Social workers with the Dutch Child Protection Board use hypothetical questions as a means to assess the suitability of prospective adoptive parents for adoption. In particular, while talking about the future, prospective adoptive parents are assessed on their educational skills, knowledge and awareness with regard to adoption-specific problems. In our study we analysed the preliminary conversational work that has to be done in order to pose a hypothetical question. We distinguished between 1) patterns that start with an eliciting question as (...) a way of collecting topics with which to build a hypothetical question, and 2) patterns that start with a retrieving question, using themes from earlier conversation. Follow up questions are part of the preparatory work and form a bridge between the elicitation of topics and the actual hypothetical question. These follow up questions can be asked both before and after the introduction of the hypothetical question. Follow-up questions in post-position allow the social worker to challenge parents' answers to hypothetical questions. (shrink)

"A valuable collection both for original source material as well as historical formulations of current problems."-- The Review of Metaphysics "Much more than a mere collection of papers . . . a valuable addition to the literature."-- Mathematics of Computation An anthology of fundamental papers on undecidability and unsolvability by major figures in the field, this classic reference opens with Godel's landmark 1931 paper demonstrating that systems of logic cannot admit proofs of all true assertions of arithmetic. Subsequent papers by (...) Godel, Church, Turing, and Post single out the class of recursive functions as computable by finite algorithms. Additional papers by Church, Turing, and Post cover unsolvable problems from the theory of abstract computing machines, mathematical logic, and algebra, and material by Kleene and Post includes initiation of the classification theory of unsolvable problems. Suitable for graduate and undergraduate courses. 1965 ed. (shrink)

A ‘lottery belief’ is a belief that a particular ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, based on nothing more than the odds against it winning. The lottery paradox brings out a tension between the idea that lottery beliefs are justified and the idea that that one can always justifiably believe the deductive consequences of things that one justifiably believes – what is sometimes called the principle of closure. Many philosophers have treated the lottery paradox as an argument against the (...) second idea – but I make a case here that it is the first idea that should be given up. As I shall show, there are a number of independent arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified. (shrink)

Earlier in this century, many philosophers of science (for example, Rudolf Carnap) drew a fairly sharp distinction between theory and observation, between theoretical terms like 'mass' and 'electron', and observation terms like 'measures three meters in length' and 'is _2° Celsius'. By simply looking at our instruments we can ascertain what numbers our measurements yield. Creatures like mass are different: we determine mass by calculation; we never directly observe a mass. Nor an electron: this term is introduced in order to (...) explain what we observe. This (once standard) distinction between theory and observation was eventually found to be wanting. First, if the distinction holds, it is difficult to see what can characterize the relationship between theory :md observation. How can theoretical terms explain that which is itself in no way theorized? The second point leads out of the first: are not the instruments that provide us with observational material themselves creatures of theory? Is it really possible to have an observation language that is entirely barren of theory? The theory-Iadenness of observation languages is now an accept ed feature of the logic of science. Many regard such dependence of observation on theory as a virtue. If our instruments of observation do not derive their meaning from theories, whence comes that meaning? Surely - in science - we have nothing else but theories to tell us what to try to observe. (shrink)

Text představuje aktivní role-playing jako výzkumnou experimentální metodu v sociálních vědách. Zasazuje role-playing do rámce simulačních výzkumných metod, rozkrývá jeho epistemo- logii a dosavadní metodologická uchopení zejména v sociální psychologii. Hlavní linií textu je obhajoba epistemologických kvalit metody a experimentu v sociálních vědách obecně. Inspiračním zdrojem je zde na jedné straně Latourova kvalitativní sociologie asociací, tázající se po původu sociality a problematizující samotný před- mět sociálních věd, tj. sociálno. A na druhé straně přístupy naturalizující sociálně- vědné výzkumy propojením s kognitivní (...) vědou. V tomto ohledu je naším klíčovým předpokladem pro smysluplné uchopení sociální reality v její simulované podobě shodnost kognitivních mechanismů skutečného i simulovaného jednání. V pojetí textu jsou oba zdroje spojeny jejich akcentem na tematizaci sociálna jako inter-psychologického fenoménu mezi tradiční mikro a makro úrovní. Analogií s Petriho miskou text promýšlí posunutí původní metody situační sociální psycho- logie směrem k využití konstruovaných diegetických liminálních situací jako svého druhu laboratoří sociálna. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the formulation and investigation of a dynamic semantic interpretation of the language of first-order predicate logic. The resulting system, which will be referred to as ‘dynamic predicate logic’, is intended as a first step towards a compositional, non-representational theory of discourse semantics. In the last decade, various theories of discourse semantics have emerged within the paradigm of model-theoretic semantics. A common feature of these theories is a tendency to do away with the principle of compositionality, (...) a principle which, implicitly or explicitly, has dominated semantics since the days of Frege. Therefore the question naturally arises whether non-compositionality is in any way a necessary feature of discourse semantics. Since we subscribe to the interpretation of compositionality as constituting primarily a methodological principle, we consider this to be a methodological rather than an empirical question. As a consequence, the emphasis in the present paper lies on developing an alternative compositional semantics of discourse, which is empirically equivalent to its non-compositional brethren, but which differs from them in a principled methodological way. Hence, no attempts are made to improve on existing theories empirically. Nevertheless, as we indicate in section 5, the development of a compositional alternative may in the end have empirical consequences, too. First of all, it can be argued that the dynamic view on interpretation developed in this paper suggests natural and relatively easy to formulate extensions which enable one to deal with a wider range of phenomena than can be dealt with in existing theories. Moreover, the various approaches to the model-theoretic semantics of discourse that have been developed during the last decade, have constituted a ‘fresh start’ in the sense that much of what had been accomplished before was ignored, at least for a start. Of course, this is a justified strategy if one feels one is trying to develop a radically different approach to recalcitrant problems. However, there comes a time when such new approaches have to be compared with the older one, and when an assessment of the pros and cons of each has to be made. One of the main problems in semantics today, we feel, is that a semantic theory such as Montague grammar, and an approach like Kamp’s discourse representation theory, are hard to compare, let alone that it is possible to unify their insights and results.. (shrink)

In B. Repacholi and V. Slaughter (eds), _Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical_ _Development_. Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 2003..

L'A. esamina in primo luogo l'origine del problema metafisico in Enrico. Il tema del subiectum metaphysice è inquadrato nel contesto della problematica del soggetto scientifico e ciò che interessa l'A. è soprattutto il procedimento argomentativo di Enrico ed il significato delle conseguenze di tale procedere. Lo studio si chiude con uno sguardo sul commentario alla Metafisica di Pietro di Auvergne, evidenziando la relazione fra soggetto della metafisica e dottrina del primum cognitum nell'intelletto umano. Riferimenti alle posizioni di Avicenna, Averroè e (...) Tommaso. (shrink)

In 294 most modern scholars either accept rapidique or adopt Lachmann's rapideque. An exception is Romanes, who oddly favours rapidisque, which he takes with impetibus crebris, placing a comma after corripiunt. If rapidique is read, one has to assume that Lucretius is writing as though venti, not flamina, were the subject. There are parallels for this kind of grammatical irregularity , but there is no need to assume an irregularity here, for, as E. J. Kenney has pointed out to me, (...) the right reading is almost certainly rapidoque. rapidoque was favoured by Lambinus, but did not originate with him. He notes ‘ex libris scriptis alii habent, rapidoque rotanti, alii rapidique rotanti’, and Pius knew rapidoque, which is printed in the ed. Juntina . rapido…turbine is strongly supported by 1.273 rapido…turbine and 6.668 rapidus…turbo, also by subito…turbine in 1.279, a line which, as we shall see, is to be closely compared with 1.294. (shrink)

In 294 most modern scholars either accept rapidique or adopt Lachmann's rapideque. An exception is Romanes, who oddly favours rapidisque, which he takes with impetibus crebris, placing a comma after corripiunt. If rapidique is read, one has to assume that Lucretius is writing as though venti, not flamina, were the subject. There are parallels for this kind of grammatical irregularity, but there is no need to assume an irregularity here, for, as E. J. Kenney has pointed out to me, the (...) right reading is almost certainly rapidoque. rapidoque was favoured by Lambinus, but did not originate with him. He notes ‘ex libris scriptis alii habent, rapidoque rotanti, alii rapidique rotanti’, and Pius knew rapidoque, which is printed in the ed. Juntina. rapido…turbine is strongly supported by 1.273 rapido…turbine and 6.668 rapidus…turbo, also by subito…turbine in 1.279, a line which, as we shall see, is to be closely compared with 1.294. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cambridge Companion to Galileo ed. by Peter MachamerMartin CurdPeter Machamer, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Galileo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp xii + 462. Cloth, $59.95. Paper, $19.95.The contributions fall into three main areas: Galileo’s work on mechanics, his defense of Copernicus, and his relationship with the church. The relative number of pages devoted to these topics is unusual: the ratio is roughly 3 to 1 (...) to 3.The papers on Galileo’s mechanics and physics are by William Wallace, Peter Machamer, Rivka Feldhay, Wallace Hooper, and Pietro Redondi. Wallace concentrates on unpublished manuscripts from Galileo’s early period, arguing that they reveal Galileo’s intense involvement with Aristotelian philosophy. As in his other writings, Wallace emphasizes the importance of the demonstrative regressus argument for Galileo’s thought, especially for Galileo’s later claim in the Dialogue to have demonstrated the earth’s motion from the phenomenon of the tides. Machamer offers an “Archimedean” [End Page 364] interpretation of Galileo, stressing the Galileo’s use of simple machines, especially the balance, as a model of intelligibility throughout his scientific work. According to Machamer, these machines functioned as something like a Kuhnian exemplar for Galileo, providing the element of necessity and picturability that Galileo deemed essential for scientific explanation. Feldhay explores the role of mathematics in Galileo’s science, arguing that Galileo began to diverge from the Jesuit-Aristotelian tradition once he gave up trying to understand the causes of accelerated motion and focused instead on its geometrical analysis in terms of degrees of velocity. In a useful discussion, Hooper follows the development of Galileo’s inertial mechanics, concluding that even in the Discourses (1638) it is unclear whether Galileo abandoned his pre-Newtonian notion of impetus as the sustaining cause of motion. Redondi examines the relationship of Galileo’s physics to his theology. While Redondi’s conclusion is clear—“Galileo’s physics required God”—his argument is hard to follow, ranging as it does over Galileo’s views on time, atomism, macroscopic and microscopic physics, and cosmogony.Only two articles are directly about Galileo and the Copernican theory but those two pieces, by William Shea and Noel Swerdlow, are models of clarity. Swerdlow focuses on Galileo’s telescopic discoveries 1610–13 while Shea covers the entire period up to the Dialogue of 1632. Unfortunately, this involves repetition of the material about the telescopic discoveries, including some diagrams and illustrations. Tighter editorial control might have avoided this duplication and allowed Shea to devote more time to the fascinating arguments in the Dialogue. What we have is fine, but more would have been better.On Galileo and the church, there are contributions from Ernan McMullin, Richard Blackwell and Marcello Pera. McMullin argues that the seeds of Galileo’s downfall in 1633 were sown in his Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina (1615) in which Galileo endorsed a theory of scriptural interpretation remarkably similar to that contained in Augustine’s commentary on Genesis. McMullin finds a tension in that theory between regarding Scripture and natural science as mutually irrelevant while at the same time giving science priority over the literal reading of Scripture if and only if a demonstration has been provided. Once the demonstration principle was adopted, Galileo’s task of defending the earth’s motion against biblical literalism in the Dialogue became hopeless. Blackwell asks whether there could be another Galileo case in light of the Vatican’s admission of error in 1992. His answer is “Yes.” Blackwell reminds us that while in 1616 it was the Copernican theory that been tried and found heretical, in 1633 the sole issue was Galileo’s obedience to church authority. In Blackwell’s view, there remains the potential for conflict between the church’s “logic of centralized authority” and the democratic, pluralistic methods that give legitimacy to science. Pera, too, concludes that the possibility of conflict remains as long as the church insists that there are truths of faith, necessary for salvation, and those doctrines also have a factual content amenable, at least in principle, to scientific investigation.The book concludes with two pieces: a survey by Michael Segre of the evolution of Galileo’s... (shrink)

Introduction: "meaning in life and death : our stories" -- John Martin Fischer and Anthony B rueckner, "Why is death bad?", Philosophical studies, vol. 50, no. 2 (September 1986) -- "Death, badness, and the impossibility of experience," Journal of ethics -- John Martin Fischer and Daniel Speak, "Death and the psychological conception of personal identity," Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 24 -- "Earlier birth and later death : symmetry through thick and thin," Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason R. (...) Raibley, eds., The good, the right, life and death (Aldershot : Ashgate Publishing, 2006) -- "Why immortality is not so bad," International journal of philosophical studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (September 1994) -- John Martin Fischer and Ruth Curl, "Philosophical models of immortality in science fiction," in George Slusser et. al., eds., Immortal engines : life extension and immortality in science fiction and fantasy (Athens, Ga. : University of Georgia Press, 1996) -- "Epicureanism about death and immortality," Journal of ethics, vol. 10, no. 4 -- "Stories," Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 20 -- "Free will, death, and immortality : the role of narrative," Philosophical papers (Special issue : meaning in life) volume 34, number 3, November 2005 -- "Stories and the meaning of life," revised and expanded version of "A reply to Pereboom, Zimmerman, and Smith," part of a book symposium on John Martin Fischer, my way : essays on moral responsibility, philosophical books, vol. 47, no. 3. (shrink)