ResumenEn el presente trabajo se intentará mostrar que la fenomenología no conduce a una postura solipsista. Para ello, se caracterizará en qué consiste el solipsismo. Luego, se intentará refutar a lo que se ha de llamar “solipsismo metafísico” y “solipsismo gnoseológico”, con el objetivo principal de poner de manifiesto el fundamento de motivación para la salida de la ficción solipsista.Palabras claves:Phenomenology – solipsim – empatía - HusserlWith the aim of showing that phenomenology does not lead in solipsism, I will first (...) attempt a characterization of it. Then, I will attempt a refutation of the so-called “metaphysical” and “epistemological” solipsisms. Finally, the nature and role of Husserl´s solipsistic fiction is examined, and the grounds that motivate the overcoming of this standpoint are disclosed.key wordsFenomenología – solipsismo - empathy – Husserl. (shrink)

El proceso creativo en el diseño en general resulta ser una parte fundamental de su hacer. En su interior, cobija fases, protocolos particulares, diagnósticos, desarrollos conceptuales y, por ende, la integración de información que recoge aspectos asociados a las experiencias particulares, a contextos diversos y a las condiciones propias de enunciación de los creadores y sus productos. En dicho proceso, el error y la posibilidad de anticipar un resultado o una respuesta son el insumo para atender creativamente una problemática y, (...) formular, desde lo extraordinario, lo diferente o lo novedoso la respuesta. Y es desde estos adjetivos que se pretende estudiar la construcción de sentido como la columna vertebral que nutre el proceso creativo y lo fortalece desde el primer momento del proceso de diseño. Este artículo se propone plantear algunas posibilidades de interpretación del proceso creativo desde una perspectiva semiótica y filosófica, haciendo un recorrido por un repertorio conceptual proporcionado por el pragmatismo peirceano y las teorías semióticas. Para ello, en la primera parte se expone la importancia que tiene la experiencia sensorio perceptual y la necesidad de reconocer el error y lo alótopo como conceptos fundamentales para romper la uniformidad como ley universal. En segundo lugar, se busca establecer el momento de conexión ente leyes físicas y psíquicas desde tres miradas semióticas para comprender el lugar que tiene la experiencia en la construcción de sentido. Y, finalmente, se desarrolla la idea de anticipación como parte de una estructura temporal que subyace de modo natural en el proceso creativo. (shrink)

En el presente artículo nos interrogamos acerca del lugar que ocupan los cuerpos en la configuración afectiva patriarcal de la acción educativa en la escena universitaria. En primer lugar, nos detenemos en las normatividades que regulan la concepción dominante de la acción educativa a través de una erótica pedagógica centrada en la cancelación del valor epistémico de los cuerpos. En segundo lugar, indagamos las continuidades y las rupturas que esa erótica asume en el marco de la virtualización forzosa de la (...) acción educativa, como consecuencia de la emergencia sanitaria producida por la pandemia de Covid-19. Por último, retomando algunos elementos de la teoría crítica del Giro Afectivo, proponemos una interpretación del marco conceptual que proporciona la Ley Nacional de Educación Sexual Integral, para postular una erótica pedagógica que restituya críticamente los cuerpos y los afectos en la escena educativa e interrogue su configuración patriarcal. (shrink)

La Inclusión en la educación superior chilena se ha enmarcado dentro del contexto del respeto a la diversidad, sustentabilidad y dignidad de las personas. La aplicación del Index for Inclusion en la Universidad Bernardo O’Higgins instala como ejercicio la autoevaluación respecto de los propios procesos inclusivos. Esta investigación cuantitativa permite proponer mejoras desde la reflexión de la propia comunidad educativa respecto de la cultura, políticas y prácticas inclusivas. Conocer la comunidad, sus necesidades e intereses, respetando su potencial independiente de su (...) diversidad, es lo que permite establecer procesos de aprendizaje y enseñanza que aseguren una educación para todos y todas. (shrink)

Drawing on data from 18 months of participant observation and interviews at a community health clinic in North Carolina, the author illustrates how an intersectional perspective deepens our understanding of the construction of a moral identity. In this case, the author examines the moral identity of health care providers—all women—who provide family planning and contraceptive counseling for women clients. The author analyzes how maternity care coordinators—two whites and two Latinas—craft a moral identity by drawing on the cultural toolkit available (...) to them, using gendered frames but also racial, class, and nationalist frames. An intersectional lens helps us better understand how maternity care coordinators' moral identities are shaped by their different locations within racism, classism, and nationalism. (shrink)

Drawing from ethnographic research in the Research Triangle of North Carolina and Williamsburg, Virginia, the authors build on Anzaldúa's conceptualization of “borderlands” to analyze how borders of social membership are constructed and enforced in “el Nuevo South.” Our gender analysis reveals that intersecting structural conditions—the labor market, the organization of public space, and the institutional organization of health care and other public services—combine with gendered processes in the home and family to regulate women's participation in community life. Enforcers of (...) borders include institutional actors, mostly women, in social services and clinics who occupy institutional locations that enable them to define who is entitled to public goods and to categorize migrants as undeserving “others.” We reveal how a particularly configured matrix of domination transcends the spheres of home, work, and community to constrain women migrants' physical and economic mobility and personal autonomy and to inhibit their participation in their societies of reception. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

In this paper we aim to think systematically about, formulate, and begin addressing some of the challenges to applying theories of moral responsibility to behaviors shaped by a particular subset of unsettling psychological complexities: namely, implicit biases.

Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a new questionnaire for the assessment of self-control as an individual trait. We describe the process of construction of this assessment tool. We also report the results of relevant validation studies. The questionnaire has two independent versions, one based on self-reports and another one based on other-reports. The first version consists of five subscales, called Initiative and Persistence, Proactive Control, Switching and Flexibility, Inhibition and Adjournment, and Goal Maintenance. Seven samples of participants took part in (...) the validation study. The second version has not been split into subscales. Both versions obtained satisfactory indices of internal consistency, assessed with Cronbach’s alpha. The NAS-50 and NAS-40 scores were highly correlated with other measures of self-control, including Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone’s self-control scale. They also proved to be entirely independent of general intelligence. In conclusion, both versions can be regarded reliable and valid enough, and therefore suitable for the assessment of trait self-control for research purposes. (shrink)

Interview of Amina Kkhelufi, Kseniia Myroshnyk, Nataliia Reva with Natalia Viatkina.

The fast-developing field of neuroscience has given philosophy, as well as other disciplines and the public broadly, many new tools and perspectives for investigating one of our most pressing challenges: addressing the health and well-being of our mental lives. In some cases, neuroscientific innovation has led to clearer understanding of the mechanisms of mental illness and precise new modes of treatment. In other cases, features of neuroscience itself, such as the enticing nature of the data it produces compared to previous (...) behavioral methods, together with its costliness and “coldness” have complicated understanding of mental illness and decision making about mental illness. Taking neuroscientific information into account can leave practitioners in psychiatry and law with difficult questions, stemming not only from the complexity of these fields, but also from our rapidly evolving understanding of and facility with neuroscience. In this chapter, we will review several examples of the insights and dilemmas that have unfolded as mental illness has been examined through the lens of neuroscience, covering diagnoses such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), schizophrenia, addiction, and severe mood disorders. (shrink)

Cross-linguistic studies focus on inverse correlations (trade-offs) between linguistic variables that reflect different cues to linguistic meanings. For example, if a language has no case marking, it is likely to rely on word order as a cue for identification of grammatical roles. Such inverse correlations are interpreted as manifestations of language users’ tendency to use language efficiently. The present study argues that this interpretation is problematic. Linguistic variables, such as the presence of case, or flexibility of word order, are aggregate (...) properties, which do not represent the use of linguistic cues in context directly. Still, such variables can be useful for circumscribing the potential role of communicative efficiency in language evolution, if we move from cross-linguistic trade-offs to multivariate causal networks. This idea is illustrated by a case study of linguistic variables related to four types of Subject and Object cues: case marking, rigid word order of Subject and Object, tight semantics and verb-medial order. The variables are obtained from online language corpora in thirty languages, annotated with the Universal Dependencies. The causal model suggests that the relationships between the variables can be explained predominantly by sociolinguistic factors, leaving little space for a potential impact of efficient linguistic behavior. (shrink)

Introduction. The article is focused on studying the self-knowledge techniques used in Buddhism and their application in teaching philosophy. The relevance of the study is due to the search for new approaches to studying philosophy, including approaches related to philosophical practice, as well as the interest of modern scientists in the problem of consciousness. The problem of consciousness is interdisciplinary and its study is of practical importance for philosophers, psychologists, linguists, specialists in artificial intelligence. Buddhism as a philosophical doctrine provides (...) rich material for the study of the phenomenon of consciousness, which does not lose its relevance today. A feature of the Buddhist approach to consciousness is that it has an axiological orientation that is directly related to the problem of self-knowledge. The practices of self-knowledge used in Buddhism enable a person to become happier and more harmonious, which is so important for each of us. The aim of the study is to conduct a philosophical analysis of Buddhist practices of self-knowledge and self-transformation in order to use them in the educational process. Methods: the author uses general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction; phenomenological method to identify the intentions that are key for consciousness. The author also uses the hermeneutical method to interpret Buddhist texts. The method of introspection as self-observation of consciousness is used in Buddhist meditation techniques. The scientific novelty of the study is that we approach the study of extensive material on Buddhism in the context of the problem of selfknowledge, which is inextricably linked with the Buddhist concept of consciousness. The revealed and studied Buddhist techniques of self-knowledge have been adapted for teaching philosophy. Results. A philosophical analysis of the literature on Buddhism in the context of the problem of self-knowledge was carried out. As a result of the analysis, Buddhist techniques for working with consciousness, such as meditation, the method of pondering Zen koans, the method of getting rid of material attachments, or the practice of austerities, were studied and described. A philosophical analysis of various Buddhist meditation techniques showed that they are based on the Buddhist concept of consciousness, which denies the existence of an individual “I”, considers the “I” to be nothing more than a combination of various dharmas, therefore the purpose of meditation in Buddhism is to identify oneself with one’s own “I”, to achieve a state of voidness in which we must comprehend our true identity. The method of pondering Zen koans is also one of the techniques for working with one’s consciousness in Buddhism. As a result of deliberation of these paradoxical miniatures, a person goes beyond the boundaries of logical thinking; there is a transition from the level of profane consciousness to the level of deep consciousness. The basis of the method of getting rid of material attachments or the practice of austerities in Buddhism is the concept of the middle path. We have established a similarity between the method of getting rid of material attachments, the concept of the middle path and minimalism as a way of life. Findings. Elements of the Buddhist practices of self-transformation can be successfully used in the teaching of philosophy at the university as a practical aspect of studying this discipline, forming students with the idea of philosophy as a way of life leading to positive self-transformation. Studying the practical aspects of Buddhist philosophy contributes to the formation of tolerance, awareness, education of humanism and altruism, and the skills of psycho-emotional self-regulation. (shrink)

The article addresses the role played by “moralized revulsion”, understood as the emotional disgust we feel against individuals and social practices that we deem to be the object of moral evaluation, from an evolutionist perspective. The first part provides a general analysis of the emotion of revulsion and its triggers. Then, the paper discusses two opposing positions regarding the reliability and instrumental value of revulsion in promoting “adequate” moral judgments and inciting to moral action. It then proposes a reinterpretation of (...) the problem from an evolutionist perspective, attempting to correlate the diverse value judgments promoted by moralized revulsion with different adaptive strategies. Finally, it correlates those strategies with liberal and conservative moral positions. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

Ausgehend von einem kurzem Blick in die Geschichte des Einfühlungskonzepts betrachtet der Beitrag zunächst dessen begriffliche Entwicklung in der Psychoanalyse. Empathie, so die These, sei als moderne Konzeption von Einfühlung unter dem Einfluss der Nachbarwissenschaften zu einem verkörperlichten Zugang für ich-syntone Anteile im anderen geworden. Vorgeschlagen wird, Empathie um psychoanalytische Verstehenselemente zu erweitern, um auch einen Zugang zum Unbewussten, Verdrängten, dem Ich Fremden zu finden, und dazu zum klassischen Begriff der Einfühlung zurückzukehren. Unter Rückgriff auf Waldenfels’ Phänomenologie des Fremden und (...) das von der Kleinkindforschung herausgearbeitete affektiv-kognitive Gedächtnissystem wird Einfühlung als kreative Antwort auf ein pathisches Ereignis im unmittelbaren Kontakt zum anderen spezifiziert. Dabei kann auch zwischenkörperlich gewonnenes Verstehen nach der hier vertretenen Auffassung immer nur subjektiv sein und seine transformative Kraft vor allem im korrigierenden Dialog entfalten. (shrink)

The existence of embodied communication in humans places them among other living systems and helps to differentiate sign patterns that are common to all bioforms from those that are peculiarly human. Despite the fact that the biological roots of communication have been proven, the understanding of human forms of discourse is still far from being clarified. The main question remains: when and why did humans acquire the ability to exchange messages via speech? My thesis is that it became possible only (...) after humans made a shift from on-line to off-line interaction and learned to communicate in the interpersonal mode via externalized analog codes that constitute the various forms of human culture. (shrink)

"Vivimos en un mundo en el cual la ciencia tiene un lugar protagónico tanto en nuestra vida cotidiana como en aspectos alejados de ella para nuestra percepción pero que, aun así, impactan en la realidad que vivimos. La propuesta de estas páginas es recorrer algunos interrogantes sobre aquello que llamamos ciencia, partiendo desde esa misma problematización, y sobre las vías posibles para entenderla.Si bien los objetos que aborda este libro no están exentos de complejidad se procura mantener un lenguaje llano (...) y ameno que permita el mayor alcance posible de su propuesta." --Descripción del editor. (shrink)

Alberto Moretti en “La lógica y la trama de las cosas” presenta y defiende una concepción de la lógica según la cual existen principios lógicos que estructuran el lenguaje y, consecuentemente, el mundo. Este modo de entender la lógica ofrece una respuesta al problema de su normatividad, al tiempo que disuelve el problema de su justificación. En este trabajo, analizo críticamente esta mirada acerca de la lógica y propongo una concepción alternativa que permite vindicar la legitimidad de ambos problemas y (...) darles una respuesta satisfactoria. (shrink)

Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic singleconclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based (...) on B-matrices, is introduced, providing a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.