This paper shows that the Freudian “timelessness” of psychical process is not to be understood as a bare consequence of his distinction between conscious and unconscious psychical process. It shows that Freud have a positive and phenomenological characterization of that timelessness, obtained and affirmed beyond and against that distinction, and that the challenge that Freud, with this timelessness, throws to a “Kantian” philosophy is not completely senseless, but can be well worked-out in a somewhat Bergsonian lines.

Kant criticizes Plato for his interest in positing ideas that are entirely purified from any sensible elements, but which, nonetheless, exist in some supra-sensible reality. I argue that Kant’s criticism can be repositioned and even countered if, in our assessment of Plato, we assign a wider scope of significance and greater value to the senses. In order to lend focus to my article, I analyze Socrates’ presentation of what I translate as the “look of the Good” (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, 508e) (...) in the Republic so as to show the proximity between Plato and Kant on the question of sensibility. I also draw on the Phaedo and extant literature that goes against the traditional view regarding the status of Ideas or Forms, including the Idea of the Good. I further discuss an affinity between the Good that is “beyond being” (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, 509c) in the Republic and Kant’s view of God as an Ideal of Reason. Given my articulation of the importance of the sensible dimension in Plato, there is a continuity between Kant and Plato on the question of the illegitimacy of certain ideas. In other words, in my reading (and contrary to Kant’s view of Plato), Kant does not so much overturn Plato’s metaphysics, but develops further the view that is already inscribed in Plato. (shrink)

L’avenir du judéo-christianisme (suite et fin), p. 55. La première partie de cet article ( Revue philosophique, 2001-4, p. 435-480) envisageait, pour le siècle nouveau, un judéo-christianisme compatible avec l’athéisme contemporain, car il consisterait en une sorte de pratique « théâtrale » qui, de la tradition, ne retiendrait pas la foi métaphysique et historique mais le couple péché/Rédemption vécu comme une sorte d’illusion positive. On essaie maintenant de déterminer le rôle qu’ont pu jouer, dans ce devenir : Kant, Bergson, (...) Freud, le pape Jean-Paul II et certains philosophes français d’aujourd’hui (Michel Henry, Alain Juranville, Jean-Luc Marion). (shrink)

Koichiro Kokubun focuses on Deleuze's method of 'free indirect discourse' to locate and explicate Deleuze's philosophy of transcendental empiricism and its constitutive limits. He works through Deleuze's confrontations with Hume, Kant, Bergson, Freud, Lacan, Foucault and Guattari, and the influence of structuralism and psychoanalysis.

Felsefe, kümülatif yapısı ile ele alınmalıdır. Bu yüzden, bir filozofun düşünceleri anlaşılmak istendiğinde, o kendi çağındaki mevcut ve geçmiş teorilerden soyutlanmamalı ve bu kümülatif ve devamlılık arz eden yapı dikkate alınarak incelenmelidir. Bu bağlamda, Kant, Bergson ve İkbal’in zaman anlayışları, bazı uyumsuz noktalara sahip gibi anlaşılabilseler de, dikkatle incelendiğinde birbirleri arasında bir devamlılığın bulunduğu göze çarpar. Kant’ın zaman anlayışı, Kritik öncesi ve Kritik dönemi olmak üzere iki dönemde incelenebilir. Kritik öncesi döneminde Kant, zamanın insan zihninin dışında kendinde bir gerçekliğe (...) ve varlığa sahip olduğunu kabul eder. Fakat Kant, zamanı bütün duyuları önceleyen bir görü olarak anlamasının tohumlarını da hala Kritik öncesi dönemde iken eker. Bu doğrultuda, onun odağı özneyi merkeze alan bir tutuma doğru ilerler görünür. Kritik döneminde özne merkezci konumu daha da belirginleşir ve Kant, zamanın bütün dışsallıkları öncelediğini iddia eder. Ona göre zaman, duyulur bir görü olarak, eşyayı zihnin algılayabilmesi için eşzamanlılık ve ardışıklık içinde konumlandırır. Diğer taraftan Bergson, Kant’ı pek çok açıdan eleştirmekle beraber onun düşüncelerinden açık bir şekilde faydalanır. Bergson’un zaman anlayışı iki bileşenden oluşur: Salt süre ve homojen zaman. Salt süre, özne-merkezci olması bakımından üzerinde Kant’ın düşünce pratiğinin etkisinin görünür olduğu bir kavramsallaştırmadır. Bu, her bir bilincin, kişinin geçmiş ve şimdisini bir bütünde birleştirerek bireysel olarak sahip olduğu ve özünde heterojen, sırasız bir şekilde ardışık ve bölünemez zamandır. Homojen zaman ise sıralı ve eşzamanlı olması bakımından köklerini yine Kant’ta bulur. Homojen zaman, salt sürelerin uyum içinde çalışmasını sağlayan, bireyler için ortak zemini teşkil eden zamandır. Bu iki filozofun düşünceleri doğrultusunda İkbal’in zaman teorisi incelendiğinde, onun hem duyulabilir görünün bir formu olan Kant’ın zamanından hem de Bergson’un salt süresinden faydalandığı ortaya çıkar. İkbal, bu iki zaman anlayışını kullanarak İslam düşüncesinde İlahi Zaman’ı ve dolayısıyla da özgür iradeyi yeniden inşa eder. Salt süre ve yaratıcılık açısından, evrene yönelik mekanik bir anlayış Bergson ve İkbal tarafından reddedilir. Böylece İkbal, özgür iradenin Tanrı’nın salt süresi, yani İlahi Zaman, aracılığı ile yayılmasına ve tüm benliklere ait salt sürelere nüfuz etmesine izin verir. Biz, bu makale aracılığı ile, İkbal’in salt süre mefhumunu ve Tanrı’ya ait salt süre olarak İlahi Zaman’ı kullanarak özgür irade anlayışını yeniden inşa etmesinin köklerine gitmek niyetindeyiz. (shrink)

The flowering of creative and speculative philosophy that emerged in modern Europe--particularly in Germany--is a thrilling adventure story as well as an essential chapter in the history of philosophy. In this integrative narrative, Solomon provides an accessible introduction to the major authors and movements of modern European philosophy, including the Enlightenment and Romanticism, Rousseau, German Idealism, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and the Romantics, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Max Brentano, Meinong, Frege, Dilthey, Bergson, Nietzsche, Husserl, Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, hermeneutics, Sartre, Postmodernism, (...) Structuralism, Foucault, and Derrida. (shrink)

In »Materie und Gedächtnis« , seinem Hauptwerk, erörtert der französische Philosoph und Nobelpreisträger Henri Bergson das Zusammenwirken von Körper und Geist in der freien Handlung. Auf höchstem gedanklichen Niveau, aber in bestechend einfacher Sprache geschrieben, zählt das Werk zu den wenigen herausragenden Grundtexten der Gegenwartsphilosophie, vergleichbar »in ihrer Zeit mit Berkeleys Principles oder Kants Kritik« .Nachdem Bergson im Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience das Verhältnis von Freiheit und Determinismus auf eine neue Basis zu stellen versucht (...) hat, wendet er sich hier, in Auseinandersetzung mit der Psychologie und Hirnphysiologie seiner Zeit, dem alten philosophischen Problem des Verhältnisses von Geist und Materie zu. Dabei reduziert er ›Materie‹ weder – idealistisch – auf reine Vorstellungen noch nimmt sie – materialistisch – als deren dinglichen Grund an, sondern sieht sie als eine Gesamtheit von ›Bildern‹, wobei er den Bildbegriff auf halbem Wege zwischen Ding und Vorstellung ansetzt und damit vor die Trennung von Existenz und Erscheinung zurückgeht. Eine herausragende Bedeutung kommt dabei dem Gedächtnis zu: hier verstanden nicht als ›mechanisches‹ Registrieren aufgenommener Inhalte, sondern als ›reines‹, lebendiges Gedächtnis, das sich einer geistigen, in der Vergangenheit entstandenen Bilderwelt bedient und der Dauer korrespondiert. Das auf Dauer ausgerichtete Gedächtnis verweist auf eine Selbstständigkeit des Geistes, die allerdings qua Handlung wieder auf den Körper zurückwirkt. »Der Geist entnimmt der Materie die Wahrnehmungen, aus denen er seine Nahrung zieht, und gibt sie ihr zurück in Form von Bewegung, der er seine Freiheit aufgeprägt hat«. (shrink)

This book assesses the adequacy of the traditional theories of laughter and humor, suggests revised theories, and explores such areas as the aesthetics and ethics of humor, and the relation of amusement to other mental states. Theories of laughter and humor originated in ancient times with the view that laughter is an expression of feelings of superiority over another person. This superiority theory was held by Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes. Another aspect of laughter, noted by Aristotle and Cicero and neglected (...) until Kant and Schopenhauer developed it into the incongruity theory, is that laughter is often a reaction to the perception of some incongruity. According to the third and latest traditional theory, the relief theory of Herbert Spencer and Freud, laughter is the venting of superfluous nervous energy. Historical examples of all these theories are presented along with hybrid theories such as those of Descartes and Bergson. The book also features traditional explorations of the place of humor in aesthetics, drama, and literature. This is the first work in the last fifty years to include the classic sources in the philosophy of humor and the first to present theories by contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze is increasingly gaining the prestige that its inventiveness calls for in the Anglo-American theoretical context. His wide-ranging works on the history of philosophy, cinema, painting, literature, and politics are being taken up and put to work across disciplinary divides, and in interesting and surprising ways. However, the backbone of Deleuze's philosophy – the many and varied sources from which he draws the material for his conceptual innovation – has until now remained relatively obscure and unexplored. (...) This book takes as its goal the examination of this rich theoretical background. Presenting essays by a range of Deleuze scholars and theorists of his work, it is composed of in-depth analyses of the key figures in Deleuze's lineage, whose significance – as a result of either their obscurity or the complexity of their place in the Deleuzean text – has not previously been well understood. Included are essays on Deleuze's relationship with figures as varied as Marx, Simondon, Wronski, Hegel, Hume, Maimon, Ruyer, Kant, Heidegger, Husserl, Reimann, Leibniz, Bergson, and Freud. (shrink)

Vida, pasión y razón son tres conceptos que invitan al hombre actual a enfrentarse con problemas de hondo calado por hundir sus raíces en esa realidad que es la propia vida. Esa inmensa tarea, que va de la antigua lucha por una vida digna a la lucha actual por la vida misma, es la idea que está en el trasfondo de este volumen, en el que se recogen las actas de un Congreso, celebrado en diciembre del año 2000 en Ciudad (...) Real y que se inscribe dentro de un Proyecto de Investigación subvencionado por el Ministerio y titulado Teoría de las pasiones y las virtudes. Estructura y dinámica de los afectos en grandes filósofos como expresión de sistemas y etapas históricas de la filosofía occidental. El resultado son dieciséis estudios monográficos sobre algunos de los filósofos más representativos de la historia de la teoría afectiva, a saber: Aristóteles, Tomás de Aquino, autores precartesianos, Gracián, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, W. James Scheler, Unamuno, Freud, Sartre, Heidegger, Habermas. Una lectura atenta permitirá al lector interesado ampliar mucho más ese abanico, pues encontrará referencias a Platón, los estoicos y Cicerón, a Agustín de Hipona y Francisco de Sales; a Fichte, y Schelling, Goethe y Schopenhauer, Darwin y Spencer, Klages y Dilthey, Husserl y Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, Ortega y Gasset. Y si su curiosidad histórica va acompañada de un atento análisis teórico, descubrirá además ricas perspectivas sobre afectos fundamentales como el deseo, el amor y el odio, la ambición, el miedo y la angustia, la moderación, la justicia y prudencia. En suma, un esbozo histórico y teórico de las principales teorías de la afectividad. (shrink)

"Filozofjo po ślōnsku, czyli heft do historje filozofje Dziadka Kika" to podróż przez dzieje filozofii światowej napisane ze śląskiej perspektywy przez doktora filozofii Marcina Kika. Tyn heft niy jest tak ruby jak niywtore buchy, ale to jest heft, w kerym wjela ciykawygo i ważnygo możno znolyź… I to żech tam znoloz dlo siebje. Ale najsamprzōd musza pedzieć, że jest to heft, w kerym dziadek szukoł som siebje i chcioł sie dowjedzieć czegoś ô sobje samym i śwjecie, w kerym –szczynśliwje lub (...) niy, jak sie to wto forszteluje – prziszło mu żyć. A napisane na niym było "Filozofjo" – prawje jak heft do jakigoś przedmjotu we szkole. Wstęp dr hab. Jacek Surzyn: "Autor przeprowadza czytelnika przez historię filozofii, opowiada ją po śląsku, pewnym siebie głosem zatrzymując go tam, gdzie trzeba na chwilę przystanąć. Jest to historia nie w sensie faktograficznym, ale historia jako proces rozwoju problematyki filozoficznej, to znaczy jest to wędrówka przez odpowiedzi na najważniejsze i podstawowe filozoficzne pytania." Strony: 257 SPIS FILOZOFÓW Presokratycy 24 Sokrates 32 Sofiści, cynicy, cyrenaicy i megarejczycy 36 Platon 41 Arystoteles 45 Sceptycyzm, stoicyzm i epikureizm 49 Plotyn 56 Aureliusz Augustyn z Hippony 59 Tomasz z Akwinu 63 William z Ockham 68 Jean Buridan 70 Mikołaj z Kuzy 72 Francis Bacon 75 Kartezjusz (René Descartes) 79 Baruch Spinoza 83 Blaise Pascal 87 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 90 John Locke 94 George Berkley 98 David Hume 100 Jeremy Bentham 103 John Stuart Mill 106 Bernard de Mandeville 108 Jean Jacques Rousseau 110 Immanuel Kant 114 Arthur Schopenhauer 122 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 126 Ludwig Feuerbach 131 Max Stirner 134 Karol Marks 136 Sigmunt Freud 143 Søren Kierkegaard 149 Friedrich Nietzche 155 Henri Bergson 162 Edmund Husserl 166 Martin Heidegger 172 Max Scheler 177 Nicolai Hartmann 181 Karl Jaspers 187 Egzystencjalizm 191 William James 198 Helmuth Plessner 202 Arnold Gehlen 206 Ludwig Wittgenstein 209 Emmanuel Mounier 213 Karol Wojtyła 217 Gabriel Marcel 221 Emmanuel Lévinas 224 Jozef Tischner 228 Jean-François Lyotard 232 Zygmunt Bauman 236 Karl Raimund Popper 239 Viktor Emil Frankl 243. (shrink)

There are striking structural similarities between Freud's ego and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There are also striking similarities between Freud's superego and Kant's account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre-discursive representation of moral motivation, and the (...) unconscious character of moral motivation. The suggestion is that Freud offers resources for a naturalized account (an account in terms of the causal development of empirical human beings) of just those features of our moral motivation that, according to Kant, seem to make it least amenable to a naturalistic explanation. How much of a revision of Kant's analysis of moral justification is thereby entailed is beyond the purview of the paper. (shrink)

According to the standard analysis, humor theories can be classified into three neatly identifiable groups:incongruity, superiority, and relief theories. Incongruity theory is the leading approach and includes historical figures such as Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, and perhaps has its origins in comments made by Aristotle in the Rhetoric. Primarily focusing on the object of humor, this school sees humor as a response to an incongruity, a term broadly used to include ambiguity, logical impossibility, irrelevance, and inappropriateness. The paradigmatic Superiority theorist (...) is Thomas Hobbes, who said that humor arises from a “sudden glory” felt when we recognize our supremacy over others. Plato and Aristotle are generally considered superiority theorists, who emphasize the aggressive feelings that fuel humor. The third group, Relief theory, is typically associated with Sigmund Freud and Herbert Spencer, who saw humor as fundamentally a way to release or save energy generated by repression. In addition, this article will explore a fourth group of theories of humor: play theory. Play theorists are not so much listing necessary conditions for something’s counting as humor, as they are asking us to look at humor as an extension of animal play. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la conscience? Un chemin pour se connaître. La question de la conscience est sans doute la plus importante de la philosophie, mais aussi la plus essentielle dans nos vies : sans la conscience, il n'y a pas de philosophie et nous n'existons plus! Dans cet ouvrage magistral, Serge Carfantan pose la question de la conscience en s'appuyant sur les philosophes orientaux et occidentaux. Des auteurs classiques sont convoqués : Pascal, Hegel, Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Bergson, Sartre, Maine de (...) Biran, Freud, Simone Weil mais aussi des maîtres indiens, des enseignants spirituels ou des poètes : Ramana Maharshi, Nisargadatta Maharaj, Swami Prajnanpad, Krisnamurti, René Daumal, Jean Klein, Steve Jourdain... L'auteur distingue les différents états de conscience, donne la signification de l'éveil spirituel, de la conscience pure, et propose un véritable chemin de connaissance de soi. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Laughing at Nothing: Humor as a Response to NihilismWill SlocombeLaughing at Nothing: Humor as a Response to Nihilism, by John Marmysz. 209 pp. Albany: SUNY Press, 2003; $54.50 cloth, $17.95 paper.Nihilism has become a (relatively) more popular theme in academia in recent years. Aside from the revival of standby texts such as Goudsblom's Nihilism and Culture and Rosen's Nihilism, there has been a glut of books in areas (...) as diverse as economics (Ritzer's The Globalization of Nothing), theology (Cunningham's Genealogy of Nihilism), and theory (Clemen's The Romanticism of Contemporary Theory). John Marmysz's contribution, Laughing at Nothing, is a refreshing change inasmuch as he invites us to laugh at nihilism and, in effect, to laugh with him at much of the scholarly work on nihilism. Primarily philosophical in tone, Laughing at Nothing is an academic treatise on nihilism and humor, an exploration of contemporary American culture, and a plea for understanding in a hostile environment.Marmysz is determined, as few others are, to see a positive potential in nihilism. Although he never uncovers a "positive" nihilism, he is willing to accept the idea that nihilism may be a valuable cultural concept. In his introduction, he stresses the fact that most critics of nihilism "underplay the constructive and positive role of nihilism in both individual and collective human history" (p. 10). This book attempts to undermine such trite interpretations of nihilism; evident from his observation that, "too often scholars proceed to draw conclusions about nihilism itself on the basis of philosophies that are, in fact, very poor models" (p. 11). This is an important point, and one to which I will return.All exegeses on nihilism must include a history of the concept to orient the reader within the given intellectual milieu, and Marmysz's is no exception. Moving comfortably from late eighteenth-century debates between Friedrich Jacobi and Johann Fichte to contemporary theories by Michael Gillespie, Cornel West, Yukio Mishima, and Karen Carr, Laughing at Nothing guides the reader through the intricacies of the arguments in three brisk chapters without [End Page 449] ever sacrificing clarity. This is no mean feat given the task that Marmysz has taken upon himself: to summarize more than 200 years of history and avoid the pitfalls of saying that nihilism is an aspect of modernity is a significant achievement (and one for which I am grateful).For most readers, however, the most important part of Laughing at Nothing will be Marmysz's own definition of nihilism, which is essentially thwarted idealism: "The full impact of the problem of nihilism strikes only when an individual passionately desires ultimate meaning, value, and purpose, but believes those things to be out of reach" (pp. 84-85). There are thus two elements to a nihilistic worldview: an idealized desire for a better world coupled with a belief that this can never be realized—"the real world is denigrated in comparison to the ideal, and the ideal is believed to be hopelessly out of reach" (p. 85). This, for Marmysz, is the basis of a "nihilistic incongruity," upon which the solution—humor—is founded.After Marmysz's treatment of a history of nihilism, it is unsurprising that his discussion of humor is as accomplished, skilfully navigating theories of Kant, Freud, Bergson, and Morreall. Marmysz's treatment of "incongruous" humor is impressive, basing itself on the idea that "humor allows us to confront incongruities and, instead of being overwhelmed by them, to understand them in an unusual and original fashion" (p. 152). For this reason, humor creates "the capacity to make incongruities unthreatening and to interpret them in a manner that produces amusement" (p. 153). This is, of course, critical to avoid the potential problems of nihilistic incongruity. Through an analysis of jokes, and the application of different theories about humor, Marmysz demonstrates that the "solution" to nihilism is disarmingly simple: we must learn to laugh at ourselves. Marmysz writes: "Nihilism reminds us that humans are not gods, and that despite all our accomplishments and wonders of civilization, humans cannot alter the fact that they only possess a finite amount of mastery and control over their own destinies... (shrink)

L'originalité de Jeanne Hersch est de réorganiser le développement de la philosophie en Occident à partir, non plus de ses principales thèses, mais de sa nature même, de son objet premier : l'étonnement. L'étonnement est cette capacité qu'il y a à s'interroger sur une évidence aveuglante, c'est-à-dire qui nous empêche de voir et de comprendre le monde le plus immédiat. La première des évidences est qu'il y a de l'être, qu'il existe matière et monde. De cette question apparemment toute simple (...) est née voilà des siècles en Grèce un type de réflexion qui depuis lors n'a cessé de relancer la pensée : la philosophie. L'histoire de cet étonnement, toujours repris, sans cesse à vif, continûment reformulé, Jeanne Hersch nous la raconte à partir de quelques philosophes occidentaux : les présocratiques, Socrate, Platon, Aristote, les épicuriens, les stoïciens, saint Augustin, Thomas d'Aquin, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Comte, Marx, Freud, Bergson, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers. Aussi cette histoire de la philosophie nous dit-elle, en réalité, comment la philosophie fut en tout temps, actuelle. (shrink)

A travers les différents thèmes abordés le réel, la poésie, la pulsion de mort, l'interprétation, la télépathie, le rêve, l'inconscient ou le rire est ici interrogée la relation entre ces deux penseurs strictement contemporains du XXe siècle. L'exégèse textuelle recrée un dialogue qui n'a pas réellement existé entre eux. Elle l'inscrit dans un contexte épistémique très riche où se livre une bataille spéculative à l'origine d'une rupture majeure dans les sciences humaines, dont les retombées sont encore palpables aujourd'hui, se nouant (...) autour de nombreux points théoriques liés à la naissance de la psychologie. La finalité revendiquée par celle-ci est ambivalente : à la fois se distinguer de la philosophie et de la médecine, et s'y rattacher. Dans cette optique, autant Bergson que Freud vont se trouver au centre d'un débat sur la "scientificité" de la science du psychique, revendiquant, à l'instar de T Ribot ou P Janet par exemple, le recours à l'expérimentation et aux thèses psychophysiologistes et psychophysiques. La métaphysique de Bergson, comme la métapsychologie de Freud, ainsi désignée en 1896, seront redevables de ces théories, tout en s'en détachant pour aller vers l'idée d'inconscient, concept fondateur de la psychoanalysefreudienne. (shrink)

Menschliche Existenz ist wesentlich zeitlich verfasst. Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft bilden keine lineare Abfolge, sondern durchdringen einander in der jeweiligen Gegenwart. Diese Durchdringung ist von entscheidender Bedeutung für das Gelingen unserer Existenz. Es liegt jedoch auf der Hand, dass wir darüber nicht vollständig verfügen. Um die zeitlichen Bedingungen für das Gelingen oder Scheitern unserer Existenz zu verstehen, ist es daher wichtig, eine Erfahrungsebene jenseits der Kontrolle des bewussten Ichs zu berücksichtigen. Ich untersuche drei Ansätze, die dazu auf unterschiedliche Weise beitragen: (...) (1) Freud denkt, dass das Unbewusste, das er als zeitlos versteht, die Fähigkeit des bewussten Ichs beeinträchtigen kann, die Vermittlung mit der Realität zu leisten. Im Gegensatz dazu (2) beschreibt Bergson die innere „Dauer“ (die systematisch an die Stelle von Freuds Unbewusstem tritt) als ein Werden, von dem verstandesmäßig getroffene Entscheidungen das Subjekt entfremden können. Schließlich (3) ist Subjektivität Levinas zufolge durch eine „Diachronie“ konstituiert, einen Prozess des Verlusts oder Vergehens einer Zeit, die das Ich nicht wieder einholen kann, die aber gerade deshalb das Subjekt von sich selbst zu befreien vermag. Ich argumentiere, dass jeder der Autoren etwas zum Ausdruck bringt, das für unsere zeitliche Existenz von großer Bedeutung ist, und biete eine Möglichkeit an, ihre Einsichten zu integrieren. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary article takes a philosophical approach to The Interpretation of Dreams, connecting Freud to one of the few philosophers with whom he sometimes identified - Immanuel Kant. It aims to show that Freud's theory of dreams has more in common with Bion's later thoughts on dreaming than is usually recognized. Distinguishing, via a discussion of Kant, between the conflicting 'epistemological' and 'anthropological' aspects of The Interpretation of Dreams, it shows that one specific contradiction in the book - concerning the (...) relation between dream-work and waking thought - can be understood in terms of the tension between these conflicting aspects. Freud reaches the explicit conclusion that the dream-work and waking thought differ from each other absolutely; but the implicit conclusion of The Interpretation of Dreams is quite the opposite. This article argues that the explicit conclusion is the result of the epistemological aspects of the book; the implicit conclusion, which brings Freud much closer to Bion, the result of the anthropological approach. Bringing philosophy and psychoanalysis together this paper thus argues for an interpretation of The Interpretation of Dreams that is in some ways at odds with the standard view of the book, while also suggesting that aspects of Kant's 'anthropological' works might legitimately be seen as a precursor of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western PhilosophyRalph AcamporaGary Steiner. Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. Pp. ix + 332. Cloth, $37.50.In this text Steiner surveys the (Eurocentric) history of doctrines, attitudes, and beliefs about the ethical standing of (nonhuman) animals. Unsurprisingly, he finds that the (...) mainstream of thought in this area manifests "an underlying logic: that all and only human beings are worthy of moral consideration, because all and only human beings are rational and endowed with language" (2). This neatly expresses the anthropocentrism identified in the book's title, the "discontents" of which are obviously a gloss on Freud's reading of civilization—that is to say, Steiner sees a great deal of dissatisfaction (largely misgivings of conscience) mixed in with our sense of superiority over other animals. Subliminal unease with, and even explicit dissent from, the mainstream orthodoxy is not absent from the [End Page 480] historical account—indeed, as the author rightly indicates, there has been a parallel (if comparatively minor) stream of more animal-friendly philosophy throughout the ages of thinking on this subject. Moreover, this latter current of thought has been gathering strength lately as "an increasing number of ethologists and philosophers have marshaled insights concerning the evolutionary continuity and physiological similarity between animals and human beings to argue that many animals are conscious, sentient beings that [or better, who] deserve substantial moral consideration" (3).From the outset, then, Steiner situates his historical project within the context of contemporary debates in animal ethics. "By focusing on the historical development of thinking about animals," he proposes, "one can understand the sources of our own anthropocentric prejudices and use that history as the basis for a radical rethinking of the moral status of animals" (37). Early on, in the first chapter in fact, Steiner identifies two problems in the current development of the heterodox, animal-friendly tradition: animal ethicists, he claims, tend to overestimate the mental faculties of nonhumans and do not question the longstanding assumption that intellect (rational or linguistic) is what ultimately imparts moral significance. In effect, Steiner's charge is that these moralists anthropomorphize animals psychologically because they are still tied (critical protestations notwithstanding) to ethical anthropocentrism.Even aside from his ambition to further contemporary animal ethics, Steiner has provided a needed and lucid account of the history he targets. The historical surveys of animal ethics already on the record are limited either because they are merely brief preludes to anthologies or monographs whose main interest is to theorize anew or because they are subsidiary to histories of broader fields such as environmental or ecological thinking. Though Steiner harbors no pretense to exhaustive coverage, the figures he does treat are representative of a fairly comprehensive range from antiquity to postmodernity. Not only are famous vegetarians of the classical Greco-Roman periods covered (viz. Pythagoras, Plutarch, and Porphyry), but arch-anthropocentrists such as Aristotle and the Stoics are examined as well (though in the chapter dedicated to them, one would have liked to see more attention given to the animal-friendly Theophrastus). Notable here is that Steiner treats an assortment of Presocratic philosophers, extending back even to epic thinkers such as Hesiod and Homer. A number of medieval Christians are covered (including Augustine, Francis of Assisi, and Thomas Aquinas), and then it is on to a full chapter about Cartesian thought, before another on empiricism, utilitarianism, and Kant. Last in the survey come a trio of late moderns (Schopenhauer, Darwin, and Schweitzer), followed by a postmodern triumvirate (Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida). Unfortunately absent from this later coverage are the vitalist Henri Bergson and his post-structuralist heirs, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.In his final chapter Steiner aims to harness the history he has related for the purpose of reconceiving the moral status of animals so as to avoid the twin problems of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism which he sees as our inheritance in the Western tradition. The route he takes is to synthesize biocentrically two rival approaches of species linkage, one that stresses common competence and another... (shrink)

Resumo: Este texto tem por objeto a análise da intuição, das especificidades das definições bergsonianas e suas distinções em relação à visão moderna, sobretudo da doutrina kantiana, buscando mostrar os pontos de rompimento e avanço de Bergson em relação a essa concepção. O que se nota, em um primeiro momento, é como a obra de Bergson está de certo modo intimamente ligada a alguns temas clássicos da teoria do conhecimento já amplamente trabalhados na obra de Kant, razão pela (...) qual esse autor está presente desde o início de seu pensamento, desde o Ensaio sobre os dados da consciência, estendendo-se mesmo por quase todo o conjunto de sua obra. De fato, se se abordar os textos de Bergson pela sua referência à história da filosofia, será Kant, sem dúvida, que aparecerá como seu grande interlocutor; na maior parte das vezes como contrapondo a uma crítica que pode ser estendida a toda tradição filosófica, sobretudo àquela que teria subjugado a metafísica aos métodos e orientações da ciência. É natural, com efeito, que o autor da Crítica da Razão Pura surja como personagem importante na obra de Bergson. O pensamento de Kant está assentado em um momento importante quanto aos "rumos" da filosofia, especialmente no que diz respeito ao alcance da metafísica. E, se Bergson expressara, em sua doutrina, todo um esforço para reaver o lugar de direito da metafísica, ampliando mesmo, para além dos limites da análise científica, seu alcance, é certamente Kant que ele haveria de encontrar em suas investigações.: This text aims to analyze intuition, the specificities of the Bergsonian definitions relevant to it, and their distinctions relative to the modern view. Above all, we discuss the doctrine of Kant and seek to show Bergson's points of rupture and advancement in relation to this conception. What is noticeable at first glance is how Bergson's work is in a certain way intimately linked to some classical themes of the theory of knowledge already extensively treated in Kant's work. Kant is present from the beginning of Bergson's thought, ever since his An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, and his influence extends through almost all of Bergson's work. In fact, if one approaches the texts of Bergson in terms of his references to the history of philosophy, it is no doubt Kant who appears as the great interlocutor, in most cases advancing a critique that can be extended to the whole philosophical tradition, especially to that part which would subjugate metaphysics to the methods and orientations of science. It is natural, indeed, that the author of the Critique of Pure Reason emerges as an important character in Bergson's work. Kant's thinking appeared at an important moment in terms of the "directions" of philosophy, especially with regard to the attainment of metaphysics. Bergson expressed in his doctrine an effort to reclaim the rightful place of metaphysics, even extending its reach beyond the limits of scientific analysis, and thus it is certain that he would encounter Kant in his investigations. (shrink)

Research into Bergson’s philosophy downplays a key development in his first work, Time and free will. It is there that Bergson explicitly opposes himself to Kant by arguing that succession is not a temporal concept, but a spatial one. This is the crucial point of departure for Bergson’s entire philosophy, one that allows him to radically dismiss Kant’s notion of freedom in favor of one based on duration and multiplicity. This text has two aims. Firstly to add (...) to Bergson scholarship by explicating the structure and force of Bergson’s initial argument against Kant, demonstrating that his engagement with Kant is much less incremental than has been suggested in secondary literature. Secondly, to reconstruct the consequences regarding freedom that Bergson immediately draws in departing from Kant, which illustrates the profundity and originality of his thought at the very inception of his oeuvre. (shrink)

O presente comentário analisa um breve texto tardio de Kant sobre afisiologia especulativa. Além de ilustrar muito bem os princípios metodológicos doprograma de pesquisa kantiano para as ciências da natureza – segundo o qual as ficçõesespeculativas, de valor apenas heurístico, podem ser utilizadas para observar eorganizar fenômenos na procura de suas leis empíricas –, esse escrito antecipa,metodológica e epistemologicamente, os trabalhos de Freud sobre a metapsicogiafisiológica.t:This commentary analyzes a short text by late Kant on speculativephysiology. It ilustrates main metodological principles (...) of Kant’s research programmefor natural sciences – according to which speculative fictions with exclusively heuristicvalue are allowed to be used in observing and organizing phenomena in search forempirical laws – and in addition it anticipates, both methodologically andespistemologically, Freud’s writings on physilogical metapsychology. (shrink)

This paper engages Freud’s relation to Kant, with specific reference to each theorist’s articulation of the interconnections between ethics and religion. I argue that there is in fact a constructive approach to ethics and religion in Freud’s thought, and that this approach can be better understood by examining it in relation to Kant’s formulations on these topics. Freud’s thinking about religion and ethics participates in the Enlightenment heritage, with its emphasis on autonomy and rationality, of which Kant’s model of practical (...) reason is in many ways exemplary. At the same time, Freud advances Kantian thinking in certain important respects; his work offers a more somatically, socially, and historically grounded approach to the formation of rational and ethical capacities, and hence makes it more compatible with contemporary concerns and orientations that eschew the pitfalls of ahistorical idealist orientations. (shrink)

Dans un passage de L’évolution créatrice, Bergson ne réfute pas purement et simplement Kant, mais le présente comme le précurseur d’une philosophie nouvelle, voire comme un précurseur probable mais manqué de sa propre philosophie. Si la philosophie transcendantale, pourtant prometteuse, s’avère finalement décevante, c’est parce qu’elle ne propose qu’une déduction des catégories et non une genèse de l’intelligence. Mais comment Bergson ose-t-il comparer deux démarches que tout semble opposer? Y a-t-il, chez Kant lui-même, quelque chose qui justifie ce (...) rapprochement apparemment incongru entre une déduction transcendantale et une genèse de l’intelligence?In a passage of Creative Evolution, Bergson does not refute Kant, but presents him as a precursor of a new philosophy, and even as a liable but failed precursor of his own philosophy. If the transcendental philosophy, really promising, seems finally disappointing, it is because it only gives us a deduction of the categories and not a genesis of intelligence. How can Bergson say that? How can he compare two perspectives which seem diverging completely? Is there anything in Kant’s texts which evidences this connexion between a transcendental deduction and a genesis of intelligence? (shrink)

Fr. Seidel sees "the crisis of creativity" as a perennial issue facing man, forcing him to make decisive choices that ultimately affect his destiny. The basic concern of the book is to analyze the creative process itself which Seidel does not accept as an irrational, brute eruption into consciousness. While recognizing the importance of the unconscious, he attempts to bring out those factors that are not immune to analysis. Drawing on insights of Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Freud, James, and Bergson, (...) Seidel discusses the significance of "selective forgetting," remembering, and the association of ideas. According to the author, creativity is a process that should be taken account of in the conscious reflections of philosophers. He feels its neglect in much modern and contemporary philosophy can be attributed to a fundamentally misleading conception of the importance of methodology that found its way into philosophy with Bacon and Descartes. The search for the single right method, which when found and exercised would yield "truth," is thus seen as concomitant with the denigration of an intuitive basis for knowledge. For Seidel, this is a reversal of the Aristotelian view which acknowledges the instrumental character of any method and its subordination to prior insight. Because of its non-technical nature, the book can be read with profit by both professional philosophers and the generally educated public.—L. W. (shrink)

O presente comentário analisa um breve texto tardio de Kant sobre afisiologia especulativa. Além de ilustrar muito bem os princípios metodológicos doprograma de pesquisa kantiano para as ciências da natureza – segundo o qual as ficçõesespeculativas, de valor apenas heurístico, podem ser utilizadas para observar eorganizar fenômenos na procura de suas leis empíricas –, esse escrito antecipa,metodológica e epistemologicamente, os trabalhos de Freud sobre a metapsicogiafisiológica.t:This commentary analyzes a short text by late Kant on speculativephysiology. It ilustrates main metodological principles (...) of Kant’s research programmefor natural sciences – according to which speculative fictions with exclusively heuristicvalue are allowed to be used in observing and organizing phenomena in search forempirical laws – and in addition it anticipates, both methodologically andespistemologically, Freud’s writings on physilogical metapsychology. (shrink)

This paper is inspired by one of Freud’s last notes, which is famous for its astonishing conclusion: “Psyche is extended; knows nothing about it,” which describes the perception of space as a product of the extension of the psychic apparatus, and compares it with Kant’s a priori categorie s. The Author reconstructs the historical background of this idea as part of a long discussion between Freud and his pupil Marie Bonaparte in the second half of 1938, and shows how the (...) relationship between body and psychic functions in Freud’s thought was influenced by his intellectual debt to Kant. Through an outline of the influence of Kantian philosophy on the emerging Naturphilosophie in fin de siècle Vienna, the Author aims to show the profound influence of Kantian philosophy on the development of Freu d’s thought. By committing to a modern and non -dualistic conception of the relationship between body and mind, Freud conceives an indissoluble bond between the mind and, not only the brain, but the whole body and its spatial extension. The Author concludes by identifying a close link between the aphorism of 1938 and Kantian pre-Critique thought, and, more generally, highlighting the influence of the Königsberg philosopher on the relationship between mind and body and on the perception of time and space in Freudian thought. (shrink)

During his 2000–2001 seminar on the death penalty, Jacques Derrida argues that Kant is the most ‘rigorous’ philosophical proponent of the death penalty and, thus, the thinker who poses the most serious objections to the kind of philosophical abolitionism that Derrida is trying to develop in his seminar. For Kant, the death penalty is the logical result of the fundamental principle of criminal law, namely, talionic law or the right of retaliation as a principle of pure, disinterested reason. In this (...) paper, I demonstrate how Derrida attempts to undermine Kant’s defence of the death penalty by demonstrating both its internal contradictions and its strange affinities with the law of primitive peoples. I argue that Derrida’s repeated returns throughout the seminar to Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals suggest that Kant’s seemingly rational defence of the death penalty is ultimately motivated by interests that belie the supposed disinterestedness of modern law and by a notion of natural justice that at once subtends and subverts all criminal law. (shrink)

This article analyzes the role played by Immanuel Kant's defense of the death penalty, in the first and the second years of Jacques Derrida's Death Penalty Seminars, delivered from 1999 to 2001. Regarding the first year, the initial part of this article charts how Derrida introduces Kant's writings that purport to elaborate the categorical imperative of the death penalty, not by Kant's primary arguments but rather precisely through Kant's concession of an exception to this categorical imperative, concerning the impunity of (...) a mother's infanticide. Derrida's lectures juxtapose Kant's philosophy of the death penalty with Victor Hugo's claim for the inviolability of life, and in doing so, the sessions introduce other examples of the applicability of the death penalty to mothers who have killed their children. What is at stake is the status of philosophy relative to the death penalty. Concerning the second year, the latter part of this article isolates the logic of Kant's categorical imperative, as deconstructed by Derrida, through recourse to the additions that Kant was obliged to append to his initial argument—those involving precisely sex crimes. The article follows how Derrida thoroughly takes apart both the simplicity of Kant's categorical imperative of the death penalty by means of the complications that are its abyssal foundation and the phallogocentrism of Freud's sexual oppositions through the extraction of insights into another thinking of sexual difference that Freud's categories foreclosed. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende analisar a natureza e a função da teoria metapsicológica napsicanálise freudiana. Mostra-se que a teoria psicanalítica de Freud é composta por umaparte empírica – a sua psicologia dos fatos clínicos – e outra, especulativa – ametapsicologia. Esta última é considerada por ele uma superestrutura especulativa de valorapenas heurístico, passível de ser substituída por outras superestruturas do mesmo tipo.Sustenta-se, ainda, que sua metapsicologia é fruto do método especulativo, cujosfundamentos foram elaborados por filósofos e epistemólogos anteriores a Freud, entre (...) elesImmanuel Kant e Ernst Mach. O artigo finaliza com algumas considerações sobre o futuroda teorização do tipo metapsicológica, explicitando críticas feitas à metapsicologiafreudiana, tanto por filósofos quanto por psicanalistas, e apontando para a perspectiva,aberta por Donald W. Winnicott, de uma psicanálise sem metapsicologia. This article seeks to analyze the nature and function of metapsychologicaltheory in Freudian psychoanalysis. It will show that Freudian psychoanalytic theory iscomposed of an empirical part — the psychology of clinical facts — and a speculative part— metapsychology. Freud considers this latter part as being a speculative superstructure ofvalue that is only heuristic, capable of being substituted by other superstructures of thesame type. This article sustains the idea that this metapsychology is the fruit of speculativemethod, whose foundations were elaborated by philosophers and epistemologists beforeFreud, including Immanuel Kant and Ernst Mach. The article concludes withconsiderations regarding the future of metapsychological theorization, presenting criticismsof Freudian metapsychology offered by both philosophers and psychoanalysts, andpointing to the open perspective of Donald W. Winnicott of a psychoanalysis without metapsychology. (shrink)

Bergson reconoce a Kant el mérito de haber caracterizado al espacio y al tiempo homogéneos como actos del espíritu distintos de todo contenido sensible. Le reprocha no haber advertido que su función no es especulativa sino práctica. De ahí la posibilidad de la metafísica como conocimiento de la duración, una vez superado el mecanismo espacializante de la inteligencia.

Dans un passage de L'évolution créatrice, Bergson ne réfute pas purement et simplement Kant, mais le présente comme le précurseur d'une philosophie nouvelle, voire comme un précurseur probable maie manqué de sa propre philosophie. Si la philosophie transcendantale, pourtant prometteuse, s'avère finalement décevante, c'est parce qu'elle ne propose qu'une déduction des catégories et non une genèse de l'intelligence. Mais comment Bergson ose-t-il comparer deux démarches que tout semble opposer ? Y a-t-il, chez Kant lui-même, quelque chose qui justifie (...) ce rapprochement apparemment incongru entre une déduction transcendantale et une genèse de l'intelligence ? In a passage of Creative Evolution, Bergson does not refute Kant, but presents him as a precursor of a new philosophy, and even as a liable but failed precursor of his own philosophy. If the transcendental philosophy, really promising, seems finally disappointing, it is because it only gives us a deduction of the categories and not a genesis of ntelligence. How can Bergson say that ? How can he compare two perspectives which seem diverging completely ? Is there anything in Kant's texts which evidences this connexion between a transcendental deduction and a genesis of intelligence ? (shrink)

RESUMENAunque Bergson no ignoró las tesis de Freud ni el psicoanálisis, sin embargo las divergencias entre los dos pensadores respecto al inconsciente resultan, en gran medida, irreconciliables. El presente trabajo pretende mostrar que sus intereses en este ámbito fueron dispares: mientras Freud se interesó por el funcionamiento de los procesos inconscientes atendiendo a un punto de vista experimental más que especulativo, a Bergson le preocupa su existencia y naturaleza.PALABRAS CLAVEINCONSCIENTE – PSICOLOGÍA – BERGSON – FREUD ABSTRACTAlthough (...) class='Hi'>Bergson did not ignore Freud’s theses nor phychoanalysis, their divergencies concerning the unconcious are, to a great extent, irrenconciliable. The present article intentds to demostrate that ther interests were completely different : whereas Freud was interested in the unconcious processes from an experimental rather than a spectualtive point of view, Bergson was concerned with their existence and nature.KEYWORDSUNCONSCIOUS – PSYCHOLOGY – BEGSON – FREUD. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 1010-1025, December 2021.

There are striking structural similarities between Freud's ego and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There are also striking similarities between Freud's superego and Kant's account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre‐discursive representation of moral motivation, and the (...) unconscious character of moral motivation. The suggestion is that Freud offers resources for a naturalized account of just those features of our moral motivation that, according to Kant, seem to make it least amenable to a naturalistic explanation. How much of a revision of Kant's analysis of moral justification is thereby entailed is beyond the purview of the paper. (shrink)