Hepatitis C is a global public health threat, affecting 56 million people worldwide. The World Health Organization has committed to eliminating hepatitis C by 2030. Although new treatments have revolutionised the treatment and care of people with hepatitis C, treatment uptake has slowed in recent years, drawing attention to the need for innovative approaches to reach elimination targets. One approach involves using existing notifiable disease data to contact people previously diagnosed with hepatitis C. Within these disease surveillance systems, however, competing (...) tensions exist, including protecting individual rights to privacy and autonomy, and broader public health goals. We explore these issues using hepatitis C and Australia’s legislative and regulatory frameworks as a case study. We examine emerging uses of notification data to contact people not yet treated, and describe some of the ethical dilemmas associated with the use and non-use of this data and the protections that exist to preserve individual rights and public health. We reveal weaknesses in rights protections and processes under Australian public health and human rights legislation and argue for consultation with and involvement of affected communities in policy and intervention design before notification data is used to increase hepatitis C treatment coverage. (shrink)

Humanity and the very notion of the human subject are under threat from postmodernist thinking which has declared not only the 'Death of God' but also the 'Death of Man'. This book is a revindication of the concept of humanity, rejecting contemporary social theory that seeks to diminish human properties and powers. Archer argues that being human depends on an interaction with the real world in which practice takes primacy over language in the emergence of human self-consciousness, thought, emotionality and (...) personal identity - all of which are prior to, and more basic than, our acquisition of a social identity. This original and provocative new book from leading social theorist Margaret S. Archer builds on the themes explored in her previous books Culture and Agency (CUP 1988) and Realist Social Theory (CUP 1995). It will be required reading for academics and students of social theory, cultural theory, political theory, philosophy and theology. (shrink)

Moral Repair examines the ethics and moral psychology of responses to wrongdoing. Explaining the emotional bonds and normative expectations that keep human beings responsive to moral standards and responsible to each other, Margaret Urban Walker uses realistic examples of both personal betrayal and political violence to analyze how moral bonds are damaged by serious wrongs and what must be done to repair the damage. Focusing on victims of wrong, their right to validation, and their sense of justice, Walker presents (...) a unified and detailed philosophical account of hope, trust, resentment, forgiveness, and making amends - the emotions and practices that sustain moral relations. Moral Repair joins a multidisciplinary literature concerned with transitional and restorative justice, reparations, and restoring individual dignity and mutual trust in the wake of serious wrongs. (shrink)

How is it possible to think new thoughts? What is creativity and can science explain it? And just how did Coleridge dream up the creatures of The Ancient Mariner? When The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms was first published, Margaret A. Boden's bold and provocative exploration of creativity broke new ground. Boden uses examples such as jazz improvisation, chess, story writing, physics, and the music of Mozart, together with computing models from the field of artificial intelligence to uncover the (...) nature of human creativity in the arts. The second edition of The Creative Mind has been updated to include recent developments in artificial intelligence, with a new preface, introduction and conclusion by the author. It is an essential work for anyone interested in the creativity of the human mind. (shrink)

A work of striking originality bursting with unexpected insights, _The Human Condition_ is in many respects more relevant now than when it first appeared in 1958. In her study of the state of modern humanity, Hannah Arendt considers humankind from the perspective of the actions of which it is capable. The problems Arendt identified then—diminishing human agency and political freedom, the paradox that as human powers increase through technological and humanistic inquiry, we are less equipped to control the consequences of (...) our actions—continue to confront us today. This new edition, published to coincide with the fortieth anniversary of its original publication, contains an improved and expanded index and a new introduction by noted Arendt scholar Margaret Canovan which incisively analyzes the book's argument and examines its present relevance. A classic in political and social theory, _The Human Condition_ is a work that has proved both timeless and perpetually timely. Hannah Arendt was one of the leading social theorists in the United States. Her _Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy_ and _Love and Saint Augustine_ are also published by the University of Chicago Press. (shrink)

This book is about the methods used for unifying different scientific theories under one all-embracing theory. The process has characterized much of the history of science and is prominent in contemporary physics; the search for a 'theory of everything' involves the same attempt at unification. Margaret Morrison argues that, contrary to popular philosophical views, unification and explanation often have little to do with each other. The mechanisms that facilitate unification are not those that enable us to explain how or (...) why phenomena behave as they do. A feature of this book is an account of many case studies of theory unification in nineteenth- and twentieth-century physics and of how evolution by natural selection and Mendelian genetics were unified into what we now term evolutionary genetics. (shrink)

This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.

By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular (...) works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant’s view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant’s view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects. (shrink)

Forgiveness and Retribution: Responding to Wrongdoing argues that ultimately, forgiveness is always the appropriate response to wrongdoing. In recent decades, many philosophers have claimed that unless certain conditions are met, we should resent those who have wronged us personally and that criminal offenders deserve to be punished. Conversely, Margaret Holmgren posits that we should forgive those who have ill-treated us, but only after working through a process of addressing the wrong. Holmgren then reflects on the kinds of laws and (...) social practices a properly forgiving society would adopt. (shrink)

Berkeley has made the bold claim on behalf of his theory that it is uniquely able to justify the claim that snow is white. But this claim, made most strikingly in the Third of his "Three Dialogues," has been held, most forcefully by Margaret Wilson, to conflict with Berkeley's argument in the First Dialogue that, because of various facts to do with perceptual variation, colors are merely apparent and hence, mind-dependent. This paper develops an alternative reading of the First (...) Dialogue arguments, in which their project is not to establish the mind-dependence of colors but instead to undermine the position that colors are also mind-independent. Under these circumstances, the coherence of the First and the Third Dialogue arguments is assured, just so long as the Third Dialogue claim to have established that snow is really white is not taken to mean that snow is mind-independently white, but instead, something like that our experiences of snow are stably and regularly white. (shrink)

Cet article a déjà paru dans Dissent, Spring 2014. Nous remercions Margaret Somers et Fred Block, ainsi que la revue Dissent, de nous avoir donné l'autorisation de le reproduire sur RHUTHMOS. On le trouvera en ligne également ici. In the first half century of Dissent's history, Karl Polanyi almost never made an appearance in the magazine's pages. On one level this is surprising, because Polanyi was a presence in socialist circles in New York City from 1947 through the mid-1950s, (...) the period of (...) - Sociologie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655): Lettres Latines, and: Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655): Introduction à la vie savanteMargaret J. OslerPierre Gassendi. Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655): Lettres Latines. Edited by Sylvie Taussig. Vol. 1, Traduction. Pp. xxxiv + 622. Vol. 2, Notes. Pp. x + 609. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2004 Paper, € 175,00.Sylvie Taussig. Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655): Introduction à la vie savante. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2003. Pp. 454. € 60,00.The reputation of Pierre Gassendi (...) (1592–1655), the French natural philosopher responsible for recovering Epicurean atomism and hedonism and modifying it to be compatible with Christian theology, has suffered neglect in part because of the difficult Latin in which his works were written. Hence, the publication of translations of large chunks of his work into a modern language is, prima facie, a welcome addition to scholarship in the history of philosophy. Accordingly, the appearance of Sylvie Taussig's translation of Gassendi's Latin correspondence, published in the posthumous Opera omnia (1658), seemed, at first blush, to make an important body of Gassendi's writings accessible to more modern scholars. The three books under review consist of a French translation of Volume 6 of Gassendi's [End Page 489] Opera omnia (the Latin letters to which the title refers); a volume of notes on the letters; and a book about Gassendi's life, based closely on the Latin letters.Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655): Introduction à la vie savante summarizes various aspects of Gassendi's life and career from 1621–1655, the years covered by the published correspondence. Basically summarizing the letters, this book has sections on Gassendi's biography for these years, the nature of the correspondence, Gassendi's science, his Epicurean project, his interactions with various notables, and his role in the history of his time. In fact, the book is little more than a topical analysis of the letters. Despite the inclusion of an extensive—but incomplete—bibliography of scholarship on Gassendi, the notes to Taussig's text refer to the letters but to almost no secondary sources.The same problem characterizes her notes to the letters. Containing 7491 footnotes and filling a volume of 609 pages, the second volume of the Lettres latines contains virtually no mention of the contributions of other scholars. These notes range from the explication of Classical references to political events in Gassendi's lifetime, from scientific and philosophical controversies to the issues of Church governance in Digne where Gassendi was a canon in the cathedral.The devil is in the details, and here the details undermine one's confidence in the project. There are many errors in the notes to the letters. For example, in note 1087, the inventor of logarithms is named 'Brigg' rather than 'Briggs.' There are numerous gaffes in the bibliography in Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655): Introduction à la vie savante. For example, the entry for Steven J. Dick, is 'Dick, St. J.'. The entry for Lynn Sumida Joy is 'Lynn, S. J.'. And the entry for Susanna Åkerman is a mess, obviously because the typesetter was unable to deal with the diacritical mark. Although these points seem trivial, their frequency points to a lack of precision and lack of good proofreading.Unfortunately, these three volumes will not provide a reliable new source for scholars seeking access to Gassendi's writings. The French translation of the letters will provide a shortcut, but they will not eliminate the need to consult the original Latin version.Margaret J. OslerUniversity of CalgaryCopyright © 2005 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes”Margaret A. Boden (bio)The theoretical work of Wright, Sloman, and Beaudoin is a significant contribution to our understanding of the nature and function of emotions, and potentially also to therapeutic method. Their message that emotions, as controlling and scheduling mechanisms, are essential to any complex intelligent system (that is: one with multiple and potentially conflicting motives, and situated in a (...) changing and unfriendly world) is important. It encourages cognitive psychologists to regard emotions as a central aspect of intelligence, not to sideline (or even to forget) them, as is too often done. In addition, it shows—at least in general outline—how emotions might be understood in computational terms.Critics of computational psychology too often assume that emotions and motivation must lie outside its scope. This is not so, although it is true that relatively little computational work has been done in this area. Interestingly, the very early days of AI saw a comparatively high proportion of models of multiple goal-seeking, affective processes, and even personality (see, for example, the papers in Tomkins and Messick 1963). But, inevitably, these were so crude as to be almost useless in illuminating the nature of emotion and motivation. As AI-workers and their psychologist colleagues found to their cost, it is difficult enough to model the pursuit of one goal, never mind the pursuit of several mutually conflicting goals. Accordingly, personality and emotion soon faded from the scene as preferred topics of computational research—but not before I too had argued that they could, in principle, be so addressed (Boden 1965; 1972).I suggested—in the sketchiest terms—that the concepts of William McDougall’s personality theory could be interpreted in a computational fashion (Boden 1965; 1972). His concept of sentiment, for example, marks what Wright et al. call “goal-sets,” and his master sentiment of self-regard relates to the descriptive and normative aspects of the self-image to which they draw our attention. He even described emotions as (conscious) control mechanisms, enabling the subject to monitor the incipient excitement of distinct types of motivation, and (sometimes) to adjust behavior so as to facilitate or inhibit the otherwise-inevitable response. What the target-authors have done is to put subtle and sophisticated computational flesh onto these minimalist theoretical bones.McDougall himself, of course, will be turning in his grave. He saw affect as partly conscious (as well as dispositional), and argued that consciousness—and purposive behavior too—cannot possibly [End Page 135] be given a mechanistic, or physicalist, explanation. Despite Wright et al.’s persuasive anti-reductionist remarks about the necessity for highly abstract (psychological) levels of explanation, he would not have accepted that such explanations could be computationally grounded. He even insisted that the neurophysiological ground of goal-seeking behavior involved a special sort of energy, or horme, intrinsically directed to specific ends. Presumably, no professional reader today would agree with McDougall on that point. But many may agree with him about consciousness. And many more will insist that consciousness is a crucial aspect—perhaps the crucial aspect—of emotion. Such critics will doubtless point out that our three authors explicitly “factor out,” or refuse to discuss, consciousness as such.Wright et al.’s rhetorical reserve on this point is defensible on two counts. First, even though emotions do involve conscious sensations, the dispositional and control aspects of affect are at least as important. Indeed, it is evident from the quotations from individuals reacting to bereavement that people often describe the phenomenology of grief in terms of these sorts of factors, rather than in a “purely qualitative” fashion (whatever that might be). Even so, these dispositional aspects of emotion are often overlooked, or regarded as less significant than the conscious phenomenology. And second, theoretical psychologists in general sideline consciousness: either they ignore it entirely, or they take it for granted philosophically and ask about the conditions under which it appears or disappears. They are well advised to do so, since we do not yet understand this concept (more accurately: this mixed bag of related concepts) at the philosophical level. Even a journal whose title has “Philosophy” as its leading... (shrink)

Recently debates about the worth of “ideal theory” have directed attention to the functions that an account of a perfectly just society can serve. One function is that of “reconciliation”: learning that a seemingly undesirable feature of the social world would exist even in the perfectly just society can show us the value that it has in the present as well. John Rawls has emphasized reconciliation as among the roles of political philosophy. For instance, Rawls claims that his theory of (...) justice can reconcile us to the pluralism of liberal democracies. In this essay, I argue that Rawls’s political theory also can reconcile the inhabitants of liberal democratic societies to the fact that such societies may be cognitively confusing on account of their complexity. Then I contend that Rawls’s work offers valuable theoretical resources for analysing a society’s transparency or lack thereof. (shrink)

Margaret J. Osler - Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.3 478-479 Christia Mercer and Eileen O'Neill, editors. Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. xxi + 298. Cloth, $55.00. The editors of this collection of essays by the late Margaret Wilson's former students and colleagues present this book "as a snapshot of state-of-the-art history of early (...) modern philosophy" . Many of the usual suspects make an appearance in these pages: Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Malebranche, and Kant. A couple of new faces also come on stage: Damaris Cudworth , best known as Locke's companion but presented here as a philosopher in her own right, and the Cartesian Bernard le Bouvier de.. (shrink)

Margaret J. Osler - Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.3 394-395 Book Review Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum Marianne Pade, editor. Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2001. Pp. 261. Paper, $34.00. Aristotle's philosophy did not suffer a sudden demise with the rise of Renaissance humanism, as many accounts would have us believe. Nor did the Renaissance lack important developments (...) in philosophy, as analytic historians of philosophy implicitly claim by the absence of philosophers in their canon during this period. Rather, in order to understand the content and contexts of Renaissance and early modern philosophy, one must be acquainted with Aristotelianism and.. (shrink)