During the course of evolution, variations of a protein sequence is an ongoing phenomenon however limited by the need to maintain its structural and functional integrity. Deciphering the evolutionary path of a protein is thus of fundamental interest. With the development of new methods to visualize high dimension spaces and the improvement of phylogenetic analysis tools, it is possible to study the evolutionary trajectories of proteins in the sequence space. Using the data-driven high-dimensional scaling method, we show that it is (...) possible to predict and represent potential evolutionary trajectories by representing phylogenetic trees into a 3D projection of the sequence space. With the case of the aminodeoxychorismate synthase, an enzyme involved in folate synthesis, we show that this representation raises interesting questions about the complexity of the evolution of a given biological function, in particular concerning its capacity to explore the sequence space. (shrink)

Although Pascal is a thinker of the figure of Christ, he seems to neglect the other Persons of the Trinity, in particular the Holy Spirit. This article examines the place Pascal gives to the third Person of the Trinity. It shows that, for Pascal, the Holy Spirit plays an important role in the conversion of man, insofar as he spreads in his heart the grace of Christ sent by the Father. Finally, this study comes to a difficult fragment of Pascal’s (...) in which he asks whether all Holy Scripture is dictated by the Holy Spirit, in order to propose a new reading. (shrink)

This paper studies ‘minority’ initiatives to organize sports games. A meta-analysis of published data in the literature identifies the formal appearance taken by each of these initiatives under the Olympic model. But it also conduces to build a number of indicators to answer a series of questions about their logic and strategies. All the initiatives studied are based on an ambivalent posture that, while based on the denunciation of a discriminating space, claim access to it. By an astonishing paradox, ‘non-normative’ (...) actors are driven to reclaim a model that, under cover of Universal, aims to establish a norm that is situated and dated. In practice, they use two types of strategies: a strategy for participation in the Olympics to transform them into a space which represents a fight against exclusion, or a strategy to create alternative events. Whatever the strategy, these initiatives are implemented according to their objectives. Differentiated in their forms—participatory or autonomy—they are also in their purpose. The comparison of these initiatives shows that ultimately, beyond strategies and logic inherent in different social, historical and organizational contexts, the mobilizations of the actors reveal the same ambivalence about the sports model conveyed by the Olympic institution. (shrink)

People meeting a robot for the first time do not know what it is capable of and therefore how to interact with it—what actions to produce, and how to produce them. Despite social robotics’ long-standing interest in the effects of robots’ appearance and conduct on users, and efforts to identify factors likely to improve human–robot interaction, little attention has been paid to how participants evaluate their robotic partner in the unfolding of actual interactions. This paper draws from qualitative analyses of (...) video-recorded interactions between a robot and groups of participants, in the framework of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. We analyse the particular ways in which participants shape their embodied actions, how they can reproduce a prior action that failed to obtain a response from the robot; and how they explore the robot’s embodied nature. We find a set of recurrent methods or practices, showing that robot-recipient design displays not only participants’ initial assumptions about the robot’s competences, but also more importantly perhaps their continuous assessment of the robot’s behaviour, and their attempts to adapt to it. Participants locally produce and constantly revise their understanding of the robot as a more or less competent co-participant, drawing from its past, current, and projected conduct and responsiveness. We discuss the implications of these findings for research in robotics and human–robot interactions, and the value of the approach to shed new light on old questions by paying attention to the quality of gesture and the sequential organisation of interaction. (shrink)

This paper presents a version of hylomorphism that intends to solve problems faced by contemporary hylomorphism. After showing that attempts to understand form as sets or relation of essential properties fail at taking into account the dynamic development of substances, the paper suggests another version of hylomorphism able to solve these difficulties. A functionalist version of hylomorphism is then defended: the best way to understand how form can be present throughout all the developmental stages of a substance is to understand (...) it as a certain kind of function. (shrink)

Cet article analyse les emplois schelérien et heideggérien de l’expression « logique du coeur ». Il revient sur l’origine de cette expression – forgée par Scheler, qui l’attribue à tort à Pascal en soulignant son opposition à la raison cartésienne – avant de reconstruire l’usage qu’en fait Heidegger. Trois phases sont mises au jour : Heidegger fait l’économie de cette expression dans ses jeunes années afin de prendre ses distances avec la doctrine schelérienne et pascalienne des sentiments ; il y (...) recourt dans les années trente et quarante pour signaler que cette doctrine est déterminée par la « logique » métaphysique cartésienne, qu’il oppose à deux logiques du coeur non métaphysiques (celles du λόγος grec héraclitéen et parménidien et du Λόγος johannique) ; dans les années cinquante, Heidegger abandonne pourtant cette expression au motif que toute logique – moderne (cartésienne) comme grecque et biblique – demeure métaphysique. (shrink)

Sylvain Luquet | : On tente ici de retracer aussi fidèlement que possible les tenants et les aboutissants du célèbre débat autour du bien commun et de la personne suscité par l’attaque du Père Eschmann contre le livre de Charles De Koninck, De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes . On y verra vite à quel point il s’agissait d’un débat d’idées et nullement de conflits personnels. | : We attempt here to retrace as faithfully as possible (...) the whys and wherefores of the famous debate about the common good and the person that resulted from the attack by Father Eschmann against Charles De Koninck’s book, On the Primacy of the Common Good against the Personalists . It will soon be obvious how much the core of this debate were ideas, and not at all personal conflicts. (shrink)

This paper investigates the late medieval controversy over the causal role of substantial forms in the generation of new substances. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, when there were two basic positions in this debate (section II), an original position was defended by Walter Burley and Peter Auriol, according to which accidents alone—by their own power—can generate substantial forms (section III). The paper presents how this view was received by the next generation of philosophers, i.e., around 1350 (section IV), (...) and how, even though some of the initial theoretical motivations for this view were quickly abandoned, the view was still defended by several philosophers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (section V). It is finally shown that this theory, still discussed by Suárez and early modern scholastics, and despite being generally rejected, contributed in its own way to the evolution of hylomorphism in the late Middle Ages and, to a certain extent, its gradual decline (section VI). (shrink)

We provide characterizations of the equal division values and their convex mixtures, using a new axiom on a fixed player set based on player nullification which requires that if a player becomes null, then any two other players are equally affected. Two economic applications are also introduced concerning bargaining under risk and common-pool resource appropriation.

This paper explores a specific problem within an important philosophical genre of the fourteenth century: the debates over the perfection of species. It investigates how the problem of defining limits for continuous magnitudes – a problem typical of Aristotelian physics – was integrated into these debates at the levels of genera, species, and individuals as these entities began to be conceptualized in quantitative terms. After explaining the emergence of this problem within fourteenth-century metaphysics, the paper examines the contributions of three (...) philosophers – Hugolinus of Orvieto, John of Ripa, and Paul of Venice – who offered varying solutions to the challenge of defining limits between species. It demonstrates that two primary solutions arose, inspired by continuous and discrete mathematical objects. It is shown that whereas Hugolinus of Orvieto advocates for a continuist model, John of Ripa proposes a discrete one. The last part of the paper examines Paul of Venice's hybrid approach, which combines elements from both models, facilitating a more comprehensive treatment of species particularly difficult to analyse, namely geometric figures. The conclusions of this comparative study underscore how profoundly the metaphysical reflections of the Middle Ages contributed to the analysis of the structure of the continuum and the extension of the notion of quantity to various objects. (shrink)

The concept of “natural attitude” as it was developed by Husserl in the Ideas I plays a key role in the phenomenological methodology. But was it in and for itself enough investigated? Heidegger’s critics and radical transformation of it is well known, unlike its treatment by the first generation of Husserl’s student. Adolf Reinach, for a short time leader of the realist phenomenology faithful to Husserl’s breakthroughs in the Logical Investigations, is one of the latter. Within a veiled debate with (...) Husserl about possibilities and limits of transcendental idealism (e. g. a critical reception of Ideas I) he attempts a kind of rehabilitation of natural attitude by way of an original and thorough description of it. Still in a strictly phenomenological manner, it though privileges for strategic reasons the “variation” process over the “reduction” one. The result is a subtle reflection that helps us thinking lived experience exactly as we lived it and not how philosophy would have it. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the way Aristotle makes use of the methods Plato labelled as "dialectic". After suggesting a unified interpretation of Plato’s dialectic, I show that Aristotle makes room for them not inside the context of demonstrative science, but at the level of the investigation concerning the principles of such a science. These principles are, for the most part, definitions; and Plato’s dialectical methods are designed to search for and obtain definitions. Although Aristotle, contrary to Plato, seems to (...) distinguish between dialectic and philosophy, he relates both to the same capacity, and he suggests that their methods are identical up to a certain point. Moreover, the cognitive state corresponding to dialectic is, for Aristotle as for Plato, intelligence (nous). Nevertheless, there remain important differences between Plato and Aristotle on this issue: while the dialogical dimension of dialectic is for Plato constitutive of philosophy and implies that the philosophical thought is a perpetual motion, it is according to Aristotle what distinguishes dialectic from philosophy, which must for its part come to a rest; and while philosophy presupposes a rupture with sensation according to Plato, Aristotle envisages it in continuity with sensible experience. (shrink)

For Merleau-Ponty and Maldiney, the world of the pictorial image is “an almost crazy world” and a world of “confused sensations”. However, it is not only an illusory and chimeric world, cut off from the real world. Indeed, far from distancing us from the real world, this craziness and this confusion bring us back to it. The objective of this essay is therefore to question the relationship between pictorial art and the real (not fictional or imaginary) world. Certainly, the pictorial (...) work of art makes us return “to the things themselves”, because it establishes a conversion of the gaze and a metamorphosis of the visible. But one can ask if this conversionof the gaze does not reverse the movement of phenomenological “reduction” as described by Edmund Husserl, since it plunges us into the very heart of the world and does not imply any abstention or abstraction. For Maldiney as for Merleau-Ponty, painting reveals our original being-in-the-world, so that it will be necessary to elucidate what it means exactly. Moreover, we will investigate the role of style and rhythm as well as the role of color and the line in order to describe more precisely the connection between the world and the work of art, between continuity and discontinuity. Finally, we will propose another meaning of the word “image”in order to highlight the ethical function of the image thus understood. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, Bromberger explores the centrality of questions and predicaments they create in scientific research. He discusses the nature of explanation, theory, and the foundations of linguistics.

This paper aims at tracking down, by looking at late medieval and early modern discussions over the ontological status of artifacts, the main steps of the process through which nature became theorized on a mechanistic model in the early 17th century. The adopted methodology consists in examining how inventions such as mechanical clocks and automata forced philosophers to modify traditional criteria based on an intrinsic principle of motion and rest for defining natural beings. The paper studies different strategies designed in (...) the transitional period 1300–1600 for making these inventions compatible with classical definitions of nature and artifacts. In the first part of the paper, it is shown that, even if virtually all medieval philosophers acknowledged an ontological distinction between artifacts and natural beings, these different strategies demonstrate a growing concern about the consistency of the art/nature distinction. The next part of the paper studies how mechanical clocks, even before the Scientific Revolution, served as theoretical models for applying mechanistic views to different objects (be they cosmological, physical or biological). The epistemological function of clocks appears to stem from different factors (like the specific manufacturing of late medieval clocks as well as the evolution of 16th-century mechanics) that are listed in this second part of the paper. These factors, combined with the definitional issues raised by automata, explain that clocks became the symbol of a new approach to natural philosophy, characterized by the collapse of the art/nature distinction and the “mechanization of nature”. (shrink)

According to Scheler, since the 12th century, Europe and the West have gradually lost their way. They abandoned the Pascalian “logic of the heart”, that is, the knowledge of holy values, spiritual values and vital values through intentional feeling (Fühlen) of the heart, in favour of the logic of reason or understanding, that is, the knowledge of domination of the external world by reason. Nevertheless, Scheler notes that since that time, European thinkers have occasionally succeeded in rediscovering this knowledge of (...) the heart, and that there is even a powerful contemporary movement in this direction in Europe. The challenge for Europe, then, is to build on this momentum and rediscover the “logic of the heart” in order to achieve a harmony of knowledge forms, and then a harmony of world civilization. (shrink)

Neuroconstructivism: How the Brain Constructs Cognition proposes a unifying framework for the study of cognitive development that brings together (1) constructivism (which views development as the progressive elaboration of increasingly complex structures), (2) cognitive neuroscience (which aims to understand the neural mechanisms underlying behavior), and (3) computational modeling (which proposes formal and explicit specifications of information processing). The guiding principle of our approach is context dependence, within and (in contrast to Marr [1982]) between levels of organization. We propose that three (...) mechanisms guide the emergence of representations: competition, cooperation, and chronotopy; which themselves allow for two central processes: proactivity and progressive specialization. We suggest that the main outcome of development is partial representations, distributed across distinct functional circuits. This framework is derived by examining development at the level of single neurons, brain systems, and whole organisms. We use the terms encellment, embrainment, and embodiment to describe the higher-level contextual influences that act at each of these levels of organization. To illustrate these mechanisms in operation we provide case studies in early visual perception, infant habituation, phonological development, and object representations in infancy. Three further case studies are concerned with interactions between levels of explanation: social development, atypical development and within that, developmental dyslexia. We conclude that cognitive development arises from a dynamic, contextual change in embodied neural structures leading to partial representations across multiple brain regions and timescales, in response to proactively specified physical and social environment. (shrink)

La philosophie française actuelle se réduit souvent à de l’historiographie ou à de l’exégèse de textes, s’exposant ainsi au reproche de stérilité. Certes, la philosophie ne doit pas céder à une telle tendance sous peine de se discréditer ou de disparaître. Cependant, à l’inverse, l’histoire de la théorie et l’exégèse sont nécessaires à la théorie non seulement pour produire de nouvelles hypothèses mais aussi pour les justifier, ceci étant vrai pour toutes les disciplines scientifiques.

Agonistic Apples at Delphi : Reflexions about Apollo''s Sacred Quince Tree According to texts and iconography a new award was created during Roman times for Pythian winners : mh''la, «apples ». It seems possible to identify more precisely the variety, thanks to ancient texts about botany, especially one from Athenaeus who speaks about mh''la Delf ikav. These one were maybe obtained by grafting an apple tree on a quince tree. This graft was particularly liked in the Greco-Roman world. For a (...) Greek mind the quince was born in Creta ; it could have come to Delphi in archaic times. Considering mythology and cult music, we may understand that Cretan people were in Delphi at the time. Then an apple tree was grafted and the new apples were so beautiful that they were considered as a wonderful award. We may assume that a Roman emperor made that decision, probably Hadrian, whose action for the sanctuary of Delphi is well known. (shrink)

Intuitive predictions and judgements under uncertainty are often mediated by judgemental heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Our micro-developmental study suggests that a presumption of rationality is justified for adult subjects, in so far as their systematic judgemental biases appear to be due to a specific executive-inhibition failure in working memory, and not necessarily to a lack of understanding of the fundamental principles of probability. This hypothesis was tested using an experimental procedure in which 60 adult subjects were trained to (...) inhibit the classical conjunction bias on a frequency judgement task derived from Tversky and Kahneman's work. Pre- and post-test performance was assessed via a probability judgement task. The data indicated a training effect, suggesting that subjects traditionally labelled as "irrational" with respect to the classical rules of inductive reasoning are in fact "inefficient inhibitors". These findings are discussed in terms of a polymorphous view of rationality. (shrink)

In his paper “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Berkeley Missed and Descartes Saw,” Myles Burnyeat purports to show not only that idealism was not endorsed by any ancient philosopher, but also that it could not have been endorsed before Descartes; Greek philosophy was dominated by an “unquestioned, unquestioning assumption of realism.” By ‘idealism,’ Burnyeat means mainly Berkeley’s immaterialism, but he also extends his demonstration to something more akin to Kant’s transcendental idealism. After arguing that this last version has more historical (...) credentials to the title of idealism than Berkeley’s doctrine, I compare Burnyeat’s reading to Natorp’s interpretation in Platos Ideenlehre, subtitled “An Introduction to Idealism.” Natorp argues that there is, on the contrary, a kind of underlying idealism in Greek philosophy, one that can be discerned on the basis of an interpretation of the meaning of the verb ‘to be’ which has found support in more recent research. (shrink)

This paper studies the theories defended by John Buridan and Nicole Oresme on the presence of the soul in the body, with a special focus on the interpretation of the Augustinian principle – or ‘holenmeric’ principle – according to which the soul is in the whole body and is wholly present in every part of it. The first part of the paper introduces the different types of composition involved in the medieval discussions over the soul and its parts and shows (...) how different psychological theories prior to 1350 employed this typology of part/whole relations to clarify the soul’s presence in the body. The next part of the paper presents how the theories designed by John Buridan and Nicole Oresme were motivated by problems raised by these earlier accounts of the soul’s presence and undertook to solve them from the perspective of a reductionist conception of parthood. It is argued that, despite their common commitment to a reductionist stance, the solutions endorsed by Buridan and Oresme represent two opposite ways of applying a nominalist metaphysics of parts to psychological matters. (shrink)

Genebanking, the process of preserving genetic resources, is a central practice in the modern management of crop genetics, especially for the species used for food and agriculture. Closely interrelated networks of local, national and global actors are responsible for ex situ conservation. They all seek to make plant genetic resources accessible for all and now face new challenges arising from digitisation. Plant sciences are entering the postgenomic era, moving fast from initially providing a single reference genome for each species (genomics), (...) to harnessing the extent of diversity within crop species (pangenomics) and among their relatives (referred to as postgenomics). This paper describes the extent to which ex situ collections have already undergone a digital shift, or are planning to do so, and the potential impact of this postgenomic-induced dematerialisation on the global governance of plant genetic resources. In turn, digitising material (seed) collection changes the relationship between genebanks and genomic databases. Comprehensive genomic characterisation of genebank accessions is ongoing, and I argue here that these efforts may provide a unique opportunity for genebanks to further embrace the moral, ethical and ultimately political principles on which they were built. Repurposing genebanks as decentralised digital biocentres could help relocate capabilities and stewardship over genetic resources. Empowering local farmers by providing access, promoting the use and unlocking benefits from state-of-the-art tools of modern plant breeding may allow bridging the breeding divide. However, to accomplish such a paradigm shift, genebanks require a strong political mandate that must primarily originate from the access and benefit-sharing framework. Only so may the global challenges associated with the loss of biodiversity and food insecurity be addressed. (shrink)

Ce livre répond aux questions : Qu'est-ce que la gauche et la droite? Quelles sont leurs origines historique, philosophique et psychologique? Quelles sont leurs valeurs profondes, qui perdurent à travers les siècles? Quelles conceptions de la nature humaine défendent-elles? Et surtout : qui a raison?

Freud accuse les philosophes d'agir comme des paranoïaques qui produiraient des projections mythiques. Cette violente attaque porte sur la valeur de vérité des productions philosophiques. Mais quel est le rapport entre philosophie et mythe? Quelle est la relation entre les contenus métaphysiques et l'individu qui les produit? L'ouvrage examine l'hypothèse freudienne en trois temps. D'abord, il la reconstitue à partir des textes de Freud. Ensuite, il étudie sa cohérence logique, ses sources extérieures, ses présupposés philosophiques et épistémologiques. Enfin il applique (...) cette grille de lecture révisée aux philosophes et à Freud lui-même. Le lien métapsychologique entre la vérité métaphysique et l'individu qui la produit apparaît alors sous un jour nouveau. (shrink)

Le traité De radiis, ou Theorica artium magicarum, est quasi unanimement tenu pour une traduction latine faite au xii e siècle d’un traité arabe perdu d’al-Kindi. En se fondant sur le fait qu’il dépend de la tradition grammaticale relevant de Donat et Priscien, on démontre ici qu’en réalité il n’a pas été traduit de l’arabe mais qu’il a été rédigé par un auteur latin, très probablement dans les décennies 1250/1260.

Cet article étudie le rapport particulier établi par Plotin entre deux notions, l’antilêpsis et la phantasia, pour penser la prise de conscience par l’âme de certains «objets» et de certaines activités. Car celle-ci pose un problème que Plotin a formulé clairement, à la fin du traité 10 (V, 1), sans lui trouver encore de solution absolument satisfaisante. Si l’antilêpsis a besoin de la phantasia pour s’exercer, peut-il en être de même pour les activités supérieures de l’âme dont elle voudrait prendre (...) conscience, puisque la phantasia se rattache à la sensation dont elle est issue? La question est alors de savoir si les réalités supérieures échappent à toute conscience ou si cette dernière peut les saisir, au moins sous la forme qui lui est propre. On cherchera ici à exposer les aspects principaux de ce problème, mais surtout, à partir de textes tirés des traités 27 (IV, 3) et 46 (I, 4), à saisir la solution que Plotin lui apporte. (shrink)

The question to know which name to attribute to the First principle is a difficult question in the Neoplatonic tradition. Indeed, as this one is situated beyond being, no term can apply to him and thus it is only in a negative way that it can be described. But the problem also settles about another aspect because, as first term, it performs a causal function. Thus it is advisable to know if certain terms turn out more appropriate than others to (...) indicate this function. By what name to indicate the First one as being a principle? We would like to show that this question is approached and answered differently throughout the Neoplatonic tradition. If Plotinus admits the existence of different names, he does not really consider that they indicate different causal functions. For Proclus, in particular in the Platonic Theology, different names refer to different manners in which the principle manifests. (shrink)

Si le xixe siècle fut le temps de l’émergence de la figure de la “ grande voyageuse ”, on ne saurait surestimer cette innovation. La hiérarchie des genres de récits de voyage, l’importance du contre-exemple britannique, la condamnation morale de la voyageuse solitaire manifestent assez le sentiment de l’illégitimité du voyage féminin. Pourtant, pèlerines, valétudinaires et touristes se multiplièrent dans un siècle qui fut aussi celui de l’invention du voyage de noces. Cet article tente de prendre la mesure de l’ensemble (...) des normes qui ont alors commandé les pratiques, nombreuses et variées, du voyage féminin. (shrink)

Using the matching bias example, the aim of the present studies was to show that adults' reasoning biases are due to faulty executive inhibition programming. In the first study, the subjects were trained on Wason's classical card selection task; half were given training in how to inhibit the perceptual matching bias (experimental group) and half in logic without the inhibition component (control group). On the pre- and post-tests, their performance was assessed on the Evans conditional rule falsification task (with a (...) negation in the antecedent of the rule), a task that also involves matching bias. In addition, subjects were tested for perceptual field dependence/independence using the Embedded Figures Test. The results brought out a specific inhibition training effect, as well as a clear-cut relationship in the experimental group between receptiveness to training and perceptual field independence. In the second study, the training paradigm was the same except that on the pre- and post-tests, the negation was in the consequent of the conditional rule (in this case, the perceptual matching response corresponds to the logical response). The subjects succeeded on the pre-test, and the matching-bias inhibition training had a negative effect on post-test performance. This specific negative priming effect confirms the inhibitory impact of our experimental training and outlines the dissociation of inhibition and logical components. (shrink)

Cet article interroge les tensions entre phénoménologie et herméneutique telles qu’elles se cristallisent dans le propos de Ricœur sur la religion, en particulier dans un texte tardif qui a connu plusieurs versions et qui est peut-être le seul où le philosophe aborde aussi directement les questions méthodologiques que soulève une phénoménologie de la religion. Nous tentons de montrer que Ricœur considère en quelque sorte cette dernière avec des œillères, au profit d’une herméneutique de la religion qui, pour modeste et prudente (...) qu’elle soit, se voit forcée de renoncer à prendre en charge l’élucidation de la constitution originaire de l’expérience religieuse. (shrink)

Levinas’ relationship to Platonism is ambiguous. In Totality and Infinity, indeed, references to Plato’s writings are multiple and Levinas depicts Plato as following two diverging paths. On the one hand, Levinas considers Plato’s writings to be works that consecrate the primacy of identity over difference, of the Same over the Other. On the other hand, Platonism is presented as a philosophy of absolute transcendence due to its refusal to make the Good a simple ontological principle and to its attempt to (...) free the Good from all forms of totality. The present study aims to show that, although Levinas criticizes the first path taken by Plato, he conceives of himself as partially in line with Plato’s philosophy of absolute transcendence, albeit in a paradoxical form. In this way, Levinas understands the meaning of the Platonic approach in an original way. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est le tout premier à proposer un tour d'horizon historique et systématique des multiples conceptions phénoménologiques du mouvement. Après une introduction qui s'efforce de retracer la 'Begriffs- und Wirkungsgeschichte' de cette notion de mouvement, et par là de montrer comment elle fut longtemps l'apanage de la philosophie de la nature avant que la phénoménologie ne s'en empare et lui rétrocède toute sa dimension subjective et charnelle, les auteurs livrent une série d'analyses détaillées qui se répartissent en deux grandes (...) parties. Dans la première, il s'agit d'examiner critiquement le traitement que des penseurs-clés lui ont réservé. Sont ainsi étudiés le sens et la portée des notions de kinesthèse, de géostatisme et d'a priori matériel chez Husserl, mais également le concept de mobilité chez Heidegger, la dynamique de l'existence chez Patocka ou encore l'interprétation merleau-pontienne du cas Schneider. Dans la seconde partie, il est davantage question d'explorer de nouvelles voies, d'articuler des usages neufs et de développer des interprétations inédites du mouvement à partir de la méthode et de la conceptualité phénoménologiques, en dialogue avec les sciences cognitives, la religion et les arts - en l'occurrence la danse. L'ensemble pose ainsi les jalons pour une approche phénoménologique renouvelée du mouvement vécu. (shrink)