Speakers of different languages (e.g., English vs. Turkish) show a binary split in how they package and order components of a motion event in speech and co‐speech gesture but not in silent gesture. In this study, we focused on Mandarin Chinese, a language that does not follow the binary split in its expression of motion in speech, and asked whether adult Chinese speakers would follow the language‐specific speech patterns in co‐speech but not silent gesture, thus showing a pattern akin to (...) Turkish and English adult speakers in their description of animated motion events. Our results provided evidence for this pattern, with Chinese—as well as English and Turkish—speakers following language‐specific patterns in speech and co‐speech gesture but not in silent gesture. Our results provide support for the “thinking‐for‐speaking” account, namely that language influences thought only during online, but not offline, production of speech. (shrink)

Abstract artifacts such as musical works and fictional entities are human creations; they are intentional products of our actions and activities. One line of argument against abstract artifacts is that abstract objects are not the kind of objects that can be created. This is so, it is argued, because abstract objects are causally inert. Since creation requires being caused to exist, abstract objects cannot be created. One common way to refute this argument is to reject the causal inefficacy of abstracta. (...) I argue that creationists should rather reject the principle that creation requires causation. Creation, in my view, is a non-causal relation that can be explained using an appropriate notion of ontological dependence. The existence and the creation of abstract artifacts depend on certain individuals with appropriate intentions, along with events of a certain kind that include but are not limited to creations of certain concrete objects. (shrink)

Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosophical work done about what words really are. In this paper, I develop a new ontology for words. I argue that words are abstract artifacts that are created to fulfill various kinds of purposes, and words are abstract in the sense that they are not located in space but they have a beginning and may have an end in time given that certain conditions are met. What (...) follows from this two-fold argument is that words, from an ontological point of view, are more like musical works, fictional characters or computer programs, than numbers or sets. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Realism about types is the view that types are abstract and repeatable objects. Although type realists seem to agree that types, unlike properties, are objects in their own right, they argue that there is a metaphysically intimate tie between the existence conditions of types and properties. In particular, most type realists believe that types are, in a certain sense, determined by the properties that underlie them. I argue that this is a mistake, especially for those type realists who believe that (...) social and cultural types such as works of music and fiction or words are artifacts. I offer an alternative version of type realism where social and cultural types are dependent objects that should be understood in analogy with concrete artifacts. (shrink)

Software is a ubiquitous artifact, yet not much has been done to understand its ontological nature. There are a few accounts offered so far about the nature of software. I argue that none of those accounts give a plausible picture of the nature of software. I draw attention to the striking similarities between software and musical works. These similarities motivate to look more closely on the discussions regarding the nature of the musical works. With the lessons drawn from the ontology (...) of musical works I offer a novel account of the nature of software. In this account, software is an abstract artifact. I elaborate the conditions under which software comes into existence; how it persists; how and on which entities its existence depends. (shrink)

Artworks have authors. According to Christy Mag Uidhir, this simple assumption has significant consequences for the ontology of artworks. One such consequence is that artworks cannot be identified with abstract entities: if there are works of art, they are concrete entities. Therefore, one cannot create an abstract work of art. Mag Uidhir presents a novel challenge against abstract creationism, the view that certain kinds of art objects are abstract artifacts. This article has two aims. First, it provides a defense of (...) abstract creationism against Mag Uidhir’s arguments. Second, it argues that creation, even in the case of concrete artifacts, is never purely causal: to create an artifact is to bring about the conditions on which the created object ontologically depends. I conclude that a properly developed account of creation provides a better understanding of the question of how one comes to create an artifact, be it abstract or concrete. (shrink)

The property theory of musical works is the view that identifies works of music with properties as universals. The purpose of this paper is to distinguish different versions of the property theory and argue that none of them can satisfy certain demands we expect from a successful theory of musical works. I conclude that although properties as universals are familiar and useful in other domains, we cannot rely on them to explain the ontological nature of musical works.

According to natural kind essentialism, there are certain properties essential to natural kinds. A similar view, artifact kind essentialism, is commonly held for artifactual kinds. According to artifact kind essentialism, artifactual kinds have essential properties that determine their conditions of membership. In this paper, I explore and defend the possibility of a nonessentialist alternative for artifactual kind membership.

Hunger strikes potentially present a serious challenge for attending physicians. Though rare, in certain cases, a conflict can occur between the obligations of beneficence and autonomy. On the one hand, physicians have a duty to preserve life, which entails intervening in a hunger strike before the hunger striker loses his life. On the other hand, physicians’ duty to respect autonomy implies that attending physicians have to respect hunger strikers’ decisions to refuse nutrition. International medical guidelines state that physicians should follow (...) the strikers’ unpressured advance directives. When physicians encounter an unconscious striker, in the absence of reliable advance directives, the guidelines advise physicians to make a decision on the basis of the patient’s values, previously expressed wishes, and best interests. I argue that if there are no advance directives and the striker has already lost his competence, the physician has the responsibility to resuscitate the striker. Once the striker regains his decision-making capacity, he should be asked about his decision. If he is determined to continue fasting and refuses treatment, the physician has a moral obligation to respect this decisions and follow his advance directives. (shrink)

Theodore Sider in his latest book provides a defense of the substantivity of the first-order ontological debates against recent deflationary attacks. He articulates and defends several realist theses: (a) nature has an objective structure, (b) there is an objectively privileged language to describe the structure, and (c) ontological debates are substantive. Sider’s defense of metaontological realism, (c), crucially depends on his realism about fundamental languages, (b). I argue that (b) is wrong. As a result, Sider’s metaontological realism fails to establish (...) the substantivity of certain ontological disputes. Nonetheless, I will argue denying metaontological realism does not require giving up on the realism about structure, (a), that most of us would like to preserve: namely the idea that there are objective similarities and differences in the world that we try to wrap our minds around. (shrink)

The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing wrongly” in Turkish. (...) Then, taking Allan Hazlett’s recent account of the gap between traditional analyses of knowledge and actual epistemic practices of real cognitive agents as a point of departure, we spell out a non-universalist and non-extensionalist perspective on the value of “knowing wrongly.”. (shrink)

Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS) development teams provide an interesting and convenient setting for studying distributed work. We begin by answering perhaps the most basic question: what is the social structure of these teams? We conducted social network analyses of bug-fixing interactions from three repositories: Sourceforge, GNU Savannah and Apache Bugzilla. We find that some OSS teams are highly centralized, but contrary to expectation, others are not. Projects are mostly quite hierarchical on four measures of hierarchy, consistent with past research (...) but contrary to the naive image of these projects. Furthermore, we find that the level of centralization is negatively correlated with project size, suggesting that larger projects become more modular, or possibly that becoming more modular is a key to growth. The paper makes a further methodological contribution by identifying appropriate analysis approaches for interaction data. We conclude by sketching directions for future research. (shrink)

PREFACE. THE Author of this very practical treatise on Scotch Loch - Fishing desires clearly that it may be of use to all who had it. He does not pretend to have written anything new, but to have attempted to put what he has to say in as readable a form as possible. Everything in the way of the history and habits of fish has been studiously avoided, and technicalities have been used as sparingly as possible. The writing of this (...) book has afforded him pleasure in his leisure moments, and that pleasure would be much increased if he knew that the perusal of it would create any bond of sympathy between himself and the angling community in general. This section is interleaved with blank shects for the readers notes. The Author need hardly say that any suggestions addressed to the case of the publishers, will meet with consideration in a future edition. We do not pretend to write or enlarge upon a new subject. Much has been said and written-and well said and written too on the art of fishing but loch-fishing has been rather looked upon as a second-rate performance, and to dispel this idea is one of the objects for which this present treatise has been written. Far be it from us to say anything against fishing, lawfully practised in any form but many pent up in our large towns will bear us out when me say that, on the whole, a days loch-fishing is the most convenient. One great matter is, that the loch-fisher is depend- ent on nothing but enough wind to curl the water, -and on a large loch it is very seldom that a dead calm prevails all day, -and can make his arrangements for a day, weeks beforehand whereas the stream- fisher is dependent for a good take on the state of the water and however pleasant and easy it may be for one living near the banks of a good trout stream or river, it is quite another matter to arrange for a days river-fishing, if one is looking forward to a holiday at a date some weeks ahead. Providence may favour the expectant angler with a good day, and the water in order but experience has taught most of us that the good days are in the minority, and that, as is the case with our rapid running streams, -such as many of our northern streams are, -the water is either too large or too small, unless, as previously remarked, you live near at hand, and can catch it at its best. A common belief in regard to loch-fishing is, that the tyro and the experienced angler have nearly the same chance in fishing, -the one from the stern and the other from the bow of the same boat. Of all the absurd beliefs as to loch-fishing, this is one of the most absurd. Try it. Give the tyro either end of the boat he likes give him a cast of ally flies he may fancy, or even a cast similar to those which a crack may be using and if he catches one for every three the other has, he may consider himself very lucky. Of course there are lochs where the fish are not abundant, and a beginner may come across as many as an older fisher but we speak of lochs where there are fish to be caught, and where each has a fair chance. Again, it is said that the boatman has as much to do with catching trout in a loch as the angler. Well, we dont deny that. In an untried loch it is necessary to have the guidance of a good boatman but the same argument holds good as to stream-fishing... (shrink)

Static depiction of motion, particularly lines trailing behind a mover, has long been of interest in the psychology literature. Empirical research has demonstrated that these “motion lines” benefited motion comprehension in static images by disambiguating the direction of movement. Yet, there is no consensus on how those lines derive their meaning. In this article, we review three accounts suggesting different interpretations of what motion lines represent. While a perceptual account considers motion lines originating from motion streaks in the primary visual (...) cortex, metaphorical and lexical accounts propose them as graphical conventions that should be learned—either through resemblance to sensory experiences (e.g., natural path marks) or directly being mapped to a conceptual category of paths. To contrast these three accounts, we integrate empirical research on motion lines and their understanding. Overall, developmental, proficiency, and cross-cultural variances indicate that the understanding of motion lines is neither innate nor universal, thus providing less support for lines having a purely perceptual origin. Rather, we argue the empirical findings suggest that motion lines are not iconic depictions of visual percepts but are graphical conventions indexing conceptual path information, which need to be learned and encoded in a visual lexicon. (shrink)

In this country the idealists of the latter years of the nineteenth century and the early part of this century can be looked at as representing a conservative position, if the agnostics, naturalists and pragmatists of that time are taken to represent liberal movements. George Holmes Howison as an idealist was neither an isolated voice nor a member of a general school of thought that had slight influence. Howison’s published philosophical writings extend from 1861 to 1916. One reason (...) among others for Howison deserving a significant place in the history of philosophy was his participation in the “Conception of God” debate of 1895. That debate also serves as evidence of the completion of Howison’s odyssey from Hegelianism to personal idealism. (shrink)

The mystery of person is so deep that philosophers should welcome insights into that mystery from wherever they come. Literature, theater, film and psychology are a few sources that may provide help. The study of previous philosophies of person can be especially helpful. At the turn of the century there were numerous philosophical idealisms in this country. One was personal idealism and one of the most highly respected proponents of personal idealism was George Holmes Howison. If the idealists of (...) the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century were compared to the pragmatists, naturalists and agnostics of that time the idealists would represent a more conservative position. Howison, whose published philosophical writings span the period from 1861 to 1916, constructed an idealism that is post-Kantian: impressed and influenced by Kant, Howison rejected what he judged to be Kant’s errors. As a reaction to and rejection of Kant’s vision, Howison’s philosophy, which in the history of philosophy is a relatively rare blend of the personalistic and the idealistic, is interesting. (shrink)

In this country the idealists of the latter years of the nineteenth century and the early part of this century can be looked at as representing a conservative position, if the agnostics, naturalists and pragmatists of that time are taken to represent liberal movements. George Holmes Howison as an idealist was neither an isolated voice nor a member of a general school of thought that had slight influence. Howison’s published philosophical writings extend from 1861 to 1916. One reason (...) among others for Howison deserving a significant place in the history of philosophy was his participation in the “Conception of God” debate of 1895. That debate also serves as evidence of the completion of Howison’s odyssey from Hegelianism to personal idealism. (shrink)

The mystery of person is so deep that philosophers should welcome insights into that mystery from wherever they come. Literature, theater, film and psychology are a few sources that may provide help. The study of previous philosophies of person can be especially helpful. At the turn of the century there were numerous philosophical idealisms in this country. One was personal idealism and one of the most highly respected proponents of personal idealism was George Holmes Howison. If the idealists of (...) the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century were compared to the pragmatists, naturalists and agnostics of that time the idealists would represent a more conservative position. Howison, whose published philosophical writings span the period from 1861 to 1916, constructed an idealism that is post-Kantian: impressed and influenced by Kant, Howison rejected what he judged to be Kant’s errors. As a reaction to and rejection of Kant’s vision, Howison’s philosophy, which in the history of philosophy is a relatively rare blend of the personalistic and the idealistic, is interesting. (shrink)

Abstract:The closing section of James's "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" contains a surprisingly abrupt dismissal of Kant's philosophy. This paper suggests that James's real target is his host, George Holmes Howison, whose Philosophical Union had invited James to speak at Berkeley. James and Howison shared a common commitment to pluralism in opposition to the Absolute monism such as Josiah Royce was developing. Howison relies on Kant's account of the a priori as well as his moral ideal of (...) a Kingdom of Ends in order to fashion a pluralistic form of |idealism that would avoid the errors he found in Absolute monism while also countering the influential evolutionary philosophy of Herbert Spencer. While James shared Howison's opposition to monism, as well as his critical view of Spencer, he did not share his aversion to evolutionary ideas. Ultimately, the pragmatism that he announced at Berkeley would reply to Howison's Kantian approach by retaining a pluralism while building on the modern psychology growing out of evolution. James's position would test the alliance that they had forged against monism. In time, it would prove too fragile to withstand their growing differences until a final break came in the year before James's death. (shrink)