Speakers frequently perform representational gestures to depict concepts in an iconic fashion. For example, a speaker may hold her index finger and thumb apart to indicate the size of a matchstick. However, the process by which a physical handshape is mentally transformed into abstract spatial information is not well understood. We present a series of experiments that investigate how people decode the physical form of an articulator to derive imaginary geometrical constructs, which we call “gesture form.” We provide quantitative evidence (...) for several key properties that play a role in this process. First, “profiling,” the ability to focus on a structural subunit within the complex form of the physical hand. Second, “perspective,” for which we show that one and the same handshape seen from different perspectives can lead to different spatial interpretations. Third, “selectivity,” the fact that gestures focus on specific spatial features at the expense of others. Our results provide a first step toward mapping out the process of how representational gestures make the communication of spatial information possible. (shrink)

Hemiparetic stroke in adulthood often results in the grouped movement pattern of the upper extremity flexion synergy thought to arise from an increased reliance on cortico-reticulospinal pathways due to a loss of lateral corticospinal projections. It is well-established that the flexion synergy induces reaching constraints in individuals with adult-onset hemiplegia. The expression of the flexion synergy in individuals with brain injuries onset earlier in the lifespan is currently unknown. An early unilateral brain injury occurring prior to six months post full-term (...) may preserve corticospinal projections which can be used for independent joint control and thus minimizing the expression of the flexion synergy. This study uses kinematics of a ballistic reaching task to evaluate the expression of the flexion synergy in individuals with pediatric-onset hemiplegia (PH) ages six to seventeen years. Fifteen individuals with brain injuries before birth (n = 8) and around full-term (n = 7) and nine age-matched controls with no known neurological impairment completed a set of reaches in an admittance controlled robotic device. Descending drive, and the possible expression of the upper extremity flexion snergy, was modulated by increasing shoulder abduction loading. Individuals with early PH achieved lower peak velocities when reaching with the paretic arm compared to controls however no differences in reaching distance were found between groups. Relative maintenance in reaching seen in individuals with early brain injuries highlights minimal expression of the flexion synergy. We interpret this conservation of independent control of the paretic shoulder and elbow as the use of more direct corticospinal projections instead of indirect cortico-reticulospinal pathways used in individuals with adult-onset hemiplegia. (shrink)

Die wirtschaftliche und soziale Bedeutung der Juden im Mittelalter.--John Spencer's Erklärung der biblischen Gesetze in ihrer Beziehung zu Maimonides.--Max Webers Soziologie des antiken Judentums.--Zu Gabirols allegorischer Deutung der Erzählung vom Paradies.--Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei Ḥasdai Crescas und den islamschen Aristotelikern.--Religion und Wissenschaft im mittelalterlichen und im modernen Denken.--Zur Kritik der Offenbarungsreligion in der islamischen und jüdischen Philosophie.--[Le-ḥeḳer ha-meḳorot shel Sefer ha-ʻiḳarim].--Die Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.--Die religiösen Motive in der Philosophie des Maimonides.--Das Problem der Kontingenz in der Philosophie (...) des Maimonides.--Die Normierung des Glaubensinhalts im Judentum.--Hermann Cohens Ethik. (shrink)

This paper suggests, against a comparative horizon and in broadly philosophical context, a fresh approach to the study of Hinduism. After indicating how religion in general and ‘Hinduism’ in particular are plural phenomena both internally and externally, the paper goes on to define a distinguishing property of Hinduness in terms of an approach that is based on a re-centring system of equilibrating and interactive polarities called ‘polycentrism’. This is described further as a calculated paradoxicality, which is articulated in the light (...) of possible objections. (shrink)

Liebe Grete Herrmann, besten Dank für Ihren Brief vom 19.5! Auch ich freue mich, Sie auf dem Pariser Kongreß zu sehen; wahrscheinlich werde ich auch an der vorangehenden Positivistentagung teilnehmen, also schon am 29.7. in Paris sein. Es interessiert mich, diese antimetaphysischen Metaphysiker einmal aus der Nähe zu beobachten. Ich werde sehen, es so einzurichten, daß ich eventuell auch nach dem Hauptkongreß noch einige Tage in Paris sein kann, um die von Ihnen angeregten Diskussionen mitzuführen. Jedenfalls hoffe ich auf einige (...) gründliche Gespräche mit Ihnen. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a surge in philosophical work on the rationality of grief. Much of this research is premised on the idea that people tend to grieve much less than would be appropriate or, as it is often called, fitting. My goal in this paper is diagnostic, that is, to articulate two never properly distinguished, and indeed often conflated, arguments in favour of the purported discrepancy between experienced and fitting grief: a metaphysical and a psychological argument. According to the (...) former, grief is rationalized entirely by facts about the past. And because the past is unchangeable, grief can be said to remain forever fitting. According to the latter argument, humans’ emotional resilience causes grief to diminish at a faster rate than would be fitting. Which of these problems we end up facing depends on relatively subtle variations in the characterization of the losses that render grief appropriate. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have advocated for an ‘interactive turn’ in the methodology of social-cognition research: to become more ecologically valid, we must design experiments that are interactive, rather than merely observational. While the practical aim of improving ecological validity in the study of social cognition is laudable, we think that the notion of ‘interaction’ is not suitable for this task: as it is currently deployed in the social cognition literature, this notion leads to (...) serious conceptual and methodological confusion. In this paper, we tackle this confusion on three fronts: 1) we revise the ‘interactionist’ definition of interaction; 2) we demonstrate a number of potential methodological confounds that arise in interactive experimental designs; and 3) we show that ersatz interactivity works just as well as the real thing. We conclude that the notion of ‘interaction’, as it is currently being deployed in this literature, obscures an accurate understanding of human social cognition. (shrink)

According to the standard view, a belief is based on a reason and doxastically justified—i.e., permissibly held—only if a causal relation obtains between a reason and the belief. In this paper, I argue that a belief can be doxastically justified by a reason’s mere disposition to sustain it. Such a disposition, however, wouldn’t establish a causal connection unless it were manifested. My argument is that, in the cases I have in mind, the manifestation of this disposition would add no positive (...) epistemic feature to the belief: a belief that is justified after the manifestation of a reason’s causal powers must have already been justified before their manifestation. As a result, those who adhere to the standard causal view of the basing relation face a hard choice: they should either abandon the enormously popular view that doxastic justification has a basing requirement or modify their view of the basing relation. (shrink)

In this book, Julius M. Moravcsik disputes that a natural language is not and should not be represented as a formal language. The book criticizes current philosophy of language as having an altered focus without adjusting the needed conceptual tools. It develops a new theory of lexical meaning, a new conception of cognition-humans not as information processing creatures but as primarily explanation and understanding seeking creatures-with information processing as a secondary, derivative activity. In conclusion, based on the theories of (...) lexical meaning and cognition, this work sketches an argument showing that the human understanding of human understanding must always remain just partial. (shrink)

Morality is often thought of as non-rational or sub-rational. In Moral Notions, first published in 1967, Julius Kovesi argues that the rationality of morality is built into the way we construct moral concepts. In showing this he also resolves the old Humean conundrum of the relation between 'facts' and 'values'. And he puts forward a method of reasoning that might make 'applied ethics' (at present largely a hodge-podge of opinions) into a constructive discipline. Kovesi's general theory of concepts - (...) important in its own right - is indebted to his interpretation of Plato, and his three papers on Plato, first published here, explain this debt. This new edition of Moral Notions also includes a foreward by Philippa Foot, a biography of the author, and a substantial afterword in which the editors, Robert Ewin and Alan Tapper, explain the signficance of Kovesi's work. (shrink)

Zu den wichtigsten Entwicklungen der Diskussion der Frage, ob Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung einerseits, und der Determinismus andererseits miteinander vereinbar sind, zählen nach verbreiteter Ansicht die Überwindung der Konditionalanalyse von Freiheit, sowie der wachsende Zweifel daran, dass alternative Möglichkeiten Voraussetzung für Verantwortung sind. In meiner Habilitationsschrift versuche ich zu zeigen, dass beide Entwicklungen Irrwege sind. Das Buch gliedert sich in zwei Hauptteile. Im ersten Teil wird der Begriff der praktischen Fähigkeit bzw. der Handlungs- und Willensfreiheit analysiert. Unter welchen Bedingungen kann (...) ein Akteur etwas anderes als das tun, was er faktisch tut, bzw. unter welchen Bedingungen ist ein Akteur frei, anders zu handeln? In der philosophischen Diskussion dieser Frage ist traditionell ein zentraler Aspekt, ob zu diesen Bedingungen auch Indetermination zählt. Philosophen, die die Freiheit, anders zu handeln, für kompatibel mit dem Determinismus halten, haben oftmals eine konditionale Analyse von Freiheit/Können vertreten (Augustin, Hobbes, Hume, Moore, Tugendhat). Gegen diese Analyse sind jedoch zahlreiche Einwände erhoben worden, die von den meisten Philosophen, auch von Kompatibilisten, für triftig gehalten werden. Ich versuche im ersten Teil, die Konditionalanalyse gegen die erhobenen Einwände zu verteidigen. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit geht es um die Frage, unter welchen Bedingungen Akteure moralisch verantwortlich gemacht werden können. Diese Frage ist mit der Frage nach der Fähigkeit, anders zu handeln, dadurch verbunden, dass einer lange unbestrittenen Annahme zufolge jemand nur dann moralisch verantwortlich sein kann, wenn er anders hat handeln können. Diese Annahme ist in neuerer Zeit – im Gefolge Harry Frankfurts – angezweifelt worden. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass die Annahme dennoch richtig ist. Ich entwickle eine an Überlegungen Peter Strawsons angelehnte Analyse von moralischer Verantwortung, der zufolge ein Akteur moralisch verantwortlich für ein Ereignis ist, wenn er in einer kausalen Beziehung zu ihm steht, welche Rückschlüsse auf die moralische Qualität seines Willens ermöglicht. Durch eine Analyse der Adäquatheitsbedingungen moralischer Beurteilung von Akteuren versuche ich zu zeigen, dass die relevanten Kausalbeziehungen dann bestehen, wenn eine bestimmte Konditionalanalyse die Fähigkeit zuschreibt, anders zu handeln. Alternative Möglichkeiten im Sinne dieser Analyse sind notwendig und hinreichend für moralische Verantwortung. (shrink)

Moral rights feature prominently and are relied on substantially in debates in bioethics. Conceptually, however, duties can perform the logical work of rights, but not vice versa, and reference to rights is therefore inessential. Normatively, rights, like duties, depend on more basic moral values or principles, and attempts to establish the logical priority of rights over duties or the reverse are misguided. In practical decision making, however, an analysis in terms of duties is more fruitful than one based on rights. (...) A right may function as a proxy term for a consequentialist rule, or for a deontological constraint, but does not thereby enrich these concepts. Rights may also help in a purely expressive sense and may assist an initial focusing on a moral conflict. However, their role in bioethics discourse is more one of convenience than of necessity. Moreover, unless rights are firmly founded on fundamental moral values, their use encourages rhetoric rather than argument. (shrink)

Each of two mutually recognising persons knows herself to be capable of and responsible for acting toward the other in ways that presuppose the other’s capability and responsibility for doing the same. The lecture brings out some egalitarian, libertarian and solidaristic aspects of an interpersonal ideal of mutual recognition, and it considers conversation, friendship and respect for right as three main examples of the syndrome.

In discussing the ways in which we hold each other accountable for immoral conduct, philosophers have often focused on blame, aiming to specify adequate responses to wrongdoing. In contrast, theorizing about the ways we can appropriately respond to minor moral mistakes – i.e., criticizable conduct that is bad but not wrong – has largely been neglected. My first goal in this paper is, thus, to draw attention to this blind spot and argue that a separate account of blameless moral criticism (...) is desirable. My second goal is to propose one way to explicate the contrast between blaming and blameless moral criticism in terms of the contrast between moral anger and moral disappointment: while moral anger, as many argue, is an appropriate response to moral wrongdoing, moral disappointment, but not moral anger, is an appropriate response to these minor moral mistakes. (shrink)

With unflinching gaze and uncompromising intensity Julius Evola analyzes the spiritual and cultural malaise at the heart of Western civilization and all that passes for progress in the modern world. As a gadfly, Evola spares no one and nothing in his survey of what we have lost and where we are headed. At turns prophetic and provocative, Revolt against the Modern World outlines a profound metaphysics of history and demonstrates how and why we have lost contact with the transcendent (...) dimension of being. The revolt advocated by Evola does not resemble the familiar protests of either liberals or conservatives. His criticisms are not limited to exposing the mindless nature of consumerism, the march of progress, the rise of technocracy, or the dominance of unalloyed individualism, although these and other subjects come under his scrutiny. Rather, he attempts to trace in space and time the remote causes and processes that have exercised corrosive influence on what he considers to be the higher values, ideals, beliefs, and codes of conduct--the world of Tradition--that are at the foundation of Western civilization and described in the myths and sacred literature of the Indo‑Europeans. Agreeing with the Hindu philosophers that history is the movement of huge cycles and that we are now in the Kali Yuga, the age of dissolution and decadence, Evola finds revolt to be the only logical response for those who oppose the materialism and ritualized meaninglessness of life in the twentieth century. Through a sweeping study of the structures, myths, beliefs, and spiritual traditions of the major Western civilizations, the author compares the characteristics of the modern world with those of traditional societies. The domains explored include politics, law, the rise and fall of empires, the history of the Church, the doctrine of the two natures, life and death, social institutions and the caste system, the limits of racial theories, capitalism and communism, relations between the sexes, and the meaning of warriorhood. At every turn Evola challenges the reader’s most cherished assumptions about fundamental aspects of modern life. A controversial scholar, philosopher, and social thinker, JULIUS EVOLA (1898-1974) has only recently become known to more than a handful of English‑speaking readers. An authority on the world’s esoteric traditions, Evola wrote extensively on ancient civilizations and the world of Tradition in both East and West. Other books by Evola published by Inner Traditions include Eros and the Mysteries of Love, The Yoga of Power, The Hermetic Tradition, and The Doctrine of Awakening. (shrink)

Introduction.--The literary form and philosophical content of the Platonic dialogue.--Plato's method of dialectic.

The increasing prevalence of ecologically sustainable products in consumer markets, such as organic produce, are generally assumed to curtail anthropogenic impacts on the environment. Here I intend to present an alternative perspective on sustainable production by interpreting the relationship between recent rises in organic agriculture and greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural production. I construct two time series fixed-effects panel regressions to estimate how increases in organic farmland impact greenhouse gas emissions derived from agricultural production. My analysis finds that the rise (...) of certified organic production in the United States is not correlated with declines in greenhouse gas emissions derived specifically from agricultural production, and on the contrary is associated positively overall agricultural greenhouse gas emissions. To make sense of this finding, I embed my research within the conventionalization thesis. As a result I argue that the recent USDA certification of organic farming has generated a bifurcated organic market, where one form of organic farming works as a sustainable counterforce to conventional agriculture and the other works to increase the economic accessibility of organic farming through weakening practice standards most conducive to reducing agricultural greenhouse gas output. Additionally, I construct my own theoretical framework known as the displacement paradox to further interpret my findings. (shrink)

Enactivists often defend the following two claims: Successful interactions are not driven and explained by the interactors’ ability to mindread. And the mechanisms enabling 2nd personal social cognition and those enabling 3rd personal social cognition are distinct. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are false. With regard to I argue that enactivists fail to provide a plausible alternative to traditional accounts of social cognition in interaction. I examine and reject Hanne De Jaegher’s view according to which (...) interaction is “constitutive” for social interaction. Furthermore, I critically discuss Shaun Gallagher’s and Daniel Hutto’s views according to which social interactions are exclusively driven by low level cognitive mechanisms such as “gaze following” and “emotion detection”. Concerning, I rely on data from so called “spontaneous response” false belief tasks to show that interactive and observational paradigms require the same “social-cognitive” interpretation. (shrink)