Introduction Previous research has explored euthanasia’s ethical dimensions, primarily focusing on general practice and, to a lesser extent, psychiatry, mainly from the viewpoints of physicians and nurses. However, a gap exists in understanding the comprehensive value-based perspectives of other professionals involved in both somatic and psychiatric euthanasia. This paper aims to analyze the interplay among legal, medical, and ethical factors to clarify how foundational values shape the ethical discourse surrounding euthanasia in both somatic and psychiatric contexts. It seeks to explore (...) these dynamics among all healthcare professionals and volunteers in Belgium. Methods Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 Dutch-speaking healthcare workers who had encountered patients requesting euthanasia for psychiatric conditions, in Belgium, from August 2019 to August 2020. Qualitative thematic analysis was applied to the interview transcripts. Findings Participants identified three pivotal values and virtues: religious values, professional values, and fundamental medical values encompassing autonomy, beneficence, and non-maleficence, linked to compassion, quality care, and justice. These values interwove across four tiers: the patient, the patient’s inner circle, the medical realm, and society at large. Irrespective of their euthanasia stance, participants generally displayed a blend of ethical values across these tiers. Their euthanasia perspective was primarily shaped by value interpretation, significance allocation to key components, and tier weighting. Explicit mention of varying ethical values, potentially indicating distinct stances in favor of or against euthanasia, was infrequent. Conclusion The study underscores ethical discourse’s central role in navigating euthanasia’s intricate landscape. Fostering inclusive dialogue, bridging diverse values, supports informed decision-making, nurturing justice, and empathy. Tailored end-of-life healthcare in psychiatry is essential, acknowledging all involved actors’ needs. The study calls for interdisciplinary research to comprehensively grasp euthanasia’s multifaceted dimensions, and guiding policy evolution. While contextualized in Belgium, the implications extend to the broader euthanasia discourse, suggesting avenues for further inquiry and cross-cultural exploration. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida returns relentlessly to the question of literature which is already a prominent concern in early texts such as Writing and Difference. The focus of this article is the conception of literature in ‘Literature in Secret: An Impossible Filiation’, in which Derrida discusses filiation with reference to Abraham and Isaac, the fundamental necessity of secrecy and the notion of the pardon. Above all, it is Kafka's Letter to His Father which perhaps provides a paradigm for defining literature. In this (...) specular address, the promise of a heritage is in the balance. Writing incessantly on Kafka, Maurice Blanchot also reflects on literature. The notion of literature put forward by Derrida in ‘Literature in Secret: An Impossible Filiation’ is considered in this article, as well as reflections by Blanchot, to show what might be at stake in Kafka's Letter to His Father. (shrink)

Pardon powers are common but difficult to justify. A pardon power is, roughly, a power that is (a) possessed by a non-judicial official, (b) used to cancel legal liability to a criminal sanction in a particular case without thereby altering the law, and (c) unconstrained by law. So defined, pardon powers seem to be at odds with two constitutional principles. Contrary to the separation of powers, the pardon power gives to someone other than a judge a decisive role in determining (...) criminal liability in particular cases. Contrary to the rule of law, the pardon power is neither constrained nor ruled by law. -/- Here I provide a novel defence of pardon powers, in three steps. First, even an optimal legal code requires suboptimal results in some cases. In such cases there is a “gap” between what is required by the code we should have and what we should do absent that code. Adhering to the code in every gap case is undesirable: while it would avoid suboptimal results, it would create too much unpredictability. Deviating from the code in every gap case is also undesirable: while it would ensure predictability, it would produce too many suboptimal results. The best strategy is to adhere in some cases and to deviate in others, that is, to selectively deviate. The most important thing about selective deviation is that it leads to like cases being treated differently. This is the second step in the argument. Third, pardon powers are an appropriate vehicle for selective deviation. Selective deviation calls for a power that can be used to set aside the code without changing it. It calls for a power that can be used inconsistently. Moreover, it calls for a power that is not in the hands of a body institutionally disposed towards consistency in decision-making, such as the judiciary. That is, it requires a power with features (a)-(c) – a pardon power. -/- This argument overcomes the various objections to pardon powers. Contrary to the objection from the separation of powers, selective deviation is a task better carried out by non-judicial officials. Contrary to the objection from the rule of law, a power of selective deviation must be unconstrained to preserve the law’s guiding function. Overall, the features of pardon powers that seemed to be in tension with the separation of powers and the rule of law turn out to be favoured by those same principles. (shrink)

Spinoza shares with almost all apologists for forgiveness the idea that laying down one’s resentment of a wrong, contempt for a wrongdoer, and overcoming “bondage” to hatred, must be a primary ethical aim. Yet he denies that doing so authorizes pardoning a penitent wrongdoer. He argues that in civil society, it is actually a matter of charity and piety to collude in punishing a wrongdoer—dragging the wrongdoer before a judge, but not “judging” him oneself. I argue that Spinoza offers no (...) warrant to pardon whatever for those not authorized under civil law to punish. But I argue that the response to others’ hatred and deceit that Spinoza urges his reader to cultivate in Ethics 5p10, along with his argument that one may ‘turn the other cheek’ under conditions of oppression, where no sovereign power prosecutes claims of justice, mandates a broader emergent and reparative view of forgiveness. (shrink)

Dans cette étude je poursuis deux objectifs : d�une part, je tente d�établir d�un point de vue théorique les tenants et aboutissants de la question de savoir si le pardon entre deux communautés est possible ; d�autre part, j�examine les obstacles et les dangers d�un tel pardon. En ce qui concerne le premier objectif, je fais appel à Hannah Arendt qui nous a donné dans La condition de l�homme moderne une définition du pardon que j�applique aux relations entre communautés. Afin (...) d�examiner les problèmes d�un pardon inter-communautaire, je fais usage du roman de J. M. Coetzee, Disgrâce, qui offre à mon sens une illustration de ce qu�un tel pardon entraînerait. La situation que décrit Coetzee, et à laquelle je me réfère egalement, est celle de l�Afrique du Sud après l�apartheid. (shrink)

An engaging history of the philosophy of pardons, this volume offers special insight into presidential pardons, revealing how, over and over again, controveries about pardons have arisen at times when circumstance prevented people from thinking dispassionately about them.

Dans la crise mondiale, écologique et économique, sociale et politique que nous traversons, la coexistence juste et pacifique des hommes devient un enjeu crucial. L'ampleur des crimes commis au XXe siècle pourrait laisser sceptique quant à notre capacité à relever un tel défi. Pourtant, ce même siècle a vu surgir un recours nouveau : le pardon. Jusque-là privilège de la conscience religieuse individuelle, il s'est invité au plan politique, avec succès. Depuis 1950 en effet, de nombreux pays ont recouru au (...) pardon pour constituer un espace politique durable là où des violences destructrices avaient dominé. Trois cas attirent l'attention : l'Europe, les Commissions vérité et réconciliation et les instances juridiques internationales. Les contours d'un pardon politique se dessinent. En retour se pose la question de sa réception par chacun. La phénoménologie est convoquée : elle conduit à une distinction radicale entre coupables et victimes, privilégiant parmi elles les plus fragiles. L'herméneutique prend alors le relai d'une anthropologie devenue aporétique, esquissant avec le pardon, le geste par lequel l'homme advient. Dans ce parcours, Paul Ricoeur, interlocuteur privilégié, sera rejoint par d'autres : Jean Monnet, Maïti Girtanner, Hannah Arendt ou Simon Wiesenthal. (shrink)

"Le philosophe chilien Javier Agüero Águila a consacré ses recherches à la psychanalyse, à la philosophie française contemporaine - avec une attention toute particulière à la pensée de Jacques Derrida -, à la « philosophie politique » : la violence, la démocratie et les droits de l'homme, l'hospitalité, la communauté et l'extranéité, la marginalité mais encore l'héritage, la mémoire, l'oubli, le pardon, etc. C'est autour du pardon que ce livre s'organise, engageant un débat sur le processus chilien de transition et (...) de démocratisation mis en oeuvre après la dictature militaire de Pinochet" (4ème de couv.). (shrink)

Bernadette Meyler. Theaters of Pardoning. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019, 308 pp., $29.95 (paperback). ISBN: 9781501739347.I often give lectures about clemency and its history at law school...

Violations and biases relative to normative principles of rationality tend to occur when the structure of task environments is novel or the decision goals are in conflict. The two blades of bounded rationality, the structure of task environments and the computational capacities of the actor, can sharpen the conceptual distinctions between the sources of the normative and descriptive gap.

This article will examine the religious phenomenology of Max Scheler as it is found in his essay on repentance. In outlining Scheler’s understanding of repentance, I shall note his attempt at defining the phenomenon, as well as the presuppositions to and outcomes of this religious act. With this foundation laid, I shall then offer two critiques. First, Scheler’s rendering of repentance limps in not accounting for the cyclical and repeatable nature of repentance, to which human experience and Scheler’s own broader (...) philosophy attest. Second, Scheler’s essay does not consider the role of other persons both in leading one to repentance and in completing the process. As with the first critique, both human experience and Scheler’s own personalist philosophy testify to the necessary role of other persons. These lacunae detract from the otherwise rich phenomenological account. (shrink)

While acknowledging the difficulties, both pragmatic and moral, involved in the efforts to try to punish those involved in atrocious crimes, I try to block the quick move to a policy of pardon and oblivion by interposing a moral commitment to the past that stems from a reflection about the nature of moral deliberation and moral identity. I argue in favor of a policy that is both compatible with such commitment, and practically feasible, one centered around forms of remembrance.

Abstractabstract:This article argues for an interpretation of doctrine 7 of universal faith in Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise—that God pardons the sins of those who repent—that renders it true in the terms set by Spinoza's Ethics. Though categorized in the Ethics as a vice, repentance nevertheless has a positive political function as the lesser of two evils, supplanting the greater evils of unrepentant pride and shamelessness. The philosopher can understand God's pardon as the natural advantage conferred by repentance itself insofar as it (...) supplants those greater evils. This pardon arises through the laws of Nature (God's mercy and grace), which are equally responsible for that very repentance. The philosophical truth of the doctrines of universal faith ensures that freedom of philosophizing can be granted without harm to the peace or piety of the Republic and cannot be denied without destroying the same. (shrink)

Why does someone, S, deserve blame or reproach for an action or event? One part of a standard answer since Aristotle: the event was caused, at least in part, by S’s bad will. But recently there’s been some insightful discussion of cases where the event’s causes do not include any bad will from S and yet it seems that S is not off the hook for the event. Cheshire Calhoun, Miranda Fricker, Elinor Mason, David Enoch, Randolph Clarke, and others include (...) in this category some cases of glitches, forgetfulness, inattentiveness, the actions of one’s children or one’s country, and certain instances of explicit bias and implicit bias. Enoch and Mason argue that in these cases S should extend the realm of S’s responsibility. Drawing on Aristotle’s emphases on retrospective attitudes and the non-voluntary, this paper attempts to clarify the relation between quality of will and blameworthiness. I analyze cases where (1) S is clearly not morally responsible for an action or event, E, yet (2) S deserves reproach for E unless S has the appropriate retrospective attitudes (such as regret) or the absence of inappropriate attitudes toward E. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Perjury and Pardon, Volume 1 by Jacques DerridaRalph ShainDERRIDA, Jacques. Perjury and Pardon, Volume 1. Translated by David Wills. Edited by Ginette Michaud and Nicholas Cotton. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2022. 368 pp. Cloth, $45.00This is the translation of a volume in the posthumously published series of Derrida's lecture courses. The most important of these are the early Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (1964–65) (...) and Theory and Practice (1975–76), no parts of which were published by Derrida. Substantial portions of the first volume of the lectures on Perjury and Pardon were published as separate essays, so the main question concerning this book is what it adds to the published portions.For those readers who are familiar with Derrida's most famous work and are curious about his deconstructive ethics ("ethics beyond ethics") and have not read any of the essays drawn from this book (such as "To Forgive: the Unforgiveable and the Imprescriptible," "Literature in Secret," and "Typewriter Ribbon"), this is a good place to approach the topic. One will find here many of Derrida's classic moves, such as the deconstruction of texts, concepts, and traditions. One will find conditions of possibility that are also conditions of impossibility, concepts that are contaminated from within by their opposites, and appeals to the experience of the impossible and to the distinction between a general and restricted economy.One will also find here those points that seem to be Derrida's weakest, such as the insistence on the privacy of the mental, a rather wobbly treatment of the separation between intending and causality, and the [End Page 545] claim, important for Derrida's "poetico-performative" theory of truth, that all constatives depend on a prior performative—a promise to tell the truth, always already contaminated by failure and hence a "perjury." (The first and third of these are also found in Derrida's published work.)The topics in this book are helpful in situating Derrida vis-à-vis other thinkers, especially those in the Frankfurt School. Derrida's concept of an impossible, paradoxical pardon might be compared with Adorno's concept of utopian moments. The promise of truth implicit in every constative might be compared with Habermas's quasi-transcendental ideal speech situation.Even if one has read one or more of the published portions, if one is unsure how they fit together, these lectures will allow one to see how they cohere. In the third session Derrida provides an outline of the project, which he qualifies with the comment that "I am aware of the grossly schematic character of this outline." Grossly schematic, yes, but grossly schematic outlines are very helpful. Here's the gist of the outline: "stubbornly tracking down in the Biblio-Koranic tradition a logic of economy, an economy, a sublime ruse which... comes to contradict and undermine a demand for finite-infinite forgiveness, forgiveness without condition, the aneconomic forgiveness that is nevertheless at the heart of this same thinking... showing that on the supposed Greek side, the aneconomic notion of forgiveness comes to organize the aneconomic logic and 'syngnomic' rationality of a so-called Greek culture." In short, the concept of forgiveness that is derived from the monotheistic traditions of forgiveness claims not to be pragmatic or goal oriented, but Derrida shows that it is, whereas the Greek concept that is the closest equivalent, and is supposed to be entirely pragmatic, has moments that exceed any limited economy. (If this still sounds opaque, see Derrida's essay on Bataille and general economy in Writing and Difference.)Even those who are well versed in deconstructive ethics and have read the published parts of this book may still find it quite interesting. Derrida's verbal elucidations of the typescript are transcribed from recordings and placed in footnotes. There are quite a few of these, and some of them are interesting. The editorial apparatus will allow one to confirm that one has indeed read all of the published parts, which one should not take for granted since a couple of them are in relatively obscure venues. The readings of texts are of variable interest, but even in the... (shrink)

The English Puritan Richard Baxter (1615-1691) developed an account of forgiveness that resonates with twentieth-century virtue ethics. He understood forgiveness as one component of a larger disposition of character developed in community as human beings recognize themselves as sinful creatures engaged in complex relationships of dependency and responsibility, with both God and one another. In the midst of these relationships, persons experience divine and human forgiveness and discover opportunities to practice forgiveness in return. Baxter thus negotiated a distinctive relationship between (...) Christian hope for reconciliation and more stereotypical Puritan emphases on punishment, civil order, and justice. At the same time that recent moral reflection allows us to raise questions about some features of Baxter's argument (such as his treatment of anger), his work provides important resources for correlating dispositions with concrete obligations, establishing a place for forgiveness in the public realm, and counterbalancing the modern emphasis on individual rights. (shrink)

The clemency power of the U.S. President is limited to pardoning federal offences and expressly excludes federal impeachment from the pardon power. There is no explicit prohibition upon who might be the recipient of a presidential pardon. The U.S. Constitution does not expressly prohibit the President from issuing a self-pardon. If the American Framers placed only the one exception for impeachment, then arguably they meant to exclude all other conceivable exceptions. Yet, the very notion of such presidential self-forgiveness raises arguments (...) criticizing the possibility. Would not a selfpardon place the President above the law? In the process of investigating the various arguments denying and supporting the possibility, the parameters and the goals of issuing and accepting or rejecting a presidential pardon are developed along with alternative methods of achieving the same result as a self-pardon without actually issuing a self-pardon. Hence, the puzzle. The essay’s narrow and guarded conclusions are arrived at defeasibly. That is, the essay is driven by the force of the arguments over this paradoxical constitutional dilemma. The essay is intended as the beginning rather than a completion of the inquiry. (shrink)

Deontologists often assume that ethical constraints hold ‘come what may’ but that violations of the constraints can be excused or pardoned. Vinit Haksar has argued for pardon as deontologically appropriate mitigation for the violation of deontological constraints. However, the reasons he adduces against excuse are inconclusive. In this paper, I show how complex the question of excuse versus pardon for deontological transgressions is. Liability for the development of character traits and the assumption of agent-centered responsibility have to be taken into (...) account before the possibility of pardon can be identified as appropriate deontological softener for strict constraints. (shrink)

L’auteur montre comment la notion de pardon chez Paul Ricoeur peut être comprise comme un au-delà de l’action. Trois pistes interprétatives sont mises en avant. La première fait appel à plusieurs notions centrales de l’anthropologie ricoeurienne qui ont trait au lien entre l’agent et son acte, le concept de déliement - hérité de l’analyse de Hannah Arendt -, la notion de capacité, et celle de prédisposition au bien. La deuxième piste de recherche montre comment l’au-delà de l’action doit se lire (...) à la lumière de l’économie du don. La troisième considère la dimension pratique de l’au-delà de l’action dans le domaine judiciaire. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse au problème de la maintenance, c’est-à-dire au moment où les membres d’un collectif social tentent d’assurer dans le temps l’existence de leur collectif en instituant des règles pour réguler leurs comportements. Ce problème se pose avec acuité lorsque certains membres ne respectent pas ces règles communes. Pour maintenir la coopération sociale, les membres peuvent décider d’instituer des règles secondaires visant à sanctionner les transgressions des règles primaires déjà établies. La maintenance d’un collectif peut ainsi reposer sur l’émergence (...) de pouvoirs déontiques qui donnent aux membres l’autorité de légitimement punir et expulser les transgresseurs. Mais d’où viennent ces règles ? On peut penser qu’elles émergent des émotions éprouvées par les membres envers les transgresseurs. Je le démontre à l’aide d’une étude de cas qui établit que, dans le collectif Occupy Geneva, l’institutionnalisation de normes pour punir, exclure et réintégrer les déviants s’ancraient respectivement dans l’indignation, le mépris et le pardon. -/- This article focuses on the problem of maintenance; that is the moment when the members of a social collective attempt to ensure the existence of their collective over time by instituting rules to regulate their behavior. This problem becomes critical when certain members do not respect the common rules. To maintain social cooperation, members can decide to institute secondary rules aimed at sanctioning the transgressions of the already established primary rules. The maintenance of a collective can thus rely on the emergence of deontic powers that give members the authority to legitimately punish and expel transgressors. But where do these rules come from? The hypothesis is that they emerge from the emotions felt by the members towards the transgressors. I show this with the help of a case study, which establishes that the institutionalization of norms allowing the punishment, the exclusion, and the reintegration of deviants within the “Occupy Geneva” collective, was grounded in indignation, contempt, and forgiveness respectively. (shrink)

The Timaeus is a muthos that attempts to imagine a logos of the cosmos. Like the demiurge, readers are to be mimetic artists, poets, who move constantly between the intelligible essences and their likenesses in the world of appearance, experience, and becoming, occupying a third register that is neither and both. The cosmology of the Timaeus is both a likely story and an allegory of its own failure. It takes place within the nonspace of the khōra, a realm accessible only (...) through bastard reasoning that we can perceive only as if in a dream. The Timaeus is an unfinalizable logos in which each moment of positing is also a moment of irony and interrogation, of simultaneous acceptance and active separation, of choric space. (shrink)

S'il y a une difficulté intrinsèque à l'acte de pardonner, le pardon est toujours possible, quel que soit le temps qu'il prend. Quelle que soit la motivation du pardon (éthique, spirituelle, politique), il importe qu'il soit à l'avantage de l'homme. Mais le pardon ne se substitue pas à la justice. Le devoir de la vérité et de la justice renforce le sens authentique du pardon qui est celui du "don" gratuit et immérité. La "hauteur du pardon" répond à ce que (...) Paul Ricoeur appelle la profondeur de la faute. (shrink)

Presidential pardon has always existed in criminal law and continues to constitute a very important competence of the head of state in many modern day countries. In the past, the clemency given by the sovereign represented an act which showed his/her mercy upon their subjects. It was often used as a tool to show the arbitrary will of the sovereign that constituted the law, rather than the law itself. Therefore, the classical school of criminal law that appeared in the 18th (...) century and emphasized the importance of the principle of legality, opposed harshly every kind of arbitrary deciding that excluded the law at the interest of the sovereign. This school is among the only interpretations of criminal law that engages for a complete abandonment of institutes such as pardon or amnesty. The revolutionary French Penal Code of 1791, which was strongly influenced by the classical school, excluded clemency for the proved wrongs that were severely punished. However, due to imperfections of the criminal justice system, amnesty and pardon or clemency, continue to exist and to be used in modern day criminal law. They are no longer considered acts of arbitrary decisions of the sovereign, instead they should represent important instruments of criminal law, used rarely and wisely with specifically designed goals that aim to bring justice rather than deny it. However, there are many cases when these institutes have been inappropriately used in a very arrogant way which shows that the ancient regime is not yet over for some countries in which the highest institutions continue to act as old and middle age despots. This article will analyze the legal reasoning of the institution of presidential pardon. It will try to establish why the classical school was so strictly opposed to this institute making use of the studies and interpretations found in the writings of Cesare Beccaria. It will explain the philosophy of modern day institutions of amnesty and pardon and the way in which they are regulated in the legal theory and practice. The article will explain the recent developments in Macedonia in regard to the use of presidential pardon. The methods to be used consist of desk research, historical and comparative methods and analysis of legal texts, laws and judicial decisions. (shrink)

An inquiry into the problematic of perjury, or lying, and forgiveness from one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. “One only ever asks forgiveness for what is unforgivable.” From this contradiction begins Perjury and Pardon, a two-year series of seminars given by Jacques Derrida at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris in the late 1990s. In these sessions, Derrida focuses on the philosophical, ethical, juridical, and political stakes of the concept of responsibility. His (...) primary goal is to develop what he calls a “problematic of lying” by studying diverse forms of betrayal: infidelity, denial, false testimony, perjury, unkept promises, desecration, sacrilege, and blasphemy. Although forgiveness is a notion inherited from multiple traditions, the process of forgiveness eludes those traditions, disturbing the categories of knowledge, sense, history, and law that attempt to circumscribe it. Derrida insists on the unconditionality of forgiveness and shows how its complex temporality destabilizes all ideas of presence and even of subjecthood. For Derrida, forgiveness cannot be reduced to repentance, punishment, retribution, or salvation, and it is inseparable from, and haunted by, the notion of perjury. Through close readings of Kant, Kierkegaard, Shakespeare, Plato, Jankélévitch, Baudelaire, and Kafka, as well as biblical texts, Derrida explores diverse notions of the “evil” or malignancy of lying while developing a complex account of forgiveness across different traditions. (shrink)

An exploration of the political dimensions of forgiveness and repentance from Jacques Derrida. Perjury and Pardon is a two-year seminar series given by Jacques Derrida at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris during the late 1990s. In these sessions, Derrida focuses on the philosophical, ethical, juridical, and political stakes of the concept of responsibility. His primary goal is to develop what he calls a “problematic of lying” by studying diverse forms of betrayal: infidelity, denial, false testimony, (...) perjury, unkept promises, desecration, sacrilege, and blasphemy. This volume covers the seminar’s second year when Derrida explores the political dimensions of forgiveness and repentance. Over eight sessions, he discusses Hegel, Augustine, Levinas, Arendt, and Benjamin as well as Bill Clinton’s impeachment and Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu’s testimonies before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The seminars conclude with an extended reading of Henri Thomas’s 1964 novel Le Parjure. (shrink)

I argue that the aporetic character of clemency must be understood in terms of its unmerited and merited character to achieve the underlying purposes of justice within criminal justice: justice as fairness (punishment must be deserved and proportionate) and justice as restoration (repair of the harm to victims and society and the reintegration of offenders) are paramount goals. Rather than destabilizing political order, pardons can render productive potential tensions between justice as fairness and justice as restoration. Taking as my conceptual (...) point of departure Paul Ricoeur's claims about the suprajuridical and supraethical character of pardon, I develop the argument through three central sections: an excursus into historical and contemporary practices of clemency in the United States; a critical analysis of the merited and unmerited aspects of clemency with respect to remorse and atonement theories within theological and legal discourse; and a normative engagement with pardons and felony disenfranchisement. (shrink)

Situating narrative: philosophical and theological context -- Ethical being: the storied self as moral agent -- Reconciled being: narrative and pardon -- Pedagogies of pardon in praxis -- Towards a narrative pedagogy of reconciliation -- Ricoeur's legacy: A Praxis of Peace.

[Omslag] La question du mal résonne à travers toute l'œuvre de Paul Ricoeur comme une énigme et un scandale : très présente dès les premières œuvres, dans Finitude et culpabilité ou dans Le conflit des interprétations, elle est également au centre de l'inédit Logique, éthique et tragique du mal chez saint Augustin et elle resurgit avec force dans l'essai, Le mal. Un défi à la philosophie et à la théologie. Il n'en est pas de même de la thématique du pardon, (...) qui n'est vraiment développée que dans les dernières œuvres, en particulier dans l'épilogue de La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli. Et pourtant, si, comme le dit Ricoeur, « la compassion vient briser le cercle vicieux de la culpabilité », n'est-ce pas à la lumière du pardon qu'il importe de revisiter la question de la faute et même l'excès du mal? C'est l'hypothèse que suggère cet ouvrage consacré à l'œuvre de Paul Ricoeur. Fruit d'une journée d'étude organisée conjointement par le Centre Sèvres - Facultés jésuites de Paris et le Fonds Ricoeur, à l'occasion du centenaire de la naissance de Paul Ricoeur, ce volume offre en outre un long inédit de Paul Ricoeur, qui éclaire la manière dont il a travaillé Augustin, mais aussi la genèse et l'évolution de sa pensée sur la question du mal. (shrink)

The presidential pardon as it currently exists is a violation of the separation of powers, checks and balances, and rule of law. With the exception of impeachment, the pardon power of the president is not subject to judicial review. The court has no rights to deny a pardon even though it may violate many explicit laws and implicit values of the constitution. It seems clear that the current form of the presidential power is a usurpation of the role of the (...) judiciary making the president judge and jury combining as it does the legislative and judicial function in the presidency. This unilateral and essentially unchecked power of the presidency threatens the consistency and unity of the government for it is independent and beyond the scope of legal restraint of the other branches of government. (shrink)