I explore how the notion of divine creation could be made understandable in a worldview dominated by empirical science. The crucial question concerns the empirical basis of belief in creation. Astronomical observations have changed our worldview in an exemplary manner. I show by an example from imaginative literature that human beings can perceive stars by means other than astronomical observation. This alternative mode may be described as “participatory perception,” in which a human experiences the world not by objectifying separation (...) as in science, but by personal involvement. I relate such perceptions to “embodied cognitive science,” a topical interdisciplinary field of research in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. Embodied cognitions initiate processes that can convey personal experiences of the stars. Such cognitions may involve religious apprehensions and give rise to sophisticated values. It is argued that the knowledge available through astrophysics and interpretation of the universe as divine creation represent two different ways of perceiving the same reality and should thus be seen as mutually complementary. (shrink)

While written by a prominent and active scientist, this book is based on personal experience and biblical theology. It doesn't try to derive God s existence from science and it's critical of scientific inferences on the notion of God (Natural Theology). Cosmic fine-tuning and other coincidences are no proof of God, but are amazing, astounding and will never be fully explained. Amazement is the appropriate emotional perception of reality. The objective world is not a matter of course and may (...) well not exist at all; thus reality, at times, is experienced to be very special. Human life, the beauty of nature, the habitability of planet Earth can be considered undeserved gifts. In the light of these gifts, the universe is metaphorically interpreted and existentially believed as a divine Creation. Science cannot create such faith but can foster it. Is God necessary to explain the universe? Is the idea of a Creator excluded by modern science? Why continue speaking of a Creator and to believe (trust and hope) in His continuing creation when God cannot be demonstrated in scientific data? Arnold Benz, a renowned astrophysicist and Christian, insists that human perception reaches further than science and demonstrates this in various examples, personal, biblical, and literary.". (shrink)

We report the results of an exploratory study that examines the judgments of climate scientists, climate policy experts, astrophysicists, and non-experts (N = 3367) about the factors that contribute to the creation and persistence of disagreement within climate science and astrophysics and about how one should respond to expert disagreement. We found that, as compared to non-experts, climate experts believe that within climate science (i) there is less disagreement about climate change, (ii) methodological factors play less of a (...) role in generating disagreements, (iii) fewer personal or institutional biases influence climate research, and (iv) there is more agreement about which methods should be used to examine relevant phenomena we also observed that the uniquely American political context predicted experts’ judgments about some of these factors. We also found that, in regard to disagreements concerning cosmic ray physics, and commensurate with the greater inherent uncertainty and data lacunae in their field, astrophysicists working on cosmic rays were generally more willing to acknowledge expert disagreement, more open to the idea that a set of data can have multiple valid interpretations, and generally less quick to dismiss someone articulating a non-standard view as non-expert, than climate scientists were in regard to climate science. (shrink)

Evidence for instances of astrophysical ‘fine tuning’ (or ‘coincidences’) is thought by some to lend support to the design argument (i.e. the argument that our universe has been designed by some deity). We assess some of the relevant empirical and conceptual issues. We argue that astrophysical fine tuning calls for some explanation, but this explanation need not appeal to the design argument. A clear and strict separation of the issue of anthropic fine tuning on one hand and any form of (...) Eddingtonian numerology and teleology on the other, may help clarify arguably the most significant issue in the philosophy of cosmology. (shrink)

This chapter examines some of the philosophical literature on idealizations in science and the epistemic challenges idealizations potentially pose for astrophysical methodology, particularly its use of computer simulations. We begin by surveying philosophical literature on idealization connected to (1) kinds of idealizations deployed in science, (2) the aims of idealization in science, and (3) various strategies for de-idealization. Using collisional ring galaxy simulations as a case study, we examine how these three themes play out in the context (...) of astrophysical computer simulations. Ultimately, we argue that deploying deidealization strategies is central to bolstering epistemic confidence in simulations in astrophysics. We conclude with some remarks on the role of idealization in the context of astrophysical computer simulations more generally. (shrink)

Astrophysics is often cast as an observational science, devoid of traditional experiments, along with astronomy and cosmology. Yet, a thriving field of experimental research exists called laboratory astrophysics. How should we make sense of this apparent tension? I argue that approaching the epistemology of astrophysics by attending to the production of empirical data and the aims of the research better illuminates both the successes and challenges of empirical research in astrophysics than evaluating the epistemology of astrophysics according to the (...) presence or absence of experiments. (shrink)

Astrophysics faces methodological challenges as a result of being a predominantly observation-based science without access to traditional experiments. In light of these challenges, astrophysicists frequently rely on computer simulations. Using collisional ring galaxies as a case study, I argue that computer simulations play three roles in reasoning in astrophysics: (1) hypothesis testing, (2) exploring possibility space, and (3) amplifying observations.

The compact and, with \ M\, very massive object located at the center of the Milky Way is currently the very best candidate for a supermassive black hole in our immediate vicinity. The strongest evidence for this is provided by measurements of stellar orbits, variable X-ray emission, and strongly variable polarized near-infrared emission from the location of the radio source Sagittarius A* in the middle of the central stellar cluster. Simultaneous near-infrared and X-ray observations of SgrA* have revealed insights into (...) the emission mechanisms responsible for the powerful near-infrared and X-ray flares from within a few tens to one hundred Schwarzschild radii of such a putative SMBH. If SgrA* is indeed a SMBH it will, in projection onto the sky, have the largest event horizon and will certainly be the first and most important target for very long baseline interferometry observations currently being prepared by the event horizon telescope. These observations in combination with the infrared interferometry experiment GRAVITY at the very large telescope interferometer and other experiments across the electromagnetic spectrum might yield proof for the presence of a black hole at the center of the Milky Way. The large body of evidence continues to discriminate the identification of SgrA* as a SMBH from alternative possibilities. It is, however, unclear when the ever mounting evidence for SgrA* being associated with a SMBH will suffice as a convincing proof. Additional compelling evidence may come from future gravitational wave observatories. This manuscript reviews the observational facts, theoretical grounds and conceptual aspects for the case of SgrA* being a black hole. We treat theory and observations in the framework of the philosophical discussions about “realism and underdetermination”, as this line of arguments allows us to describe the situation in observational astrophysics with respect to supermassive black holes. Questions concerning the existence of supermassive black holes and in particular SgrA* are discussed using causation as an indispensable element. We show that the results of our investigation are convincingly mapped out by this combination of concepts. (shrink)

Evidence for instances of astrophysical 'fine tuning' (or 'coincidences') is thought by some to lend support to the design argument (i.e. the argument that our universe has been designed by some deity). We assess some of the relevant empirical and conceptual issues. We argue that astrophysical fine tuning calls for some explanation, but this explanation need not appeal to the design argument. A clear and strict separation of the issue of anthropic fine tuning on one hand and any form of (...) Eddingtonian numerology and teleology on the other, may help clarify arguably the most significant issue in the philosophy of cosmology. (shrink)

In the context of astrophysical modeling at the solar system scale, we investigate the modalities implied by taking into account different levels of detail at which phenomena can be considered. In particular, by framing the analysis in terms of the how-possibly/how-actually distinction, we address the debated question as to whether the degree of plausibility is tightly linked to the degree of detail. On the grounds of concrete examples, we argue that, also in the astrophysical context examined, this is not necessarily (...) the case. (shrink)

Aristotle usually has an extremely bad reputation as a physicist among scientists and historians of science. Central to this is the treatment of his version of the geocentric conception of the cosmos, according to which the earth is at the centre of the cosmos and does not move, and which was the dominant picture in antiquity and throughout the middle ages. Aristotle’s view is commonly regarded as a pernicious influence on the course of cosmology until the Renaissance, one which (...) held sway only because of Aristotle’s authority. The chapter argues that his integration of astronomy and physics—his pursuit, in a variety of works written over a long period, of the question: ‘what does the world have to be like, in terms of a unified physics, if current astronomical theory is right?’—embodies a degree of comprehensiveness, sophistication, and elegance simply unparalleled in the ancient world. It is also more robust—given the astronomy of Aristotle’s day—than is usually thought: the chapter considers a number of difficulties it faced, and outlines responses which Aristotle either did make or could have made. The only serious rival to Aristotle’s astrophysics before Kepler and Newton was the theory set out in Ptolemy’s Planetary Hypotheses, which attempts to integrate physics with his astronomy: the chapter argues that for all its subtlety, this theory fares very poorly as a piece of physics. It was not, therefore, simple deference to authority which led some Islamic and Renaissance scientists to prefer Aristotle’s theory even though they could not see how to square it with Ptolemaic astronomy. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the dynamical dark matter problem in twentieth century astrophysics from the point of view of History and Philosophy of Science. The dynamical dark matter problem describes the situation astronomers find themselves in with regard to the dynamics of large scale astrophysical systems such as galaxies and galaxy clusters: The observed motions are incompatible with the visible distribution matter given the accepted law of gravitation. This discrepancy has two classes of possible solutions: either there exists copious amounts (...) of some kind of matter that neither emits nor absorbs radiation , or the law of gravitation must be revised. ;Chapter 2 describes the physical and philosophical foundations of dynamical inferences---inferences from discrepancies between well-founded theoretical expectations and reliable observations to the characteristics of candidate solutions. Chapter 3 discusses the history of dark matter . Chapter 4 reviews the present evidence bearing on the dark matter problem. Chapter 5 evaluates the important candidate matter solutions in light of the available evidence. Chapter 6 evaluates two candidate gravitational solutions on evidential and methodological grounds, and addresses the problem of theory choice. I do not try to solve the dark matter problem, but to uncover and evaluate patterns of inference involved in evidential arguments for and against candidate solutions. ;I show that Newton's "Reasoning from Phenomena" is a good framework from which to understand what is going on in this field. I argue that "higher order" and especially non-dynamical evidence is the best hope for solving this problem in dynamics. This is so in part because of "the dark matter double bind": the very existence of the dark matter problem means that we cannot be sure of the overall matter distribution in astrophysical systems, and this in turn means that the observed motions by themselves cannot provide relative confirmation of any theory of gravitational interactions taking place at these scales. I use Newton's Rules of Reasoning to argue that we should retain General Relativity as our theory of gravity at galactic and greater scales, despite the lack of positive evidence to confirm it over its rivals at these scales. (shrink)

With the ever-growing quality of observational data in astronomy, the complexity of astrophysical models has been increasing in turn. This trend raises the question: Are there still reasons to prefer simpler models if the final goal is an actual model-target comparison? I argue for two aspects in which astrophysical research may favor models having reduced complexity: first, to address the problem of determining the values of adjustable parameters and, second, to pave the way for a validation of the model based (...) on the modeler’s understanding of the scope of the model and the critical processes on the target’s side. (shrink)

This article argues in favour of an inferential role for fictions in scientific modelling. The argument proceeds by means of a detailed case study, namely models of the internal structure of stars in stellar astrophysics. The main assumptions in such models are described, and it is argued that they are best understood as useful fictions. The role that conditionals play in these models is explained, and it is argued that fictional assumptions play an important role as either background or antecedent (...) conditions. I then expand on the argument for the compatibility of fictions and scientific realism. I argue that realism and antirealism plausibly offer correspondingly different accounts of the semantics of these fictional conditionals. (shrink)

Theoretical astrophysics emerged as a significant research programme with the construction of a series of stellar models by A. S. Eddington. This paper examines the controversies surrounding those models as a way of understanding the development and justification of new theoretical technologies. In particular, it examines the challenges raised against Eddington by James Jeans, and explores how the two astronomers championed different visions of what it meant to do science. Jeans argued for a scientific method based on certainty and (...) completeness, whereas Eddington called for a method that valued exploration and further investigation, even at the sake of secure foundations. The first generation of stellar models depended on the validity of Eddington's approach – the physics and many of the basic facts of stars were poorly understood and he justified his models through their utility for future research and their robustness under challenging use. What would become theoretical astrophysics depended heavily on this phenomenological outlook, which Jeans dismissed as not even science. This was a dispute about the practice of theory, and it would be this methodological debate that made theoretical astrophysics viable. (shrink)

The dark matter problem in astrophysics exposes an underappreciated weakness in the evidential warrant for General Relativity (GR). The "dark matter double bind" entails that GR gets no differential evidential support from dynamical phenomena occurring at scales larger than our solar system, as compared to members of a significant class of rival gravitation theories. These rivals are each empirically indistinguishable from GR for phenomena taking place at solar system scales, but make predictions that may differ radically from GR's at larger (...) scales. Thus the typical confidence in the universal applicability of GR is insufficiently warranted in the present evidential context. (shrink)

Recent developments in astrophysical cosmology have revived support for the design argument among a growing clique of astrophysicists. I show that the scientific/mathematical evidence cited in support of intelligent design of the universe is infected with a mathematical sharp practice: the concepts of two numbers being of the same order of magnitude, and of being within an order of each other, have been stretched from their proper meanings so as to doctor the numbers evidentially. This practice started with A. S. (...) Eddington and P. A. M. Dirac in the 1920s and 1930s, but it is still very much alive today. 1 Introduction 2 The birth of a sharp practice 3 High tide for the anthropic principle 4 How not to do things with numbers 5 The recalcitrant sloppiness of crud 6 How excited can excited carbon-12 be? 7 Is a pile of doubts a doubtful pile? 8 Conclusion. (shrink)

(1978). Edward C. Pickering, the Henry Draper Memorial, and the beginnings of astrophysics in America. Annals of Science: Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 365-377.

This paper compares four techniques for measuring the masses of galaxies and larger astrophysical systems from their dynamics. The apparent agreement of these techniques is sometimes invoked as reason for hypothesizing the existence of huge quantities of “dark matter” as the best solution to “the dynamical discrepancy”, the 100-fold disparity between the amount of mass visible in large scale astrophysical systems and the amount calculated from dynamics. This paper argues that the agreement, though suggestive, is not definitive. The coincident measurements (...) remain the best reason for preferring dark matter over revisions to General Relativity for solving the dynamical discrepancy, but the resulting warrant for this preference is weak. (shrink)

Scientific collaboration can only be understood along the epistemic and cognitive grounding of scientific disciplines. New scientific discoveries in astrophysics led to a major restructuring of the elite network of astrophysics. To study the interplay of the epistemic grounding and the social network structure of a discipline, a mixed-methods approach is necessary. It combines scientometrics, quantitative network analysis and visualization tools with a qualitative network analysis approach. The centre of the international collaboration network of astrophysics is demarcated by identifying the (...) 225 most productive astrophysicists. For the years 1998–1999 and 2001–2006 four co-authorship networks are constructed comprehending each a two year period. A visualization of the longitudinal network data gives first hints on the structural development of the network. The network of 2005–2006 is analyzed in depth. Based on cohesion analysis tools for network analysis, two main cores and three smaller ones are identified. Scientists in each core and additionally in structurally interesting positions are identified and 17 qualitative expert interviews are conducted with them. The visualization of the network of 2005–2006 is used in the interviews as a stimulus for the interviewees. An analysis of the three most often used keywords of the 225 astrophysicists is included and combined with the other data. The triangulation of these approaches shows that major epistemic changes in astrophysics, e.g. the discovery of the accelerating expansion of the universe, together with technical and organizational innovations, leads to a restructuring of the network of the discipline. The importance of a combination of qualitative and quantitative network analysis tools for the understanding of the interplay of cognitive and social structure in the sociology of science is substantiated. (shrink)

François Arago, the first to show in 1810 that the surface of the Sun and stars is made of incandescent gas and not solid or liquid, was a prominent physicist of the 19th century. He used his considerable influence to help Fresnel, Ampere and others develop their ideas and make themselves known. This book covers his personal contributions to physics, astronomy, geodesy and oceanography, which are far from negligible, but insufficiently known. Arago was also an important and influential political man (...) who, for example, abolished slavery in the French colonies. One of the last humanists, he had a very broad culture and range of interests. In parallel to his biography, this title also covers the spectacular progresses of science at the time of Arago, especially in France: the birth of physical optics, electromagnetism and thermodynamics. Francois Arago's life is a fascinating epic tale that reads as a novel. (shrink)

Systems of differential equations are used to describe, model, explain, and predict states of physical systems. Experimental and theoretical branches of physics including general relativity, climate science, and particle physics have differential equations at their center. Direct solutions to differential equations are not available in many domains, which spurs on the use of creative mathematics and simulated solutions.

The LIGO-Virgo Collaboration achieved the first ‘direct detection’ of gravitational waves in 2015, opening a new “window” for observing the universe. Since this first detection (‘GW150914’), dozens of detections have followed, mostly produced by binary black hole mergers. However, the theory-ladenness of the LIGO-Virgo methods for observing these events leads to a potentially-vicious circularity, where general relativistic assumptions may serve to mask phenomena that are inconsistent with general relativity (GR). Under such circumstances, the fact that GR can ‘save the phenomena’ (...) may be an artifact of theory-laden methodology.This paper examines several ways that the LIGO-Virgo observations are used in theory and hypothesis testing, despite this circularity problem. First, despite the threat of vicious circularity, these experiments succeed in testing GR. Indeed, early tests of GR using GW150914 are best understood as a response to the threat of theory-ladenness and circularity. Each test searches for evidence that LIGO-Virgo’s theory-laden methods are biasing their overall conclusions. The failure to find evidence of this places constraints on deviations from the predictions of GR. Second, these observations provide a basis for studying astrophysical and cosmological processes, especially through analyses of populations of events. As gravitational-wave astrophysics transitions into mature science, constraints from early tests of GR provide a scaffolding for these population-based studies. I further characterize this transition in terms of its increasing connectedness to other parts of astrophysics and the prominence of reasoning about selection effects and other systematics in drawing inferences from observations.Overall, this paper analyses the ways that theory and hypothesis testing operate in gravitational-wave astrophysics as it gains maturity. In particular, I show how these tests build on one another in order to mitigate a circularity problem at the heart of the observations. (shrink)

Work on the methodology of natural science involves serious difficulties over and above those encountered in any other aspect of natural science or of philosophy. Reference is to the obvious fact that in discussing methodological questions of, for example, physics, so as to be precise, it is not enough to know physics: it is also necessary to familiarize oneself with certain branches of philosophy, the history of science, and so forth. Furthermore, a professional cannot limit himself to (...) "general familiarity" with the material. He has to know the details and, if possible, the entire literature on the question under discussion. However, the volume of literature on physics has, within the memory of the author alone — that is, over approximately forty years — multiplied dozens of times. I cannot say how great has been the increase in the quantity of information on the methodology of natural science and related disciplines. But what is important is that the amount of material that has accumulated to date is enormous. Some notion of the scale of the work may be gained from the abstract journal Obshchestvennye nauki za rubezhom. Seriia 8. Naukovedenie. For example, no. 1 for 1980 contained abstracts of 72 articles and books; this amounts to over 400 titles a year . When we add to this the Soviet literature and the need to include material from many years, we arrive at a figure of four digits. Naturally, only a very small portion of the literature is made use of in any particular piece of work, but it is impossible to know beforehand which items will be specifically needed. (shrink)

Science and religion have long been thought incompatible. But nowhere has this apparent contradiction been more fully resolved than in the figure of A. S. Eddington (1882–1944), a pioneer in astrophysics, relativity, and the popularization of science, and a devout Quaker. Practical Mystic uses the figure of Eddington to shows how religious and scientific values can interact and overlap without compromising the integrity of either. Eddington was a world-class scientist who not only maintained his religious belief throughout his (...) scientific career but also defended the interrelation of science and religion while drawing inspiration from both for his practices. For instance, at a time when a strict adherence to deductive principles of physics had proved fruitless for understanding the nature of stars, insights from Quaker mysticism led Eddington to argue that an outlook less concerned with certainty and more concerned with further exploration was necessary to overcome the obstacles of incomplete and uncertain knowledge. By examining this intersection between liberal religion and astrophysics, Practical Mystic questions many common assumptions about the relationship between science and spirituality. Matthew Stanley’s analysis of Eddington’s personal convictions also reveals much about the practice, production, and dissemination of scientific knowledge at the beginning of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Numerical simulations have come to be widely used in scientific work. Like experiments, simulations generate large quantities of numbers that require analysis and constant concern with uncertainty and error. How do simulationists convince themselves, and others, about the credibility of output? The present analysis reconstructs the perspectives related to performing numerical simulations, in general, and the situations in which simulationists deal with uncertain output, in particular. Starting from a distinction between idealized and realistic simulations, the paper presents the principal methods (...) of evaluation in relation to these practices and how different audiences expect different methods. One major challenge in interpreting output data is to distinguish between “real” and “numerical” effects. Within the practice of idealized simulations, simulationists hold the underlying model accountable for results that manifest “real” effects, but because “numerical” and “real” effects cannot be distinguished on the basis of what they derive from, attempted causal explanations are rather justifications for their conclusions. At the same time, simulationists’ explanations are part and parcel of their contradictory perspectives, according to which they believe in simulations largely due to the underlying model, while painfully recognizing everything they have to add to make computations doable on the basis of this model. (shrink)

In this book a team of expert academics trained in mathematics, engineering, philosophy, physical anthropology, physics, astrophysics, biology and more investigate the prospects for intelligent design. Edited by William Dembski.

Mary Somerville (1780-1872), after whom Somerville College Oxford was named, was the first woman scientist to win an international reputation entirely in her own right, rather than through association with a scientific brother or father. She was active in astronomy, one of the most demanding areas of science of the day, and flourished in the unique British tradition of Grand Amateurs, who paid their own way and were not affiliated with any academic institution. Mary Somerville was to science (...) what Jane Austen was to literature and Frances Trollope to travel writing. Allan Chapman's vivid account brings to light the story of an exceptional woman, whose achievements in a field dominated by men deserve to be very widely known. (shrink)

After a decade of intense debate about mechanisms, there is still no consensus characterization. In this paper we argue for a characterization that applies widely to mechanisms across the sciences. We examine and defend our disagreements with the major current contenders for characterizations of mechanisms. Ultimately, we indicate that the major contenders can all sign up to our characterization.

This book presents consciousness models from Eastern and Western perspectives that accommodate current scientific research in the natural sciences and humanities, from neurological experiments through philosophical enquiries to spiritual approaches. It offers up to date research from key disciplines in consciousness studies ranging from neurology, quantum mechanics, algorithmic science, mathematics, and astrophysics to literary studies, philosophy, and (comparative) theology. The volume examines the dichotomy between Western and Eastern perceptions of consciousness – where consciousness is perceived as brain activity by (...) Western scientists, and as a divine presence by various religions, especially in the East. The essays contextualize each other and reciprocally illuminate the potential and limits of the respective approaches. The texts aim at a transdisciplinary and transcultural exchange of ideas in consciousness studies and address a readership from interested lay-readers to experts of the field. The volume is of interest to researchers of consciousness studies. (shrink)

Between the spring and summer of 1973, the "Gang of Four" began to interfere publicly with the field of astrophysics, launching a critique of modern cosmology under the lead of the Magazine of Natural Dialectics, which they directly controlled. All of modern astrophysical cosmology was proclaimed to be a "new theology," and those studying cosmological models were denounced for "letting their intellects run wild." An endless litany of transgressions was attributed to Big-Bang cosmology in various "criticisms" and "recriticisms."1 Pseudoscience masqueraded (...) as science; idealism went under the guise of materialism; metaphysics and sophistry posed as dialectics. Under this torrent of abuse the study of the universe became a crime, and anyone showing the slightest interest in or concern for cosmological questions could not be free of suspicion. This was a massive obstacle to the growth of modern astrophysical cosmology in our country. (shrink)

This volume includes the Sigma XI-RESA National Lectures, 1961; the Sigma XI-Phi Beta Kappa Lecture, 1961; the RESA Proctor Prize Lecture, 1960; and a special Sigma XI Diamond Jubilee presidential article. The latter three are non-technical articles on such topics as trends in and growth of science in this decade, and the interrelations of science and government. The other articles discuss recent experimental and theoretical results in such areas as climatology, magnetic interaction of atomic nuclei, the effects of (...) solar disturbances on terrestrial magnetism, human genetics and evolution, the biophysics of chemoreceptors, astrophysics and cosmogony, and the physics of the plasma state of matter.--K. P. F. (shrink)

This handbook provides both an overview of state-of-the-art scholarship in philosophy of science, as well as a guide to new directions in the discipline. Section I contains broad overviews of the main lines of research and the state of established knowledge in six principal areas of the discipline, including computational, physical, biological, psychological and social sciences, as well as general philosophy of science. Section II covers what are considered to be the traditional topics in the philosophy of (...) class='Hi'>science, such as causation, probability, models, ethics and values, and explanation. Section III identifies new areas of investigation that show promise of becoming important areas of research, including the philosophy of astronomy and astrophysics, data, complexity theory, neuroscience, simulations, post-Kuhnian philosophy, post-empiricist epistemology, and emergence. Most chapters are accessible to scientifically educated non-philosophers as well as to professional philosophers, and the contributors - all leading researchers in their field -- bring diverse perspectives from the North American, European, and Australasian research communities. This volume is an essential resource for scholars and students. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to understand the relationship between knowledge and society and to reflect on the links between science and political decision making. The text evolved from a number of reflections the author made while president of the European Astronomical Society, president of the Swiss Academy of Sciences and vice-president of the European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC). The book starts by using astronomy as a showcase for what science brings to society in terms (...) of intellectual enrichment, of practical tools and of societal inputs. It then turns to looking generally at science as a human endeavour for which pleasure is a prime motivation and it describes the efforts made by researchers to rationalise their findings, thus making them universally acceptable. The author also describes the role of science in shaping our environment and discusses resulting responsibility of the scientists with respect to the evolution of the world. As part of an analysis of the relationship between science and policy the author describes the way in which scientists can (and must) bring knowledge in the political decision making process. The argument is closed with considerations on global governance, while the conclusion puts evidence based decision making processes in relation with the more emotional aspects of our behaviour. The readership of the book is intended to be all scientists involved in "science for policy" activities, as well as those who should become more active in this domain. This includes, but is not limited to, all members of science academies. Astronomers will find specific elements to help them think about their science. The intended readers of the book also include civil servants and policy makers who develop legislation and societal action in domains in which a solid knowledge base is important. The book should furthermore be of interest to citizens following public life and all those worried by the "post evidence" trends in policy. (shrink)

Correspondence in Nature Human Behaviour.