Plus que de différences qui se juxtaposent, on parle aujourd'hui de processus de différenciation pour traduire le changement fondamental entraîné par la rupture du lien jusqu'ici présumé insécable entre la culture en tant que facteur d'identification collective et son inscription spatiale. A la dichotomie classique entre Nous et les Autres - fondement même du projet anthropologique - se substituent ainsi de nouvelles catégories hybrides : communautés diasporiques, transnationalisme, créolisation, autant d'indicateurs thématiques d'une véritable réorientation de la réflexion sur la culture. (...) C'est dans ce contexte que se pose, de nos jours, le problème d'une " gestion " juridique de la différence culturelle présumée ou revendiquée. Tributaires de l'émergence des peuples autochtones et des minorités " ethniques " ou " culturelles " en tant que nouveaux acteurs sur la scène nationale et internationale, les quatorze contributions à ce recueil d'orientation interdisciplinaire proposent autant de réflexions critiques sur la notion de culture dans son double rapport au Droit (c'est-à-dire au droit positif) et aux droits. Ce qui est en jeu ici, c'est la culture comme variable de l'élaboration de normes juridiques en réponse à des revendications d'ordre identitaire. (shrink)

BackgroundThe landscape of clinical research has evolved over the past decade. With technological advances, the practice of using electronic informed consent (eIC) has emerged. However, a number of challenges hinder the successful and widespread deployment of eIC in clinical research. Therefore, we aimed to investigate the views of various stakeholders on the potential advantages and challenges of eIC.MethodsSemi-structured interviews were conducted with 39 participants from 5 stakeholder groups from across 11 European countries. The stakeholder groups included physicians, patient organization representatives, (...) regulator representatives, ethics committee members, and pharmaceutical industry representatives, and all were involved in clinical research. Interviews were analyzed using the framework method.ResultsInterviewees identified that a powerful feature of eIC is its personalized approach as it may increase participant empowerment. However, they identified several ethical and practical challenges, such as ensuring research participants are not overloaded with information and offering the same options to research participants who would prefer a paper-based informed consent rather than eIC. According to the interviewees, eIC has the potential to establish efficient long-term interactions between the research participants and the research team in order to keep the participants informed during and after the study. Interviewees emphasized that a personal interaction with the research team is of utmost importance and this cannot be replaced by an electronic platform. In addition, interviewees across the stakeholder groups supported the idea of having a harmonized eIC approach across the European Member States.ConclusionsInterviewees reported a range of design and implementation challenges which needs to be overcome to foster innovation in informing research participants and obtaining their consent electronically. It was considered important that the implementation of eIC runs alongside the face-to-face contact between research participants and the research team. Moreover, interviewees expect that eIC could offer the opportunity to enable a personalized approach and to strengthen continuous communication over time. If successfully implemented, eIC may facilitate the engagement of research participants in clinical research. (shrink)

Teleosemantic theories of representation are often criticized as being “too liberal”, i.e. as categorizing states as representations which are not representational at all. Recently, a powerful version of this objection has been put forth by Tyler Burge. Focusing on perception, Burge defends the claim that all teleosemantic theories apply too broadly, thereby missing what is distinctive about representation. Contra Burge, I will argue in this paper that there is a teleosemantic account of perceptual states that does not fall prey to (...) this problem, and that we can arrive at this account by combining some of Burge’s insights with a producer-oriented version of teleosemantics. The resulting theory turns out to be attractive and perfectly coherent. By contrast, the coherence of Burge’s own anti-teleosemantic approach becomes quite doubtful under closer examination—or so I will argue. (shrink)

Let us begin by making a rather obvious remark: the meaning of the question of ‘what we do not know’ varies according to whether or not the word “yet” is explicitly or implicitly included. It comes as no surprise that it should be in physics, the science in which, ever since Galileo and Newton, the quest for knowledge has been so amply and unexpectedly rewarded, that we find the most dramatic examples of both possibilities: one in which theory points to (...) knowledge not yet acquired, knowledge which is still to be conquered, but which, once attained, should constitute its final triumph; and one in which “we do not know” may be taken as the conclusion of established knowledge. We do not (yet) know how to unify the four fundamental forces of interaction in a single theory, and yet that eventuality is already being called the theory of everything (TOE). Since interaction is the principle on which physics now bases all its explanations, and since physical explanations are in principle valid for everything that exists, the unification of the forces of interaction must therefore be the science of the principles of everything that exists. On the other hand, we do not know at what moment a particular radioactive nucleus will disintegrate. In this case, our knowledge of physics makes it impossible to use the word “yet”: radioactive disintegration is described in terms of a “lifetime,” which means that each nucleus within a given population has, at any one moment, the same probability of disintegrating, and that this probability is not a function of any variable which we can identify and manipulate. In this case, our knowledge asserts that we cannot know now and will not be able to know for as long as our present knowledge remains valid. (shrink)

Perceptual constancies have been studied by psychologists for decades, but in recent years, they have also become a major topic in the philosophy of mind. One reason for this surge of interest is Tyler Burge’s (2010) influential claim that constancy mechanisms mark the difference between perception and mere sensitivity, and thereby also the difference between organisms with genuine representational capacities and ‘mindless’ beings. Burge’s claim has been the subject of intense debate. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that we cannot (...) hope to settle this debate (as well as related debates in the philosophy of mind) without a clear and substantive theoretical account of what perceptual constancies are. In the first part of this paper, I argue that the standard definitions in the literature fall short of providing such an account. Still, as I aim to show in the second part of the paper, by taking a closer look at some of the paradigm examples, it is possible to construct a plausible general account of perceptual constancies that is both clear and substantive, and that can serve as a firm foundation for settling debates like the dispute about Burge’s ‘constancy mechanism criterion’ for perception. (shrink)

Perceptual representations have distal content: they represent external objects and their properties, not light waves or retinal images. This basic fact presents a fundamental problem for ‘input-oriented’ theories of perceptual content. As I show in the first part of this paper, this even holds for what is arguably the most sophisticated input-oriented theory to date, namely Karen Neander's informational teleosemantics. In the second part of the paper, I develop a new version of informational teleosemantics, drawing partly on empirical psychology, and (...) partly on philosophical considerations. I shall argue that this version has all the virtues of Neander's original theory, but also the further crucial advantage of being able to account for the distality of perceptual content. (shrink)

This article examines how the Kashmiri non-dualistic Śaiva philosophers Utpaladeva (tenth century) and Abhinavagupta (10th–11th centuries) present and criticize a theory expounded by certain Buddhist philosophers, identified by the two Śaiva authors as Sautrāntikas. According to this theory, no entity external to consciousness can ever be perceived since perceived objects are nothing but internal aspects (ākāra) of consciousness. Nonetheless we must infer the existence of external entities so as to account for the fact that consciousness is aware of a variety (...) of objects: just as a mirror takes on a variegated appearance only by reflecting a multiplicity of objects that remain external to it, in the same way, phenomenal variety can be explained only by assuming the existence of various objects external to consciousness. In Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikās I, 5, 8–9 and their commentaries, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta endeavour to criticize this theory, which challenges their own idealistic principles: according to them, the Sautrāntikas’ inference is neither legitimate nor even possible. The passage is particularly telling as regards the strategy developed by Pratyabhijñā philosophers with respect to their Buddhist opponents: they make use of certain arguments propounded by Dharmakīrti in defense of Vijñānavāda in order to criticize the Sautrāntikas’ inference, but they also exploit this discussion to underline the superiority of their idealism over that of the Vijñānavādins. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a notable increase in the production of scientific expertise by large multidisciplinary groups. The issue we address is how reports may be written by such groups in spite of their size and of formidable obstacles: complexity of subject matter, uncertainty, and scientific disagreement. Our focus is on the International Panel on Climate Change, unquestionably the best-known case of such collective scientific expertise. What we show is that the organization of work within the IPCC aims to make (...) it possible to produce documents that are indeed expert reports. To do so, we first put forward the epistemic norms that apply to expert reports in general, that is, the properties that reports should have in order to be useful and to help decision-making. Section 2 claims that these properties are: intelligibility, relevance and accuracy. Based on this analysis, section 3 points to the difficulties of having IPCC reports indeed satisfying these norms. We then show how the organization of work within the IPCC aims at and to a large extent secures intelligibility, relevance and accuracy, with the result that IPCC reports can be relied on for decision-making. Section 4 focuses on the fundamentals of IPCC’s work organization--that is, division of labour within the IPCC--while section 5 investigates three frameworks that were introduced over the course of the functioning of the IPCC: the reviewing procedure of IPCC reports, the language that IPCC authors use to express uncertainty and the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project. Concluding remarks are offered in section 6. (shrink)

Truthmakers are supposed to explain the truth of propositions, but it is unclear what kind of explanation truthmakers can provide. In this paper, I argue that ‘truthmaker explanations’ conflate two different explanatory projects. The first project is essentially concerned with truth, while the second project is concerned with reductive explanation. It is the latter project, I maintain, which is really central to truthmaking theory. On this basis, a general account of truthmaking can be formulated, which, when combined with a specific (...) theory of reduction (the ‘conceptual entailment approach’), yields a new analysis of truthmaking. This analysis is intuitively appealing and avoids the problem of necessary truths, which poses a serious obstacle for standard accounts. (shrink)

This paper describes the corner-stones of a means-ends approach to the philosophy of inductive inference. I begin with a fallibilist ideal of convergence to the truth in the long run, or in the 'limit of inquiry'. I determine which methods are optimal for attaining additional epistemic aims (notably fast and steady convergence to the truth). Means-ends vindications of (a version of) Occam's Razor and the natural generalizations in a Goodmanian Riddle of Induction illustrate the power of this approach. The paper (...) establishes a hierarchy of means-ends notions of empirical success, and discusses a number of issues, results and applications of means-ends epistemology. (shrink)

Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher-level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower-level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher-level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. Some (...) truthmaker theorists—most prominently David Armstrong—have tried to solve this puzzle by arguing that these entities are ‘an ontological free lunch’, i.e. real existents that are still ‘no addition of being’. This answer is prima facie attractive, but I argue in this paper that the standard approaches to truthmaking—modal theories and grounding theories—are unable to vindicate the doctrine of the ontological free lunch, and thus fail to solve the problem of higher-level entities. Fortunately, there is a non-standard account of truthmaking available, the reductive explanation account, which succeeds where the standard approaches fail. (shrink)

1. IntroductionIn What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter, Justin Garson offers a novel theory of biological functions, the generalized selected effects (GSE) theory.1 He presents the theory in a clear and comprehensive way, defends it against various objections and applies it to different areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of psychiatry, the debate about mechanisms and the debate about teleosemantic theories of mental content.2Like other proponents of the aetiological approach to functions, Garson maintains that a trait’s biological functions (...) are grounded in its selectional history. However, his GSE theory differs from standard versions of the aetiological approach – so-called selected effects (SE) theories – in a crucial respect: while SE theories assume that all biological functions must ultimately be grounded in phylogenetic processes of natural selection or other (closely analogous) processes of differential reproduction (Millikan 1984: 15–82, Neander 1991, Godfrey-Smith 1994), the GSE theory allows that functions may also be grounded in processes of differential retention (see §2 for details). Garson forcefully argues that this broader account is theoretically well-motivated and has significant advantages over standard SE accounts when it comes to accommodating certain important classes of ontogenetically determined functions. (shrink)

According to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, a subject who has freed himself from the bondage of individuality is necessarily compassionate, and his action, necessarily altruistic. This article explores the paradoxical aspects of this statement; for not only does it seem contradictory with the Pratyabhijñā’s non-dualism (how can compassion and altruism have any meaning if the various subjects are in fact a single, all-encompassing Self?)—it also implies a subtle shift in meaning as regards the very notion of compassion ( karuṇā, kr̥pā ), (...) since according to the two Śaivas, compassion does not result from the awareness of the others’ pain ( duḥkha )—as in Buddhism—but from the awareness of one’s own bliss ( ānanda ). The article thus shows that in spite of their radical criticism of traditional ethical categories such as merit ( dharma ) and demerit ( adharma ), the two Śaiva philosophers still make use of ethical categories, but not without pro- foundly transforming them. (shrink)

Dans le cadre d’une ouverture des frontières à l’échelle internationale, la question de la résidence à prévoir au sens légal est d’une importance cruciale. En effet, le statut juridique est devenu un incontournable dans les discussions sur la liberté de circulation, avec le système migratoire que nous connaissons aujourd’hui, gouverné par un contrôle strict et stratifié selon le type de migrant. Le présent article vise à examiner les manifestations contemporaines de ce contrôle et à formuler des pistes de solution sur (...) le type de droit de résidence à prévoir advenant une ouverture des frontières. Nous explorerons tout d’abord les fondements de la liberté de circulation et des protections juridiques pour les migrants, pour ensuite passer en revue le traitement des résidents non citoyens dans l’expérience canadienne et américaine, dans celle de l’Union européenne et dans le cadre des phénomènes de migrations Sud-Sud afin de faire un compte-rendu pour résoudre la question portée en titre. En conclusion, une synthèse des observations sera effectuée pour tenter de réconcilier la notion de résidence avec le droit à la libre circulation. (shrink)

Bien que l’évolution du droit se soit traduite pour l’essentiel par une libéralisation des règles d’organisation de la famille, une analyse en terme de contractualisation de la famille est excessive. Certes, les couples peuvent se former et se défaire relativement librement, mais le pouvoir de la volonté reste limité, qu’il s’agisse des couples mais aussi et surtout des enfants. En effet, la volonté ne permet pas de dépasser certaines normes communes (conditions de validité du mariage). Elle est par ailleurs impuissante (...) pour suppléer l’absence de règles adaptées à certaines formes d’organisation familiale (familles recomposées). Son rôle a même reculé, au nom de l’égalité, lorsqu’il s’agit de donner une place aux enfants dans la famille (filiation). (shrink)

The Īśvarapratyabhijñā treatise—an important philosophical text composed in Kashmir in the 10th century CE by the Śaiva nondualist Utpaladeva—remains partly unavailable to date: a crucial component of this work, namely the detailed commentary (Vivṛti or Ṭīkā) in which Utpaladeva explained his own verses, is considered as almost entirely lost, since only a small part of it has been preserved in a single, very incomplete manuscript remarkably edited and translated by Raffaele Torella. However, our knowledge of the Vivṛti is quickly expanding: (...) many additional fragments have recently come to light. The article gives an overview of these new findings while highlighting the most interesting of them, i.e. the discovery of the lengthiest Vivṛti fragment known to date in the margins of a manuscript containing Abhinavagupta’s Vivṛtivimarśinī. It also provides an edition and translation of the beginning of this fragment. (shrink)

This book promotes the research of present-day women working in ancient and medieval philosophy, with more than 60 women having contributed in some way to the volume in a fruitful collaboration. It contains 22 papers organized into ten distinct parts spanning the sixth century BCE to the fifteenth century CE. Each part has the same structure: it features, first, a paper which sets up the discussion, and then, one or two responses that open new perspectives and engage in further reflections. (...) Our authors’ contributions address pivotal moments and players in the history of philosophy: women philosophers in antiquity, Cleobulina of Rhodes, Plato, Lucretius, Bardaisan of Edessa, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, Porphyry, Peter Abelard, Robert Kilwardby, William Ockham, John Buridan, and Isotta Nogarola. The result is a thought-provoking collection of papers that will be of interest to historians of philosophy from all horizons. Far from being an isolated effort, this book is a contribution to the ever-growing number of initiatives which endeavour to showcase the work of women in philosophy. (shrink)

En los años 1976 y 1977, la literatura parece tener una nueva función para Michel Foucault. Después de haberla considerado como un «pensamiento del fuera» en su análisis de Blanchot, que permitía huir del discurso, como línea de escape, Foucault, mientras afirma ya no interesarse por la literatura, sigue trabajando con ella de manera implícita y define otra manera de hacer con ella. Primero cambia la definición que le atribuía, con Roland Barthes: lo literario se hace «escritura» y alcanza lo (...) ético; por otra parte se presenta como una «forma de vivir», y en particular con el ejemplo de la escritura de sí mismo de Mauriac, que aparece como una práctica de subjetivación. Así, este artículo se propone estudiar esos años, para poner de relieve la inflexión que se trama en el pensamiento de Foucault a propósito de lo literario, al mismo tiempo que analiza las prácticas de sí de la Antigüedad. (shrink)

Nous proposons dans le cadre de cet article de penser à nouveaux frais la notion de témoignage à partir des travaux de Michel Foucault sur les pratiques de soi, en particulier dans les derniers cours au Collège de France. L’analyse du témoignage, dans ce cadre ne relève plus alors uniquement des études littéraires et remet en question la catégorie de « genre littéraire » affectée au témoignage. Il procède davantage d’un processus de subjectivation éthique qu’il s’agit d’appréhender à la lisière (...) de la philosophie et de la littérature. À partir d’un corpus de témoignages rendant compte de l’expérience concentrationnaire, il s’agira de mettre en évidence comment les derniers travaux de Michel Foucault fournissent des éléments pour penser cette notion transversale et déplacent le cadre épistémologique sur un terrain éthopoiétique. (shrink)

L'imitation est-elle l'apanage de l'espèce humaine? Dans quelle mesure l'imitation, abondamment mentionnée dans le discours colonial, est-elle révélatrice des ambiguïtés de la situation coloniale? Comment rendre intelligible l'adoption délibérée par des individus tant de comportements que de gestes imitatifs? Qu'il s'agisse des rapports entre les colons français et les "indigènes" , de la constitution de Tahiti en paradis touristique , des différences entre hip-hop français et américain , ou encore des liens entre les dimensions biologique, psychologique et culturelle de l'imitation (...) , tous les textes réunis ici révèlent l'importance du rôle joué par l'imitation dans le phénomène de la culture. (shrink)

Qu’aurait pensé Paul Otlet, « l’homme qui voulait classer le monde », face à la globalisation des procédures d’évaluation, s’étendant aujourd’hui ni plus ni moins au domaine de la pensée ? Le père fondateur de la bibliographie, qui entendait inventer un système permettant la mutualisation et le partage des fruits du génie humain, verrait aujourd’hui son rêve transformé..

S’il est un mot que le 21ème siècle semble avoir rayé de son vocabulaire, c’est bien celui d’« utopie ». De quelle manière peut-on encore aujourd’hui convoquer les utopies, est-ce seulement possible ? Évoquer les utopies en 2010, c’est d’une certaine manière assumer une position doublement sceptique. C’est en effet s’ancrer dans un scepticisme face au présent et tourné..

Advances in commercialism, materialism, and especially the exponential growth of telecommunication and social media, have dramatically altered the way human beings relate to one another and their environment. New means for providing access to education have arisen including online courses and programs thereby enhancing opportunities for participation in educational offerings and collaborative exchanges across the globe. This paper proposes to examine the online learning and its connection to the ultimate principle governing the values—integrity.

"The Invention of Modern Science proposes a fruitful way of going beyond the apparently irreconcilable positions, that science is either "objective" or "socially constructed." Instead, suggests Isabelle Stengers, one of the most important and influential philosophers of science in Europe, we might understand the tension between scientific objectivity and belief as a necessary part of science, central to the practices invented and reinvented by scientists."--pub. desc.

Joachim Schulte’s introduction provides a distinctive and masterful account of the full range of Wittgenstein’s thought. It is concise but not compressed, substantive but not overloaded with developmental or technical detail, informed by the latest scholarship but not pedantic. Beginners will find it accessible and seasoned students of Wittgenstein will appreciate it for the illuminating overview it provides.

Desires, or directive representations, are central components of human and animal minds. Nevertheless, desires are largely neglected in current debates about the naturalization of representational content. Most naturalists seem to assume that some version of the standard teleological approach, which identifies the content of a desire with a specific kind of effect that the desire has the function of producing, will turn out to be correct. In this paper I argue, first, that this common assumption is unjustified, since the standard (...) approach is in fact deeply problematic. Secondly, I propose an alternative account of the content of desires which, while generating plausible and determinate content ascriptions, avoids the main problem that plagues the standard approach, and is also preferable on other grounds. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt at bringing out various aesthetically relevant points alluded to by Wittgenstein in what I call ‘the Engelmann remark’ – a longish manuscript remark written by Wittgenstein in 1930 and painstakingly discussed by Michael Fried in the context of elucidating what is strikingly new in the work of a photographer like Jeff Wall. One part of this paper is dedicated to summarizing and briefly examining the account given by Fried while another part is meant to clarify (...) some of Wittgenstein’s points by way of contrasting their import with the story told by Fried. In this second part Wittgenstein’s late observations on aspect change are used to show in which ways these observations may help us to gain a better understanding of the idea of a specific ‘perspective’ claimed to go with a given work of art. (shrink)

Diversity and psychological health issues at the workplace are pressing issues in today’s organizations. However, research linking the two fields is scant. To bridge this gap, drawing from team faultline research, social categorization theory, and the job-demands resources model, we propose that perceiving one’s team as fragmented into subgroups increases strain. We further argue that this relationship is mediated by task conflict and relationship conflict and that it is moderated by psychological empowerment and task interdependence. Multilevel structural equation models on (...) a two-wave sample consisting of 536 participants from 107 work teams across various industries and work contexts partially supported the hypotheses: Task conflict did indeed mediate the positive relationships between perceived subgroups and emotional exhaustion while relationship conflict did not; effects on stress symptoms were absent. Moreover, contrary to our expectations, neither empowerment, nor task interdependence moderated the mediation. Results indicate that team diversity can constitute a job demand that can affect psychological health. Focusing on the mediating role of task conflict, we offer a preliminary process model to guide future research at the crossroads of diversity and psychological health at work. (shrink)

Sensory perceptions represent things in the outside world. This mundane fact raises a major problem for naturalistic theories of content: the ‘distality problem’. In a previous paper for this journal, I presented a solution to this problem which makes central appeal to constancy mechanisms. Justin Garson, also in this journal, recently criticized my solution and suggested a Dretskean alternative to it. Here, I defend my proposal by arguing, first, that Garson's criticisms ultimately miss the mark, and secondly, that his Dretskean (...) alternative is not viable, because it faces two fundamental problems: the empirical problem and the problem of changing response functions. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 19 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-4.

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 23 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-6.

In the history of metaphysics the position of John Duns Scotus is of major significance. Scotus argues that a univocal concept of being qua being serves as the subject of metaphysics. But the question remains whether this ought to be a concept of being which is so common that it even includes both real and mental being. Scotus himself opts for metaphysics as a real science by excluding the ens rationis from it. How did his pupils receive this doctrine? Do (...) they conform with the interpretation of metaphysics as a real science or do they consider being to be «supertranscendental», i.e., as being common to real as well as mental being and even transcending the transcendentals in the sense of a mere something? For these questions, the position of the Franciscan Nicolaus Bonetus , probably a pupil of Scotus’, is of great importance because he indeed defends the innovative position — almost completely unknown today — that ‘being’ is univocal to real and mental being. Here I present and interpret this metaphysical thesis of Bonetus, his sources and consequences. For this purpose I also draw on by John P. Doyle’s studies on the supertranscendental, which are dedicated to finding the missing link between medieval and Kantian conceptions of metaphysics. (shrink)