v. 1. Qian Sugeladi zhe xue yan jiu, Sugeladi ji qi zhe xue si xiang -- v. 2. Si, shi, shi.

Collected works of Dge-lugs-pa scholar predominantly on doctrines, commentary on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa, study on Abhisamayālaṅkāra of Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāparāmitā, Buddhist logic, philosophy, rituals, etc.

Selected works of author's on critical analysis on different concepts of Buddhist doctrines and philosophy.

本书包括:中西文化之“会通和合”;写在《中国审美意识的探讨》出版之际;学者的使命;“诗言志”小注等内容。.

v. 1. Qian Sugeladi zhe xue yan jiu, Sugeladi ji qi zhe xue si xiang -- v. 2. Si, shi, shi.

In this article, we examine the empirical association between firm value and CSR engagement for firms in sinful industries, such as tobacco, gambling, and alcohol, as well as industries involved with emerging environmental, social, or ethical issues, i.e., weapon, oil, cement, and biotech. We develop and test three hypotheses, the window-dressing hypothesis, the value-enhancement hypothesis, and the value-irrelevance hypothesis. Using an extesive US sample from 1995 to 2009, we find that CSR engagement of firms in controversial industries positively affects firm (...) value after controlling for various firm characteristics. To address the potential endogeneity problem, we further estimate a system of equations and change regression and continue to find a positive relation between CSR engagement and firm value. Our findings support the value-enhancement hypothesis and are consistent with the premise that the top management of US firms in controversial industries, in general, considers social responsibility important even though their products are harmful to human being, society, or environment. (shrink)

Current work in language models (LMs) helps us speed up or even skip thinking by accelerating and automating cognitive work. But can LMs help us with critical thinking -- thinking in deeper, more reflective ways which challenge assumptions, clarify ideas, and engineer new concepts? We treat philosophy as a case study in critical thinking, and interview 21 professional philosophers about how they engage in critical thinking and on their experiences with LMs. We find that philosophers do not find LMs to (...) be useful because they lack a sense of selfhood (memory, beliefs, consistency) and initiative (curiosity, proactivity). We propose the selfhood-initiative model for critical thinking tools to characterize this gap. Using the model, we formulate three roles LMs could play as critical thinking tools: the Interlocutor, the Monitor, and the Respondent. We hope that our work inspires LM researchers to further develop LMs as critical thinking tools and philosophers and other 'critical thinkers' to imagine intellectually substantive uses of LMs. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAccording to the Dogmatism Puzzle presented by Gilbert Harman, knowledge induces dogmatism because, if one knows that p, one knows that any evidence against p is misleading and therefore one can ignore it when gaining the evidence in the future. I try to offer a new solution to the puzzle by explaining why the principle is false that evidence known to be misleading can be ignored. I argue that knowing that some evidence is misleading doesn't always damage the credential of (...) the evidence, and therefore it doesn't always entitle one to ignore it. I also explain in what kind of cases and to what degree such knowledge allows one to ignore evidence. Hopefully, through the discussion, we can not only understand better where the dogmatism puzzle goes wrong, but also understand better in what sense rational believers should rely on their evidence and when they can ignore it. (shrink)

According to a widely held norm of rationality, one should not change prior credences without new evidence. An important argument for this norm appeals to accuracy considerations, which says that changing priors doesn’t maximize expected accuracy. This is because accuracy measures are strictly proper, and thus any probabilistically coherent person regards her own priors as uniquely maximizing expected accuracy compared with other priors. -/- This paper attempts to resist the accuracy argument against changing priors. We argue that even if rational (...) epistemic decisions maximize expected accuracy according to strictly proper accuracy measures, it can still be rational to change priors sometimes. The core idea of our argument is that changing priors can be rational if one wants to maximize not just one’s current, short-term accuracy but also future, long-term accuracy. Our argument, if successful, shows that considering long-term accuracy has significant ramifications for the accuracy-first project. (shrink)

In Power and Moral Education in China, Wangbei Ye examines China’s recent initiation of school-based curriculum development in moral education as a means to analyze the power redistribution brought about by China’s economic reform. Though there is a great deal of scholarship dealing with moral education in China, the role of power has never been systematically discussed in relation to this topic.

Study on Am̥rtānubhava, philosophical classic by Jñānadeva, fl. 1290, Marathi religious leader.

This book intends to show that radical naturalism, nominalism and strict finitism account for the applications of classical mathematics in current scientific theories. The applied mathematical theories developed in the book include the basics of calculus, metric space theory, complex analysis, Lebesgue integration, Hilbert spaces, and semi-Riemann geometry. The fact that so much applied mathematics can be developed within such a weak, strictly finitistic system, is surprising in itself. It also shows that the applications of those classical theories to the (...) finite physical world can be translated into the applications of strict finitism, which demonstrates the applicability of those classical theories without assuming the literal truth of those theories or the reality of infinity. Both professional researchers and students of philosophy of mathematics will benefit greatly from reading this book. (shrink)

This paper explores how to explain the applicability of classical mathematics to the physical world in a radically naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics. The applicability claim is first formulated as an ordinary scientific assertion about natural regularity in a class of natural phenomena and then turned into a logical problem by some scientific simplification and abstraction. I argue that there are some genuine logical puzzles regarding applicability and no current philosophy of mathematics has resolved these puzzles. Then I introduce (...) a plan for resolving the logical puzzles of applicability. (shrink)

Study on Tibetan Buddhist logic; includes some poems and essays.

本书介绍了21条快乐法则, 涉及看淡、转换、进退、知足、糊涂、认同、放松、享受、随喜等.

本书侧重探讨中国神话中的哲学蕴含以及中国哲学思维模式的神话基础问题,包括神话哲学的元语言,神话的时空哲学,神话的生命哲学三编。.

We empirically examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on CEO compensation using a large sample of the US firms from 1996 to 2010. We develop and test two hypotheses, the overinvestment hypothesis based on agency theory and the conflict–resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory. We find that the lag of CSR adversely affects both total compensation and cash compensation, after controlling for various firm and board characteristics. Our estimates show that an interquartile increase in CSR is followed by (...) a 4.35% (2.78%) decrease in total (cash) compensation. We also find an inverse association between lagged employee relations and CEO compensation. Our results are robust to the correction for endogeneity using instrumental variable approach. Taken together, our results support the conflict–resolution hypothesis, but not the CSR overinvestment argument. (shrink)

Richard Foley has presented a puzzle purporting to show that all attempts in trying to find a sufficient condition of rationality are doomed. The puzzle rests on two plausible assumptions. The first is a level-connecting principle: if one rationally believes that one's belief that p is irrational, then one's belief that p is irrational. The second is a claim about a structural feature shared by all promising sufficient conditions of rationality: for any such condition, it is possible that one's belief (...) satisfies it and yet one rationally believes that it doesn’t. With the two assumptions, Foley argues that a sufficient condition of rationality is impossible. I explain how exactly the puzzle goes and I try to offer a solution. If my solution works, all theorists of rationality who accept certain level-connecting principles need to add an extra condition to their favourite rationality-making condition. (shrink)

Robert Talisse charges as doomed the Berlinian effort to infer liberal politics from value pluralism, based on the observation that it unavoidably vio- lates Hume’s law and that the two in fact clash in their basic logic. In arriving at this diagnosis, however, Talisse relies on several problematic assumptions about practical reasoning as well as about value pluralism and liberalism. As a result, he fails to appreciate the practical nature of practical reasoning and also fails to see the negative aspects (...) of value pluralism and of liberalism. Once these misconceptions get straightened out there is an increased opportunity for the Berlinian inference to succeed. (shrink)