Background No studies have been conducted in Mexico to ascertain what ethical problems doctors working at hospitals deal with. This article aims to describe the ethical conflicts most commonly identified by Mexican internists and the importance they attribute to each of these conflicts. Methods Voluntary survey to the members of the Internal Medicine Association of Mexico. Results Responses were submitted by 347 internists. Half of those face ethical conflicts almost always or frequently. The most commonplace and relevant conflicts are those (...) resulting from the clinical relationship (communication, confidentiality, informed consent, assessment of mental capacity, decisions involving incapacitated patients, and conflicts with family members), and secondly those problems related with the end of life (palliative care, withholding or withdrawing treatment, and “No CPR orders”). To resolve conflicts they seek support through protocols, Institutional Ethics Committees (IECs), and consultations with colleagues and, occasionally, with bioethics experts. Protocols and IECs are the tools most in demand among them. Conclusions 1) the most frequent and relevant conflicts are those caused by the clinical relationship, above all those due to doctor–patient communication, and secondly those due to problems which arise at the end of life; 2) though nearly all of them have doubts about how to resolve conflicts, the vast majority are satisfied with the way in which they do so; 3) to deal with conflicts, they seek support mainly in protocols, IECs, and consultation with colleagues; and 4) in order to resolve them better, what they most demand are protocols and IECs, but also bioethics consultants. (shrink)

Dyadic play fighting occurs in many species, but only humans are known to engage in coalitional play fighting. Dyadic play fighting is hypothesized to build motor skills involved in actual dyadic fighting; thus, coalitional play fighting may build skills involved in actual coalitional fighting, operationalized as forager lethal raiding. If human psychology includes a motivational component that encourages engagement in this type of play, evidence of this play in forager societies is necessary to determine that it is not an artifact (...) of agricultural or industrial conditions. We examine whether coalitional play fighting appears in the hunter-gatherer record and includes motor skills used in lethal raiding. Using the ethnographic record, we generated a list of motor patterns regularly used in forager warfare. Then, using Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas, we identified 100 culture clusters containing forager societies and searched the ethnographic records of these societies for descriptions of coalitional play fighting, operationalized as contact games played in teams. Resulting games were coded for the presence of eight motor patterns regularly used in forager lethal raiding. Although play does not tend to be systematically documented in the hunter-gatherer literature, sufficiently detailed descriptions of coalitional play were found for 46 of the 100 culture clusters: all 46 exhibited coalitional play using at least one of the predicted motor patterns; 39 exhibited coalitional play using four or more of the eight predicted motor patterns. These results provide evidence that coalitional play fighting occurs across a diverse range of hunter-gatherer cultures and habitats, regularly recruits motor patterns used in lethal raiding, and is not an artifact of agricultural or industrial life. This is a first step in a new line of research on whether human male psychology includes motivations to engage in play that develops the deployment of coordinated coalitional action involving key motor patterns used in lethal raiding. (shrink)

Schelling’s late philosophy is characterized by its division of philosophy into a “negative” and a “positive” approach. After developing positive philosophy, Schelling goes back in his last work (Darstellung der reinrationalen Philosophie) to a negative philosophy that is to play a critical role within Schelling’s late system by showing pure rationally the limits of pure reason. This critical task requires the failure and crisis of negative philosophy. In the article, I show why Schelling understands his late negative project as a (...) radicalization of Kantian criticism, undertaken by recourse to Aristotle and his notion of actuality. By taking the Aristotelian inspiration into account, I propose a new way of understanding two problems of Schelling scholarship: the need for a late negative philosophy, and the problem of the transition from negative into positive philosophy. (shrink)

This article aims to explore the relationship between neutralization and “as if” consciousness in Husserl’s phenomenology, in particular, from its convergence in intuitions concerning phantasy. Starting from a critique of a line of interpretation that, in its attempt to approach phenomenologically to an “aesthetic consciousness”, homologates the neutrality modification with the Epoché, the article seeks to expose the methodological function that the modalization of belief fulfills in the project of Ideas I, as well as highlighting the growing importance that phantasy (...) and the “as if” consciousness will acquire in the subsequent development of Husserl’s phenomenology. (shrink)

El presente trabajo desarrolla una breve introducción a la ausencia u obscurecimiento de la doctrina epistémica de Francisco Suárez bajo una triple restricción especulativa: 1. se referirá exclusivamente a las investigaciones contemporáneas sobre el pensamiento de Suárez, donde se observarían sugerencias y consideraciones generales sobre su epistemología; 2. a las Disputaciones Metafísicas, y a los filósofos y teólogos allí consignados, y en derredor de ello, a la conflictiva relación doctrinal con Tomás de Aquino y su vinculación con Duns Escoto. A (...) su vez tales consideraciones quedarán expuestas al modo de una pesquisa siempre inconclusa, en la medida en que es imposible dar cuenta de la significativa investigación actual en todos sus matices. (shrink)

Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for (...) our actions in those circumstances. We argue that such situationist moral luck, as a variety of circumstantial moral luck, exemplifies a distinct and interesting type of moral luck. Further, there is a case to be made that situationist moral luck is perhaps more worrying than some other well-discussed cases of moral luck. (shrink)

Reseña de ‘Filosofía y experimentación sonora’ de Gustavo Celedón Bórquez, realizada por Marcela Rivera Hutinel, Dra. en Filosofía, académica de la Universidad Metropolitana de Ciencias de la Educación. Gustavo Celedón Bórquez Filosofía y experimentación sonora Ediciones Metales Pesados 2023 Santiago 376 páginas ISBN: 9789566203100.

En el presente trabajo examino la tesis de José María Sauca sobre la “liquidez constitucional” y las cláusulas de este tipo que identifica en la Constitución Española. Propondré analizarlas a la luz de la tesis de la cláusula alternativa tácita presentada por Kelsen.

Reseña de: Un corpus olvidado: la tragedia fragmentaria y sus héroes, Colección Estudios Sociales y Humanidades, Bahía Blanca: Editorial de la Universidad Nacional del Sur (Ediuns), 2020, 196 pp. ISBN: 978-987-655-251-6. ISBN electrónico: 978-987-655-260-8.

Libet’s timing experiments have resulted in some strong and unsavoury claims about human agency. These range from the idea that conscious intentions are epiphenomenal to the idea that we all lack free will. In this paper, I propose a new type of response to the various sceptical conclusions about our agency occasioned by both Libet’s work and other experiments in this testing paradigm. Indeed, my argument extends to such conclusions drawn from fMRI-based prediction experiments. In what follows, I will provide (...) a brief description of these experiments, sketch arguments one may be tempted to draw on their basis, and argue that such arguments rely on a questionable premise: that experimental subjects have relevant proximal intentions. (shrink)

Instituted in 2004, the Czech Republic research assessment has since changed on an annual basis. In this paper I examine how researchers in the Czech Republic negotiate research assessment. Using the concept of epistemic living spaces (Felt & Fochler, 2010; Felt, 2009), I first set in context the Czech research assessment system and second explore the micro-politics of resistance in which researchers engage in their daily conduct. Empirically, I draw on individual and group interviews carried out with Czech researchers in (...) the humanities, social sciences and natural sciences, analyses of science policy documents including the Methodology for Evaluating Research, Development and Innovation Results, as well as public debates relating to research assessment, such as blogs and newspaper articles. The interviews were carried out between 2007 and 2010. Additional sources of data include participant observation at public events and seminars on the research and development system reform, research assessment and audit of the Czech system of research, development and innovation gathered between 2009 and 2011. (shrink)

I argue that we do not intentionally and rationally shape our character and values in major ways. I base this argument on the nature of transformative experiences, that is, those experiences which are transformative from personal and epistemological points of view. The argument is roughly this. First, someone who undergoes major changes in her character or values thereby undergoes a transformative experience. Second, if she undergoes such an experience, her reasons for changing in a major way are inaccessible to her (...) beforehand. Third, if such reasons are inaccessible beforehand, she cannot act on them and thus cannot rationally and intentionally shape her character or values. I also explore some consequences of my argument, especially those related to control and responsibility. (shrink)

As in other countries, the public in Argentina became aware of the existence of something called “the theory of relativity” only after November 1919. Although the news of Arthur Eddington's eclipse expedition, which provided the first confirmation of Einstein's theory, was poorly reported in the newspapers, by the end of 1920 Einstein had become a household name for the educated middle class of Buenos Aires, the capital city of the country. This was in great measure the result of the activity (...) of a few enthusiastic lecturers. Significantly, none of them belonged to the prestigious Institute of Physics of the University of La Plata, which during the decade of the 1910s was considered the most important center of physical research in Latin America. Between July and August 1920 the Spanish physicist Blas Cabrera – perhaps the greatest popularizer of Einstein's theory in Spain – visited Argentina and talked about relativity. In September Georges Duclout, a French engineer who had graduated from the Zurich Polytechnic and by then was professor of applied mechanics at the School of Exact, Physical and Natural Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires, also gave a series of conferences on the subject. That same month José Ubach, a Jesuit astronomer trained at the Ebro Observatory in Spain, and established in Buenos Aires, lectured on relativity at the Colegio del Salvador. (shrink)

In debating the ethics of immigration, philosophers have focused much of their attention on determining whether a political community ought to have the discretionary right to control immigration. They have not, however, given the same amount of consideration to determining whether there are any ethical limits on how a political community enforces its immigration policy. This article, therefore, offers a different approach to immigration justice. It presents a case against legitimate states having discretionary control over immigration by showing both how (...) ethical limits on enforcement circumscribe the options legitimate states have in determining their immigration policy and how all immigrants (including undocumented immigrants) are entitled to certain protections against a state’s enforcement apparatus. (shrink)

In this article, Breny Mendoza examines and critically discusses María Lugones’ concept of the “coloniality of gender.” Lugones’ influential thesis asserts that the binarity of gender was introduced in the colonies as part of colonial rule and displaced previously predominant egalitarian systems of gender relations. As Mendoza outlines, this thesis has been challenged in recent years by Latin American and indigenous feminisms (such as the Argentinean anthropologist Rita Segato, and indigenous feminists from countries such as Bolivia, Guatemala, and (...) Mexico). In light of these new perspectives, Mendoza expounds and acknowledges Lugones’ ideas, while also pointing out their pitfalls and limitations, since such an approach can lead to a romanticisation of pre-colonial orders, presenting them as the “absolute other” of colonial violence. In contrast, drawing on the analysis by Bolivian Aymara feminist Julieta Paredes, Mendoza argues that the imposition of gender can only be understood as an “entanglement of patriarchies.” Finally, Mendoza applies these discussions to issues surrounding sexualised violence, i.e., feminicide, in Latin America proving them to provide a fruitful framework for understanding and addressing these current forms of violence. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta desarrollar una deducción del concepto de sumo bien kantiano: esto es, intenta demostrar, de acuerdo con la interpretación de Dieter Henrich acerca de la deducción, que el sumo bien es un fin a la vez que un deber. Apelo a los rasgos de la razón práctica que constituyen la legitimidad de los hechos, la premisa que cualquier deducción debe tener. De acuerdo con Kant, el sumo bien consiste en la felicidad, la virtud y sus relaciones de proporcionalidad (...) y causalidad, tal que la felicidad es proporcional a, y causada por, la virtud. Sostengo, utilizando las nociones kantianas aceptadas, que Kant tiene razones convincentes para concluir que el sumo bien es, de hecho, un fin a la vez que un deber. Si esto es correcto, entonces este argumento ofrece la deducción prometida en mi título. This paper attempts a deduction of Kant's concept of the highest good: that is, it attempts to prove, in accordance with Dieter Henrich's interpretation of the notion of deduction, that the highest good is an end that is also a duty. It does this by appealing to features of practical reason that make up the legitimating facts that serve as the premises that any deduction must possess. According to Kant, the highest good consists of happiness, virtue, and relations of proportionality and causationbetween happiness and virtue, such that happiness is proportional to and caused by virtue. I argue, by drawing on accepted Kantian notions, that Kant had compelling reasons for concluding that the highest good is in fact an end that is also a duty. If correct, then this argument provides the deduction promised in my title. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for two main hypotheses. First, that self-control is not a natural mental kind and, second, that there is no dedicated mechanism of self-control. By the first claim, I simply mean that those behaviors we label as “self-controlled” are a somewhat arbitrarily selected hodgepodge that do not have anything in common that distinguishes them from other behaviors. In other words, self-control is a gerrymandered property that does not correspond to a natural mental or psychological kind. By (...) the second claim, I mean that self-controlled behaviors are not produced by a mechanism that is not utilized in the production of other behaviors. Not only is there no natural mental property of self-control, there is no mechanism that is dedicated to producing self-controlled behavior. I further evaluate whether this account of self-control has enough explanatory power to account for a range of phenomena related to self-control. I argue that my account does a better job of explaining these phenomena than accounts which appeal to a dedicated self-control mechanism. (shrink)

In (Re)Defining Racism, Alberto Urquidez argues that conflicting philosophical accounts over the definition of racism are at bottom linguistic confusions that would benefit from a Wittgensteinian-inspired approach. In this essay, I argue that such an approach would be helpful in disputes over the definition of metaphysically contested concepts, such as “race,” or semantically contested concepts, such as “racialization.” I disagree, however, that such insights would prove helpful or do very little for disputes concerning normatively contested concepts, such as “racism.”.

David Miller’s defense of a state’s presumptive right to exclude non-refugee immigrants rests on two key distinctions. The first is that immigration controls are “preventative” and not “coercive.” In other words, when a state enforces its immigration policy it does not coerce noncitizens into doing something as much as it prevents them from doing a very specific thing (e.g., not entering or remaining within the state), while leaving other options open. Second, he makes a distinction between “denying” people their human (...) rights and “deterring” people from exercising their human rights. On this view, when those assigned to protect or fulfil human rights are also tasked with performing immigration enforcement duties, undocumented immigrants are not being denied their human rights, even when this deters them from exercising those rights. In this article, I argue that Miller’s two distinctions have an implication that he might not have foreseen. Specifically, I argue that these distinctions provide ideological cover for what has come to be known as “crimmigration” and that we have strong reasons for wanting our theory of immigration justice to reject this, even when doing so leaves open the possibility for an indirect open-borders argument. (shrink)

Este texto corresponde a una versión ligeramente extendida de la presentación leída en el lanzamiento del libro _La Universidad (im)posible_, publicado por Ediciones Macul, realizada el 10 de mayo de 2019 en el Salón Juan Gómez Millas de la UMCE. El volumen reúne la mayoría de los trabajos presentados en el Coloquio Internacional “La Universidad posible”, realizado en Santiago de Chile, entre el 18 y el 21 de abril de 2016, incluyendo contribuciones de quienes se hicieron parte de la convocatoria, (...) pero no pudieron estar presentes. Ampliando las resonancias de la fórmula nietzscheana que da nombre a la segunda de sus consideraciones intempestivas, en las que el golpe de martillo recae sobre la utilidad y el perjuicio de la historia para la vida, intentamos esbozar una clave de lectura que permita recorrer los diversos envites de este libro desde la atención al malestar que se aloja hoy en la universidad, anudado a su devenir corporativo y a la gramática de una existencia sofocada por el lenguaje_ _del neoliberalismo. Viendo resquebrajarse la idea que la universidad tenía de sí misma, su transformación exige a quienes la habitamos volver a tensar los hilos que la anudan con la vida y con la muerte, para no conceder simplemente a las prácticas que, por los poderes y lógicas que la asedian y conforman, esta institución actualmente alberga. Si la vida queda excluida de la universidad, como vislumbra Walter Benjamin en su ensayo temprano sobre _La vida de los estudiantes, _la tarea recae en activar las facultades de la contienda para inventarse una nueva, _otra _universidad posible, una en la que el pensamiento, la imaginación y el deseo puedan volver a rastrillar lo que queda de porvenir en la memoria de ese nombre. _Palabras Clave: _Universidad – Vida – Neoliberalismo – Crítica. (shrink)

Situations are powerful: the evidence from experimental social psychology suggests that agents are hugely influenced by the situations they find themselves in, often without their knowing it. In our paper, we evaluate how situational factors affect our reasons-responsiveness, as conceived of by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and, through this, how they also affect moral responsibility. We argue that the situationist experiments suggest that situational factors impair, among other things, our moderate reasons-responsiveness, which is plausibly required for moral responsibility. However, (...) even though we argue that situational factors lower the degree of our reasons-responsiveness, we propose that agents remain moderately reasons-responsive to the degree required for moral responsibility. Nonetheless, those affected by situational factors are arguably less morally responsible than those who are not subject to similar situational factors. We further evaluate an understanding of reasons-responsiveness which relativizes reasons-responsiveness to agents’ circumstances. We argue that the situationist data do not warrant this kind of divergence from Fischer’s and Ravizza’s account. We conclude by discussing what situationist experiments tell us about our relationship to non-reasons. (shrink)

Certain aspects of our situations often influence us in significant and negative ways, without our knowledge (call this claim “situationism”). One possible explanation of their influence is that they affect our abilities. In this paper, we address two main questions. Do these situational factors rid us of our abilities to act on our sufficient reasons? Do situational factors make it more difficult for us to exercise our abilities to act for sufficient reasons? We argue for the answer ‘sometimes’ to both (...) these questions. We then explore the consequences of this view for moral responsibility. (shrink)

I. There is a deep tension in the laws of war. The laws that regulate the resort to war (jus ad bellum) are independent from the laws that regulate conduct in war (jus in bello). This implies that...

The article deals with analyzing the historiographical debates that have arisen in recent years around Atlantic history, the crisis of the monarchy and the origins of liberalism in the Hispanic world. The essay focuses on the historiography dedicated to the Río de la Plata and on the displacements exhibited in the research agendas. The objective is to register these displacements within the framework of the double and simultaneous movement that occurred with the revision of the interpretive model based on the (...) national state: the one that concerns the internationalization of the approaches and the regionalization of the scales of analysis. (shrink)

Since at least the second half of the 19th century, the U.S. federal government has enjoyed “plenary power” over its immigration policy. Plenary power allows the federal government to regulate immigration free of judicial review and thereby, with regard to immigration cases, minimize the Constitutional protections afforded to non-citizens. The justification for granting the U.S federal government such broad powers comes from a certain understanding of sovereignty; one where limiting sovereign authority in cases like immigration could potentially undermine its legitimacy (...) and thereby lead to something like a Hobbesian “state of nature.” One of the potential downsides of allowing the federal government to have such broad powers, however, is the potential to place non-citizens in a situation analogous to what Giorgio Agamben has called the “state of exception.” This situation appears to leave us with the following dichotomy: without something like the plenary power doctrine a political community will end up with a state of nature, but with something like the plenary power doctrine they end up with a state of exception. This essay offers a two-part response to this dilemma. First, it argues that the plenary power doctrine goes against the spirit of the U.S. Constitution, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment. Non-citizens, even undocumented immigrants, are entitled to more Constitutional protections than they currently enjoy. Second, since extending these protections is more consistent with the spirit of the Constitution, I argue that curtailing the federal government’s power over matters of immigration does not undermine its sovereignty, but promotes it. In short, with regard to immigration, it is a false but seductive dichotomy that constitutional democracies must choose between a state of nature and a state of exception. (shrink)

Following the levels of intentionality and semiosis distinguished by the Semiotic Hierarchy, and the distinction between original agency and enhanced agency, we propose a model of an agency hierarchy, consisting of six layers. Consistent with the phenomenological orientation of cognitive semiotics, a central claim is that agency and subjectivity are complementary aspects of intentionality. Hence, there is no agency without at least the minimal sense/feeling of agency. This perspective rules out all artefacts as genuine agents, as well as simple organisms, (...) since it is highly unlikely that e.g. bacteria have any first-person perspective. Using this model, we review and assess recent proposals on the nature of agency from cognitive science, and neuroscience, and draw conclusions on how to incorporate aspects of them within a synthetic cognitive-semiotic framework. (shrink)

The persistent educational challenges that fractions pose call for developing novel instructional methods to better prepare students for fraction learning. Here, we examined the effects of a 24-session, Cuisenaire rod intervention on a building block for symbolic fraction knowledge, continuous and discrete non-symbolic proportional reasoning, in children who have yet to receive fraction instruction. Participants were 34 second-graders who attended the intervention (intervention group) and 15 children who did not participate in any sessions (control group). As attendance at the intervention (...) sessions was irregular (median = 15.6 sessions, range = 1–24), we specifically examined the effect of the number of sessions completed on their non-symbolic proportional reasoning. Our results showed that children who attended a larger number of sessions increased their ability to compare non-symbolic continuous proportions. However, contrary to our expectations, they also decreased their ability to compare misleading discretized proportions. In contrast, children in the Control group did not show any change in their performance. These results provide further evidence on the malleability of non-symbolic continuous proportional reasoning and highlight the rigidity of counting knowledge interference on discrete proportional reasoning. (shrink)

In this essay, I reflect on the implications of intellectual virtues in scientific endeavor. To this end, I first offer a depiction of scientific endeavor by resorting to the notion of academic attitude, which involves aspects concerning the generation and possession of knowledge. Although there are differences between these activities, they have in common the engagement of diverse intellectual agents (scientists). In this sense, I analyze how intellectual virtues are linked to 1) scientific research tasks, such as theory appraisal, and (...) 2) those tasks of vigilance and intervention in the uses of scientific knowledge. I conclude that intellectual virtues play a leading role in achieving higher quality scientific research and adequate foresight on the uses and impacts of scientific findings. In this order of ideas, I propose an agenda for further inquiries on these matters, highlighting the relevance of reflecting and empirically researching the relationship between intellectual virtues and science, as well as cultivating intellectual virtues in various stages of scientific training. (shrink)

The article interrogates transnational feminisms as a concept and as a practice. It frames its analysis using contemporary theories of globalization and the older concept of global sisterhood as a backdrop to the concept of transnational feminism. To assess the practical dimension of transnational feminisms, the analysis focuses on women's rights as a human rights movement and the transnationalization of Latin American feminisms. The article suggests that, although transnational feminisms (particularly feminist postcolonial theories) envision themselves in a new frame and (...) see themselves as committed to intersectional analysis and transversal politics, there are important gaps between the intentions (theory, tactics) and outcomes of their theory and practice. (shrink)

El texto es un ensayo bibliográfico sobre _Una historia Atlántica de los orígenes de la Nación y el Estado, _la nueva y potente contribución de José María Portillo Valdés. La novedad que ofrece la obra gira en torno a un concepto clave: _emancipación. A_ través de un estudio sistemático sobre la “teoría de la emancipación”, el autor ilumina la compleja –y siempre discutida– relación del mundo hispano con la modernidad. Desde un enfoque atlántico, el libro explora el prolongado proceso emancipatorio (...) del conglomerado hispánico que afectó a ciudadanos y naciones durante el siglo XIX y traza horizontes hacia pasados remotos como asimismo hacia el siglo XX hasta el presente. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that some intentional actions are not triggered by proximal intentions; i.e. there are actions which are intentional, but lack relevant proximal intentions in their immediate causal history. More specifically, I first introduce various properties of intentions. I then argue that some actions are triggered by mental states which lack properties typically ascribed to intentions, yet these actions are still intentional. The view that all intentional actions are triggered by proximal intentions is thus false.

Alfred Mele presents an influential argument for incompatibilism which compares an agent, Ernie, whose life has been carefully planned by the goddess Diana, to normal deterministic agents. The argument suggests both that Ernie is not free, and that there is no relevant difference between him and normal deterministic agents in respect of free will. In this paper, I suggest that what drives our judgement that Ernie is not free in the Diana case is that his actions are merely an extension (...) of Diana's—he is akin to a tool, which she uses solely for her own purposes, and his behaviour occurs only because of the interest Diana takes in its occurring. This contrasts with normal deterministic universes, in which normal agents are not such tools. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza “Contéstame, Baila mi danza”, la antología de seis poetas norteamericanas que tradujera y publicara Diana Bellesi en 1984. El objetivo es comprender las implicancias políticas, artísiticas e ideológicas de la misma. La antología editada por Bellesi incluye poemas de las autoras estadounidenses Muriel Rukeyser, Denise Levertov, June Jordan, Diane Di Prima, Adrienne Rich, Irena Klepfisz, y un ensayo de Barbara Deming. El volumen mostró al público hispanohablante algunas de las escritoras más relevantes del siglo XX, que en (...) algunos casos no habían sido traducidas antes al español. Bellesi considera que las seis autoras que seleccionó comparten el espíritu rebelde, un lenguaje potente, una historia común, pero sobre todo, sus voces de mujeres. Esta ponencia se propone leer la antología como un diálogo político, artístico y de género entre la poeta-traductora argentina y sus seis pares norteamericanas. A través de la lectura de la Intro-ducción, las notas de presentación de las escritoras, y las traducciones propiamente dichas, la labor de investigación busca demostrar la importancia de la traducción literaria como un programa artístico e ideológico que resulta en un fructífero diálogo entre las lenguas y las culturas. (shrink)

La traducción literaria ocupa un papel fundamental en toda literatura, ya que produce dos efectos: por un lado, amplía el espectro literario-cultural al que tendrán acceso los lectores que hablan la lengua de llegada; y por otro, permitirá renovar la expresión poética en esa lengua. Esta propuesta implica analizar las dos antologías de poesía anglófona traducida en Argentina en la revista SUR, dirigida por V. Ocampo, para estudiar los dos efectos mencionados, como así también el canon de dicha poesía que (...) se ha conformado en este país a partir de las dos antologías mencionadas, cuya publicación sancionó lo que se entiende como un canon válido de poetas angloparlantes para los lectores argentinos, y en muchos casos, latinoamericanos en general. De este modo, resultaría que la traducción antologada da lugar no solo a un diálogo inter, sino también intra cultural. (shrink)