The book introduces a conception of discourse ethics, an intersubjectivist version of Kantian ethics. Analyzing contributions from Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, Albrecht Wellmer, Robert Alexy, Klaus Günther, Rainer Forst, Marcel Niquet and others, it reconstructs critical discussions on the justification of the principle of morality (part I) and on the various proposals on how to apply it (part II). It defends an alternative model of how discourse ethics can provide guidance under non-ideal circumstances and avoid both arbitrariness (...) and rigorism. (shrink)

Enth. u.a.: ".eine Form und ein Name: Tristan". Strukturelle und semantische Untersuchungen an Hans Werner Henzes Préludes für Klavier, Tonbänder und Orchester / Peter Petersen ; Prélude à l'après-midi d'un faune. Mallarmés Gedicht und Debussys Musik / József Ujfalussy ; Fragmente - Stille, An Diotima. Ikonographische Untersuchungen an Luigi Nonos Streichquartett / Georg Friedrich Haas.

In der deutschen Geistesgeschichte wurde seit Hegel und Hölderlin die Geschichte als tragischer Prozess verstanden. Ein Drama wie die Antigone des Sophokles sollte als das vollkommenste Werk der Kunst die griechische Deutung des Miteinanders der Menschen und der Götter zeigen. Hegel legte aber dar, dass die Antigone mit den Reigen ihrer Chöre auf einer modernen Bühne nicht aufführbar sei. Doch zehn Jahre nach seinem Tod dirigierte sein Hörer Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy in Potsdam und Berlin seine Vertonung der Antigone. Hölderlins Sophokles-Übertragungen erhielten (...) eine harte Kritik; im Zeitalter des Expressionismus griff man aber auf ihre ausdrucksvolle Sprache zurück. Als nach den Zerstörungen des Zweiten Weltkriegs gleich ein weiterer Krieg drohte, brachte Carl Orff seine Vertonung von Hölderlins Antigonä auf die Bühne. Martin Heidegger, der selber das erste Standlied der Antigone übersetzt und ausgelegt hatte, gratulierte Orff bei einer Münchener Aufführung zur 'Wiedererweckung der antiken Tragödie'. Bertolt Brecht stellte seine Bearbeitung der Antigone gegen Orffs Mythisierung. Als man diese Bearbeitung im Oktober 1989 in Ost-Berlin spielte, bejubelte das Publikum Antigones Wort an Kreon: 'Weniger (Menschen) sind es (in der DDR) geworden, seit du herrschst'. Auch in den Ruinen von Kabul wurde Antigone gezeigt. John Cranco brachte ein Antigone-Ballett ein, als er das Stuttgarter Ballett zum Weltruhm führte. Ein Maler wie Werner Scholz, einst durch die Brücke beeinflusst, zeigte Antigone auf Ölbildern. Dabei ging es, wie Hans-Georg Gadamer formulierte, nicht mehr um die überlebensgroßen Erscheinungen der Götter Homers. Schon die tragische Bühne und dann das gemalte Bild zeigten den Geschlagenen und Leidenden als den ganz menschlichen Menschen. So führt Antigones Tragödie die Menschen vor ihr Schicksal und zeigt, was Geschichte ist. (shrink)

Otto Pöggeler, the well-known Hegel scholar and Director of the Hegel-Archiv of Bochum, Germany, has published a collection of essays relating to the “idea” of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Of the seven essays in this book, we shall discuss only the fourth and fifth - “Zur Deutung der Phänomenologie des Geistes” and “Hegels Phänomenologie des Selbstbewusstseins” - because they are immediately related to this topic.

Vorwort - Einleitung: Welt und Wirkung von Hegels Ästhetik I. KUNSTIDEAL UND KULTURPOLITIK. Otto Pöggeler. System und Geschichte der Künste bei Hegel - Helmut Schneider. Aus der Ästhetikvorlesung Hegels 1820/1821 - Lucia Sziborsky. Schelling und die Münchener Akademie der bildenden Künste. Zur Rolle der Kunst im Staat - Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert. Die Rolle der Kunst im Staat. Kontroverses zwischen Hegel und den Hegelianern II. DIE BILDENDEN KÜNSTE UND DIE HISTORIE. Heinrich Dilly. Hegel und Schinkel - Werner Busch. Wilhelm von (...) Kaulbach -peintre-philosophe und modern painter. Zu Kaulbachs Weltgeschichtszyklus im Berliner Neuen Museum - Gregor Stemmrich/Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert. Hegels Kügelgen-Rezension und die Auseinandersetzung um den eigentlichen historischen Stil in der Malerei - Wolfgang Beyrodt. Ansichten vom Niederrhein. Zum Verhältnis von Carl Schnaases Niederländischen Briefen zu Georg Forster III. MUSIK UND POESIE. Konrad Schüttauf. Melos und Drama. Hegels Begriff der Oper - Jürgen Söring. Hegel und die Romantheorie R. Wagners IV. POESIE UND WELTKULTUR. Hans-Georg Gadamer. Die Stellung der Poesie im System der Hegelschen Ästhetik und die Frage des Vergangenheitscharakters der Kunst - Dieter Bremer. Hegel und Aischylos - Clemens Menze. Das indische Altertum in der Sicht Wilhelm von Humboldts und Hegels - Barbara Stemmrich-Köhler/Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert. Von Hammer, Goethe und Hegel über Firdausi. Literaturkritik. Geschichtsbild und kulturpolitische Implikation der Ästhetik - Karlheinz Stierle. Malerei und Literatur der italienischen Renaissance in Hegels Ästhetik - Ursula Rautenberg. Ein Hegelianer unter Germanisten. Karl Rosenkranz' mediaevistische Studien. (shrink)

Proponents of impure moral perception claim that, while there are perceptual moral experiences, these experiences epistemically depend on a priori moral knowledge. Proponents of pure moral perception claim that moral experiences can justify independently of substantive a priori moral knowledge. Some philosophers, most notably David Faraci, have argued that the pure view is mistaken, since moral perception requires previous moral background knowledge, and such knowledge could not itself be perceptual. I defend pure moral perception against this objection. I consider two (...) ways to understand the notion of “background knowledge” that is crucial to the objection. On a reading, the claim that background knowledge is necessary for moral perception is likely false. On a second and weaker reading, the claim is true, but the background knowledge in question could be perceptual, and thus compatible with pure moral perception. Thus, the objection fails. (shrink)

This volume has its already distant or1g1n in an inter national conference on Evolutionary Epistemology the editors organized at the University of Ghent in November 1984. This conference aimed to follow up the endeavor started at the ERISS (Epistemologically Relevant Internalist Sociology of Science) conference organized by Don Campbell and Alex Rosen berg at Cazenovia Lake, New York, in June 1981, whilst in jecting the gist of certain current continental intellectual developments into a debate whose focus, we thought, was in (...) danger of being narrowed too much, considering the still underdeveloped state of affairs in the field. Broadly speaking, evolutionary epistemology today con sists of two interrelated, yet qualitatively distinct inves tigative efforts. Both are drawing on Darwinian concepts, which may explain why many people have failed to discriminate them. One is the study of the evolution of the cognitive apparatus of living organisms, which is first and foremost the province of biologists and psychologists (H. C. Plotkin, Ed. , Learning, Development, and Culture: Essays in Evolu tionary Epistemology, New York, Wiley, 1984), although quite a few philosophers - professional or vocational - have also felt the need to express themselves on this vast subject (F. M. Wuketits, Ed. , Conce ts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology, Dordrecht Boston, Reidel, 1984). The other approach deals with the evolution of science, and has been dominated hitherto by (allegedly) 'naturalized' philosophers; no book-length survey of this literature is available at present. (shrink)

Imagine coming across an alternative community such that, while they have normative terms like 'ought' with the same action-guiding roles and relationships to each other, their normative terms come to pick out different properties. When we come across such a community, or even just imagine it, those of us who strive to be moral and rational want to ask something like the following: Further Question: Which set of concepts ought we use—theirs or ours? The problem, first raised by Eklund, is (...) that on almost any metasemantic theory, Further Question cannot be stated in a way that captures the spirit of what we want to ask. This is because any way of asking the question makes use of our own normative concepts, and thus their reference is already fixed on the properties that our current normative concepts refer to. Any purported solution to this problem must meet two conditions. First, it must capture the spirit of what Further Question is intuitively attempting to ask. Second, it must reframe the inquiry in a way that makes the answer neither trivial nor ineffable. In this paper, I propose a solution to this problem by appeal to edenic representation, inspired by, but not identical to, Chalmers’ notion of edenic content. The rough idea here is that representation is edenic to the extent that the representational vehicle mirrors, in quality and structure, the represented property. I argue that a reframing of Further Question in terms of edenic representation can capture the spirit of the question, without collapsing it into a question with a trivial or ineffable answer. Thus, the realist about normative properties can face the problem of the alternative normative community head on, without collapsing into incoherence or triviality. If correct, this solution is of further interest to any metanormative realist concerned with metasemantic questions, because it can tell us more about how the proper representation of the robustly normative would look. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/synthetic distinction—that, indeed, his version of the distinction deserves to be called Kantian. For both Kant and Hegel, the analytic/synthetic distinction can be explained in terms of the discursive character of cognition: insofar as our cognition is discursive, its most basic form can be articulated in terms of a genus/species tree. The structure of that tree elucidates the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Second, I argue that (...) Hegel has an interesting and so far unexplored argument for the analytic/synthetic distinction: Hegel argues that the systematic relationship between concepts expressed in a genus/species tree can only be expressed through synthetic judgments. Third and finally, I explore some of the implications that the arguments in the first two parts of the essay have for understanding the way in which Hegel differs from Kant. I argue that Hegel accepts Kant's point that discursive cognition cannot be used to cognize the absolute. However, Hegel thinks that we can, nevertheless, cognize the absolute. I explore the character of this non-discursive cognition and argue that we can understand Hegel's glosses on this form of cognition—as simultaneously analytic and synthetic and as having a circular structure—through contrasting it with his account of discursive cognition. As a consequence, I argue that we must give up on attempts to understand ‘the dialectical method’ and ‘speculative cognition’ on the model of discursive cognition. (shrink)

Are there relationships between consciousness and the material world? Empirical evidence for such a connection was reported in several meta-analyses of mind-matter experiments designed to address this question. In this paper we consider such meta-analyses from a statistical modeling perspective, emphasizing strategies to validate the models and the associated statistical procedures. In particular, we explicitly model increased data variability and selection mechanisms, which permits us to estimate 'selection profiles ' and to reassess the experimental effect in view of potential other (...) effects. An application to the data pool considered in the influential meta-analysis of Radin and Nelson (1989) yields indications for the presence of random and selection effects Adjustment for possible selection is found to render the,without such an adjustment significant, experimental effect non-significant. Somewhat different conclusions apply to a subset of the data deserving separate consideration. The actual origin of the data features that are described as experimental, random, or selection effects within the proposed model cannot be clarified y our approach and remains open. (shrink)

Embodied cognition postulates a bi-directional link between the human body and its cognitive functions. Whether this holds for higher cognitive functions such as problem solving is unknown. We predicted that arm movement manipulations performed by the participants could affect the problem-solving solutions. We tested this prediction in quantitative reasoning tasks that allowed two solutions to each problem. In two studies with healthy adults, we found an effect of problem-congruent movements on problem solutions. Consistent with embodied cognition, sensorimotor information gained via (...) right or left arm movements affects the solution in different types of problem-solving tasks. (shrink)

Context: Von Foerster’s concept of eigenbehavior can be recognized against the broader context of enactivism as it has been advocated by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, by Noë and recently by Hutto and Myin, among others. This flourishing constellation of ideas is on its way to becoming the new paradigm of cognitive science. However, in my reading, enactivism, putting stress on the constitutive role of action when it comes to mind and perception, faces a serious philosophical challenge when attempting to account (...) for the way we actually perceive our environments, most importantly for the fact that we perceive things or objects. Von Foester’s eigenbehavior is understood here as a concept supposed to take on this challenge. Problem: In this article I tackle the following issues: Enactivism must be able to account for the apparent stability of the perceived world: this is not a realm of a never-ending flux of stimuli; it is a realm of stable things. Enactivism is committed to the anti-Cartesian endeavor seeking to bridge the gap between the inner and the outer; between the subjective and the objective. Now, these two points constrain each other so that one cannot address simply by regarding the apparent stability of things as a projection that springs out of the internal machinery binding inputs with outputs. This is because the very idea of such an internal machinery opposes, i.e., it employs the Cartesian dichotomy. So, enactivism is in need of an account of that would not oppose its anti-Cartesian commitment. Method: I introduce the ontology of location and niche theory, as it has been brought forth by Varzi, Casati, and Smith, and develop it so that it can be used in the philosophy of mind. This is a conceptual, semi-formal philosophical analysis. Results: I shall come up with the idea of object conceived of a product of action, and - drawing on von Foerster’s central idea - as a product of coordination of perceptions. Yet, it is not coordination of stimuli but coordination of cognitive connections. The notion of connection is thus articulated in the article and cast as the central concept in my proposal. Implications: We are able to account for both and (2. The apparent stability of the perceived world is due to the setting up and maintaining of connections between the perceiver and the things perceived, resulting in the establishment of what I call a cognitive niche. Constructivist content: Constructivism, broadly construed, takes, in my reading, a negative stance in the first place. Namely, it opposes what I call the metaphysics of the ready-made world. So, it holds that there is no ready-made reality; however it remains open when it comes to positive claims: a mind-independent reality does not exist at all or it does exist but it is not ready-made and as such it must be brought to completion, so to speak, or enacted, as Varela et al. would say, by a cognitive subject. In this article, I follow the latter and address one specific issue: how the enacted world gains its relatively stable architecture. (shrink)

The program of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, formulated primarily by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, calls for relating conceptual change to structural transformations of government, society, and economy in German-speaking Europe. J. G. A. Pocock, of Cambridge, identified the range of alternative and competing political discourses available to early modern writers, while Quentin Skinner, also of Cambridge, treated political theories in terms of those historical contexts and linguistic conventions which both facilitate and circumscribe legitimations of political arrangements, (...) and he described such theories as intentional speech acts. Despite the differences in the German and Anglophone modes of treating political language, however, there are no major obstacles in bringing them together. The GG could profit from Pocock's technique of analysis and comparison in identifying early modern political languages, and the issues raised by Skinner about political thought and theorizing as forms of linguistic action, as well as the effect of general linguistic conventions upon available modes of legitimating political arrangements. The Anglophone mode might profit from considering the GG's non-reductive use of social history in conjunction with that of concepts, and from the GG's systematic use of contemporary sources of language and linguistic definitions. (shrink)