This article critically reconstructs militant democracy’s ‘institutional conservatism’, a theoretical preference for institutions that restrain transformation. It offers two arguments, one historical and one normative. Firstly, it traces a historical development from a substantive to a procedural version of institutional conservatism from the traditional militant democratic thought of Schmitt, Loewenstein and Popper to the contemporary militant democratic theories of Kirshner and Rijpkema. Substantive institutional conservatisms theorize institutions that hinder transformation of the existing order; procedural conservatisms encourage (...) transformation but contain and limit it within the boundaries of existing institutions. Secondly, the article uses resources internal to this historical reconstruction to make the normative case that even the procedural version of institutional conservatism, which characterizes contemporary theories of militant democracy, is problematic from a democratic perspective. The reason for this is that it unjustifiably restricts fundamental democratic change to existing institutions. In conclusion, the article calls for further engagement with modes of democratic defence that do not limit the possibility of radical democratic change but nevertheless enable the protection of democratic institutions against authoritarian regression. (shrink)

In the 1970s the Federal Republic of Germany found itself locked in a battle with leftwing extremism, when groups of self-styled urban guerrillas attempted to press through a radical agenda using methods that included bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations. This essay examines the counterterrorist initiatives of West Germany’s ruling social-liberal coalition as anti-state violence forced officials to reconsider the principles of democracy and state power. With the collapse of the Weimar Republic casting an ominous shadow, political leaders gradually forged a (...) consensus around the concept of “militant democracy.” In practice, this meant a more centralized state, prepared to forcefully defend the lives and property of its citizens against terrorist attacks. Although the country embraced a new image of German militarism in the form of counterterrorist commandos, citizens expressed a growing concern over computerized crime fighting as an intrusive surveillance of their private lives. (shrink)

This volume offers an up-to-date overview of the much-debated issue of how a democracy may defend itself against those who want to subvert it. The justifications, effectiveness and legal implications of militant democracy are discussed by addressing questions as: How can militant democracy measures such as party bans be justified? Why is it that some democracies ban antidemocratic parties? Does militant democracy succeed in combatting right-wing extremism? And is militant democracy evolving (...) into an internationalized legal and political concept? Bringing together experts and perspectives from political science, law and philosophy, this volume advances our understanding of the current threats to democracy, a political system once thought almost invincible. It is especially timely in the light of the rise of illiberal democracy in the EU, the increasingly authoritarian rule in Turkey, the steady shift to autocracy in Russia and the remarkable election of Trump in the US. (shrink)

Decisions in democracy are binding not in virtue of being true or good, but on account of being an outcome of the majority voting procedure. For some, this is a proof of an intricate connection between democracy and moral relativism. The ‘militant democracy’ model, on the other hand, is premised on the idea that certain political actors and choices have to be banned for being fatally bad for democracy. This gives rise to the claim that (...) protected democratic fundamental values of freedom and equality enjoy the status of absolute moral standards. This article dismisses the intuition that justification of ‘militant democracy’ depends on unpacking the relation between democracy and meta-ethics. Instead, following Bernard Suits’ analytical exposition of the important features of games, it demonstrates, first, how democracy is like a game and, then, it argues that a plausible justification of ‘militant democracy’ stems from its game-like character. (shrink)

In their efforts to prevent democratic backsliding, militant democrats have traditionally been sympathetic to technocratic arrangements. Does this sympathy imply a logical congruence? Comparing theories of militant democracy and epistemic technocracy (aka epistocracy), I discover a common approach to basic aspects of representative democracy. Both theories see voters as fallible or ignorant instead of capable political agents; and they both understand political parties to be channels of state rule rather than democratic expression. This shared suspicion of (...) grassroots political agency explains why they employ non-democratic means to pursue their goals. But the two theories appear to be also analytically co-extensive. Like militant democrats, epistemic technocrats polemicize antidemocrats inasmuch as the latter are proxies for epistemically foul decision-making. Conversely, militant democrats try to block ‘incorrect’ decisions as long as these lead to democratic subversion, thereby producing a distinct type of militant technocracy. The article ends by drawing the implications of this symbiosis of epistemic and militant democratic ideas for contemporary democratic theory. (shrink)

Militant democracy is an attempt to defend democracy against totalitarian parties that would use democratic procedures to rise to power. This article is focused on the consistency of the concept of ‘militant democracy’. I argue that what militant democracy defends is not the democratic procedure itself but rather certain rights and the rule of law, and that those elements may in fact be compromised by democracy. This applies both if the democratic procedure (...) is concerned and if democracy is interpreted as a reflection of the will of the people. Those elements may be upheld, but democracy is to be mitigated rather than fortified in order to do so. (shrink)

Constellations, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 310-328, September 2022.

In this essay, I address some questions and challenges brought about by the contributors to this special issue on my book ‘Democracy without Shortcuts’. First, I clarify different aspects of my cri...

Cristina Lafont gives an impressive defence of deliberative democracy against its critics. This article considers in detail her engagement with the ‘deep pluralist’ position that characterizes Nadia Urbinati’s, Jeremy Waldron’s and Richard Bellamy’s positions. After considering Lafont’s threefold argument against the deep pluralists, I contend that she vacillates between a substantialist and recursive-iterative defence of the democratic ideal. Her defence of judicial review does not consider some of the strategic ways in which civil society groups may approach the process. (...) I conclude by arguing that constitutionalization is not always a salutary move for resolving controversial issues in a democracy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Militant democracy calls for pre-emptive measures against political actors who use democratic institutions to undermine or outright abolish a democratic political system. Born in the context of interwar fascism, militant democracy has recently been revived by political and legal theorists concerned about the rise of authoritarian right-wing populists. A long-standing charge against militant democracy—also articulated with renewed force in our era—is that, as a top-down way to deal with the intolerant, militant (...) class='Hi'>democracy is inherently elitist and bears uncomfortable similarities with technocracy. But while it is true that militant democracy relies on state institutions to preserve democracy, it by no means excludes citizen engagement: “courts or the people” is a false choice. On the other hand, citizens engaged in militant democracy must take on the difficult task of distinguishing very clearly between democratic essentials under threat and political questions about which citizens might reasonably disagree. While citizen assemblies are not the answer to all of contemporary democracies’ travails, they might be very helpful in clarifying such distinctions for wide audiences. (shrink)

This article critically examines Busk's Democracy in Spite of the Demos, which critiques the “categorical imperative of democracy.” Although Busk effectively challenges the commitment to value-neutral democratic procedures as the foundation for legitimate law, his alternative, curtailing powerful interests ability to manipulate voters using “socially necessary delusions,” risks establishing elite rule. This article instead proposes basic liberal rights as the normative foundation for legitimate public order and militant democracy as its most effective institutional safeguard, arguing that (...) this combination better realizes human emancipation. (shrink)

In its opening chapters, ‘Languages of the Unheard’ offers a broad account of militancy as an aid to democracy and a principled response to the intransigence of elites and the unresponsiveness of institutions to the public interest. It proposes an understanding of militancy as a civic virtue and a contribution to democratic politics, relying on a normative conception of ‘autonomous democracy.’ In the second part of the book, this understanding of admirable militancy is applied to a wide range (...) of protest styles, including the nonviolent civil disobedience promoted by Gandhi and King, the disruptive direct action of strikes and other forms organized disruption, the rioting and black blocs of militant street protest, and the armed insurgency promoted by both urban and rural guerrilla groups. (shrink)

This pioneering book delivers a systematic account of agonistic democracy, and a much-needed analysis of the core components of agonism: pluralism, tragedy, and the value of conflict. It also traces the history of these ideas, identifying the connections with republicanism and with Greek antiquity. Mark Wenman presents a critical appraisal of the leading contemporary proponents of agonism and, in a series of well-crafted and comprehensive discussions, brings these thinkers into debate with one another, as well as with the post-structuralist (...) and continental theorists who influence them. Wenman draws extensively on Hannah Arendt, and stresses the creative power of human action as augmentation and revolution. He also reworks Arendt's discussion of reflective judgement to present an alternative style of agonism, one where the democratic contest is linked to the emergence of a militant form of cosmopolitanism, and to prospects for historical change in the context of neoliberal globalisation. (shrink)

In this article, it is argued that a significant internal tension exists in John Rawls' political liberalism. He holds the following positions that might plausibly be considered incongruous: (1) a commitment to tolerating a broad right of freedom of political speech, including a right of subversive advocacy; (2) a commitment to restricting this broad right if it is intended to incite and likely to bring about imminent violence; and (3) a commitment to curbing this broad right only if there is (...) a constitutional crisis. By supporting a broad right of freedom of political speech in Political Liberalism, he allows militant intolerant people such as Jihadists, White Supremacists and Neo-Nazis to advocate publicly their dangerously intolerant beliefs. Public advocacy of dangerously intolerant beliefs can be construed as subversive advocacy. As demonstrated by the historical examples of the Weimar Republic and the Second Spanish Republic, militant intolerant groups could use a right of subversive advocacy to threaten the stability of liberal democracies. Hence, by allowing them to exercise a broad right of freedom of political speech, Rawls could jeopardize that which he intends to defend, namely the actual political stability of a liberal democratic order. Lastly, Rawls' conception of ideal constitutional interpretation, which privileges a broad right of freedom of political speech, might be insufficient to deal effectively with the threat posed by militant intolerant groups. Yet a tradition of American constitutional interpretation that balances freedom of speech with other important constitutional and/or political values has overcome a civil war, two world wars, the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks without abandoning democracy or permanently renouncing those values. Still, Rawls' ideal approach to constitutional interpretation might, in hindsight, help us to understand some of the excesses and deficiencies of American jurisprudence in times of emergency.<br><br><br><br>. (shrink)

The main object of this paper is to examine the new philosophical frame proposed by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek and to show that it implies some traces of Sartre's philosophical and political heritage. According the project of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek one should no longer accept today's constellation of freedom, particularistic truth and democracy, but to inscribe the issues of freedom and universal truth into a political project that attempts to re-activate a thinking of revolution. Their thinking (...) consists in the wager that it is still possible to provide a philosophical frame for this leftist emancipatory position that claims the dimension of the universal against the vicious circle of capitalist globalization-cum-particularization and, by following Marx's claim that there are formal affinities between the ambitions of emancipatory politics and the working mode of capitalism, takes up the struggle of universalism against globalization. It is only through this struggle for the universal that the intertwined processes of a constant expansion of the automatism of capital and "a process of fragmentation into closed identities," accompanied by "the culturalist and relativist ideology" can be suspended. It is precisely this constellation of revolutionary act, universal truth, subject, and militant community, that reveal some similarities with Sartre's concepts of the subject, the revolutionary action, the militant community a.o. (shrink)

The question raised by the article is: can democracy be religious and, if so, how? Can religious faith be reconciled with modern democratic political institutions? The article takes its departure from the biblical admonition to believers to be ‘the salt of the earth’ — a phrase that militates against both world dominion and world denial. In its long history, Islam (like Christianity) has been sorely tempted by the lure of worldly power and domination. Nor is this temptation entirely a (...) matter of the past (witness the rise of the Christian right and of ‘political Islam’ in our time). Focusing on contemporary Iran, the article makes a constitutional proposal which would strengthen the democratic character of the Iranian Republic without canceling religious faith. If adopted, the proposal would reinvigorate the ‘salt’ of Muslim faith thus enabling believers to live up to the Qur‘anic summons for freedom, justice and service in the world. (shrink)

Enigmatic relationship between philosophy and politics -- Figure of the soldier -- Politics as a nonexpressive dialectics.

This paper focuses on how African national leaders can make global democracy relevant to sustainable development in Africa. Seeing the problem of sustainable development in Africa from the structural and functional angles, this paper begins with an introduction and a clarification of terms such as ‘democracy’, ‘globalization’ and ‘development’. It then analyzes the underlying foundations of global democracy and its implications to cultures of the African peoples. This paper tries to place the impact of global democracy (...) on Africa in perspectives by weighing the pros and cons of global democracy. Tracing the genesis of functional and developmental problems in the post-colonial Africa to structural problems occasioned by Africa’s colonial experience, this paper however strongly contends that the main problem militating against sustainable development in the post-colonial Africa is bad politics and mismanagement of national resources. African peoples need to be taught that some of the African national leaders are responsible for the bad condition of underdevelopment in the global period because of bad political governance ranging from the inability of African leaders to calculate all the relevant factors in the making of their policies as well as failing to provide effective technologies and competent staff to deal with rigging of elections and other electoral problems in addition to corruption and mismanagement of public funds. There is no way for the African nations to survive without production of goods and services in terms of farming, agriculture and diversification of their revenue base. National leaders of the various African nations cannot avoid policies that enable the industrialization of African nations through the provision of the basic infrastructures and viable amenities for social, economic, and political development. They should however be wary of debt traps of International Monetary Fund and World Bank because borrowing nations are often given difficult conditions that often make it difficult for them to obtain the desired benefits in terms of sustainable development. The study recommends that for sustainable development to take place in Africa there is need for national leaders to embrace good political governance that places the people at the centre of development to be manifested in guileless electoral process and effective management of the resources. This paper contends that the realization of sustainable development in African nations requires moral, political, and economic integration. It concludes with perspectives for further research on the issue. (shrink)

The question raised by the article is: can democracy be religious and, if so, how? Can religious faith be reconciled with modern democratic political institutions? The article takes its departure from the biblical admonition to believers to be ‘the salt of the earth’ — a phrase that militates against both world dominion and world denial. In its long history, Islam (like Christianity) has been sorely tempted by the lure of worldly power and domination. Nor is this temptation entirely a (...) matter of the past (witness the rise of the Christian right and of ‘political Islam’ in our time). Focusing on contemporary Iran, the article makes a constitutional proposal which would strengthen the democratic character of the Iranian Republic without canceling religious faith. If adopted, the proposal would reinvigorate the ‘salt’ of Muslim faith thus enabling believers to live up to the Qur‘anic summons for freedom, justice and service in the world. (shrink)

The most valuable political theoretical contribution made by Marx's idea of socialism is towards the resolution of the seeming opposition of mass democracy and rational government. Marx follows Hegel's redefinition of political rationalization as the actualization of the nascent self?consciousness of the existing ethical world when he uses socialism as a statement of those tendencies of bourgeois society that will create the perspectives of social awareness that allow mass democracy. This thesis is made against aspects of the interpretation (...) of Marx's relation to Hegel in Bolshevik political theory. I claim that the Bolshevik idea of socialism as the militant political intervention of the dictatorship of the proletariat develops, through Engels, a position taken with respect to Hegel's philosophy of right in Marx's Rhenish Journal articles. This idea is, however, pre?Hegelian in the sense that it is open to a democratic criticism based on the philosophy of right understood in an alternative fashion. In his writings after leaving the Rhenish Journal and up to the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx makes this alternative available, and the notion of socialism he arrives at here turns on an awareness of the contradictions which make the militant political imposition of freedom impossible. Whereas for Bolshevism socialism is to be imposed on existing society, for Marx it is more the development within that society that makes possible mass democratic freedom. (shrink)

Trade union leaders serve dual, seemingly contradictory roles. They must command militant organizations in conflicts with employers. Simultaneously, they must be accountable and democratically responsive to their members. Few unions possess the institutions or leadership to accomplish both. This article analyzes the practices of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, in which effective contract negotiation and an informed, active rank-and-file democracy are mutually supportive. We offer an alternative to standard accounts of union democracy. While the claims are (...) based on a detailed case study, the theoretical model and its insights hold for labor unions and organizations more broadly. (shrink)

Cet article analyse les principales caractéristiques d’un réseau d’organisations civiles mobilisées autour de la biodiversité. Il revient sur le discours produit par ces ONG autour de la thématique de la biodiversité, sur sa structuration en réseau, sur ses activités particulières de production et de diffusion d’informations, ainsi que sur son positionnement hybride entre expertise et militantisme.This article analyses the main characteristics of a network of civil society organisations involved in biodiversity advocacy. It investigates the discourse on biodiversity produced by these (...) NGOs, the formation of a structured network, its specific activities in the production and dissemination of information and its hybrid position combining expertise and activism. (shrink)

A new theory of ethnic cleansing based on the most terrible cases and cases of lesser violence. Murderous cleansing is modern, 'the dark side of democracy'. It results where the demos is confused with the ethnos. Danger arises where two rival ethno-national movements each claims 'its own' state over the same territory. Conflict escalates where either the weaker side fights because of aid from outside, or the stronger side believes it can deploy sudden, overwhelming force. Escalation is not simply (...) the work of 'evil elites' or 'primitive peoples'. It results from complex interactions between leaders, militants, and 'core constituencies' of ethno-nationalism. Understanding this complex process helps us devise policies to avoid ethnic cleansing in the future. (shrink)

This article engages new histories of the black frontline communities of the Underground Railroad to rethink both fugitive democracy and the transformative possibilities of sanctuary as its constitutive twin. We analyze the ways that communities of free blacks and fugitives in the border zones between the Antebellum US North and South crafted themselves as magnetic spaces of creative refuge that suggest we reconceive sanctuary as the generative twin of fugitivity. This insight enables us to theorize new ethical and political (...) dimensions of Sheldon Wolin’s concept fugitive democracy by illuminating how fugitivity as flight away from danger can be interwoven with sanctuary as flight into and toward alternatives. Specifically, we theorize three dimensions of fugitive democracy/transformative sanctuary—sanctuary tending, dramatic sanctuary, and disruptive hospitality. While some theorists have considered key motifs in Wolin’s fugitive democracy to be opposed to vital themes disclosed in contemporary theories of black fugitivity, we argue that the power of black frontline communities stemmed precisely from their capacities to dynamically entangle political approaches taken to be at odds. For example, we suggest a theory and practice of tending involving both nurturing care and militantly defensive action, dramatic sanctuary performances that amplify public power by oscillating between tricky concealment and flagrant publicity, and disruptive hospitality that interweaves law-breaking harbor with strategies for juridical and institutional change. These insights open onto an alternative imaginary that can also provide a toolbox for building grassroots democratic power today, particularly in the face of emergent neofascism and escalating displacement worldwide. (shrink)

Across almost a decade, Desmond Tutu, Anglican cleric and chairman of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supported a model of civil resistance against the apartheid regime based solely on religious argument. Tutu is one of what Appleby (2000) calls the “religious militants for peace”: people of faith who use religious arguments to buttress resistance against unjust regimes and to support vital political change with regard to rights and justice. Yet the employment of religious arguments to justify political action seems (...) to contradict the liberal democratic requirements of public reason, particularly the duty of liberal citizens to provide reasons that others could reasonably endorse. If “religious militants” violate their duty of civility by appealing to their comprehensive doctrines, should liberal democracy exclude this form of religiously founded dissent as being unreasonable? Or, rather, should liberal democracy embrace and support the efforts of “religious militants” to enhance and/or restore political justice? (shrink)

This article argues that new (and sometimes invisible) forms of civic protest are finding a voice in the age of the Internet. It poses the questions whether these voices of protest are (a) part of a long, militant and sometimes violent tradition of street politics based on class struggle or (b) new, peaceful and creative political (and anti-political) platforms (a metaphysical revolt) offering critical and innovative insights into the possibilities of democratic renewal - as part of a process of (...) deepening democracy into more ethical and participatory forms.En este artículo se argumenta que las nuevas (y a veces invisibles) formas de protesta cívica están encontrando voz en la era de internet. Se plantea la cuestión de si estas voces de protesta son (a) parte de una larga, militante y, en ocasiones, violenta tradición de política de la calle basada en la lucha de clases o bien (b) nuevas, pacíficas y creativas plataformas (una revuelta metafísica) políticas (y antipolítica), que ofrece una perspectiva innovadora y crítica respecto a las posibilidades de renovación democrática, como parte de un proceso de profundización de la democracia en formas más éticas y participativas. (shrink)

Due to the persistent rise of extremism, democrats in recent years have been exploring old and new possibilities of democratic self-defence. This article explores an unconventional and little known alternative to militant democracy that places the demos at the centre stage of the struggle against extremism. Through a neo-procedural reinterpretation of ancient ostracism and modern-day recall, I suggest that citizens should have rights of democratic de-selection of elected parties and candidates. I argue that, if properly designed, such a (...) mechanism of de-presentation distributes the burden of democratic self-defence among citizens and creates a bottom-up majoritarian resistance to anti-democratic threats, without compromising free parliamentary mandate or minority rights. (shrink)

Sophocles's classical tragedy, Antigone, is continually reinvented, particularly in the Americas. Theater practitioners and political theorists alike revisit the story to hold states accountable for their democratic exclusions, as Antigone did in disobeying the edict of her uncle, Creon, for refusing to bury her brother, Polynices. Antigone in the Americas not only analyzes the theoretical reception of Antigone, when resituated in the Americas, but further introduces decolonial rumination as a new interpretive methodology through which to approach classical texts. Traveling between (...) modern present and ancient past, Andrés Fabián Henao Castro focuses on metics (resident aliens) and slaves, rather than citizens, making the feminist politics of burial long associated with Antigone relevant for theorizing militant forms of mourning in the global south. Grounded in settler colonial critique, black and woman of color feminisms, and queer and trans of color critique, Antigone in the Americas offers a more radical interpretation of Antigone, one relevant to subjects situated under multiple and interlocking systems of oppression. (shrink)

Rawls stipulates that nonideal theory must include theories of punishment and compensatory justice, as well as a justification for the forms of opposition to unjust regimes, from civil disobedience and conscientious refusal to militant resistance, rebellion and revolution. (TOJ, p. 8) Given the Kantian interpretation of nonideal theory we now can see that each of its parts must be constructed to contribute to the teaching of justice. The preferred theory of moral development enables us to understand how persons come (...) to adopt nonideal conceptions and practices, and how they can be convinced to change their thinking. The theory of history enables us to determine which traditions contain empirical causes of contemporary conceptions and practices.We recall that Rawls identifies the parties in the original position as we ourselves; when we ground our judgments upon its procedures, then we can perceive the world as persons in that position do. Our view need not be obscured by the economic determinism of traditional Marxism, nor does it require a psychoanalytic corrective in the manner stipulated by contemporary critical Marxists. A Rawlsian critique of American liberal democracy resolves the question of these determinants in the same way as it resolves all questions of an empirical nature, by placing them in their systematic unity according to a Kantian moral anthropology. If we can see what judgments result regarding empirical injustices and their removal we may ourselves learn something of how to redesign nonideal culture to conform to ideal principles of justice. And this prospect in turn is identical to the prospect of constructing a bridge between social theory and practice within liberal democracy. (shrink)

Political activists can cheer when Jacques Derrida says that his idea of “democracy to come” is “a call for militant and interminable political critique.” Our acclamations grow louder when he adds that this idea is “a weapon aimed at the enemies of democracy.” He identifies these “enemies” as people who use the discourse of democracy as an “obscene alibi” for “tolerating the plight” of people “deprived of bread and water” and “equality or freedom.”1 He accuses the (...) United States of committing this sort of hypocrisy when it denounces other states for practicing the very roguery in which it indulges.2We can also praise Derrida for what he offers us as well as rejects. He comments that there is a need for a “European... (shrink)

What should the EU do about the fact that some Member States are backsliding on their commitments to democracy, supposedly a fundamental value of the EU? The Treaty provisions under Article 7 TEU are widely criticized for being ineffective in preventing such developments. Are they legitimate? I argue that the ultimate sanction of Article 7 TEU falls into a performative contradiction, which undermines its ability to coherently defend fundamental values. Instead, expulsion from the EU is the appropriate, coherent and (...) legitimate final political sanction for democratic and rule of law backsliding by a Member State. The argument has the following steps: In Part 1, I argue that the current Article 7 framework for responding to democratic and rule of law backsliding in the EU is normatively problematic, in that the mechanism currently in the Treaty undermines the values it purports to defend; in other words, it falls into a performative contradiction. It is undemocratic to deprive Member States of their right to vote in the Council while holding them subject to Council decisions. However, Part 2 studies relevant philosophical arguments from an adjacent literature on criminal disenfranchisement, concluding that allowing backsliding Member States to keep their voting rights in the Council _also_ taints the democratic character of Council decision-making. In Part 3, I consider the resulting paradox in light of the literature on militant democracy. Could militant democracy justify Article 7? I argue not; even if we accept the hypothetical justifiability of militant measures, they are not legitimate here since a democratically acceptable alternative exists that would safeguard the democratic character and legitimacy of Council decision-making: expulsion from the Union. I also address a central objection to an expulsion mechanism—that it would require treaty change and is therefore practically impossible. (shrink)

Athenian ostracism has long captured democratic imaginations because it seems to present clear evidence of a people (demos) routinely asserting collective power over tyrannical elites. In recent times, ostracism has been particularly alluring to militant democrats, who see the institution as an ancient precursor to modern militant democratic mechanisms such as social media bans, impeachment measures, and lustration procedures, which serve to protect democratic constitutions from anti-democratic threats. Such a way of conceptualizing ostracism ultimately stems from Aristotle’s “rule (...) of proportion,” or the removal of “outstanding” individuals in a polity who threaten to disturb the achievement of communal eudaimonia (Aris. Pol. 1284a). However, this way of interpreting the institution only presents a truncated view, one which is overly centered on the ultimate expulsion of an individual from the polity, rather than on its broader contextual telos—the transformation of the ostracized individual and of the community. To move past this simplified view, this paper considers all elements of ostracism with equal force, and argues that ostracism offered a shared opportunity and shared space for all members of the polis—citizens, non-citizens, and elite members alike—to reform the character of the subject individual and to instill and reaffirm democratic values in the community. (shrink)

Recently, extremist ‘populist’ parties have succeeded in obtaining large enough democratic electoral mandates both to legally make substantive changes to the law and constitution and to legally eliminate avenues to challenge their control over the government. Extremists place committed liberal democrats in an awkward position as they work to legally revolutionize their constitutions and turn them into ‘illiberal democracies’. This article analyses political responses to this problem. It argues that the twin phenomena of legal revolution and illiberal democracy reveal (...) a latent tension between the constitutional commitments to democracy and liberalism, that is, the equal chance to have one’s political goals enacted into law and individual basic rights. Political extremists make the latent tension real when they use the procedures of democratic legal change to abrogate constitutional commitments to liberalism, among other things. Although the two commitments normally coexist side by side, exceptional times raise an existential dilemma for liberal democracies: is it constitutional to democratically amend liberalism out of the constitution? After analysing the moral legitimacy of both the democratic and liberal arguments, this article concludes that liberal constitutionalism is constitutive of genuine democracy. In other words, it is unconstitutional to abrogate basic liberal commitments and it is legitimate to adopt constitutional mechanisms to guarantee liberalism – even if it means constraining democracy to do so. This article then situates ‘constrained democracy’ within the liberal current as a way to conceive of and respond to this pressing problem. It concludes by discussing four constitutional mechanisms – inspired by the German Grundgesetz – to guarantee liberalism: unambiguous lexically prior commitment to liberalism, limits on negative majorities, the eternity clause and party bans. It concludes that constrained democracy is an important constitutional guarantee of liberal democracy and that the four mechanisms, among others, are essential to enact constrained democracy. (shrink)

Political theorists tend to dismiss the concept of constitutional patriotism for two main reasons. On the one hand, constitutional patriotism — understood as a post-national, universalist form of democratic political allegiance — is rejected on account of its abstract quality. On the otherhand, it is argued that constitutional patriotism, while apprearing universalist, is in fact particular through and through. According to this genealogical critique, it is held that constitutional patriotism might have been appropriate in the context when it originated — (...) namely West Germany, a half-nation with a deeply compromised sense of nationality on account of the Nazi past — but it is not universally applicable. This article reconstructs the origins of constitutional patriotism arguing that both the ‘protective’ and state-centred patriotism of Dolf Sternberger, and the ‘purifying’ patriotism of Jurgen Habermas — focused mainly on the public sphere — can indeed be understood as relying on ‘supplements of particularily’. However, there are also normative connections between universalist constitutional morality and militant democracy on the one hand, and universalist constitutionalist morality and an imperative to remember on the other. Thus, the genealogical critique by itself is insufficient to invalidate the idea of constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

Recently, extremist ‘populist’ parties have succeeded in obtaining large enough democratic electoral mandates both to legally make substantive changes to the law and constitution and to legally eliminate avenues to challenge their control over the government. Extremists place committed liberal democrats in an awkward position as they work to legally revolutionize their constitutions and turn them into ‘illiberal democracies’. This article analyses political responses to this problem. It argues that the twin phenomena of legal revolution and illiberal democracy reveal (...) a latent tension between the constitutional commitments to democracy and liberalism, that is, the equal chance to have one’s political goals enacted into law and individual basic rights. Political extremists make the latent tension real when they use the procedures of democratic legal change to abrogate constitutional commitments to liberalism, among other things. Although the two commitments normally coexist side by side, exceptional times raise an existential dilemma for liberal democracies: is it constitutional to democratically amend liberalism out of the constitution? After analysing the moral legitimacy of both the democratic and liberal arguments, this article concludes that liberal constitutionalism is constitutive of genuine democracy. In other words, it is unconstitutional to abrogate basic liberal commitments and it is legitimate to adopt constitutional mechanisms to guarantee liberalism – even if it means constraining democracy to do so. This article then situates ‘constrained democracy’ within the liberal current as a way to conceive of and respond to this pressing problem. It concludes by discussing four constitutional mechanisms – inspired by the German Grundgesetz – to guarantee liberalism: unambiguous lexically prior commitment to liberalism, limits on negative majorities, the eternity clause and party bans. It concludes that constrained democracy is an important constitutional guarantee of liberal democracy and that the four mechanisms, among others, are essential to enact constrained democracy. (shrink)

Die Zahl der Staatsrechtler, die die Weimarer Verfassung mit Leidenschaft verteidigten, war gering; noch geringer war die Zahl derer, die auch auf ihrem Fachgebiet fruh zu einer pluralistischen Sicht von "Staat" und "Volk" - und damit nach "Westen" - durchdrangen. Zu ihnen zahlte Karl Loewenstein, der in seiner politikwissenschaftlich orientierten Verfassungslehre ein gegen die Tradition gerichtetes, entontologisiertes Staatsverstandnis entwarf, indem er Verfassung, Institutionen und Gesellschaft "realistisch" begriff. Danach ist der demokratische "Staat" nur der durch "checks and balances" kontrollierte politische Prozess, (...) der sich als Kampf um Macht auf der Grundlage einer Verfassung in offener aber zugleich verfahrensmaaig "zivilisiert-rationaler" Weise vollzieht - und der notfalls als "militant democracy" verteidigt werden muss. Dieser "Verfassungsrealismus" wird in seinen staatstheoretischen und politikwissenschaftlichen Entwicklungs- und Rezeptionslinien sowie anhand zentraler Werkaspekte erortert. (shrink)

Political theorists tend to dismiss the concept of constitutional patriotism for two main reasons. On the one hand, constitutional patriotism — understood as a post-national, universalist form of democratic political allegiance — is rejected on account of its abstract quality. On the otherhand, it is argued that constitutional patriotism, while apprearing universalist, is in fact particular through and through. According to this genealogical critique, it is held that constitutional patriotism might have been appropriate in the context when it originated — (...) namely West Germany, a half-nation with a deeply compromised sense of nationality on account of the Nazi past — but it is not universally applicable. This article reconstructs the origins of constitutional patriotism arguing that both the ‘protective’ and state-centred patriotism of Dolf Sternberger, and the ‘purifying’ patriotism of Jurgen Habermas — focused mainly on the public sphere — can indeed be understood as relying on ‘supplements of particularily’. However, there are also normative connections between universalist constitutional morality and militant democracy on the one hand, and universalist constitutionalist morality and an imperative to remember on the other. Thus, the genealogical critique by itself is insufficient to invalidate the idea of constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

RESUMENEl presente artículo trata de poner de manifiesto con motivo del cincuentenario de la muerte de K. Mannheim la actualdiad de su pensamiento del período anglosajón. Se analiza cómo los procesos históricos fruto del desarrollo desproporcionado de las capacidades humanas -moral e instrumental- han abocado en la sociedad masa. También se trata de poner de manifiesto el nuevo sentido de la libertad y la planificación en las sociedades altamente desarrolladas, así como las nuevas posibilidades de democratización que se abren en (...) su seno, tomando como marco de referencia una "democracia militante" cuyo fundamento es la convicción básica de que el proceso democrático no es un mero procedimiento formal.PALABRAS CLAVEMANNHEIM-LIBERTAD-PLANIFICACIONABSTRACTOn the ocassion of the fiftieth anniversary of the death of K. Mannheim, this paper tries to highlight the presnet day validity of his ideas of the last period. i analyze how historic processed caused by disproportionate development of human capacities- both moral and instrumental- have led to a "mass society". I also try to point out the new sense that the concepts of freedom and planning acquire in highly developed societies and also the new posibilities of democratization that emerge in the heart of these, taking as a point of reference a militant democracy" whose foundation is the basic conviction that the democratic process is not a mere formal procedure. KEYWORDSMANNHEIM-FREEDOM-PLANNING. (shrink)

E l auto r de f iend e un a democraci a a r mónica , qu e n o e s u n model o nu ev o d e democracia sin o l a relació n equilibrad a d e la s do s modalidade s clásica s d e democracia , l a representat iv a y l a directa , a la s qu e s e añadirí a l a democraci a pa r ticipat iv (...) a prom o vid a po r lo s ciudadanos, ind i vidualment e o e n gr upo , a l ma r ge n d e lo s pa r tido s políticos . L a resultant e serí a un nu evo marc o polític o co n meno s democraci a representat iva (l a d e lo s pa r tido s político s y lo s representante s electos) , q u e actualment e e s l a democraci a e xclus iva y e xclu y ent e en la s sociedade s política s a v anzadas , má s democraci a direct a (l a d e lo s ciudadano s qu e sin inte r mediario s v otaría n política s y n o sól o a su s representantes ) y u n nu evo espaci o polític o ocupad o po r lo s ciudadanos-actore s político s si n militanci a pa r tidista . E n cad a uno d e esto s tre s modelo s democrático s s e analiz a l a de f inició n de l modelo , e l escenari o que actualment e atr a vies a y la s propuesta s concreta s d e cambio. (shrink)

All modern liberal democracies have strong reasons to support an idea of toleration, understood as involving respect, not only grudging acceptance, and to extend it to all religious and secular doctrines, limiting only conduct that violates the rights of other citizens. There is no modern democracy, however, in which toleration of this sort is a stable achievement. Why is toleration, attractive in principle, so difficult to achieve? The normative case for toleration was well articulated by John Locke in his (...) influential A Letter Concerning Toleration , although his attractive proposal thus rests on a fragile foundation. Kant did much more, combining a Lockean account of the state with a profound diagnosis of ‘radical evil’, the tendencies in all human beings to militate against stable toleration and respect. But Kant proposed no mechanism through which the state might mitigate the harmful influence of ‘radical evil’, thus rendering toleration stable. One solution to this problem was proposed by Rousseau, but it has deep problems. How, then, can a respectful pluralistic society shore up the fragile human basis of toleration, especially in a world in which we need to cultivate toleration not only within each state, but also among peoples and states, in this interlocking world? Key Words: toleration • emotion • evil • liberal democracy • Locke • Mill • Kant • Rousseau. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The possibility and need for justification Civil, militant, and revolutionary disobedience Worries about violence and letting the individual decide Justifications for militant environmental activism The critique of humans‐only democracy Implications for militant disobedience Conclusion.

First published in 1972. Militant protest is not new to British politics, but the widespread recourse to direct action, in Britain and abroad, is unprecedented. This book was the first comprehensive examination of contemporary protest in the British context. The contributors represented leading agencies of protest as well as those academics who had made this phenomenon their special concern. The result is a unique blend of direct experience and objective reflection. The first part of the volume covers the theoretical (...) and historical dimensions of protest, and is followed by a detailed consideration of specific issues. An analysis is then made of the reaction of the State to such protest through legislative and administrative channels. The final part shows the intermediary roles of political parties, MPs, the NCCL and the mass media. The book concludes with a critical examination of the interaction between protest and representative democracy and the implications which arise from it. Students of politics and sociology as well as political activists of all shades of opinion will find this book essential to an understanding of the bases of protest movements. (shrink)