The paper considers some questions of a conceptual nature as regards freedom of the individual in a socio-Political and socio-Cultural context. Some of its main points may be stated as follows: 1) there are (at least) two lexicographical definitions of freedom in english, The first conceptually centered around the idea of 'not being interfered with from without', The second around 'not being determined from without'. For both concepts more precise definitions are proposed. 2) the terms 'negative' and 'positive' freedom are (...) apt to lead to confusion of various kinds and are better avoided. 3) an adequate definition of 'freedom as non-Interference' should include the idea of a minimum level. (shrink)

The author argues that there is a sharp contrast between Plato's earlier teleological explanation of nature and his later conception. In the Phaedo Anaxagoras' νοṽς as a teleological principle is rejected, the forms taking its place, in the Philebus the existence of a νοṽς explaining order and finality in nature, is strictly demonstrated. After that nature and consequences of this new doctrine are briefly discussed : the ineffable character of the transcendent cause of the world ; the reduction of the (...) number of the Forms to those of substances in nature ; the causality of νοṽς as an immanent and intermediate one ; the foundation of a mathematical science of nature. Thirdly the author makes an effort to reconstruct the philosophical grounds of this development, starting from the three theses, on which the argumentation of the Philebus is based. 1) νοṽς can only exist in a soul. It is argued that the dynamic conception of soul in the Phaedrus logically leads to the conclusion, that νοṽς also is movement . 2) To explain cosmic order and finality a νοṽς has to be accepted. This new idea occurs for the first time in the Sophistes and in the myth of the Politicus. 3) Cosmic order has a mathematical and astronomical character. This aspect is absent before the Philebus and seems to have been a consequence of Plato's discovery of the regularity in the planitary motions . Finally the author thinks he can indicate in the Sophistes the turning-point in the theory of Forms, as a result of the extension of the notion of being. (shrink)

The subject of this study is the relation between dialectic and dialogue. First an attempt is made to delineate a universe of discourse 'communication'. Mutual acknowledgement as a subject ('intersubjectivity') is proposed as a distinctive characteristic of the concept of dialogue, and a distinction is made between several classes of dialogue (see the diagram). Then the concept of dialectic is examined. Special attention is paid to the question what is to be understood by the term 'modern dialectical thinking' (from Fichte (...) onwards). Because it seems impossible to describe dialectic as a method in a methodical way, or to find some one characteristic common to such divergent dialectical philosophies as those of Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Engels, Marxism-Leninism and various forms of Neo-Marxism (L. Goldmann, Th. Adorno, E. Bloch), the proposal is made to stipulate that the terms dialectic, dialectical method and dialectical thinking in the modern sense should only be used when negation and/or contrast (in a specific sense, peculiar to the thinkers mentioned) characterize a mode of thinking in a more or less systematic way. After these preliminaries the relation between dialogue and dialectic is examined as it presents itself from an historical point of view. As regards Plato, it is contended that his dialektikê technê neither constitutes a dialogal philosophy, nor a dialogic (theory of the dialogue). His 'dialogues' rather are an instance of the 'literary dialogue' (with agogic intentions). Hegel's way of thinking is characterized as monological and speculative. Though his conception of thought as a process, as well historical as collective, does not logically exclude a dialogue, his attitude towards it seems to be rather cool (or at least ambiguous). With Marx the concept of the class struggle enters the dialectic and this concept is essentially inimical to the concept of the dialogue as a peaceful means of solving conflicts. In Marxism-Leninism the distinction between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions (necessitated by the universalization of the dialectic by Engels and the Russian pretension of having founded the socialist state) implies the view that only in socialist and communist societies fundamental contradictions are absent and that consequently only within these societies there is no need for non-peaceful means of solving conflicts. In the thought of Th. Adorno, M. Horkheimer and H. Marcuse there seems to be no room for a dialogue, as a consequence of the Utopian implications of their concept of negation. Only in J. Habermas we meet with a positive attitude towards the (social-practical) dialogue. For him the dialogue even is 'the normative foundation' of his 'critical theory' of society. Dialectic is seen by him as a consequence of a repression of the dialogue (and so the dialogue as an antidote against the dialectic of ‘Verdinglichung’). The main conclusion drawn from this historical survey is that, as far as modern dialectical thinking is concerned, dialectic exhibits an antithetic relation towards the concept of dialogue generally, and more specifically towards the 'social-practical dialogue'. With all these thinkers a positive attitude towards dialectical thinking de facto implies a negative evaluation of the dialogue (or at least coolness towards it), or conversely (Habermas). Finally the author presents some considerations of a more general nature: that dialectic and dialogue are not to be considered correlative concepts, because contrasting opinion (not dialectic) is a sufficient condition for the dialogue; that the startingpoint for a social-practical dialogue may be found in the concept of 'problematic situations related to generally accepted ends' (such as e.g. well-being); that the socialpractical dialogue is directed at a consensus indeed, at least directly, but that this does not prevent it from being directed indirectly at the truth; that the concept of synthesis constitutes the normative foundation of the dialogue, because the ideal consensus consists in a synthesis of contrasting points of view. (shrink)

After some preliminaries concerning the original character of Rawls's formulation of the problem of social justice the author discusses the question, whether the proposed principles of justice for the basic structure of society bear the marks of a liberal theory.The conclusion of this part (IA) is that Rawls seems to have in view a mixed society, or perhaps rather a society which transcends the contrast between liberalism and socialism.Some critics have ascribed to Rawls the view of man of classical liberalism (...) and for this reason have considered him a liberal. The author contends that these critics do not seem to have grasped the purely methodological significance of the concept of the original position. After some preliminaries concerning the original character of Rawls's formulation of the problem of social justice the author discusses the question, whether the proposed principles of justice for the basic structure of society bear the marks of a liberal theory.The conclusion of this part (IA) is that Rawls seems to have in view a mixed society, or perhaps rather a society which transcends the contrast between liberalism and socialism.Some critics have ascribed to Rawls the view of man of classical liberalism and for this reason have considered him a liberal. The author contends that these critics do not seem to have grasped the purely methodological significance of the concept of the original position. After a short interlude in which the conceptions of justice of Marx and Rawls are compared (IB) the author presents some considerations of a critical nature as regards the principles of justice (IC). The distinction between the general and the special conception of justice hinges on the lixical priority of freedom. Now, a contradiction seems to emerge between the fact that the choice in favor of the special conception is an absolute one, valid for all societies regardless of time and place, and the fact that the general conception is sometimes presented as a first phase in the evolution of a well-ordered society (sect.82). This is an indication that in Rawl's theory the priority of freedom is not as absolute as he thinks it to be. The decisive point in this respect seems to be the fact that the „fair value of liberty” (Sect. 36) would demand that a subsistence minimum is lexically prior to freedom. These seem to be serious inconsistencies for which nnno remedy can be found and which are apt to lead us back to „instuitionism” The author considers next (and this is his main point) the logical structure of Rawls's contract theory, which in his opinion stands in urgent need of clarification. It is argued that the concept of contract as such implies a certain indifference or indeterminateness as regards its result. At the other hand, the result (that which is agreed upon, i.e. the principles of justice) is ex hypothesi considered to explain „our considered judgements” in reflective equilibrium. In this way it appears that Rawl's central idea (rather implicitly) is : there exists a consensus as regards our considered judgements concerning justice and this consensus may be explained as resulting from a (hypothetical) contract. So the argument really is of a hypothetico-deductive nature and it would have been much better if Rawls had been clear about it himself. Some critical considerations follow. First attention is paid to the fact that strict observance is an essential element of the concept of contract and that from this point of view the three psychological laws (chapt. VIII) are of crucial importance to the theory. Their nature, however, is not altogether clear. They are neither empirical laws (because they presuppose a just institutional structure and a just society is said not to exist), nor are they a priori ones. So it is only left for us to say that they are construed as empirical laws. Now, the difficulty for Rawls with this must be that reliance on such laws is inconsistent with the rationality of the parties in the original position, because as a matter of fact these laws have not been tested empirically (the fact that they can not be tested in this way makes no difference at all). Secondly it is asked whether we are dealing with a contract doctrine at all. Starting from the question, whether in this theory the notion of contract (intended to explain our considered judgements as givens) really is an ultimate explanatory concept, it is argued that there are some anthropological presuppositions, which rather point in the direction of a theory of self-realization. This seems to be confirmed by some other features of the theory, e. g. the Aristotelian principle, the Kantian interpretation, the concept of natural rights, and society as a social union of social unions. In conclusion, neither Rawls's principles of justice nor his contract theory are sufficiently consistent to escape the need of reconsideration. (shrink)

It is given to few political thinkers to be at once as innovative and as self- contradictory as Jean Bodin. This paper examines the way in which a number of his ideas were developed in the seventeenth century, and attempts made, principally in Germany, the Netherlands and England, either to reconcile apparent contradictions within his thought or to exploit their ambiguity for political advantage. Elsewhere in Western Europe there was a more hostile response. In Counter-Reformation Spain Bodin was almost universally (...) disparaged as a politico, second only to Machiavelli in his alleged advocacy of the subordination of religion to political ends. His constructive ideas were taken rather more seriously in Counter-Reformation Italy, but there too there were attacks upon his secularism and negative criticism of his theory of sovereignty. In France itself Bodin was absorbed into the absolutist current, and since his reservations were weakened by the prevailing doctrine of divine right kingship, and his deviations generally forgotten, the problem of his legacy there is much less complex. (shrink)

Raynal and his collaborator, Diderot, offer views on the history and nature of the British Constitution in various parts of their encyclopedic account of Western expansion, The History of the Two Indies (1770, revised versions 1780 and 1784). These opinions are analysed in comparison with the judgments of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Bolingbroke, De Lolme and others. The evolution of Raynal's ideas on the subject is discussed in the light of his earlier anglophobic History of the Parliament of England (1748) and (...) the mutually contrasting French historians he used for that work, the Jesuit Pierre-Joseph d'Orleans and the Huguenot Paul de Rapin-Thoyras. Raynal's conversion to a liberal admiration for British institutions is seen both in the context of the American Revolution and his relationship with Diderot. His insistence on a historical approach clashes with Diderot's more radical and philosophical rhetoric, and the stress between their attitudes becomes apparent in the compromises they attain. Notable among their conclusions are the rejection of English appeals to antiquity, and the fortuitous development of liberty through a series of well defined stages. (shrink)

This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect of social (...) interaction, and second, ‘what—and how—people think’, the conceptual, classifying, cognitive component of human culture. Now in reality, of course (and perhaps not so ‘of course’; people do tend to think of them as separate ‘things’), these two aspects are inextricably intertwined. But it is essential to distinguish them analytically, because each aspect gives rise to quite different kinds of problems of understanding for the social anthropologist. We shall see that the problem of how to be ‘objective’, and so to avoid ethnographic error, arises in both contexts, but in rather different forms in each. (shrink)

This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect of social (...) interaction, and second, ‘what—and how—people think’, the conceptual, classifying, cognitive component of human culture. Now in reality, of course (and perhaps not so ‘of course’; people do tend to think of them as separate ‘things’), these two aspects are inextricably intertwined. But it is essential to distinguish them analytically, because each aspect gives rise to quite different kinds of problems of understanding for the social anthropologist. We shall see that the problem of how to be ‘objective’, and so to avoid ethnographic error, arises in both contexts, but in rather different forms in each. (shrink)

Background: The factors influencing parents’ willingness to enroll their children in biobanks are poorly understood. This study sought to assess parents’ willingness to enroll their children, and their perceived benefits, concerns, and information needs under different consent and data-sharing scenarios, and to identify factors associated with willingness. Methods: This large, experimental survey of patients at the 11 eMERGE Network sites used a disproportionate stratified sampling scheme to enrich the sample with historically underrepresented groups. Participants were randomized to receive one of (...) three consent and data-sharing scenarios. Results: In total, 90,000 surveys were mailed and 13,000 individuals responded (15.8% response rate). 5737 respondents were parents of minor children. Overall, 55% (95% confidence interval 50–59%) of parents were willing to enroll their youngest minor child in a hypothetical biobank; willingness did not differ between consent and data-sharing scenarios. Lower educational attainment, higher religiosity, lower trust, worries about privacy, and attitudes about benefits, concerns, and information needs were independently associated with less willingness to allow their child to participate. Of parents who were willing to participate themselves, 25% were not willing to allow their child to participate. Being willing to participate but not willing to allow one’s child to participate was independently associated with multiple factors, including race, lower educational attainment, lower annual household income, public health care insurance, and higher religiosity. Conclusions: Fifty-five percent of parents were willing to allow their youngest minor child to participate in a hypothetical biobank. Building trust, protecting privacy, and addressing attitudes may increase enrollment and diversity in pediatric biobanks. (shrink)

The injection of modality and strict implication into philosophical logic traditionally has invoked a common objection: conceptual gains achieved by introducing modal notions just aren't outweighed by the technical complexities of modality. For example, it is often pointed out that modal notions are introduced to eliminate the paradoxical aspects of material implication only to lead in turn to "paradoxes of strict implication.".

In the last of this set of ten essays, "How do Realism, Material and Dialectics Fare in Contemporary Science?," Professor Bunge invites his audience to join him in developing a philosophy he chooses to call logical materialism. This philosophy presupposes mathematical logic and includes a critical realist epistemology wherein scientific theories are symbolic, partial representations of things out there, and a dynamical materialist ontology wherein every existent is an ever changing system situated in emerging multiple levels of complexity and organization (...) the behavior of which is lawful, both of which are seen as programmatic. In arriving at this program, Bunge is both critical of and shares important points with the dominate Anglo-American approaches to philosophy of science. For example, with the tradition of logical positivism-empiricism he shares the heavy use of formal logic, semantics, and axiomatization, as a way to understanding scientific theories. At the same time he applauds the historico-philosophical tradition for its careful attention to the history of science and he insists that real science must be the object of analysis in philosophy of science, rather than what he considers to be unilluminating examples like green emeralds or black ravens. (shrink)

The stated aim of this investigation is to clarify and critically examine the philosophical concepts inherent in the cosmological argument: he aspires to investigate the argument rather than to either refute critics or support defenders. He treats both the thirteenth century versions of Aquinas and Duns Scotus and the eighteenth century versions developed by Samuel Clarke and Leibniz, but attaches greater importance and spends more time with the latter, finding them both more sophisticated and more fruitful for investigation. The eighteenth (...) century forms make no use of "what many philosophers would regard as a strange and perhaps nonexistent kind of causal series" and, according to the author, are more relevant because modern objections, e.g. those of Hume and Russell, aim at the eighteenth century forms. (shrink)

Argumentation as the public exchange of reasons is widely thought to enhance deliberative interactions that generate and justify reasonable public policies. Adopting an argumentation-theoretic perspective, we survey the norms that should govern public argumentation and address some of the complexities that scholarly treatments have identified. Our focus is on norms associated with the ideals of correctness and participation as sources of a politically legitimate deliberative outcome. In principle, both ideals are mutually coherent. If the information needed for a correct deliberative (...) outcome is distributed among agents, then maximising participation increases information diversity. But both ideals can also be in tension. If participants lack competence or are prone to biases, a correct deliberative outcome requires limiting participation. The central question for public argumentation, therefore, is how to strike a balance between both ideals. Rather than advocating a preferred normative framework, our main purpose is to illustrate the complexity of this theme. (shrink)

For the scholastic philosopher William Ockham (c. 1285-1347), there are three kinds of heresy. The first, and most unmistakable, is an outright denial of the truths of faith. Another is so obvious that a very simple person, even if illiterate, can see how it contradicts Divine Scripture. The third kind of heresy is less clear cut. It is perceptible only after long deliberation and only to individuals who are learned, and well versed in Scripture. It is this third variety of (...) heresy that J.M.M.H. Thijssen addresses in Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400. The book documents 30 cases in which university trained scholars were condemned for disseminating allegedly erroneous opinions in their teaching or writing, and focuses particularly on four academic censures that have occupied prominent positions in the historiography of medieval philosophy. Thijssen grants central importance to a number of questions so far neglected by historians regarding judicial procedures, the authorities supervising the orthodoxy of teaching, and the effects of condemnations on the careers of the accused. He also places still current questions regarding academic freedom and the nature of doctrinal authority into their medieval contexts. (shrink)

Due to increasing empiricalinformation on farm animal welfare since the1960s, the prospects for sound decisionmakingconcerning welfare have improved. This paperdescribes a strategy to develop adecision-making aid, a decision support system,for assessment of farm-animal welfare based onavailable scientific knowledge. Such a decisionsupport system allows many factors to be takeninto account. It is to be developed accordingto the Evolutionary Prototyping Method, inwhich an initial prototype is improved inreiterative updating cycles. This initialprototype has been constructed. It useshierarchical representations to analysescientific statements and statements (...) describingthe housing system. Welfare is assessed fromwhat is known about the biological needs of theanimals, using a welfare model in the form of atree that contains these needs as welfarecomponents. Each state of need is assessedusing welfare relevant attributes of thehousing system and weighting factors.Attributes are measurable properties of thehousing system. Weighting factors are assignedaccording to heuristic rules based on theprinciple of weighting all components(attributes and needs) equally, unless thereare strong reasons to do otherwise. Preliminarytests of the prototype indicate that it may bepossible to perform assessment of farm-animalwelfare in an explicit way and based onempirical findings. The procedure needs to berefined, but its prospects are promising. (shrink)

This book is a collection of papers on the metaphysics and natural philosophy of John Buridan (ca. 1295-1361), one of the most innovative and influential ...

A core symptom of anxiety disorders is the tendency to interpret ambiguous information as threatening. Using EEG and BOLD-MRI, several studies have begun to elucidate brain processes involved in fear-related perceptual biases, but thus far mainly found evidence for general hypervigilance in high fearful individuals. Recently, multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) has become popular for decoding cognitive states from distributed patterns of neural activation. Here, we used this technique to assess whether biased fear generalization, characteristic of clinical fear, is already present (...) during the initial perception and categorization of a stimulus, or emerges during the subsequent interpretation of a stimulus. Individuals with low spider fear (LSF, n = 20) and high spider fear (HSF, n = 18) underwent functional MRI scanning while viewing series of schematic flowers morphing to spiders. In line with previous studies, individuals with high fear of spiders were behaviorally more likely to classify ambiguous morphs as spiders than individuals with low fear of spiders. Univariate analyses of BOLD-MRI data revealed stronger activation towards spider pictures in high fearful individuals compared to low fearful individuals in numerous areas. Yet, neither average activation, nor support vector machine classification (i.e. a form of MVPA) matched the behavioral results - i.e., a biased response towards ambiguous stimuli - in any of the regions of interest. This may point to limitations of the current design, and to challenges associated with classifying emotional and neutral stimuli in groups that differ in their judgment of emotionality. Improvements for future research are suggested. (shrink)