Evolutionary debunking arguments appeal to selective etiologies of human morality in an attempt to undermine moral realism. But is morality actually the product of evolution by natural selection? Although debunking arguments have attracted considerable attention in recent years, little of it has been devoted to whether the underlying evolutionary assumptions are credible. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evolutionary hypotheses put forward by two leading debunkers, namely Sharon Street and Richard Joyce. We raise (...) a battery of considerations, both empirical and theoretical, that combine to cast doubt on the plausibility of both hypotheses. We also suggest that it is unlikely that there is in the vicinity a plausible alternative hypothesis suitable for the debunker’s cause. (shrink)

This article shows how Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of science can bring resolution to a recent controversy: the controversy that arises from Intelligent Design theorists' and proponents of neo-Darwinian evolution. Intelligent Design theories argue that the complex structures of living organisms cannot be adequately explained by neo-Darwinian theories, especially by its postulate of random variations. Hence, an "intelligent designer" must be postulated in order to fill out scientific explanations. This article finds fault with the Intelligent Design arguments, but proposes a (...) different form of design argument–one that accepts neo-Darwinian evolution (or something very much like it). It shows how Lonergan's analysis of scientific methods grounds his account of evolution, and how much this can overcome the most basic Intelligent Design objections. It then shows how Lonergan's philosophy of God also can offer a design argument based, not in the complexity of this or that organism, but in the "design" of evolution itself. /// O presente artigo mostra até que ponto a filosofia da ciência de Bernard Lonergan pode trazer resolução à recente controvérsia suscitada pelos defensores da Teoria do Desígnio Inteligente, teoria essa fortemente atacada pelos defensores neo-darwinistas da teoria da evolução. As teorias do Desígnio Inteligente defendem que as estruturas complexas dos organismos vivos não podem ser adequadamente explicadas pelas teorias neo-darwinistas, especialmente pelo seu postulado relativo às variações de acaso. Nesse sentido, um agente Inteligente teria de ser postulado em ordem a prover as necessárias explicações científicas. O autor do presente artigo, porém, considera que a argumentação dos defensores do Desígnio Inteligente é defeituosa, pelo queavança um novo argumento de desígnio, um efectivamente que aceita a teoria da evolução neo-darwiniana (ou algo muito semelhante a ela). Em suma, o artigo mostra até que ponto a análise lonerganiana dos métodos científicos subjaz à sua própria teoria da evolução, mostrando-se assim também de que forma esta doutrina ultrapassa as objecções mais elementares dos defensores da Teoria do Desígnio Inteligente. Por fim, mostra-se ainda de que modo a filosofia de Lonergan sobre Deus pode oferecer um argumento de desígnio baseado, não na complexidade deste ou daquele organismo, mas no "desígnio" da evolução em si mesma. (shrink)

This unique and pioneering book critically appraises current work from both the cognitive science of religion and the evolutionary study of religion. It addresses the question: Why does the believer possess supernatural or religious beliefs in the combined context of his cognitive biases, their adaptive usefulness measured in terms of survival and reproduction, and the impact of social learning and cultural traits? The authors outlines a pluralistic approach to the study of religion that does not treat religion as (...) an accidental by-product but an adaptation selected by natural selection. Chapters discuss the role of religious components for the evolution of cooperation and altruism, and explore the development of atheism and secular ideas, in cognitive and evolutionary terms. Topics such as the usefulness of religion, the transmission of religious beliefs, and a Darwinian approach to religion are among those addressed. Contrary to standard views, religious biases are regarded as shaped by cultural influences and not merely by natural dispositions. This monograph will particularly appeal to researchers who are looking for a scientific explanation of religion and religious beliefs but who do not stop at the level of narrow cognitive and evolutionary accounts. The work will also be of interest to students of philosophy, sociology, religious studies, theology, or anthropology who seek to explain such fascinating, complex, and unequivocal phenomena as religion and religious components. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr is a well-known biologist and philosopher in the twentieth century. Being a biologist, he is an important person in constructing the synthesis theory of evolution; being a philosopher, he has advocated a new philosophy, which, he claims, synthesizes the achievement of different biologies and physics, while at the same time getting rid of the influences of the traditional philosophy of science. In this essay, I will systematically investigate the main principles and the basic scheme of his new (...) philosophy. I find that Mayr’s new ideas of philosophy of biology can be summarized as the following five statements: The physical science is not the standard paradigm of the whole science; The historical narratives are more important than the explanation of laws; The explanation and the prediction are asymmetrical in life science; Concepts are more essential than laws in biology; There is no conflict between causality and teleonomy. (shrink)

In the second half of the twentieth century, a surprising change in the notion of scientific truth gained ground when an evolutionary cosmology made the Newtonian world machine into no more than a passing phase of the cosmos, subject to exceptions in the neighborhood of Black Holes and other unusual objects. Physical and chemical laws ceased to be eternal and universal and became local and changeable, that is, fundamentally historical instead, and faced an uncertain, changeable future just as they (...) had in the initial phases of the cosmos.The earth sciences along with biology had become historical in the nineteenth century; and the Big Bang cosmology in effect brought physics and chemistry into line, allowing venturesome intellects to concoct a new all-embracing worldview that recognizes the catalytic role of the observer in defining what is observed, and how different levels of local complexity provoke new and surprising phenomena--including terrestrial life forms, and most notably for us, humanly-constructed symbolic meanings--of which science is only one example.The article then argues that it is time for historians to take note of the imperial role thus thrust upon their discipline by making a sustained effort to enlarge their views and explore the career of humankind on earth as a whole, thus making human history an integral part of the emerging scientific and evolutionary worldview.Tentative suggestions of how this might be addressed, focusing on changes in patterns of communication that expanded the scale of human cooperation, and thus conduced to survival, follow. Dance, then speech, were early breakthroughs expanding the practicable size of wandering human bands; then caravans and shipping allowed civilizations to arise; writing expanded the scale of coordination; warfare and trade harshly imposed best practice across wide areas of Eurasia and Africa and kept the skills of that part of the world ahead of what the peoples of other continents and islands had at their command. Then with the crossing of the oceans after 1492 our One World began to emerge and swiftly assumed its contemporary shape with further improvements in the range and capacity of communication--for example, printing, mechanically-powered transport, instantaneous data transmission--with consequences for human society and earth's ecosystem yet to be experienced.Much remains to be investigated and, in particular, interactions between the history of human symbolic meanings and the history of other equilibria--ecological, chemical, physical--within which we exist needs further study. But with suitable effort, history can perhaps become scientific and the emerging scientific evolutionary worldview begin to achieve logical completeness by bringing humankind within its scope. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the usage of the term “just-so story.” I attempt to show that just-so storytelling can be seen as an epistemic concept that, in various ways, tackles the epistemological an...

Great promise for the evolutionary analysis of animal behavior lies in the distinction between generative novelties and the evolutionary innovations to which they can give rise. Ramsey et al. succeed in emphasizing the contribution of individual learning and intelligence to behavioral innovations, but do not correct the tendency to confound individual invention with socio-ecological or group-level innovation.

(1993). Is the improvement of human condition our field? Making Evolutionary science work for human betterment. World Futures: Vol. 38, Theoretical Achievements and Practical Applications of General Evolutionary Theory, pp. 17-31.

"Legend is overdue for replacement, and an adequate replacement must attend to the process of science as carefully as Hull has done. I share his vision of a serious account of the social and intellectual dynamics of science that will avoid both the rosy blur of Legend and the facile charms of relativism.... Because of [Hull's] deep concern with the ways in which research is actually done, Science as a Process begins an important project in the study (...) of science. It is one of a distinguished series of books, which Hull himself edits."—Philip Kitcher, Nature "In Science as a Process, [David Hull] argues that the tension between cooperation and competition is exactly what makes science so successful.... Hull takes an unusual approach to his subject. He applies the rules of evolution in nature to the evolution of science, arguing that the same kinds of forces responsible for shaping the rise and demise of species also act on the development of scientific ideas."—Natalie Angier, New York Times Book Review "By far the most professional and thorough case in favour of an evolutionary philosophy of science ever to have been made. It contains excellent short histories of evolutionary biology and of systematics (the science of classifying living things); an important and original account of modern systematic controversy; a counter-attack against the philosophical critics of evolutionary philosophy; social-psychological evidence, collected by Hull himself, to show that science does have the character demanded by his philosophy; and a philosophical analysis of evolution which is general enough to apply to both biological and historical change."—Mark Ridley, Times Literary Supplement "Hull is primarily interested in how social interactions within the scientific community can help or hinder the process by which new theories and techniques get accepted.... The claim that science is a process for selecting out the best new ideas is not a new one, but Hull tells us exactly how scientists go about it, and he is prepared to accept that at least to some extent, the social activities of the scientists promoting a new idea can affect its chances of being accepted."—Peter J. Bowler, Archives of Natural History "I have been doing philosophy of science now for twenty-five years, and whilst I would never have claimed that I knew everything, I felt that I had a really good handle on the nature of science, Again and again, Hull was able to show me just how incomplete my understanding was.... Moreover, [Science as a Process] is one of the most compulsively readable books that I have ever encountered."—Michael Ruse, Biology and Philosophy. (shrink)

Invited book review of R. P. Thompson, A remarkable journey: The story of evolution (Reaktion Books, 2015).

Recent advances in cognitive science have been enriched by integrating findings from research on evolution. This convergence, in turn, has led to greater interest in understanding important domains of competence and ability in the arts and literature. This evolutionary point of view in the study of human creativity promises to shed light on a number of controversies that have come to be stalled for lack of a clear research program and mired in currently fashionable unscientific conjecture. The study (...) of narrative in particular will play an important role in the emerging synthesis between psychology and evolutionary science, laying the groundwork for a new dialogue with creative writers and analysts of literature. (shrink)

This book was planned as a joint work by the two authors, but the death of Nogar in 1967 left Deely to carry out the original plan alone. The purpose of the book is to challenge the reader to think about the evidence for an evolving world and the impact of such a world on diverse areas of human concern. The authors have assembled nineteen articles written by fifteen different authors. Introducing each article is an essay which places it in (...) the context of the whole work. An extensive introductory essay by the authors shows that the development of evolutionary science has offered a model alternative to that presented by mathematical physics. Tracing the historical and philosophical origins of these two models, the editors suggest that the static world view going back to Aristotle is not the only conclusion which can be drawn from the great philosopher’s work. Rather, this world view depends on emphasizing his work on the apparently non-changing heavens; another picture would have emerged had more emphasis been placed on the dynamism of the living world. Unfortunately, the involved structure of this introductory essay may dissuade some readers from pondering its important insights. (shrink)

This text addresses the profound human questions of love and work. Beginning with a historical introduction, the author progresses through adaptive problems that humans face, and concludes by showing how evolutionary psychology encompasses all branches of psychology.

Why are there so many controversies in evolutionary psychology? Using a couple of concepts from philosophy of science, this paper argues that evolutionary psychology has not reached the stage of mature, normal science, since it does not currently have a unifying research program that guides individual scientists working in the discipline. The argument goes against claims made by certain proponents and opponents of evolutionary psychology, and it is supported by discussion of several examples. The paper (...) notes that just because evolutionary psychology has not reached the stage of normal science, the discipline is nevertheless a source of many progressive theoretical developments and interesting empirical discoveries. (shrink)

Both Popper and van Fraassen have used evolutionary analogies to defend their views on the aim of science, although these are diametrically opposed. By employing Price's equation in an illustrative capacity, this paper considers which view is better supported. It shows that even if our observations and experimental results are reliable, an evolutionary analogy fails to demonstrate why conjecture and refutation should result in: (1) the isolation of true theories; (2) successive generations of theories of increasing truth-likeness; (...) (3) empirically adequate theories; or (4) successive generations of theories of increasing proximity to empirical adequacy. Furthermore, it illustrates that appeals to induction do not appear to help. It concludes that an evolutionary analogy is only sufficient to defend the notion that the aim of science is to isolate a particular class of false theories, namely those that are empirically inadequate. (shrink)

Proponents of evolutionary psychology take the existence of humanuniversals to constitute decisive evidence in favor of their view. Ifthe same social norms are found in culture after culture, we have goodreason to believe that they are innate, they argue. In this paper Ipropose an alternative explanation for the existence of humanuniversals, which does not depend on them being the product of inbuiltpsychological adaptations. Following the work of Brian Skyrms, I suggestthat if a particular convention possesses even a very small (...) advantageover competitors, whatever the reason for that advantage, we shouldexpect it to become the norm almost everywhere. Tiny advantages aretranslated into very large basins of attraction, in the language of gametheory. If this is so, universal norms are not evidence for innatepsychological adaptations at all. Having shown that the existence ofuniversals is consistent with the so-called Standard Social ScienceModel, I turn to a consideration of the evidence, to show that thisstyle of explanation is preferable to the evolutionary explanation, atleast with regard to patterns of gender inequality. (shrink)

To properly understand behavior, we must obtain both ultimate and proximate explanations. Put briefly, ultimate explanations are concerned with why a behavior exists, and proximate explanations are concerned with how it works. These two types of explanation are complementary and the distinction is critical to evolutionary explanation. We are concerned that they have become conflated in some areas of the evolutionary literature on human behavior. This article brings attention to these issues. We focus on three specific areas: the (...) evolution of cooperation, transmitted culture, and epigenetics. We do this to avoid confusion and wasted effort—dangers that are particularly acute in interdisciplinary research. Throughout this article, we suggest ways in which misunderstanding may be avoided in the future. (shrink)

Evolutionary theory is a paradigmatic example of a well-supported scientific theory. In this chapter we consider a number of objections to evolutionary theory, and show how responding to these objections reveals aspects of the way in which scientific theories are supported by evidence. Teaching these objections can therefore serve two pedagogical aims: students can learn the right way to respond to some popular arguments against evolutionary theory, and they can learn some basic features of the structure of (...) scientific theories and evidence. (shrink)

Preface.--Science, ideology, and world view.--Objectives and methods in intellectual history.--The Kuhnian paradigm and the Darwinian revolution in natural history.--Biology and social theory in the nineteenth century.--Darwin as a social evolutionist.--Darwinism as a world view.--From Huxley to Huxley.--Postscript.

An important question facing contemporary philosophy of science is whether the natural sciences in terms of their historical records exhibit distinguishing developmental patterns or structures. At least two philosophical stances are possible in answering this question. The first pertains to the plurality of the individual sciences. From this stance, the various sciences are analyzed individually and compared with one another in order to derive potential commonalities, if any, among them. The second stance involves a general philosophy of science (...) in which a thorough theory of the natural sciences is developed. The latter stance strives to account for more than possible commonalities among the sciences but also to provide a broad-spectrum philosophical framework to account for, or to explicate, the nature of science itself and its progress. In this paper, the second stance is taken in which an evolutionary philosophy of science is proposed. To that end, Thomas Kuhn’s evolutionary philosophy of science is initially discussed and critiqued. An evolutionary philosophy of science is then proposed based on a revision of Kuhn’s evolutionary philosophy of science in terms of George Gaylord Simpson’s various tempos and modes for biological evolution. Next, two historical case studies from the biological sciences are reconstructed to illustrate the robustness of the proposed evolutionary philosophy of science for explicating the progress of the natural sciences. A concluding section discusses the proposed evolutionary philosophy of science with respect to providing a broad-spectrum framework or general philosophy of science for understanding the nature and progress of the natural sciences. (shrink)

For two decades, the integrated causal model of evolutionary psychology (EP) has constituted an interdisciplinary nucleus around which a single unified theoretical and empirical behavioral science has been crystallizing – while progressively resolving problems (such as defective logical and statistical reasoning) that bedevil Gintis's beliefs, preferences, and constraints (BPC) framework. Although both frameworks are similar, EP is empirically better supported, theoretically richer, and offers deeper unification. (Published Online April 27 2007).

What credentials does evolutionary epistemology have as science? A judgement based on past performance, both in terms of advancing an empirical programme and further ng theory construction, is not much. This paper briefly outlines some of the research areas, both theoretical and empirical, that can be developed and that might secure for evolutionary epistemology a future in evolutionary biology.

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Despite many arduous attempts to reconcile the separation between theology and science, the common ground where these two areas of intellectual inquiry could converge has not been fully identified yet. The purpose of this paper is to use evolutionary theology as the new and unique framework in which science and theology are indeed brought into coherent alignment. The major step in this effort is to acknowledge that theology can no longer dialogue with science but must assume (...) science and its method as its conceptual foundation. This approach successfully does away with any tensions that may arise between the two disciplines and establishes a firm ground on which neither of them will turn into ideology. Moreover, it enables the dialogue with contemporary scientific atheism on solid grounds and the restoration of the credibility of theology in the secularist culture of the day. (shrink)

This short paper is about the generalized evolutionary approach to the economics of science. Stephen Toulmin and David Hull are pioneers of the former rather than Karl Popper whose falsification thesis was sociologically naive. Useful directions for the future would go beyond the generalities of variation, transmission and selection towards making more explicit use of Darwin’s “two great principles.” The first is “the unity of types” i.e. common descent by employing phylogenetic methods to answer historical questions. The second (...) is “the conditions of existence” i.e. natural selection by making use of general principles of evolutionary ecology and socioecology to answer questions about why something evolved. (shrink)

Four decades ago, E.O. Wilson famously declared that “the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized." One still finds Wilson’s idea echoed frequently in popular science writing today. While I’m not going to deny that evolutionary biology and other sciences have important things to tell us about morality, I think there is a lot of confusion about what exactly they can tell us, and how much they can tell (...) us. My aim here is first to make some distinctions and sort out some issues, and then to examine one overreaching claim in particular, about the explanation of our moral beliefs by appeal to evolutionary causal influences. That is a claim used by some philosophers to argue that evolutionary biology somehow forces on us either a skeptical or a purely subjectivist understanding of morality. I will explain why I think this is misguided and is a poor use of science in philosophy. (shrink)

s book, Hermeneutic Dialogue and Social Science: A critique of Gadamer and Habermas, intends to present an account of debates on objectivity in the social sciences, in stressing the political and epistemological responsibility, in public spheres, to those who want to create a fairer understanding of societies and history, without demonizing natural enterprises or leaving social studies out of acute critical questioning. Key Words: dialogue • hermeneutic • social sciences • natural sciences • method.

Nonetheless the suggestion, at least as regards the development of science, is a valuable one. The analogy suggested by Huxley can be developed in a way which will not only bypass the logical difficulties of traditional philosophical accounts, but will also demystify many of the findings of historians and sociologists of science. Since the strength of our analogy rests on its clarity we will begin with a general discussion of the nature of evolutionary systems, gradually adding enough (...) complexity and detail to guarantee plausibility. (shrink)

“Over a hundred years ago Thorstein Veblen expressed the view that the ontological or ‘metaphysical’ presuppositions of economics needed to be more realistic, a view that was a necessary part of his support for evolutionary thinking. When he was writing, though, evolutionary theorising in economics had been introduced in a rather incoherent manner resulting in an ontological mishmash - of a sort that led Veblen to coin the label neoclassical for those involved. As it happened evolutionary thinking (...) never really took off in a coherent way in economics, and social ontological reasoning itself became somewhat marginalised. As I write, however, there are once more groups of scholars including economists developing systematic projects in social ontology. Now, however, the branch of non-social science attracting the most attention is quantum mechanics. An issue of interest that is explored here is whether the growing concern of economists with quantum insights will finally allow the specific ontological conception supported by Veblen to become established, facilitating, amongst other things, a turn to a coherent form of evolutionary thinking, or whether, as argued by some, it is more likely to lead to support for the ontological mix-up sustained by those Veblen labelled neoclassical.”. (shrink)

The social sciences are witnessing renewed enthusiasm for sociobiological accounts of human behaviour. Feminist theory has, understandably, tended to engage cautiously with biological reasoning, because women have often been poorly served by the politics of such research. It is important, though, that feminists continue to contribute to this literature, in order to challenge problematic discourses that may emerge. The present paper seeks to analyse a domain of sociobiology that has been the focus of recent controversy: an evolutionary explanation of (...) rape. Particular attention is given to the way in which women's traumatic experience of rape is constructed within this framework. It is argued that women's psychological pain is contorted, via the strategies of (a) diminishing women's pain and (b) ignoring their experience altogether. The operation of these two strategies is illuminated, and their practical consequences in the domains of legal reform and the depoliticization of science are evaluated. (shrink)

Scientific thought is characterized in general as methodical and rational. I would like to present here an opposing view which treats science as a non-systematic activity, where serendipity, tinkering and imitation, rather than so-called rational thought, characterizes it. All these kinds of acts, which are considered to be a-rational, are related to an evolutionary view of science. I will deal here with a version of evolutionary epistemology as applied to science, integrated with the concept uf (...) "meme". Richard Dawkins, who coined the term "meme", treats memes as units of information which propagate in the meme-pool by leaping from brain to brain. The way that memes replicate is through imitation. Examples for this phenomenon in science are illustrated by some historical cases. In particular, I will deal with the evolution of theories of "internal symmetries" in particle physics. Memetics is the counterpart of genetics in the cultural arena. In its application to science, it deals with the manner memes/ideas spread in scientific communities. (shrink)

Scientific thought is generally characterized as methodical and rational. I would like to present here an opposing view which treats science as a non-systematic activity, where serendipity, tinkering and imitation, rather than so-called rational thought, characterizes it. All these kinds of acts, which are considered to be a-rational, are related to an evolutionary view of science. I will deal here with a version of evolutionary epistemology as applied to science. The combination of variation and competition (...) for survival is analogous to the elements of Darwinian evolution. I will give some examples for this phenomenon in science from historical cases and Examples for this phenomenon in science are illustrated by some historical cases, in particular by the evolution of theories of internal symmetries in particle physics. (shrink)

The author considers the evolutionary approach to the development of the scientific knowledge in framework of the Niklas Luhmann's system-communicative theory and presents a thesis that in respect to the final evolutional state (state of stabilization of new form of knowledge) the organization of the Russian science has not yet achieved the world-level of sufficient autonomy because there was not yet been established the self-substitutive order of the knowledge accumulation which is inherent to the autopoiesis of the contemporary (...) science i.e. the process of continued change of some ones truths by some others. The factors impeding to establish such a self-substitutive order are to be connected by the author with the impact on the scientific discourse from some external communicative forms (the theological, financial, economical, political ones) and with the continuous change of some selective criterions that have to define what has to be accumulated as a memory of the science as a communicative system. (shrink)