Alain Lévêque, né en 1942 à Paris, est l'auteur notamment de Bonnard, la main légère (Deyrolle Editeur/L'Arbre voyageur, 1994 ; Verdier, 2006), et le préfacier des Observations sur la peinture de Pierre Bonnard, parues aux éditions L'Atelier contemporain en 2015. Il faut miser pour voir. Savoir jouer, ruser, cacher, mais aussi dévoiler son jeu, s'attendre à perdre, à gagner, réfléchir, avoir des coups de tête, de la chance, se recueillir, tout dépenser. Ne pas retenir quelques mots bien au chaud pour (...) l'hiver, dans son bas de laine pour les temps de disette. Tout dépenser. Il faut à chaque fois écrire toutes voiles dehors, au risque de se trouver fort dépourvu quand la bise n'est pas venue. Je ne connais rien de plus difficile que ces commandes d'un " petit texte " pour une exposition de peinture, le travail d'un sculpteur. Car jamais de moi-même je n'irais me fourrer dans pareil pétrin (encore qu'il est tentant de mettre ses mains dans la pâte qui finira par s'échauffer et lever, mais c'est une autre histoire). Il s'agit qu'on m'invite à jouer, et si le jeu est engageant, je ne peux m'empêcher de dire chiche et de jouer à perdre haleine, me fiant à l'excitation, à l'emportement, et croisant les doigts pour qu'à la fin je puisse enlever le bandeau que j'ai sur les yeux et reconnaître ce que j'ai cru toucher. Ecrire pour voir. Est-ce écrire en regard du tableau? On peut bien écrire quelques mots dans un carnet devant le tableau, il ne s'agit jamais d'un tête-à-tête. Le tableau a une et même plusieurs longueurs d'avance. Qu'il soit peint comme de toute éternité et ne demande rien à personne crève les yeux. Le tableau est immobile, cela crève aussi les yeux, on ne peut pourtant pas le fixer. Ecrire dans son carnet oblige à baisser les yeux. Lorsqu'on les relève, le tableau a détalé. On envoie des mots en éclaireur. L'ensemble des textes écrits par Maryline Desbiolles (parus pour la plupart dans des catalogues ou revues, ou inédits) sur l'art, autour de l'art, à partir de l'art est ici réuni : une première partie rassemble les approches les plus réflexives sur la création ; dans le second chapitre les textes s'articulent autour de deux thématiques chères à l'auteur : l'Italie, la cuisine ; le troisième chapitre réunit les essais et poèmes consacrés aux sculptures de Bernard Pagès ; sont ensuite regroupés les essais consacrés à des artistes ou des oeuvres ; le volume se clôt enfin sur des oeuvres de fiction dont l'élément déclencheur de l'écriture fut la fréquentation d'oeuvres plastiques. L'ensemble des textes a été revu en prévision de cet ouvrage, tout autant essai sur l'art qu'oeuvre littéraire. (shrink)

Mereological nihilism (henceforth just "nihilism") is the thesis that composition never occurs. Nihilism has often been defended on the basis of its theoretical simplicity, including its ontological simplicity and its ideological simplicity (roughly, nihilism's ability to do without primitive mereological predicates). In this paper I defend nihilism on the basis of the theoretical unification conferred by nihilism, which is, roughly, nihilism's capacity to allow us to take fewer phenomena as brute and inexplicable. This represents a respect in which nihilism enjoys (...) greater theoretical simplicity than its rivals which has not yet been explored, and which is immune to many of the objections which have been leveled against previous arguments for nihilism from nihilism's theoretical simplicity. Composition as identity might be thought to confer a similar degree of theoretical unification as nihilism. I end the paper by arguing that this is not the case. (shrink)

Kris McDaniel has recently proposed an interpretation of the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth, as that distinction is made within Abhidharma metaphysics. According to McDaniel's proposal, the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth is closely connected with a similar distinction between conventional existence and ultimate existence. What is more, the distinction between conventional existence and ultimate existence should be interpreted along ontological pluralist lines: the difference between things that ultimately exist and things that merely conventionally exist amounts (...) to a difference in the modes of being enjoyed by the things in question.One... (shrink)

L’histoire du Kronprinzenpalais, dans sa lente émergence vers la reconnaissance de son existence, ainsi que du rôle majeur qu’il joua sur la scène muséale allemande, en tant que premier musée d’art moderne, demeure étroitement lié au sort de son unique conservateur, Ludwig Justi. Cet article s’attache à restituer les innovations didactiques et muséographiques menées par Justi, les très nombreuses expositions temporaires aussi bien que l’enrichissement des collections, de même que la fondation de la revue Museum der Gegenwart, lesquels eurent un (...) rayonnement sur l’ensemble des musées d’art allemands. (shrink)

Ecology and sustainability are current narratives about the behavior of humans toward themselves and the environment. Ecology is defined as a science, and a philosophy of ecology has become a recognized domain of the philosophy of science. For some, sustainability is an accepted, important moral goal. In 2013, a Special Issue of the journal Sustainability dealt with many of the relevant issues. Unfortunately, the economic, ideological, and psychological barriers to ethical behavior and corresponding social action remain great as well as (...) obvious. In this paper, I propose that a new, non-standard and non-propositional logic of real processes, Logic in Reality (LIR) grounded in physics applies to the science and philosophy of these narratives and helps to explicate them. Given the ecological role of organizations and institutions, reference is often made to organizational or institutional logics as guides to ecological practice. This paper suggests that these logics are either too abstract or too informal to have an impact in a conflictual world. Recognition of the suggested new, transdisciplinary logical dimension of ecological processes may provide credibility and support to new initiatives in ecology and its philosophy. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Recherches en didactique des sciences et des technologies, N° 4, 2012. Nous remercions Maryline Coquidé, Michèle Dell'Angelo, Stanislas Dorey, Corinne Fortin, Magali Gallezot, Sandrine Henocq, Faouzia Kalali, Jean-Marc Lange, Guy Rumelhard et la RDST de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : Les travaux de la biologie intégrative remettent en cause le déterminisme strict de l'organisation spatiale et temporelle du vivant. Ce texte, travail collectif de notre (...) - Biologie – Nouvel article.

Quelle conception de la science proposer aujourd'hui? Les grandes doctrines du XXe siècle se sont heurtées successivement à des difficultés, que ce soit le positivisme du Cercle de Vienne ou le rationalisme critique de Popper. Même la perspective historique inspirée par Bachelard et par Kuhn a donné lieu à des versions disparates. Pourtant, toutes ces tentatives partent d'un même constat : l'échec de la vision classique de la science et la nécessité d'un nouveau discours. On peut en retracer l'histoire. Face (...) à la pluralité des hypothèses possibles au sujet de l'espace, du temps et de la matière, Poincaré pose l'existence de conventions, ou mieux de libres décisions, au cœur de la science. Ainsi, dès la fin du XIXe siècle, il coupe court aux projets traditionnels de fondation : ni le synthétique a priori de Kant, ni les faits généraux de Comte ne sauraient expliquer la nature de l'activité scientifique. C'est la naissance d'un mouvement d'idées, le conventionnalisme, quia eu un impact décisif sur la philosophie viennoise et, à travers elle, sur la philosophie mondiale. Voilà un fil conducteur pour évaluer un siècle de débats. Que signifie donc libre décision en matière scientifique? On affirme la dimension historique irréductible de notre savoir ; on reconnaît la créativité et la responsabilité inhérentes à la science en tant qu'aventure humaine. (shrink)

La prise de rendez-vous dans un service de consultation conjugale est un aspect spécifique du travail de la secrétaire-réceptionniste. Les différentes tâches qui s’y associent sont le tri des appels et l’évaluation des demandes, l’écoute, l’information et l’orientation. Le rôle de la secrétaire est d’assurer le premier contact, de recueillir les éléments de la demande et de présenter le cadre de travail du conseiller conjugal. Les rendez-vous sont pris selon des règles et des consignes définies dans un cadre institutionnel.

La prise de rendez-vous dans un service de consultation conjugale est un aspect spécifique du travail de la secrétaire-réceptionniste. Les différentes tâches qui s’y associent sont le tri des appels et l’évaluation des demandes, l’écoute, l’information et l’orientation. Le rôle de la secrétaire est d’assurer le premier contact, de recueillir les éléments de la demande et de présenter le cadre de travail du conseiller conjugal. Les rendez-vous sont pris selon des règles et des consignes définies dans un cadre institutionnel.

Dr Sydney Brenner has played a major, and unique, role in biology during the past 40 years. His contributions have ranged from key work on the structure of the genetic code and the existence of mRNA through the development of Caenorhabditis elegans as a key model system in developmental biology to genomic analysis and function in vertebrates. BioEssays went to interview Dr Brenner at his home in the cathedral city of Ely, England, on the significance of the genome (...) projects for human biology, in particular, and for biology, in general. (shrink)

Segue abaixo a tradução do alemão da seção dedicada ao cinismo presente nas Lições Sobre a História da Filosofia de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Na seção em questão, o filósofo alemão aborda não somente a história da escola cínica, mas também seus princípios, suas influências e a importância que esse movimento teve para o pensamento filosófico posterior – sobretudo para o estoicismo.

In “The logic of deep disagreements” (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed that there is a kind of disagreement – deep disagreement – which is, by its very nature, impervious to rational resolution. He further claimed that these two views are attributable to Wittgenstein. Following an exposition and discussion of that claim, we review and draw some lessons from existing responses in the literature to Fogelin’s claims. In the final two sections (6 and 7) we explore the role reason can, (...) and sometimes does, play in the resolution of deep disagreements. In doing this we discuss a series of cases, mainly drawn from Wittgenstein, which we take to illustrate the resolution of deep disagreements through the use of what we call “rational persuasion.” We conclude that, while the role of argumentation in “normal” versus “deep” disagreements is characteristically different, it plays a crucial role in the resolution of both. (shrink)

Despite an intractable judiciary, there is widespread consensus within the legal academy that jury nullification is compatible with the rule of law. This proposition is most strongly tested by where a jury nullifies simply because it disagrees with the law itself. While some substantive nullifications can comport with the rule of law, most commentatorsjustice,vely undifferentiated view of a morality (even though jurisdictional and vicinage morality can diverge). In doing so, a healthy vision of antityrannical nullifications is presented, but this leaves (...) out many problematic cases. Once these errors are rectified, a more nuanced picture emerges, and it becomes apparent that localism will often disrupt the congruence feature of the rule of law. (shrink)

While democracy is derided for a variety of reasons in Plato’s thought, his most damning critique of that regime type does not involve an observation about democracy qua democracy, but of the transition that it so easily engenders: the decline to tyranny. Regimes are composed of individuals and groups, though, and Plato is anxious to ascribe culpability for the degradation. Two actors are the primary focus of his analysis — the political leaders and the demos. At times he emphasizes the (...) puissance of the demos, but in other passages he suggests it is the leaders who are most authoritative. This paper discusses these apparently contradictory passages, and works towards a reconciliation. It argues that neither is assigned sole culpability, as both work in complex synrgy, and that the underlying cause of the decline—and the motivator behind both actors — is not simply freedom, but greed for material wealth. (shrink)

Metaphysicians frequently appeal to the idea that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, in the sense that, all other things being equal, simpler metaphysical theories are more likely to be true. In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, against several recent objections. I do not give any direct arguments for the thesis that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, since I am aware of no such arguments. I do argue, however, that (...) there is no special problem with the notion that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that if you accept the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in science, then it would be objectionably arbitrary to reject the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. (shrink)

This article argues that changes in the organization of social reproduction, defined to include the activities, attitudes, behaviors, emotions, responsibilities, and relationships involved in maintaining daily life, can explain historical differences in women's political self-organization. Examining the Progressive period, the 1930s, and the 1960s and 1970s, the authors suggest that the conditions of social reproduction provide the organizational resources for and legitimation of women's collective action.

Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composite objects—objects with proper parts—do not exist. Nihilists generally paraphrase talk of composite objects F into talk of there being “xs arranged F-wise” . Recently several philosophers have argued that nihilism is defective insofar as nihilists are either unable to say what they mean by such phrases as “there are xs arranged F-wise,” or that nihilists are unable to employ such phrases without incurring significant costs, perhaps even undermining one of the chief motivations for (...) nihilism. In this paper I defend nihilism against these objections. A key theme of the paper is this: if nihilists need to employ such phrases as “there are xs arranged F-wise,” non-nihilists will need to do so as well. Accordingly, any costs incurred by the nihilist when she employs such phrases will be shared by everyone else. What’s more, such phrases are intelligible when employed by the nihilist, as well as when they are employed by the non-nihilist, insofar as analyses of such phrases will not essentially involve mereological concepts incompatible with nihilism. (shrink)

Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composition never occurs. Some philosophers have thought that science gives us compelling evidence against nihilism. In this article I respond to this concern. An initial challenge for nihilism stems from the fact that composition is such a ubiquitous feature of scientific theories. In response I motivate a restricted form of scientific anti-realism with respect to those components of scientific theories which make reference to composition. A second scientifically based worry for nihilism is that certain (...) specific scientific phenomena might require ineliminable quantification over composite objects. I address these concerns, and argue that there seem to be nihilist-friendly construals of the scientific phenomena in question. (shrink)

This is terribly hard, Thouless, I'm sorry. I have thought over all this for years. … It is now as if we had ploughed furrows in different parts of a field. There is a lot left to do. Judging from their writings, most contemporary analytic philosophers have not been persuaded that “the inverted spectrum problem” is – as Wittgenstein maintained – really a conceptual puzzle calling for dissolution, rather than a straight problem calling for a solution. In this paper, I (...) present Wittgenstein's view as clearly and persuasively as I can, contrasting it with the views of Sidney Shoemaker and Ned Block, two of his more prominent critics. I conclude with a look at Frank Jackson's well-known Knowledge Argument, which, if successful, would demonstrate the futility of looking for a physicalist solution to the inverted spectrum and related philosophical problems. My goal is to combat what I take to be the common and unfortunate failure – among both physicalistically inclined philosophers, including Shoemaker and Block, and anti-physicalists, such as Jackson – to appreciate the force of Wittgenstein's arguments. (shrink)

Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composition never occurs. Sider has defended nihilism on the basis of its relative ideological simplicity. In this paper I develop the argument from ideological simplicity, and defend it from some recent objections. Along the way I discuss the best way to formulate nihilism, what it means for a theory to exhibit lesser or greater degrees of ideological simplicity, the relationship between the parthood relation and the identity relation, and the notion that we should judge (...) the ideological simplicity of competing theories on the basis of the kinds of ideological commitments required by those theories. (shrink)

Some facts ground other facts. Some fact is fundamental iff there are no other facts which partially or fully ground that fact. According to metaphysical foundationalism, every non-fundamental fact is fully grounded by some fundamental fact(s). In this paper I examine and defend some neglected considerations which might be made in favor of metaphysical foundationalism. Building off of work by Ross Cameron, I suggest that foundationalist theories are more unified than, and so in one important respect simpler than, non-foundationalist theories, (...) insofar as foundationalist theories allow us to derive all non-fundamental facts from some fundamental fact(s). Non-foundationalist theories can enjoy a similar sort of theoretical unification only by taking on objectionable metaphysical laws. (shrink)

Weise and Daly (2014) provide a useful spectrum of accountability of the clinical ethics consultant (CEC), ranging from restricted to unbounded. They argue for a position chiseled out in the middle...

In 1929 Moritz Schlick and those scholars he had brought together came to realize that they had given rise to something entirely new, so the text of the Vienna Circle Manifesto has it. What was novel was the conception of the world, henceforth scientific. Or as we may put it otherwise: a discipline had been established, the philosophy of science, that is a reflection on science no longer subordinate to traditional theory of knowledge and metaphysics. The text goes on to (...) explain why such a conception arose geographically where it did: “That Vienna was specially suitable ground for [the development of the spirit of a scientific conception of the world] is historically understandable” 1. The Vienna Circle Manifesto proceeds to enumerate the multifarious intellectual movements that were brought together at the beginning of the 20th century in the city of Vienna. Is it irrelevant or untimely to emphasize this cosmopolitan spirit? I believe, on the contrary, that cosmopolitanism provides both a lesson about philosophical creativity and a key for understanding the vitality of Viennese philosophy: the achievements of the Vienna Circle were the result of an exceptional open-mindedness on the part of its members. (shrink)

Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper, I argue that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who reject substance dualism and accept composition, have some explaining to do. Secondly, one (...) popular objection to mereological nihilism, one which contends that mereological nihilism is objectionable insofar as it is incompatible with the existence of people, is untenable. (shrink)

To better understand what information is and to explain information-related issues has become an essential philosophical task. General concepts from science, ethics and sociology are insufficient. As noted by Floridi, a new philosophy, a Philosophy of Information (PI), is needed. In the 80’s, Wu Kun proposed a “The Basic Theory of the Philosophy of Information”, which became available in English only in 2010. Wu and Joseph Brenner then found that the latter’s non-standard “Logic in Reality” provided critical logical support (...) for Wu’s theory. In Part I of our paper, we outline the two basic theories as a metaphilosophy and metalogic for information. We offer our two theories as a further contribution to an informational paradigm. In Part II [WuB14], we develop the relation between information and social value as a basis for the ethical development of the emerging Information Society. (shrink)

Many say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Since the disputes over the existence of composite objects have these substantive implications, they are (...) themselves substantive. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas, along with many other medieval philosophers, believed that God is timeless. Aquinas’s treatment of this doctrine seems to imply a view of time that some commentators have noticed is inescapably tenseless, what we would now call a “B-theory” view of time. This is problematic because Aquinas also seems to affirm that tense and temporal becoming are real, implying that what we would now call an “A-theory” of time is correct. In this essay I attempt to adjudicate this apparent (...) conceptual tension in Aquinas’s thought. After analyzing some of the relevant passages I conclude that these passages inescapably, though perhaps inadvertently, commit Aquinas to what is fundamentally a B-theoretic notion of time. I move on to criticize some philosophers’ attempts to reconcile Aquinas’s treatment of divine timelessness with the A-theory. I argue that all these attempts are unsuccessful. I conclude with what I believe are the implications of my interpretation of Aquinas for his broader system of philosophy. (shrink)

We analyze two problems in mathematics – the first (stated in our title) is extracted from Wittgenstein’s “Philosophy for Mathematicians”; the second (“What set of numbers is non-denumerable?”) is taken from Cantor. We then consider, by way of comparison, a problem in musical aesthetics concerning a Brahms variation on a theme by Haydn. Our aim is to bring out and elucidate the essentially riddle-like character of these problems.

The work of Luciano Floridi lies at the interface of philosophy, information science and technology, and ethics, an intersection whose existence and significance he was one of the first to establish. His closely related concepts of a philosophy of information (PI), informational structural realism, information logic (IL), and information ethics (IE) provide a new ontological perspective from which moral concerns can be addressed, especially but not limited to those arising in connection with the new information and communication technologies. In this (...) paper, I relate Floridi's approach to another novel perspective, namely, that of an extension of logic to complex real processes, including those of information production and transfer. This non-propositional, non-truth-functional logic (logic in reality (LIR)) is grounded in the fundamental dualism (dynamic opposition) inherent in energy and accordingly present at all levels of reality. The LIR description of the dynamics of processes and their evolution is relevant to what Floridi refers to as the possible non-linguistic aspects of information. It suggests answers to some of Floridi's “outstanding problems” in PI related to the ontological status of information and how it is used in cognition. Floridi's IL retains the formal structure of the doxastic and epistemic logics from which he correctly distinguishes it and is the basis for his conceptual PI. However, LIR fulfills Floridi's implied requirement that logic be regarded as a natural phenomenon dealing with other natural phenomena, recovering its original philosophical function. LIR provides a logical foundation for discussion of ethical questions based on kinds of information that complements IL. Both are reconsiderations of logic that, as Marijuan suggests, may be necessary for the advancement of information technology in an ethical direction (cf. also Brenner). IE focuses on entities as constituted by information in an overall strategy that generalizes the concept of moral agents. LIR and its related ontology naturalize critical aspects of Floridi's theses, especially, the moral value of being as such and a non-separable joint responsibility of individuals and groups. I compare IE to other current approaches to ethics and information technology (e.g., phenomenological and social constructivist). Ethical information is defined “ecologically” in process terms as reality in a physical space (cf. Floridi), with an intentional “valence,” positive and negative, in the morally valued interaction between producer and receiver. LIR is neither topic-neutral nor context independent and can support an ethics involving apparently contradictory perspectives (e.g., internalist and externalist). Ethics involves practical reasoning, and unlike standard logics, LIR supports Magnani's approach to abductive reasoning in rational moral decision making. The basis of moral responsibility and the consequent behavior of individuals involved in information and communications technologies is the same logical–metaphysical principle of dynamic opposition instantiated at other levels of reality. The way moral responsibilities are actively accepted (or not) by individuals supervenes on their primitive psychological structure, which in turn reflects an evolutionary development grounded in the fundamental dualism of the physical world. The paper concludes with some suggestions of areas of philosophical research, such as causality, identity, and the ontological turn, where convergence of the Floridi and LIR approaches might be envisaged. Their overall motivation is the same, namely, the development of strategies for reinforcing and increasing ethical sensitivity wherever possible. The ethical information concept outlined in the paper supports the function of IE, assigned to it by Floridi, of potentially determining what is right and what is wrong. (shrink)

The problem of gender equality among lawyers has been a subject of significant research, study and action across the globe. It is well known that despite women's entrance into law school in relatively equal numbers to men over the past few decades, they remain significantly under-represented in positions of leadership and power across sectors of the legal profession. Progress has come to a standstill, making this a particularly critical time to examine the ways we conceptualise the problem and rethink the (...) solutions. The legal profession, as a gatekeeper of equality and as an institution committed to the preservation of rights, should be emblematic of gender equality. Responsibility for addressing the problematic gender dynamics is something that lies with the entire profession and should be framed as a matter of ethics. To date, the conversation on this issue has been relatively insular and this essay argues for an expansion of this conversation to include the entire bar. Toward this end, this essay suggests that there are new ways to think about pathways to gender equality by expanding the boundaries that have defined the problem. First, it has been defined in a way that focuses almost exclusively on those already engaged in the practice of law, often at the highest echelons of practice to the exclusion of other sectors, especially legal education. Second, the existing movement has almost unilaterally focused on the structural impediments within the legal system or the characteristics of law practice itself that exist as roadblocks to women, ignoring significant barriers that are not necessarily unique to women lawyers but impede the progress of women generally. The movement also often fails to extend beyond geographic borders of a particular country, thereby eliminating the potential for a global conversation. In crafting solutions, there has been little acknowledgement of the role of legal education. (shrink)

I am grateful to Hannes Nykänen for his discussion of the important role that I–Thou relationships, as described by Martin Buber, have in shaping a moral life. The author makes a distinction between two very different kinds of moral experience, one based in encounters between mutually engaged subjects (I–Thou relationships), and another based on the internalization of external standards. He argues that only the former can provide a foundation for moral decisions that are guided by conscience. He is careful to (...) limit his use of the term conscience to the sense of moral imperative one feels out of consideration and concern for another subject—one who is appreciated as a unique and immeasurably valuable person. The .. (shrink)

One of the difficulties facing the philosopher of science today is the divide between historical epistemology and analytic philosophy of science. For over half a century these two traditions have followed independent and divergent paths. Historical epistemology, which originated in France in the early twentieth century, has recently been reformulated by a number of scholars such as Lorraine Daston, Ian Hacking, and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger. Elaborating novel historical methods, they seek to provide answers to major questions in the field. In the (...) light of this situation, my article examines the cultural barrier that explains the uneasy relationship between the two traditions. This barrier hinges on a number of factors—institutional, political and social—that are bound up with the philosophical issues in question. By resorting both to historical study and logical analysis, the new historical epistemology incites us to move beyond a rather sterile antagonism. (shrink)