A set A is m-reducible to B if and only if there is a polynomial-time computable function f such that, for all x, x∈ A if and only if f ∈ B. Two sets are: 1-equivalent if and only if each is m-reducible to the other by one-one reductions; p-invertible equivalent if and only if each is m-reducible to the other by one-one, polynomial-time invertible reductions; and p-isomorphic if and only if there is an m-reduction from one set to the (...) other that is one-one, onto, and polynomial-time invertible. In this paper we show the following characterization. Theorem The following are equivalent: P = PSPACE. Every two 1-equivalent sets are p-isomorphic. Every two p-invertible equivalent sets are p-isomorphic. (shrink)

There is a family of questions in relativized complexity theory--weak analogs of the Friedberg Jump-Inversion Theorem--that are resolved by 1-generic sets but which cannot be resolved by essentially any weaker notion of genericity. This paper defines aw2-generic sets. i.e., sets which meet every dense set of strings that is r.e. in some incomplete r.e. set. Aw2-generic sets are very close to 1-generic sets in strength, but are too weak to resolve these questions. In particular, it is shown that for any (...) set X there is an aw2-generic set G such that $\mathbf{NP}^G \cap co-\mathbf{NP}^G \nsubseteq \mathbf{P}^{G \oplus X}$ . (On the other hand, if G is 1-generic, then $\mathbf{NP}^G \cap co-\mathbf{NP}^G \subseteq \mathbf{P}^{G \oplus \mathrm{SAT}}$ . where SAT is the NP-complete satisfiability problem [6].) This result runs counter to the fact that most finite extension constructions in complexity theory can be made effective. These results imply that any finite extension construction that ensures any of the Friedberg analogs must be noneffective, even relative to an arbitrary incomplete r.e. set. It is then shown that the recursion theoretic properties of aw2-generic sets differ radically from those of 1-generic sets: every degree above O' contains an aw2-generic set: no aw2-generic set exists below any incomplete r.e. set; there is an aw2-generic set which is the join of two Turing equivalent aw2-generic sets. Finally, a result of Shore is presented [30] which states that every degree above 0' is the jump of an aw2-generic degree. (shrink)

We define and study a new notion called k-immunity that lies between immunity and hyperimmunity in strength. Our interest in k-immunity is justified by the result that θ does not k-tt reduce to a k-immune set, which improves a previous result by Kobzev [7]. We apply the result to show that Φ′ does not btt-reduce to MIN, the set of minimal programs. Other applications include the set of Kolmogorov random strings, and retraceable and regressive sets. We also give a new (...) characterization of effectively simple sets and show that simple sets are not btt-cuppable. (shrink)

Higman essentially showed that if A is any language then SUBSEQ(A) is regular, where SUBSEQ(A) is the language of all subsequences of strings in A. Let s1, s2, s3, . . . be the standard lexicographic enumeration of all strings over some finite alphabet. We consider the following inductive inference problem: given A(s1), A(s2), A(s3), . . . . learn, in the limit, a DFA for SUBSEQU). We consider this model of learning and the variants of it that are usually (...) studied in Inductive Inference: anomalies, mind-changes, teams, and combinations thereof. This paper is a significant revision and expansion of an earlier conference version [10]. (shrink)

What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...) construction of a minimal theory of mind. Minimal theory of mind is rich enough to explain systematic success on tasks held to be acid tests for theory of mind cognition including many false belief tasks. Yet minimal theory of mind does not require representing propositional attitudes, or any other kind of representation, as such. Minimal theory of mind may be what enables those with limited cognitive resources or little conceptual sophistication, such as infants, chimpanzees, scrub-jays and human adults under load, to track others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs. (shrink)

The development of children’s minds raises fundamental psychological and scientific questions, from how we are able to know about and describe basic aspects of the world such as words, numbers and colours to how we come to grasp causes, actions and intentions. This is the first book to properly introduce and examine philosophical questions concerning children’s cognitive development and considers the implications of scientific breakthroughs for the philosophy of developmental psychology. Each chapter explores a central topic in developmental psychology from (...) a philosophical perspective: social interaction and the developing mind children's awareness of objects and the question of 'object permanence' knowledge of numbers children and the acquisition of knowledge of colour language acquisition and the 'mapping problem' children's knowledge of the relation between actions and goals belief acquisition and the developing mind. Throughout the book Stephen Butterfill draws on several important case studies, including experiments with children on memory, ‘false belief tasks’, and the process by which children come to see other people, not just themselves, as capable of experience. He shows how these questions can illuminate some fundamental debates in philosophy of mind, such as the mind’s possession of concepts, rationality and the mind, the possibility of objective thought, and the nature of perceptual experience. Additional features, such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary provide helpful tools for those coming to the subject for the first time. (shrink)

Developed as the text for the basic computer architecture course at MIT, Computation Structures integrates a thorough coverage of digital logic design with a comprehensive presentation of computer architecture.

Scientific peer reviewers play an integral role in the grant selection process, yet very little has been reported on the levels of participation or the motivations of scientists to take part in peer review. The American Institute of Biological Sciences developed a comprehensive peer review survey that examined the motivations and levels of participation of grant reviewers. The survey was disseminated to 13,091 scientists in AIBS’s proprietary database. Of the 874 respondents, 76% indicated they had reviewed grant applications in the (...) last 3 years; however, the number of reviews was unevenly distributed across this sample. Higher review loads were associated with respondents who had submitted more grant proposals over this time period, some of whom were likely to be study section members for large funding agencies. The most prevalent reason to participate in a review was to give back to the scientific community and the most common reason to decline an invitation to review was lack of time. Interestingly, few suggested that expectation from the funding agency was a motivation to review. Most felt that review participation positively influenced their careers through improving grantsmanship and exposure to new scientific ideas. Of those who reviewed, respondents reported dedicating 2–5% of their total annual work time to grant review and, based on their self-reported maximum review loads, it is estimated they are participating at 56–87% of their capacity, which may have important implications regarding the sustainability of the system. Overall, it is clear that participation in peer review is uneven and in some cases near capacity, and more needs to be done to create new motivations and incentives to increase the future pool of reviewers. (shrink)

In Human Presence Erickson offers a thoughtful study of some fundamental features of human nature central to a theoretical and therapeutic understanding of human existence. Though the language employed is largely philosophical, interfaces with psychoanalysis and religion are made in order to stimulate dialogue that reaches beyond the traditional boundaries of discipline. It is toward more such dialogue that Human Presence serves as preparation. The author provides a probing contrast between traditional psychoanalysis and existential conceptions of time consciousness and he (...) articulates the issues involved in experience or lived time in their centrality to human self-understanding. The author suggests how both conceptions, the existential and the psychoanalytic, enlarge yet limit awareness and insight. In a revealing way, Human Presence raises deep and unavoidable issues regarding the human in us all. Stephen A. Erickson is Professor of Philosophy, Pomona College and Claremont Graduate School, and is a guest faculty member of the Southern California Psychoanalytic Institute. (shrink)

My next point concerns the relative unity of these engagements and is largely negative. However comforting the situation might be were it to the contrary, we discover through extrapolating from particular engagements that our engagements form no coherent and systematic whole. In fact, some run contrary to others, and it is only because we fail to pursue them wholeheartedly that they are able to coexist with each other. In further point of fact, it might be that failure to bring certain (...) engagements to awareness is necessary for the continued existence both of them and of those engagements with which they would otherwise explicitly conflict. (shrink)

The author contends that the view of creation most basic to leibniz's thought is that of emanation accomplished by means of an act of divine self-Limitation. To establish his thesis he argues that this theory is most consistent with leibniz's definitions of essence, Existence, Power, Perfection, And related concepts, And that given these definitions another possible interpretation of leibniz's understanding of creation is irremediably contradictory. The author closes with summary remarks on leibniz's concept of limitation, The relation between possible worlds (...) and the actual world, And the relationship between God and the world. (staff). (shrink)

In this paper I offer an analysis of, and suggest some methods for dealing with, a quite particular and peculiar problem in teaching philosophy. It is, perhaps,not a problem essential to the discipline or to its teaching, but it is nevertheless one of the most serious, pervasive, and frustrating problems confronting mostphilosophy teachers today. I speak of the problem of student relativism-or, SR for short.

What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...) construction of a minimal theory of mind. Minimal theory of mind is rich enough to explain systematic success on tasks held to be acid tests for theory of mind cognition including many false belief tasks. Yet minimal theory of mind does not require representing propositional attitudes, or any other kind of representation, as such. Minimal theory of mind may be what enables those with limited cognitive resources or little conceptual sophistication, such as infants, chimpanzees, scrub‐jays and human adults under load, to track others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs. (shrink)

Presents close analysis of eight of Francis Bacon's texts in order to investigate the relation of his religious views to his instauration. Attempts to correct the persistent misconception of Bacon as a secular modern who dismissed religion in order to promote the human advancement of knowledge"--Provided by publisher.

Few things matter more than the mental states of those nearby. Their ignorance defines limits on cooperation and presents opportunities to exploit in competition. What others feel, see and know can also provide information about events otherwise beyond your ken. It’s no surprise, then, that abilities to track others’ mental states are widespread. Many animals, including scrub jays, ravens, goats, dogs, ring-tailed lemurs, monkeys and chimpanzees, reliably vary their actions in ways that are appropriate given facts about another’s mental states. (...) What underpins such abilities to track others’ mental states? (shrink)

In Silence et langage Stephen A. Noble offers a new interpretation of the development of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology which analyses the central position of language within a philosophy of perception predicated upon the interdependence of seeing and speaking.

Many of the things we do are, or could be, done with others. Mundane examples favoured by philosophers include painting a house together (Bratman 1992), lifting.

In Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the motivating psychology of the benefactor. He finds that self-love is the crucial element of consciousness that accounts for the benefactor’s desire to participate constructively in the community of being. His analysis invites comparison with Aquinas’s treatment of the theological virtue of caritas. Similarities are found, but Aquinas’s approach leads to a discussion of divine beatitude where we find a somewhat surprising analogy between Aristotle’s human and Aquinas’s divine benefactor. For Aquinas (...) finds that divine beatitude is also a self-love flowing outward to the divine creative project. (shrink)

In animal cells, the Golgi complex undergoes reversible disassembly during mitosis. The disassembly/reassembly process has been intensively studied in order to understand the mechanisms that govern organelle assembly and inheritance during cell division. A long‐standing controversy in the field has been whether formation of Golgi structure is template‐mediated or self‐organizes from components of the endoplasmic reticulum. A recent study1 however, has demonstrated that a subset of proteins that form a putative Golgi matrix can be inherited during cell division in the (...) absence of membrane input from the endoplasmic reticulum. The outcome of this study suggests that a templating mechanism for the formation of Golgi structure may exist. This study has important implications for understanding mechanisms that govern Golgi biogenesis. BioEssays 24:584–587, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Three experiments investigated response times for remember and know responses in recognition memory. RTs to remember responses were faster than RTs to know responses, regardless of whether the remember–know decision was preceded by an old/new decision or was made without a preceding old/new decision . The finding of faster RTs for R responses was also found when remember–know decisions were made retrospectively. These findings are inconsistent with dual-process models of recognition memory, which predict that recollection is slower and more effortful (...) than familiarity. Word frequency did not influence RTs, but remember responses were faster for words than for nonwords. We argue that the difference in RTs to remember and know responses reflects the time taken to make old/new decisions on the basis of the type of information activated at test. (shrink)