In some jurisdictions, the institutions of criminal justice may subject individuals who have committed crimes to preventive detention. By this, I mean detention of criminal offenders (i) who have already been punished to (or beyond) the point that no further punishment can be justified on general deterrent, retributive, restitutory, communicative or other backwardlooking grounds, (ii) for preventive purposes—that is, for the purposes of preventing the detained individual from engaging in further criminal or otherwise socially costly conduct. (...) Preventive detention, thus understood, shares many features with the quarantine measures sometimes employed in the context of infectious disease control. Both interventions involve imposing (usually severe) constraints on freedom of movement and association. Both interventions are standardly undeserved: in quarantine, the detained individual deserves no detention (or so I will, for the moment, assume), and in preventive detention, the individual has already endured any detention that can be justified by reference to desert. Both interventions are, in contrast to civil commitment under mental health legislation, normally imposed on more-or-less fully autonomous individuals. And both interventions are intended to reduce the risk that the constrained individual poses to the public. Yet despite these similarities, preventive detention and quarantine have received rather different moral report cards. (shrink)

A policy of “preventive detention” has recently been debated in the British Parliament. Alarmed by the high-profile criminal activities of people suspected of having dangerous severe personality disorder , the government have made clear their intention to “indeterminately but reviewably detain” people with DSPD, after diagnosis by forensic psychiatrists, even if the individuals are yet to commit an offence. Such a policy may improve the safety of the public, but has obvious implications for civil liberties. This essay criticises (...) the morality of the government's intention and rejects the notion that the medical profession could ethically collude with such a policy. (shrink)

I argue for two propositions. First, contrary to the common wisdom, we may justly punish individuals who are not morally responsible for their crimes. Psychopaths – individuals who lack the capacity to feel sympathy – help to prove this point. Scholars are increasingly arguing that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their behavior because they suffer from a neurological disorder that makes it impossible for them to understand, and therefore be motivated by, moral reasons. These same scholars then infer from (...) this conclusion that they must also lack criminal responsibility and therefore that our continuing to punish psychopaths for their crimes is unjust. My response is that this inference is entirely fallacious. -/- Criminal responsibility turns out to be quite distinct from moral responsibility. The two kinds of responsibility require very different conditions to be satisfied. In particular, criminal responsibility, unlike moral responsibility, does not require an agent be able to grasp and follow moral reasons; it requires only that the individual be able to grasp and follow criminal laws. Once this point is recognized, it becomes much easier to accept my thesis: while the subset of psychopaths who commit crimes are not morally responsible for their criminal behavior because they cannot understand moral reasons, they are still criminally responsible because they can understand what the consequences will be if they get caught. For this reason, even though I concede that psychopaths are not morally responsible for the crimes that they commit, our practice of punishing them for these crimes is still just. -/- Second, I argue that psychopathy is a mental illness and should be recognized as such. One reason that it should be recognized as a mental illness is simply because it is; it satisfies the main criteria for inclusion in the DSM-IV, the “bible” of mental disorders. The other reason is more practical than conceptual. It starts with two facts: the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that the preventive detention of any individual who is not a criminal suspect is not constitutional unless the individual is not only dangerous but also mentally ill; and psychopathy is not currently considered to be a mental illness. So, as things now stand, we cannot preventively commit dangerous psychopaths – that is, psychopaths who have clearly indicated that they will be committing serious crimes. Instead, we must wait for them to commit the crimes before we can lock them up. Unfortunately, this incarceration always comes too late for the victims. It would therefore be better if we could lock them up before they actually inflict any harm. Once again, then, I propose that the legal and psychological communities classify psychopathy as a mental illness. (shrink)

Persons who are dangerous and legally responsible, but who have not yet committed any currently recognised criminal offence, fall within the gap left between the domains of criminal justice and civil commitment. Many jurisdictions operate legal regimes that permit the detention of such persons in order to prevent the occurrence of anticipated criminal harms. These regimes often either fail to respect the principle of proportionality or contradictorily treat a dangerous offender as both legally responsible and not responsible at the (...) same time. In response to these problems, a number of preventive detention models have been proposed. Retributivist models seek to prevent the occurrence of anticipated criminal harms by requiring blame on the dangerous person’s part in order to warrant detention. However, these models are ill-equipped to deal with the problem of coextensiveness; i.e., they struggle to comprehensively reconcile proportionality in punitive sentencing with the period over which dangerous persons remain dangerous and during which one might therefore want them to be incapacitated. In order to achieve comprehensive incapacitation of dangerous persons for the duration of their dangerousness, retributivist models are forced to abandon their fidelity to proportionality in punitive sentencing, thereby losing themselves in the process. Accordingly, if the practice of preventive detention can be justified at all, such justification will not be of a retributivist character. (shrink)

It is often argued that suspected terrorists captured in the war on terror can be detained just the same way captured enemy soldiers can: until the relevant war is over. But there is a deep disanalogy between suspected terrorists and captured enemy soldiers. Soldiers cannot be held accountable for the use of force , whereas terrorists normally can. Detaining people who can be held accountable as if they cannot is crossing an important moral line, sacrificing the rights of the individual (...) for the welfare of the whole. (shrink)

The moral, as opposed to legal, justification for the preventive detention of terrorists is the topic of this article, and, in particular, for the preventive detention of members of extremist Islam...

What makes Don E. Scheid's article on indefinite detention interesting is that he thinks through many of the moral issues inherent in attempting to prevent certain k...

The pre-trial detention of individuals charged with crimes is viewed by many legal scholars as problematic. Standard arguments against it are that it constitutes legal punishment of individuals not yet convicted of crimes, violates the presumption of innocence, and rests on dubious predictions of future crime. I defend modified and restrained forms of pre-trial detention. I argue that pre-trial detention could be made very different than imprisonment, should be governed by strict criteria, and is warranted, when the (...) evidence of danger is convincing. I contend that the presumption of innocence does not preclude us from doing many other things to criminal suspects and defendants that imply their guilt. Finally, I dispute arguments designed to show that pre-trial detention can be justified to prevent absconding or interferences with the course of justice, but not to prevent other, and sometimes much more serious, offenses. (shrink)

I defend a form of preventive detention through the creation of an offence of ‘being a persistent violent dangerous offender’. This differs from alternative proposals and actual habitual offender laws that impose extra periods of incarceration on offenders after they have completed the sentence for their most recent crime or as a result of a certain number of prior convictions. I, instead, would make ‘being a persistent violent dangerous offender’ an offence itself. Persons to be preventively detained would (...) be tried and convicted of this offence. My approach would then have one significant advantage: provided the elements of being a PVDO could be rendered sufficiently determinate, punishing persons under such an offence would comport with central rule of law values, most importantly legality and fair notice, as well as principles of proportionality in sentencing. (shrink)

I disagree, albeit with great respect, with Don Scheid's basic proposition that preventive detention for “mega-terrorism” suspects is warranted.1 In a sense, we disagree about what constitutes prev...

A number of articles and empirical studies over the past decade, most by Paul Robinson and co-authors, have suggested a relationship between the extent of the criminal law's reputation for being just in its distribution of criminal liability and punishment in the eyes of the community – its "moral credibility" – and its ability to gain that community's deference and compliance through a variety of mechanisms that enhance its crime-control effectiveness. This has led to proposals to have criminal liability and (...) punishment rules reflect lay intuitions of justice – "empirical desert" – as a means of enhancing the system's moral credibility. In a recent article, Christopher Slobogin and Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein (SBR) report seven sets of studies that they argue undermine these claims of empirical desert and moral credibility and instead support SBR's proposed distributive principle of "individual prevention," a view that focuses on an offender's future dangerousness rather than on his perceived desert. -/- The idea that there is a relationship between the criminal law's reputation for justness and its crime-control effectiveness did not originate with Robinson and his co-authors. Rather, it has been a common theme among a wide range of punishment theory scholars for many decades. A particularly important conclusion of recent Robinson studies, however, is their confirmation that this relationship is a continuous one: even small nudges in moral credibility can produce corresponding changes in the community's deference to the criminal law. This is important because it shows that even piecemeal changes or changes at the margin – as in reforming even one unjust doctrine or procedure – can have real implications for crime-control. SBR's studies, rather than contradicting the crime-control power of empirical desert, in fact confirm it. Further, SBR's studies do not provide support for their proposed "individual prevention" distributive principle, contrary to what they claim. -/- While SBR try to associate their principle with the popular "limiting retributivism" adopted by the American Law Institute in its 2007 amendment of the Model Penal Code, in fact it is, in many respects, just the reverse of that principle. With limiting retributivism, the Model Code's new provision sets desert as dominant, never allowing punishment to conflict with it. SBR would have "punishment" essentially always set according to future dangerousness; it is to be constrained by desert only when the extent of the resulting injustices or failures of justice is so egregious as to significantly delegitimize the government and its law. This ignores the fact that even minor departures from justice may have an important cumulative effect on the system as a whole. What SBR propose – essentially substituting preventive detention for criminal justice – promotes the worst of the failed policies of the 1960s, where detention decisions were made at the back-end by "experts," and conflicts with the trend of the past several decades of encouraging more community involvement in criminal punishment, not less. (shrink)

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and many other countries have adopted a “paradigm of prevention,” employing a range of measures in an attempt to prevent future terrorist attacks. This includes the use of pretextual charges for preventive detention, the expansion of criminal liability to prohibit conduct that precedes terrorism, and expansion of surveillance at home and abroad. Politicians and government officials often speak of prevention as if it is an unqualified good. Everyone (...) wants to prevent the next terrorist attack, after all. And many preventive initiatives, especially where they are not coercive and do not intrude on liberty, are welcome. But the move to a “preventive justice” model also creates potential for significant abuse. These risks suggest that we should be cautious about adopting preventive approaches, especially where they involve coercion. In part I of this essay, I articulate why preventive coercion is a problem. I respond, in particular, to a recent essay by Fred Schauer, "The Ubiquity of Prevention," which argued that “it is a mistake to assume that preventive justice is a problem in itself [because] preventive justice is all around us, and it is hard to imagine a functioning society that could avoid it.” In part II, I outline the formal constitutional and other constraints that are implicated by preventive measures in the United States, and I demonstrate that these constraints play a relatively small role in the actual operation of preventive measures. In part III, I maintain that informal constraints may actually play a more significant operational role in checking the abuses of prevention. (shrink)

How to respond justly to the dangers persistent violent offenders present is a vexing moral and legal issue. On the one hand, we wish to reduce predation; on the other, we want to treat predators fairly. The central theme of this paper is that it is difficult to achieve both goals without compromising one of them, and that both are being seriously undermined. I begin by explaining the legal theory, doctrine and practice governing dangerous offenders and demonstrate that the law (...) leaves a gap in the ability to confine them. Next I explore the means by which the law has overtly or covertly sought to fill the gap. Many of these measures, especially the new form of civil commitment for sexual predators, dangerously conflate moral and medical categories. I conclude that pure preventive detention is more common than we usually assume, but that this practice violates fundamental assumptions concerning liberty under the American constitutional regime. (shrink)

How to respond justly to the dangers persistent violent offenders present is a vexing moral and legal issue. On the one hand, we wish to reduce predation; on the other, we want to treat predators fairly. The central theme of this paper is that it is difficult to achieve both goals without compromising one of them, and that both are being seriously undermined. I begin by explaining the legal theory, doctrine and practice governing dangerous offenders and demonstrate that the law (...) leaves a gap in the ability to confine them. Next I explore the means by which the law has overtly or covertly sought to fill the gap. Many of these measures, especially the new form of civil commitment for sexual predators, dangerously conflate moral and medical categories. I conclude that pure preventive detention is more common than we usually assume, but that this practice violates fundamental assumptions concerning liberty under the American constitutional regime. (shrink)

Douglas Husak contends that both criminalization and punishment can serve preventive goals, so long as they respect retributive culpability constraints. This Essay draws on Husak’s work to argue that, while Husak is right to defend the legitimacy of criminal law as a preventive endeavor, preventive coercion is also permissible on consequentialist grounds alone, outside the culpability constraints of the criminal law. The Essay presents a unified consequentialist theory of preventive coercion, addresses deontological objections to ‘pure’ (...) class='Hi'>preventive detention, and argues that a consequentialist approach to prevention might ultimately be more protective of liberty and equality interests than the deontological ‘mad or bad’ approach that currently dominates Anglo-American jurisprudence and legal theory. (shrink)

Ideas of prevention (the prevention of harms, or of wrongs, or of crimes) have always played a significant role in accounts of the proper aims of a system of criminal law, but in recent years they have come to play a more prominent and disturbing part in developments in criminal law policies—most obviously, but by no means only, in the USA and Britain. Governments have sought to meet (or to be seen to be meeting) a range of perceived threats, such (...) as terrorism, organised crime, and various kinds of sexual predation, by looking for more effective modes of prevention. Sometimes this involves expanding the criminal law to capture more types of preparatory conduct, or conduct (including various kinds of possession) that might facilitate the commission of target crimes; sometimes it involves expanding non-criminal provisions for preventive detention, or other kinds of restriction on the liberty of those thought to be dangerous (restrictions that may themselves be backed by criminal sanctio. (shrink)

This article examines preventive constraints on suspected terrorists that can lead to restrictions on liberty similar to imprisonment and disrespect the target’s autonomy. In particular, it focuses on two examples: travel bans and asset freezes. It seeks to develop guidelines for setting appropriate limits on their future use. Preventive constraints do not generate legal protections as constraints in response to conduct do. In addition, these constraints are often seen as a permissible alternative to imprisonment. Still, preventive de (...) facto detentions, or what I term “exprisonments”, imperil the free and autonomous life of the targeted person. With the recognition that such constraints can infringe on one’s ability to lead a free and autonomous life, this article argues that some of these constraints require similar protections as their counterparts that put persons under lock and key. (shrink)

When the state aims to prevent responsible and dangerous actors from harming its citizens, it must choose between criminal law and other preventive techniques. The state, however, appears to be caught in a Catch-22: using the criminal law raises concerns about whether early inchoate conduct is properly the target of punishment, whereas using the civil law raises concerns that the state is circumventing the procedural protections available to criminal defendants. Andrew Ashworth has levied the most serious charge against civil (...) preventive regimes, arguing that they evade the presumption of innocence. After sketching out a substantive justification for a civil, preventive regime, I ask what Ashworth’s challenge consists in. It seems that there is broad disagreement over the meaning and requirements of the presumption of innocence. I thus survey the myriad possibilities and extract two claims that have potential bearing on preventive regimes. One claim is that of substantive priority—the criminal law comes first when assessing blame. This is the claim at the root of objections to pretrial detention based on consideration of the crime charged. The second strand of argument is one of procedural symmetry. This is the concern that with respect to citizen/state relations, certain procedures are required, including, for example, proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the offense or defense. Having extracted these claims, I then assess their applicability with respect to the preventive regime defended. I first conclude that the criminal law must share blame and censure with other fora, and thus, the criminal law only has substantive priority when criminal proceedings have been instituted. I then survey whether procedural symmetry is required, specifically assessing whether the preventive regime I defend requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. My tentative conclusion is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is warranted. (shrink)

In the article “Fifty Years of U.S. Mass Incarceration and What It Means for Bioethics,” Sean Valles provides an important reminder of the consequences of mass incarceration in the United States and identifies potential roles for bioethicists in addressing this system. My limited view—that of a physician who conducts court‐ordered investigations and monitoring of health services behind bars—is that the ongoing failure of most academic and professional organizations to be more effective in this much‐ignored area stems from the lack of (...) leaders and staff who have been directly impacted by mass incarceration. As conditions behind bars worsen, and a new war on drugs recoils the spring of mass incarceration, there is a pressing need to train, recruit, and promote people who know the realities of the criminal (and immigration) justice system and its impact on health and well‐being. This step can bring a more powerful engagement of bioethics regarding housing, employment, and health care and policing, as well as the numerous and harmful elements of jails, prisons, and detention settings. I provide examples of partners I learn from in this arena, as well as some discrete and technical areas for possible investigation. (shrink)

Despite the prevalence of externalization, much work in the ethics of immigration continues to assume that the admission of immigrants is determined by state immigration officials who decide whether to admit travelers at official crossings. This assumption neglects how decisions about entrance have been increasingly relocated abroad – to international waters, consular offices, airports, or foreign territories – often with non-governmental or private actors, as well as foreign governments functioning as intermediaries. Externalization poses a fundamental challenge to achieving just migration (...) policies. It reliably harms vulnerable people, prevents refugees from receiving protection, leads to human rights abuses, and dissipates blame and accountability, creating a serious lacuna in assigning moral responsibility. (shrink)

Tuberculosis, caused by bacteria, usually affects the lung. Being airborne, TB has been one of the world’s deadliest communicable diseases. In spite of being curable and preventable, the disease has always been a continuous threat to human population. Moreover, there are cases of multidrug resistant, extremely drug resistant as well as HIV associated forms. Recognizing this grave threat, the World Health Organization urged every country to have a national program for tuberculosis prevention and control. After incidences of involuntary detentions of (...) people with suspected TB in some places, WHO also recommended that national TB prevention programs should incorporate ethical considerations in them. Specifically, it prescribed that human rights and social justice issues should be given due considerations. Studies suggest that India, following the international recommendations, has rolled down a national program to prevent and control TB cases in the country. However, neither is there much consideration of ethics in it, nor there is any pronounced effort to include social justice issues. The present paper investigates how the inclusion of elements from social justice theory can actually help India’s TB program to address the issue of equitable protection. Specifically, it shows how insights from JP Ruger’s ‘Health Capability Paradigm’ can help India’s TB strategies to render equitable protection by addressing health inequities. (shrink)

Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions provides an account of how we might effectively address wrongdoing given challenges to the legitimacy of anger and retribution that arise from ethical considerations and from concerns about free will. The issue is introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 asks how we might conceive of blame without retribution, and proposes an account of blame as moral protest, whose function is to secure forward-looking goals such as the moral reform of the wrongdoer and reconciliation in relationships. (...) Chapter 3 considers whether it's possible to justify effectively dealing those who pose dangerous threats if they do not deserve to be harmed, and contends that wrongfully posing a threat is the core condition for the legitimacy of defensive harming. Chapter 4 provides an account of how to treat criminals without a retributive justification for punishment, and argues for an account in which the right of self-defense provides justification for measures such as preventative detention. Chapter 5 considers how we might forgive if wrongdoers don't basically deserve the pain of being resented, which forgiveness would then renounce, and proposes that forgiveness be conceived instead as renunciation of the stance of moral protest. Chapter 6 considers how personal relationships might function without retributive anger having a role in responding to wrongdoing, and contends that the stance of moral protest, supplemented with non-retributive emotions, is sufficient. Chapter 7 surveys the options for theistic and atheistic attitudes regarding the fate of humanity in a deterministic universe, and defends an impartial hope for humanity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the United States, constitutional and statutory law reinforce the right of all children to receive an education, regardless of their citizenship or immigration status. In a time of heightened anti-immigrant sentiment and law enforcement, however, partnerships among school districts, local law enforcement, and the U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security subject undocumented and unaccompanied minor students to indefensible levels of risk for detention and deportation. We identify three stances that U.S. schools may take in the face of (...) a potential ‘school-to-deportation pipeline.’ Schools that engage in intentional collaboration actively increase detention and deportation by referring students to immigration officials for criminal, non-criminal, and even non-disciplinary activity. Schools that engage in predictable complicity may not intend to subject their undocumented and unaccompanied minor students to detention or deportation, but still put students at risk by involving police in school policies. We argue that U.S. schools should instead engage in proactive protection of immigrant students and families, including actively resisting federal policies when necessary. (shrink)

As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some (...) maintain or would it rather have a humanizing effect on our practices and policies, freeing us from the negative effects of belief in free will? In this chapter we consider the practical implications of free will skepticism and argue that life without free will and basic desert moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many people believe. We argue that prospects of finding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for example, would not be threatened. On treatment of criminals, we argue that although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, preventive detention and rehabilitation programs would still be justified. While we will touch on all these issues below, our focus will be primarily on this last issue. -/- We begin in section I by considering two different routes to free will skepticism. The first denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will and receives its contemporary impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and John-Dylan Haynes. The second, which is more common in the philosophical literature, does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that whether this causal efficacy is deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will by the standards of the historical debate. We argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route—e.g., Al Mele (2009), Eddy Nahmias (2002, 2011), and Neil Levy (2005)—the second route to free will skepticism remains intact. In section II we argue that free will skepticism allows for a workable morality, and, rather than negatively impacting our personal relationships and meaning in life, may well improve our well-being and our relationships to others since it would tend to eradicate an often destructive form of moral anger. In section III we argue that free will skepticism allows for adequate ways of responding to criminal behavior—in particular, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alternation of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justified and sufficient for good social policy. We present and defend our own preferred model for dealing with dangerous criminals, an incapacitation account built on the right to self-protection analogous to the justification for quarantine (see Pereboom 2001, 2013, 2014a; Caruso 2016a), and we respond to recent objections to it by Michael Corrado and John Lemos. (shrink)

Preventing future crime has become an increasingly dominant function of the criminal law of many liberal democracies. This “preventive turn” has led to a profound debate on the legal and ethical boundaries of the “preventive state.” However, the concept at the core of preventive justice—the dangerousness of the offender—has attracted relatively little attention in the current debate. This is remarkable, as the legal establishment of dangerousness permits intrusive preventive measures, such as preventive detention for (...) an indeterminate period of time. In the past, various concepts of dangerousness have been developed by criminal law scholars. We discuss these concepts in a chronological order to demonstrate how the meaning of dangerousness has evolved over time, and how it has been shaped by concurrent developments in forensic psychiatry and penology. Our description of the state of the art of legal scholarship on the concept of dangerousness also shows the lack of a fully developed theory of dangerousness, and therefore the necessity of further research. We identify five “aspects” of the concept of dangerousness on which scholars have widely diverging views. These five aspects are intended to guide further research on the concept of dangerousness in preventive criminal law. (shrink)

One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per (...) se face significant independent moral objections. Yet despite these concerns, I maintain that free will skepticism leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal behavior—in particular preventive detention, rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for good social policy. The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s, taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop the quarantine model within a broader justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics. The resulting model—which I call the public health -quarantine model—provides a framework for justifying quarantine and criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and preferable to other non-retributive alternatives. It also provides a broader approach to criminal behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own. (shrink)

The article discusses retributive justice and punitive restraint in response to the worst types of crime. I take the Breivik Case as a starting point. Anders Behring Breivik was sentenced to 21 years of preventive detention for killing 69 people, mainly youths, at Utøya and 8 people in Oslo on July 22nd, 2011. Retributivist theories as well as commonly held retributive intuitions suggest that much harsher punishment is required for such crimes. According to some retributivist theories, most notably (...) on the influential theories of Kant and Hegel, the death penalty is warranted for murderers like Breivik. This suggests that the rationale for punitive restraint in a case like the Breivik Case can only be found in forward- looking, consequentialist theories of punishment, or by adding to retributivist theories a side-constraint in the form of a principle of parsimony. However, I argue that if we look closer at the function of punishment in the retributivist theories of Kant and Hegel, they too imply a rationale for punitive restraint, even for such horrific crimes as here discussed. Against Kant and Hegel’s own views on the death penalty, I argue that their broader “freedom theories” of retributive justice do not imply the justice of the death penalty or life imprisonment. In the last part of the article, I explore differences in the concepts of freedom entailed by Kant and Hegel’s theories, and I relate these to some of the background factors relevant to the Breivik Case. (shrink)

In this Article, I will argue that a person may be deserving of criminal punishment even in certain situations where she is not necessarily morally responsible for her criminal act. What these situations share in common are two things: the psychological factors that motivate the individual’s behavior are environmentally determined and her crime is serious, making her less eligible for sympathy and therefore less likely to be acquitted. -/- To get to this conclusion, I will proceed in four steps. In (...) Part II, I will offer the first two of these steps. First, I will argue that our foundational assumption that moral responsibility is necessary for just blame and punishment is not self-evident and is actually rather difficult to explain and justify. Second, I will offer an explanation and justification that appeals to our moral psychology. Specifically, I will argue that we subscribe to this assumption ultimately because we sympathize with agents who lack responsibility for their actions. -/- Third, in Part IV, I aim to show that even if moral responsibility is not conceptually — only “emotionally” — necessary for just blame and punishment, the traditionally recognized criminal excuses are not at risk because, contrary to popular wisdom, they do not really rely on this assumption to begin with. Instead, they stand less for the metaphysical proposition that we should refrain from blaming and punishing the non-responsible and more for the normative/ethical proposition that we should refrain from blaming and punishing those whom we cannot reasonably expect to have acted better. I will further argue that the latter proposition does not necessarily reduce to the former. -/- Fourth, once I have defended my account of the excuses, I will question in Parts V and VI the increasingly popular notion that we should add certain conditions or circumstances to the list of recognized excuses. I will focus on one in particular — the psychological theory of “situationism” — and will argue that, despite its initial plausibility, it should be kept off the list. While situationism arguably does negate moral responsibility, it does not negate criminal responsibility. -/- Of course, this is a controversial point. Criminal responsibility is almost universally thought to require moral responsibility. But in a previous article, "Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention," 48 San Diego L. Rev. 1299, I used personality psychology to drive a wedge between the two. In this article, I will use the opposite end of the psychological spectrum — social psychology — to drive the same important wedge. (shrink)

Psychopathy fascinates. Modernist writers construct out of it an image of alienated individualism pursuing the moment, killing they know not why, exploiting in passing, troubled, if troubled at all, not by guilt, but by perplexity (Camus 1989; Gide 1995; Mailer 1957; Musil 1996). Psychiatrists and psychologists—even those who should know better—are drawn by it to take off into philosophical speculation about morality, evil, and the beast in man (Mullen 1992; Simon 1996). Philosophers succumb to the temptation of attempting to ground (...) speculation in the supposed facticity of psychopathy. -/- Psychopathy is a cultural construct with roots going back to the eighteenth century, but which only came to full flower over the last fifty years (Hare 1998; Lewis 1974). The currently fashionable constructions of psychopathy find wide acceptance among clinicians and academics. The problem is, however, whether the concept has connections that have been established to the behavior, psychopathology, or the structure and function of brain worthy of according even a modest level of scientific status. There is little point in basing an argument on some supposed scientific gold standard if what glitters is iron pyrites (fools' gold). -/- Neil Levy's opening paragraph contains the statement "Yet in other respects they seem quite irrational; so much so that the term moral insanity has sometimes been applied to them" (p. 129). This both asserts that there is a category "them," namely the psychopaths, and connects them to "moral insanity." Moral insanity entered the language of psychiatry when Pritchard chose to use the term to translate Pinel's category of mania sans deliré (Pritchard 1836). Pinel was attempting to conceptualize a range of disorders that bordered on insanity in the sense of severe disturbances of affect, judgment, and behavior, but that were not accompanied by hallucinations or delusions (Pinel 1798/1964). In today's terminology, the cases he described would probably fall into diagnostic groups, including major depression, bipolar disorder, epilepsy, and a range of personality disorders. A number of his more striking case histories involved antisocial and even murderous behavior, which probably reflected Pinel's role in assessing offenders for the criminal courts of Paris. Pritchard's use of the English word "moral" reflected an appeal first to its use at the time to designate something which was like or similar, but not identical (a usage the OED labels "vulgar"), and second moral in the sense of ethical, conforming to virtuous behavior. Anglophones seized on the latter meaning, although Pinel emphasized the former. Forty years later, Henry Maudsley, the most widely read psychiatrist of his generation, could assert that moral insanity was as real as Colour blindness, some people being Colour blind and some moral blind (Maudsley 1879). Moral insanity became connected variously to phrenology with its own bump over the underlying moral cortex, with the twisted genetics of degeneration, with atavistic theories of criminality, and with a range of disorders of brain from epilepsy to frontal lobe damage (Combed 1853; Ellis 1890; Pick 1989). Although it is anachronistic to use the terms "psychopathy" and "moral insanity" together, it is clear they occupied a similar social and psychiatric space, albeit in different era. This should caution against too ready acceptance of psychopathy which may turn out to be as empty and dangerous a conceptualization as moral insanity. Why dangerous? Dangerous to those labeled, because the morally insane and the moral imbeciles were placed in preventive detention in asylums and prisons, and even sterilized in some jurisdictions. Dangerous to society, because it gave a spurious scientific justification for viewing crime not as reflecting the social evils of deprivation, ignorance, and inequality but as the ravages of the born criminals. -/- Psychopaths are not, as Levy asserts, "(causally) responsible for … more than fifty percent of violent crime" (p. 129). A proportion of violent offenders, which varies widely between observers, are labeled psychopaths. This is often on the basis of Hare's psychopathy checklist, which is a subjective, albeit through training aspiring to be reproducible, and to some extent self-sustaining, evaluation system (Hare 1980, 2003). Part of the checklist gathers data on prior antisocial behavior; part constrains the examiner to subjectively estimate such matters as glibness and callousness, part requires judgments about whether the... (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive handbook in the philosophy of criminal law. It contains seventeen original essays by leading thinkers in the field and covers the field's major topics including limits to criminalization, obscenity and hate speech, blackmail, the law of rape, attempts, accomplice liability, causation, responsibility, justification and excuse, duress, provocation and self-defense, insanity, punishment, the death penalty, mercy, and preventive detention and other alternatives to punishment. It will be an invaluable resource for scholars and students whose (...) research and studies concern philosophical issues in criminal law and criminal law theory. (shrink)

The central premise is that a significant amount of sex offending stems from unusual or inappropriate sexual preferences that appear in early adolescence, are relatively stable, and immutable. In those ways, they are like more ordinary sexual preferences, generating sexual impulses that are insistent. Individuals are strongly tempted to act on them, alternatives to satisfying them are unfulfilling, and complete long-term control of such impulses is unlikely. Yet, since individuals with sexual preferences for inappropriate objects or activities are neither morally (...) nor legally permitted to act on them, they find themselves in a terrific bind. The public is, to some extent, correct to not trust the individuals with such preferences and to attempt to monitor or control them. However, most such efforts appear ineffective and counterproductive. Recidivist sex offenders are particularly worrisome. The possibility of voluntary castration for such offenders, in lieu of preventive detention or other more restrictive measures, is explored. (shrink)

Despite the fact that six years have passed since 9/11, the Pentagon's recent decision to try six Guantanamo detainees for capital crimes such as terrorism and support of terrorism made national headlines. William Glaberson, "U.S. Charges 6 With Key Roles in 9/11 Attacks", N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2008, at A1. In this Debate, Professors Amos N. Guiora, of the University of Utah, and John T. Parry, of Lewis & Clark Law School, attempt to settle the question of what sort of (...) forum is most appropriate to try the thousands of individuals in U.S. custody who are suspected of terrorism. Professor Guiora considers three forum options: treaty-based international terror courts, traditional Article III courts, and a hybrid option he calls domestic terror courts. Ultimately, Professor Guiora argues in favor of domestic terror courts, which he describes as being able to balance the legitimate rights of the individual with the equally legitimate national security rights of the state. He considers this option to be the most practical and expedient policy solution, necessitated by an untenable tension between the understanding that some of the detainees present a genuine threat to American national security, and an awareness that indefinite detention violates constitutional principles and fundamental concepts of morality. Professor Parry agrees that current U.S. policy toward detainees has been misguided, but does not believe that innovations of the sort proposed by Professor Guiora are necessary. Rather, he suggests that policymakers should choose Article III courts rather than hybrid courts for trials of suspected terrorists, with military courts as a fallback option. Professor Parry points to research that shows that the federal government is often able to prosecute suspected terrorists in federal court, and therefore considers alternative proposals to Article III courts to be solution[s] in search of a problem. Professor Parry realizes that trial in federal court will not be possible for every suspected terrorist, and concludes that, [f]or people who pose a risk but whose conduct may not violate federal criminal law, prolonged preventive detention is the best choice. (shrink)

It is easy to understand the apparent appeal of strict liability to policymakers and legal reformers seeking to reduce crime: if the criminal law can do away with its traditional culpability requirement, it can increase the likelihood of conviction and punishment of those who engage in prohibited conduct or bring about prohibited harm or evil. And such an increase in punishment rate can enhance the crime-control effectiveness of a system built upon general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous. Similar arguments (...) support the use of criminal liability for regulatory offenses. Greater punishment rates suggest greater compliance. But this analysis fails to appreciate the crime-control costs of strict liability. By explicitly providing for punishment in the absence of moral blameworthiness, the law undermines its moral credibility with the community and thereby provokes subversion and resistance instead of the cooperation and acquiescence it needs for effective crime control. More importantly, the system’s lost moral credibility undermines the law’s ability to harness the powerful forces of stigmatization, social influence, and internalized norms. Given the serious limitations inherent in the real-world application of general deterrence and preventive detention programs, the most effective crime-control strategy is to build the criminal law’s reputation for being just, which means avoiding the use of strict liability. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Tyranny of the BureaucratsSimon Wilson (bio) and Gwen Adshead (bio)Keywordsviolence, mental health, bureaucracyWe are grateful for the opportunity to respond to the two kind and thoughtful commentaries on our paper. Sadler suggests irrationality may be the key to distinguishing psychiatric from nonpsychiatric violence. We are not so sure that this is necessarily as helpful as it might at first seem. Who gets to decide what is rational? Much (...) “normal” violence, committed in the heat of the moment, impulsively, and drunkenly, may not appear that rational, even to the perpetrator, in the cold light of day. We are not sure one would wish to bring this sort of violence within the province of psychiatric explanations. Likewise, a point we made in our paper: Even delusionally driven violence often has its own internal coherence and rationality within an irrational framework.We found much to agree with in McCallum’s commentary, and perhaps his alternative approach is more helpful. He proposes a more sociological model of understanding what is going on in these complex cases, one that starts with societal dividing practices. Our present times have been described as the tyranny of the bureaucrats. Professional approaches are devalued. Diagnosis is only relevant in terms of its bureaucratic utility in moving people from one category to another. Since the writing of our paper, the criminal law has changed further in England and Wales. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 brought with it new sentences of indeterminate detention for public protection for those offenders categorized as “dangerous.” The presence or absence of psychiatric disorder being largely irrelevant for these purposes. This would seem to fit nicely with McCallum’s analysis, and in principle rather takes the wind out of our sails when we argued about the discrimination against psychiatric violence—now a diagnosis is not necessary for the state to intervene in a probabilistic fashion to prevent future violence. Deciding between what sort of violence counts as psychiatric and what does not, does not have quite the same drastic differential effect on the individual as perhaps it did. Its importance is now, as predicted by McCallum’s model, more to do with bureaucracy: Which government department will be paying for the individual’s preventive detention (Department of Health or Ministry of Justice)? [End Page 75]Related ArticlesFeature Article: When Violence Becomes a Psychiatric SymptomCommentary: The Contingent Object of PsychiatryCommentary: Reasons CountResponse: The Tyranny of the BureaucratsSimon Wilson Simon Wilson is a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist at the Maudsley Hospital and an Honorary Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Psychiatry, London, UK. He qualified at Leeds University and trained in psychiatry at the Maudsley Hospital. He was previously Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist at HM Prison, Brixton, UK. He has particular interests in prisons, philosophical, and ethico-legal issues in psychiatry. He can be contacted via e-mail at:[email protected] Adshead Gwen Adshead is a Forensic Psychiatrist and Psychotherapist. She works as a psychotherapist in a high-security hospital. She is a group analyst and researcher in attachment theory as it relates to offenders. She has a Master’s degree in Medical Law and Ethics, and is a founder member of the Philosophy Special Interest Group of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. She can be contacted via e-mail at:[email protected] © 2009 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Two general ethical problems in psychiatry are thrown into sharp relief by long term care. This article discusses each in turn, in the context of two anonymised case studies from actual clinical practice. First, previous mental health legislation soothed doubts about patients' refusal of consent by incorporating time limits on involuntary treatment. When these are absent, as in the provisions for long term care which have recently come into force, the justification for compulsory treatment and supervision becomes more obviously problematic. (...) Second, Anglo-American law does not normally allow the preventive detention of someone who may be dangerous but has not actually committed any crime. The justification for detaining a possibly dangerous user of mental health services without his or her consent can only be based on risk assessment, but this raises issues of moral luck. Is the psychiatrist who decides not to take out a supervision order for a possibly dangerous patient with an initial psychotic diagnosis morally at fault if that person harms someone in the community, or himself? Or is the psychiatrist merely unlucky? (shrink)

A liberal society should be extremely troubled by the idea of preventive detention. Authoritarian states frequently punish people on suspicion of disloyalty or because rulers wish to remove people...

Psychiatric inpatients with capacity may be treated paternalistically under the Mental Health Act 1983. This violates bodily autonomy and causes potentially significant harm to health and moral status, both of which may be long-lasting. I suggest that such harms may extend to killing moral persons through the impact of psychotropic drugs on psychological connectedness. Unsurprisingly, existing legislation is overwhelmingly disliked by psychiatric inpatients, the majority of whom have capacity. I present four arguments for involuntary treatment: individual safety, public safety, authentic (...) wishes and protection of autonomy. I explore these through a case study: a patient with schizophrenia admitted to a psychiatric hospital under the Mental Health Act 1983 after an episode of self-poisoning. Through its discussion of preventative detention, the public safety argument articulates the ethical underpinnings of the current position in English law. Ultimately, none of the four arguments are cogent—all fail to justify the current legal discrimination faced by psychiatric inpatients. I conclude against any use of involuntary treatment in psychiatric inpatients with capacity, endorsing the fusion approach where only psychiatric patients lacking capacity may be treated involuntarily. (shrink)

The paper by Szasz is about mental illness and its meaning, and like Procrustes, who altered hapless travellers to fit his bed, Szasz changes the meanings of words and concepts to suit his themes.1 Refuting the existence of “mental illness”, he suggests that the term functions in an apotropaic sense. He submits that in this sense it is used to avert danger, protect society, and hence justify preventive detention of “dangerous” people.But his arguments misrepresent the precise meaning of (...) the term “apotropaic”, which is an adjective, defined in Webster’s, Chambers and the New Shorter Oxford dictionaries as averting or turning aside evil. It is possible that amulets and incantations ward off evil, in the same way as garlic repels vampires, but evil and danger are different concepts. Yet Szasz talks of using phrases like ‘“dangerousness to self and others’ as apotropaics to ward off dangers we fear”, and the word “evil” does not appear in his paper.I will argue that “dangerousness to self and others” and “psychiatric treatment” have a prosaic rather than an apotropaic function.The word “danger” is familiar rather than arcane, and includes many risks. A predatory paedophile is usually both dangerous and evil, but many dangerous people are not evil. For example, a child who plays with a box of matches is dangerous, as is a demented person who drives a car, or a schizophrenic who, acting on delusional beliefs, arms herself with a knife and roams the streets believing she is an avenging angel.Suppose …. (shrink)

The paper criticizes criminal law scholarship for helping to construct and failing to expose analytic structures that falsely claim a higher level of rationality and coherence than current criminal law theory deserves. It offers illustrations of three such illusions of rationality. First, it is common in criminal law discourse for scholars and judges to cite any of the standard litany of "the purposes of punishment" -- just deserts, deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, rehabilitation, and sometimes other purposes -- as a (...) justification for one or another liability rule or sentencing practice. The cited "purpose" gives the rules an aura of rationality, but one that is, in large part, illusory. Without a principle defining the interrelation of the "purposes," nearly any rule can be justified by some "purpose of punishment." Thus, a decision maker can switch among distributive principles as needed to provide an apparent rationale for whichever rule the person prefers, even if that preference is not based on rational criteria. A second example is found in a central mechanism for determining an offenderâs blameworthiness: the use of an individualized objective standard. The widely used mechanism avoids the problems acknowledged to attend a strictly objective standard. A person's situation and capacities are central to an assessment of whether a person can be fairly blamed for a violation, and the individualized objective standard allows the decision maker to take these into account. At the same time, the mechanism avoids reversion to a completely subjective standard, which might exempt many blameworthy cases from liability. In reality, however, the mechanism only shifts the form of the problem. Codes that use the individualized objective standard fail to provide a principle by which one can determine those characteristics of an offender with which the objective standard ought to be individualized and those with which it ought not. Without a governing principle, the issue again is left to the discretion of decision makers, with no guidance as to how that discretion is to be exercised. A final illusion obscures whether the criminal justice system is, in fact, in the business of "doing justice." The "criminal justice" system imposes "punishment" and encourages moral condemnation of those found "guilty" of "crimes." But while the system cultivates its doing-justice image, it increasingly shifts to a system of essentially preventive detention, where a violator's sanction is derived more from what is needed to incapacitate him from committing future offenses than to punish him for a past offense. There are great advantages to the deception, but also serious costs and inefficiencies. The paper discusses why some illusions are more objectionable than others and what the existence of such illusions says about modern criminal law scholarship. (shrink)

Can state sovereignty justify privileged receiving countries exercising authority over non‐members in a third country to safeguard their own interests? Under the current migration governance of the EU, state sovereignty is manifested in migrant interdiction, interception and detention policies employed to prevent unauthorized migrants from reaching the EU, and even from attempting to embark on cross‐Mediterranean journeys. While reinforcement of the Schengen region's external borders is a key aim of the EU's internal migration politics, collaboration with third countries regarding (...) migration control has, in the last decade, become a key feature of its external migration policy. In close collaboration with third countries, the EU has managed to curb the outflux of migrants from transit and sending countries. In effect, irregular migrants are prevented from exiting as well as from entering. This article explores the justifiability of such practices, by questioning commonly invoked models of justification such as the sovereignty “model”, with a special focus on partnership agreements regarding migration control between the EU and Libya. (shrink)

John McMillan's detailed ethical analysis concerning the use of surgical castration of sex offenders in the Czech Republic and Germany is mainly devoted to considerations of coercion.1 This is not surprising. When castration is offered as an option to offenders and, at the same time, constitutes the only means by which these offenders are likely to be released from prison, it is reasonable—and close to the heart of modern medical ethics—to consider whether the offer involves some kind of coercion. However, (...) despite McMillan's seemingly careful consideration of this question, it appears to us that the matter is more complicated than his approach to it suggests.The first thing that adds to the complexity of the discussion concerns the alternative for sex offenders who do not accept the offer of castration. As mentioned, it is likely that these offenders will be kept in prison. McMillan even underlines that they may be detained ‘indefinitely’. And the response report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to the Czech Government also emphasises—as part of the Czech Criminal Code—the possibility of ‘security detention’ that will last for as long as required for ‘the protection of society’.2 Suppose, …. (shrink)

Coercive medico-legal interventions are often employed to prevent people deemed to be unable to make competent decisions about their health, such as minors, people with mental illness, disability or problematic alcohol or other drug use, from harming themselves or others. These interventions can entail major curtailments of individuals' liberty and bodily integrity, and may cause significant harm and distress. The use of coercive medico-legal interventions can also serve competing social interests that raise profound ethical, legal and clinical questions. Examining the (...) ethical, social and legal issues involved in coerced care, this book brings together the views and insights of leading researchers from a range of disciplines, including criminology, law, ethics, psychology and public health, as well as legal and medical practitioners, social-service 'consumers' and government officials. Topics addressed in this volume include: compulsory treatment and involuntary detention orders in civil mental health and disability law; mandatory alcohol and drug treatment programs and drug courts; community treatment orders; the use of welfare cards with Indigenous populations; mandated treatment of seriously ill minors; as well as adult guardianship and substituted decision-making regimes. These contributions attempt to shed light on why we use coercive interventions, whether we should, whether they are effective in achieving the benefits that are offered to justify their use, and the impact that they have on some of society's most vulnerable citizens in the names of 'justice' and 'treatment'. This book is essential reading for clinicians, researchers and legal practitioners involved in the study and application of coerced care, as well as students and scholars in the fields of law, medicine, ethics and criminology. The collection asks important questions about the increasing use of coercive care that demand to be answered, and offers critical insights, guidance and recommendations for those working in the field. (shrink)