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Robert Stalnaker [112]Robert C. Stalnaker [34]R. Stalnaker [5]R. C. Stalnaker [1]
Robert Culp Stalnaker [1]
  1. Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1999 - Oxford University Press UK.
    In Context and Content Robert Stalnaker develops a philosophical picture of the nature of speech and thought and the relations between them. Two themes in particular run through these collected essays: the role that the context in which speech takes place plays in accounting for the way language is used to express thought, and the role of the external environment in determining the contents of our thoughts. Stalnaker argues against the widespread assumption of the priority of linguistic over mental representation, (...)
  2. Common Ground.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
  3.  74
    Context.Robert Stalnaker - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Robert Stalnaker explores the contexts in which speech takes place, the ways we represent them, and the roles they play in explaining the interpretation and dynamics of speech. His central thesis is the autonomy of pragmatics: the independence of theory about structure and function of discourse from theory about mechanisms serving those functions.
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  4. Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. .) (...)
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  5. A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2). Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
  6.  25
    Representation and Reality.Robert Stalnaker & Hilary Putnam - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):359.
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  7. Our Knowledge of the Internal World.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Starting in the middle -- Epistemic possibilities and the knowledge argument -- Locating ourselves in the world -- Notes on models of self-locating belief -- Phenomenal and epistemic indistinguishability -- Acquaintance and essence -- Knowing what one is thinking -- After the fall.
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  8.  10
    Inquiry.Jon Barwise & Robert C. Stalnaker - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):429.
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  9. Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press) 9:315-332.
  10. On the Representation of Context.Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (1):3-19.
    This paper revisits some foundational questions concerning the abstract representation of a discourse context. The context of a conversation is represented by a body of information that is presumed to be shared by the participants in the conversation – the information that the speaker presupposes a point at which a speech act is interpreted. This notion is designed to represent both the information on which context-dependent speech acts depend, and the situation that speech acts are designed to affect, and so (...)
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  11. Inquiry.R. Stalnaker - 1984 - Mind 94 (376):627-630.
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  12.  85
    Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Robert Stalnaker draws together in this volume his seminal work in metaphysics. The central theme is the role of possible worlds in articulating our various metaphysical commitments. The book begins with reflections on the general idea of a possible world, and then uses the framework of possible worlds to formulate and clarify some questions about properties and individuals, reference, thought, and experience. The essays also reflect on the nature of metaphysics, and on the relation between questions about what there is (...)
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  13. On Logics of Knowledge and Belief.Robert Stalnaker - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):169-199.
  14. Studies in Logical Theory.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - Oxford: Blackwell.
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  15. Our Knowledge of the Internal World.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Robert Stalnaker opposes the traditional view that knowledge of one's own current thoughts and feelings is the unproblematic foundation for all knowledge. He argues that we can understand our knowledge of our thoughts and feelings only by viewing ourselves from the outside, by seeing our inner lives as features of the world as it is in itself.
     
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  16. Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
  17. Indicative Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
  18. Ways a World Might Be.Robert Stalnaker - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):439 - 441.
    Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a necessary proposition is true in all possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would (...)
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  19. Pragmatic Presuppositions.Robert Stalnaker - 1974 - In Context and Content. Oxford University Press. pp. 47--62.
     
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  20.  69
    Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2011 - Princeton University Press.
    The book also sheds new light on the nature of metaphysical theorizing by exploring the interaction of semantic and metaphysical issues, the connections between different metaphysical issues, and the nature of ontological commitment.
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  21. Index.Robert Stalnaker - 2012 - In Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics. Princeton University Press. pp. 161-167.
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  22.  72
    Assertion.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1978 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 179.
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  23. Pragmatics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):272--289.
  24. Possible Worlds.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1976 - Noûs 10 (1):65-75.
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  25. Presuppositions.Robert Stalnaker - 1973 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4):447 - 457.
  26.  23
    Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
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  27.  94
    On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.R. C. Stalnaker - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):399-409.
    Hawthorne and Magidor's criticisms of the model of presupposition and assertion that I have used and defended are all based on a rejection of some transparency or introspection of assumptions about speaker presupposition. This response to those criticisms aims first to clarify, and then to defend, the required transparency assumptions. It is argued, first, that if the assumptions are properly understood, some prima facie problems for them do not apply, second, that rejecting the assumptions has intuitively implausible consequences, and third, (...)
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  28. Models and Reality.Robert Stalnaker - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):709-726.
    Kripke models, interpreted realistically, have difficulty making sense of the thesis that there might have existed things that do not in fact exist, since a Kripke model in which this thesis is true requires a model structure in which there are possible worlds with domains that contain things that do not exist. This paper argues that we can use Kripke models as representational devices that allow us to give a realistic interpretation of a modal language. The method of doing this (...)
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  29. Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics.Robert Stalnaker - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):299-322.
    This paper concerns the applications of two-dimensional modal semantics to the explanation of the contents of speech and thought. Different interpretations and applications of the apparatus are contrasted. First, it is argued that David Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics for indexical expressions is different from the use that I made of a formally similar framework to represent the role of contingent information in the determination of what is said. But the two applications are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, my interpretation of the (...)
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  30. Intellectualism and the Objects of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Robert Stalnaker - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):754-761.
  31. What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:339-352.
  32. Varieties of Supervenience.Robert Stalnaker - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:221-42.
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  33. A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1981 - In William Harper, Robert C. Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Reidel. pp. 87-104.
  34. Iterated Belief Revision.Robert Stalnaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):189-209.
    This is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new information, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed (...)
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  35. Indexical Belief.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):129-151.
  36. Probability and Conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
    The aim of the paper is to draw a connection between a semantical theory of conditional statements and the theory of conditional probability. First, the probability calculus is interpreted as a semantics for truth functional logic. Absolute probabilities are treated as degrees of rational belief. Conditional probabilities are explicitly defined in terms of absolute probabilities in the familiar way. Second, the probability calculus is extended in order to provide an interpretation for counterfactual probabilities--conditional probabilities where the condition has zero probability. (...)
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  37. Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games.Robert Stalnaker - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):133.
    Deliberation about what to do in any context requires reasoning about what will or would happen in various alternative situations, including situations that the agent knows will never in fact be realized. In contexts that involve two or more agents who have to take account of each others' deliberation, the counterfactual reasoning may become quite complex. When I deliberate, I have to consider not only what the causal effects would be of alternative choices that I might make, but also what (...)
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  38. On Considering a Possible World as Actual: Robert Stalnaker.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1):141-156.
    [Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of the statement (...)
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  39.  7
    Ways a World Might Be.Robert Stalnaker - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):443-453.
    Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a necessary proposition is true in all possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would (...)
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  40. Conditional Propositions and Conditional Assertions.Robert Stalnaker - 2009 - In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
  41.  61
    Luminosity and the KK Thesis.Robert Stalnaker - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 19-40.
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  42.  6
    On Considering a Possible World as Actual.Robert Stalnaker & Thomas Baldwin - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 75:141-174.
    [Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of the statement (...)
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  43. Lewis on Intentionality.Robert Stalnaker - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):199.
    David Lewis's account of intentionality is a version of what he calls 'global descriptivism'. The rough idea is that the correct interpretation of one's total theory is the one that come closest to making it true. I give an exposition of this account, as I understand it, and try to bring out some of its consequences. I argue that there is a tension between Lewis's global descriptivism and his rejection of a linguistic account of the intentionality of thought. I distinguish (...)
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  44. Reference and Necessity.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1997 - In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell.
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  45.  40
    Ifs. Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time.W. Harper, R. Stalnaker & G. Pearce - 1984 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):181-182.
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  46. A Semantic Analysis of Conditional Logic.Robert C. Stalnaker & Richmond H. Thomason - 1970 - Theoria 36 (1):23-42.
  47. Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics.Robert Stalnaker - 2006 - In Garc (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 293-309.
    This paper concerns the applications of two-dimensional modal semantics to the explanation of the contents of speech and thought. Different interpretations and applications of the apparatus are contrasted. First, it is argued that David Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics for indexical expressions is different from the use that I made of a formally similar framework to represent the role of contingent information in the determination of what is said. But the two applications are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, my interpretation of the (...)
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  48. What is It Like to Be a Zombie?Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 385--400.
    This paper examines the disagreement between those who think zombies are possible and those who think they are not. It aims to shed light on general questions about the nature of modal claims, and about the relation between metaphysical, semantic, and empirical questions. The views of three functional philosophers who provide unequivocal answers to the question “Are zombies possible?” are described.
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  49. What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?Robert Stalnaker - 2003 - In York H. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. pp. 95-106.
  50. The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1991 - Synthese 89 (3):425 - 440.
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