live with different kinds of marginalization. As the sacred medieval space encounters the messy and chaotic lives of people, a powerful displacement of space, practices and bodies occur. The article concludes by discussing how the empirical material feeds back to kenotic theology and queer theology. (shrink)

Conducting research on adolescents raises a number of ethical issues not often confronted in research on younger children. In part, these differences are due to the fact that although assent is usually not an issue, given cognitive and social competencies, the life situations and behavior of youth make it more difficult to balance rights and privacy of the adolescents. In this article, the three ethical principles of beneficence, justice, and respect for persons are discussed in terms of their application to (...) the study of adolescents. Then, seven vignettes are presented to illustrate how these principles apply to real-life situations. How to balance the rights of adolescents and their parents is discussed, using adolescent girls and their parents for illustrative purposes. (shrink)

The problem of Time is one of the most fascinating and yet most difficult of those questions to which the human mind applies itself in philosophical thought. Dean Inge, in his Philosophy of Plotinus, has referred to this problem as ‘the hardest in metaphysics,’ and we know that “from the time of Parmenides and Zeno to that of Mr. Bradley and M. Bergson, there has been no other problem that has seemed so baffling as that of Time.”.