Results for 'game dynamics'

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  1.  38
    Chaos in Game Dynamics.Brian Skyrms - 1992 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (2):111-130.
    Two examples demonstrate the possibility of extremely complicated non-convergent behavior in evolutionary game dynamics. For the Taylor-Jonker flow, the stable orbits for three strategies were investigated by Zeeman. Chaos does not occur with three strategies. This papers presents numerical evidence that chaotic dynamics on a strange attractor does occur with four strategies. Thus phenomenon is closely related to known examples of complicated behavior in Lotka-Volterra ecological models.
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  2.  41
    No Switchbacks: Rethinking Aspiration-Based Dynamics in the Ultimatum Game[REVIEW]Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews - 2005 - Theory and Decision 58 (4):351-385.
    Aspiration-based evolutionary dynamics have recently been used to model the evolution of fair play in the ultimatum game showing that incredible threats to reject low offers persist in equilibrium. We focus on two extensions of this analysis: we experimentally test whether assumptions about agent motivations (aspiration levels) and the structure of the game (binary strategy space) reflect actual play, and we examine the problematic assumption embedded in the standard replicator dynamic that unhappy agents who switch strategies may (...)
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  3.  28
    An Introduction to Dynamo: Diagrams for Evolutionary Game Dynamics[REVIEW]Francisco Franchetti & William H. Sandholm - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):167-178.
    Dynamo: Diagrams for Evolutionary Game Dynamics is free, open-source software used to create phase diagrams and other images related to dynamical systems from evolutionary game theory. We describe how to use the software’s default settings to generate phase diagrams quickly and easily. We then explain how to take advantage of the software’s intermediate and advanced features to create diagrams that highlight the key properties of the dynamical system under study. Sample code and output are provided to help (...)
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  4.  19
    Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics.Brian Skyrms - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:374-394.
    This paper discusses the explanatory significance of the equilibrium concept in the context of an example of extremely complicated dynamical behavior. In particular, numerical evidence is presented for the existence of chaotic dynamics on a "strange attractor" in the evolutionary game dynamics introduced by Taylor and Jonker [also known as the "replicator dynamics"]. This phenomenon is present already in four strategy evolutionary games where the dynamics takes place in a simplex in three dimensional space-the lowest (...)
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  5.  5
    Evolutionary Game Dynamics for Financial Risk Decision-Making in Global Supply Chain.Zhi Li, Guanghao Jin & Shen Duan - 2018 - Complexity 2018:1-10.
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  6.  7
    Exploration of Complex Dynamics for Cournot Oligopoly Game with Differentiated Products.S. S. Askar, Mona F. El-Wakeel & M. A. Alrodaini - 2018 - Complexity 2018:1-13.
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  7.  9
    The Regularity Game: Investigating Linguistic Rule Dynamics in a Population of Interacting Agents.Christine Cuskley, Claudio Castellano, Francesca Colaiori, Vittorio Loreto, Martina Pugliese & Francesca Tria - 2017 - Cognition 159:25-32.
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  8.  3
    Nonlinear Complex Dynamics of Carbon Emission Reduction Cournot Game with Bounded Rationality.LiuWei Zhao - 2017 - Complexity:1-10.
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  9.  30
    Game Theory as Mathematics for Biology: Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games Ross Cressman Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003 (330 Pp; $48.00 Hbk; ISBN 0262033054); Moral Sentiments and Material Interests Herbert Gintis , Samuel Bowles , Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr , Eds Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005 (416 Pp; $50.00 Hbk; ISBN 0262072521).Don Ross - 2007 - Biological Theory 2 (1):104-107.
  10.  12
    Using Network Science to Analyse Football Passing Networks: Dynamics, Space, Time, and the Multilayer Nature of the Game.Javier M. Buldú, Javier Busquets, Johann H. Martínez, José L. Herrera-Diestra, Ignacio Echegoyen, Javier Galeano & Jordi Luque - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  11.  30
    Deliberational Dynamics and the Foundations of Bayesian Game Theory.Brian Skyrms - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:345-367.
  12.  9
    Stochastic Stability and Disagreements Between Dynamics.Aydin Mohseni - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    The replicator dynamics and Moran process are the main deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. These models are connected by a mean-field relationship—the former describes the expected behavior of the latter. However, there are conditions under which their predictions diverge. I demonstrate that the divergence between their predictions is a function of standard techniques used in their analysis, and of differences in the idealizations involved in each. My analysis reveals problems for stochastic stability analysis in a (...)
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  13.  58
    Quantum-Like Model for Decision Making Process in Two Players Game.Masanari Asano, Masanori Ohya & Andrei Khrennikov - 2011 - Foundations of Physics 41 (3):538-548.
    In experiments of games, players frequently make choices which are regarded as irrational in game theory. In papers of Khrennikov (Information Dynamics in Cognitive, Psychological and Anomalous Phenomena. Fundamental Theories of Physics, Kluwer Academic, Norwell, 2004; Fuzzy Sets Syst. 155:4–17, 2005; Biosystems 84:225–241, 2006; Found. Phys. 35(10):1655–1693, 2005; in QP-PQ Quantum Probability and White Noise Analysis, vol. XXIV, pp. 105–117, 2009), it was pointed out that statistics collected in such the experiments have “quantum-like” properties, which can not be (...)
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  14.  93
    Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions.Don Ross - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):57-72.
    The paper begins by providing a game-theoretic reconstruction of Gilbert’s (1989) philosophical critique of Lewis (1969) on the role of salience in selecting conventions. Gilbert’s insight is reformulated thus: Nash equilibrium is insufficiently powerful as a solution concept to rationalize conventions for unboundedly rational agents if conventions are solutions to the kinds of games Lewis supposes. Both refinements to NE and appeals to bounded rationality can plug this gap, but lack generality. As Binmore (this issue) argues, evolutive game (...)
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  15.  17
    The Phenotypic Gambit: Selective Pressures and ESS Methodology in Evolutionary Game Theory.Hannah Rubin - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (4):551-569.
    The ‘phenotypic gambit,’ the assumption that we can ignore genetics and look at the fitness of phenotypes to determine the expected evolutionary dynamics of a population, is often used in evolutionary game theory. However, as this paper will show, an overlooked genotype to phenotype map can qualitatively affect evolution in ways the phenotypic approach cannot predict or explain. This gives us reason to believe that, even in the long-term, correspondences between phenotypic predictions and dynamical outcomes are not robust (...)
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  16.  4
    Subgames Within Large Games and the Heuristic of Imitation.Soumya Paul & R. Ramanujam - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (2):361-388.
    We study repeated normal form games where the number of players is large. We argue that it is interesting to look at such games as being divided into subgames, each of which we call a neighbourhood. The structure of such a game is given by a graph G whose nodes are players and edges denote visibility. The neighbourhoods are maximal cliques in G. The game proceeds in rounds where in each round the players of every clique X of (...)
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  17. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms.Cristina Bicchieri - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
    In The Grammar of Society, first published in 2006, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations where we (...)
     
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  18. Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling.Simon Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin Zollman - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):177-191.
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  19. Numerical Simulations of the Lewis Signaling Game: Learning Strategies, Pooling Equilibria, and the Evolution of Grammar.Jeffrey A. Barrett - unknown
    David Lewis (1969) introduced sender-receiver games as a way of investigating how meaningful language might evolve from initially random signals. In this report I investigate the conditions under which Lewis signaling games evolve to perfect signaling systems under various learning dynamics. While the 2-state/2- term Lewis signaling game with basic urn learning always approaches a signaling system, I will show that with more than two states suboptimal pooling equilibria can evolve. Inhomogeneous state distributions increase the likelihood of pooling (...)
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  20.  16
    Dynamic Stability and Basins of Attraction in the Sir Philip Sidney Game.Simon M. Huttegger & Kevin J. S. Zollman - unknown
    We study the handicap principle in terms of the Sir Philip Sidney game. The handicap principle asserts that cost is required to allow for honest signalling in the face of conflicts of interest. We show that the significance of the handicap principle can be challenged from two new directions. Firstly, both the costly signalling equilibrium and certain states of no communication are stable under the replicator dynamics ; however, the latter states are more likely in cases where honest (...)
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  21. A Bargaining Game Analysis of International Climate Negotiations.John Basl, Ronald Sandler, Rory Smead & Patrick Forber - 2014 - Nature Climate Change 4:442-445.
    Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them. Negotiations have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used. Many of these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to (...)
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  22.  30
    Communication and Structured Correlation.Elliott Wagner - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):377-393.
    Philosophers and social scientists have recently turned to Lewis sender–receiver games to provide an account of how lexical terms can acquire meaning through an evolutionary process. However, the evolution of meaning is contingent on both the particular sender–receiver game played and the choice of evolutionary dynamic. In this paper I explore some differences between models that presume an infinitely large and randomly mixed population and models in which a finite number of agents communicate with their neighbors in a social (...)
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  23.  10
    Changing Types: Information Dynamics for Qualitative Type Spaces.Dominik Klein & Eric Pacuit - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (2):297-319.
    Many different approaches to describing the players’ knowledge and beliefs can be found in the literature on the epistemic foundations of game theory. We focus here on non-probabilistic approaches. The two most prominent are the so-called Kripkeor Aumann- structures and knowledge structures (non-probabilistic variants of Harsanyi type spaces). Much of the recent work on Kripke structures has focused on dynamic extensions and simple ways of incorporating these. We argue that many of these ideas can be applied to knowledge structures (...)
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  24.  90
    Evolutionary Game Theory, Interpersonal Comparisons and Natural Selection: A Dilemma.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):637-654.
    When social scientists began employing evolutionary game theory (EGT) in their disciplines, the question arose what the appropriate interpretation of the formal EGT framework would be. Social scientists have given different answer, of which I distinguish three basic kinds. I then proceed to uncover the conceptual tension between the formal framework of EGT, its application in the social sciences, and these three interpretations. First, I argue that EGT under the biological interpretation has a limited application in the social sciences, (...)
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  25.  8
    Rebirth of Paideia: Ultimacy and the Game of Games.Jonathan Doner - 2018 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 50 (6-7):719-727.
    Plato’s philosophy of paideia concerns the life-long growth toward areté, excellence, in body, mind, and spirit. Implementation of this philosophy in modern times is challenged by many societal conditions, especially relativism, plurality, and secularity. This paper discusses an approach that advocates individualized paideia. In its most simple and direct manifestation, individualized paideia can be supported and developed by the person’s participation in a class of games exemplified by the Tibetan game Rebirth. An analysis of their structure and dynamics (...)
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  26.  38
    Game Theory, Rationality and Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Game theory based on rational choice is compared with game theory based on evolutionary, or other adaptive, dynamics. The Nash equilibrium concept has a central role to play in both theories, even though one makes extremely strong assumptions about cognitive capacities and common knowledge of the players, and the other does not. Nevertheless, there are also important differences between the two theories. These differences are illustrated in a number of games that model types of interaction that are (...)
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  27. Random Boolean Networks and Evolutionary Game Theory.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1289-1304.
    Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game-theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game-theoretic models played on a social network, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution of social norms.
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  28.  28
    Game Theoretic Pragmatics.Michael Franke - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):269-284.
    Game theoretic pragmatics is a small but growing part of formal pragmatics, the linguistic subfield studying language use. The general logic of a game theoretic explanation of a pragmatic phenomenon is this: the conversational context is modelled as a game between speaker and hearer; an adequate solution concept then selects the to‐be‐explained behavior in the game model. For such an explanation to be convincing, both components, game model and solution concept, should be formulated and scrutinized (...)
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  29.  54
    Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):103-121.
    Whereas The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure supplements Evolution of the Social Contract by examining some of the earlier work’s strategic problems in a local interaction setting, no equivalent supplement exists for The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation . In this article, I develop a general framework for modeling the dynamics of rational deliberation in a local interaction setting. In doing so, I show that when local interactions are permitted, three interesting phenomena occur: (a) the attracting (...)
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  30.  74
    Social Norms and the Traditional Deterrence Game.Lisa Carlson & Raymond Dacey - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):105-123.
    Bicchieri (The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of norms, 2006, xi) presents a formal analysis of norms that answers the questions of "when, how, and to what degree" norms affect human behavior in the play of games. The purpose of this paper is to apply a variation of the Bicchieri norms analysis to generate a model of norms-based play of the traditional deterrence game (Zagare and Kilgour, Int Stud Q 37: 1-27, 1993; Morrow, Game theory (...)
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  31.  16
    Network Formation in Repeated Interactions: Experimental Evidence on Dynamic Behaviour. [REVIEW]Michele Bernasconi & Matteo Galizzi - 2010 - Mind and Society 9 (2):193-228.
    Here, we present some experiments of non-cooperative games of network formation based on Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 68:1181–1229, 2000 ). We have looked at the one-way and the two-way flow models, each for high and low link costs. The models come up with both multiple equilibria and coordination problems. We conducted the experiments under various conditions which allowed for repeated interactions between subjects. We found that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria was not an easy task to achieve, even in (...)
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  32.  16
    The Development of Complex Oligopoly Dynamics Theory.Barkley Rosser - manuscript
    One is the very founding document of oligopoly theory, Cournot’s seminal work of 1838. This is both because the specific model that he presented has been much studied for its ability to generate complex dynamics and also because of its more general foreshadowing of game theory. It has often been noted that the Cournot equilibrium is but a special case of the Nash (1951) equilibrium, the more general formulation used by modern industrial organization economists in studying oligopoly theory. (...)
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  33.  32
    Game Cultures: Computer Games as New Media.Jon Dovey - 2006 - Open University Press.
    This book introduces the critical concepts and debates that are shaping the emerging field of game studies. Exploring games in the context of cultural studies and media studies, it analyses computer games as the most popular contemporary form of new media production and consumption. The book: Argues for the centrality of play in redefining reading, consuming and creating culture Offers detailed research into the political economy of games to generate a model of new media production Examines the dynamics (...)
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  34.  39
    Transition Semantics: The Dynamics of Dependence Logic.P. Galliani - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1249-1276.
    We examine the relationship between dependence logic and game logics. A variant of dynamic game logic, called Transition Logic, is developed, and we show that its relationship with dependence logic is comparable to the one between first-order logic and dynamic game logic discussed by van Benthem. This suggests a new perspective on the interpretation of dependence logic formulas, in terms of assertions about reachability in games of imperfect information against Nature. We then capitalize on this intuition by (...)
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  35.  24
    The Dynamic Stability of Coalitionist Behaviour for Two-Strategy Bimatrix Games.Ross Cressman, József Garay, Antonino Scarelli & Zoltán Varga - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):141-152.
  36.  28
    Dynamics We Can Believe In: A View From the Amsterdam School on the Centenary of Evert Willem Beth.Cédric Dégremont & Jonathan Zvesper - 2011 - Synthese 179 (2):223 - 238.
    Logic is breaking out of the confines of the single-agent static paradigm that has been implicit in all formal systems until recent times. We sketch some recent developments that take logic as an account of information-driven interaction. These two features, the dynamic and the social, throw fresh light on many issues within logic and its connections with other areas, such as epistemology and game theory.
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  37.  32
    Modeling the Social Dynamics of Moral Enhancement: Social Strategies Sold Over the Counter and the Stability of Society.Anders Sandberg & Joao Fabiano - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (3):431-445.
    How individuals tend to evaluate the combination of their own and other’s payoffs—social value orientations—is likely to be a potential target of future moral enhancers. However, the stability of cooperation in human societies has been buttressed by evolved mildly prosocial orientations. If they could be changed, would this destabilize the cooperative structure of society? We simulate a model of moral enhancement in which agents play games with each other and can enhance their orientations based on maximizing personal satisfaction. We find (...)
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  38.  17
    Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction.Johan van Benthem - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book develops a view of logic as a theory of information-driven agency and intelligent interaction between many agents - with conversation, argumentation and games as guiding examples. It provides one uniform account of dynamic logics for acts of inference, observation, questions and communication, that can handle both update of knowledge and revision of beliefs. It then extends the dynamic style of analysis to include changing preferences and goals, temporal processes, group action and strategic interaction in games. Throughout, the book (...)
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  39. Rational Dynamics and Epistemic Logic in Games.Johan van Benthem - unknown
    Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic models for a given game, such as mutual knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we propose a different perspective, analyzing solution algorithms as processes (...)
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  40.  31
    The Cultural Evolution of Institutional Religions.Michael Vlerick - forthcoming - Religion, Brain and Behavior.
    In recent work, Atran, Henrich, Norenzayan and colleagues developed an account of religion that reconciles insights from the ‘by-product’ accounts and the adaptive accounts. According to their synthesis, the process of cultural group selection driven by group competition has recruited our proclivity to adopt and spread religious beliefs and engage in religious practices to increase within group solidarity, harmony and cooperation. While their account has much merit, I believe it only tells us half the story of how institutional religions have (...)
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  41.  6
    Dynamics and Diversity in Epistemic Communities.Cailin O’Connor & Justin Bruner - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):101-119.
    Bruner shows that in cultural interactions, members of minority groups will learn to interact with members of majority groups more quickly—minorities tend to meet majorities more often as a brute fact of their respective numbers—and, as a result, may come to be disadvantaged in situations where they divide resources. In this paper, we discuss the implications of this effect for epistemic communities. We use evolutionary game theoretic methods to show that minority groups can end up disadvantaged in academic interactions (...)
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  42.  13
    Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics.William H. Sandholm - 2010 - MIT Press.
    A systematic, rigorous, comprehensive, and unified overview of evolutionary game theory.
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  43.  27
    Dynamics and Diversity in Epistemic Communities.Cailin O'Connor & Justin Bruner - unknown
    Bruner shows that in cultural interactions, members of minority groups will learn to interact with members of majority groups more quickly---minorities tend to meet majorities more often as a brute fact of their respective numbers---and, as a result, may come to be disadvantaged in situations where they divide resources. In this paper, we discuss the implications of this effect for epistemic communities. We use evolutionary game theoretic methods to show that minority groups can end up disadvantaged in academic interactions (...)
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  44.  53
    Learning with Neighbours.Roland Mühlenbernd - 2011 - Synthese 183 (S1):87-109.
    I present a game-theoretical multi-agent system to simulate the evolutionary process responsible for the pragmatic phenomenon division of pragmatic labour (DOPL), a linguistic convention emerging from evolutionary forces. Each agent is positioned on a toroid lattice and communicates via signaling games , where the choice of an interlocutor depends on the Manhattan distance between them. In this framework I compare two learning dynamics: reinforcement learning (RL) and belief learning (BL). An agent’s experiences from previous plays influence his communication (...)
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  45.  20
    Genetic Models in Evolutionary Game Theory: The Evolution of Altruism.Hannah Rubin - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1175-1189.
    While prior models of the evolution of altruism have assumed that organisms reproduce asexually, this paper presents a model of the evolution of altruism for sexually reproducing organisms using Hardy–Weinberg dynamics. In this model, the presence of reciprocal altruists allows the population to evolve to a stable polymorphic population where the majority of organisms are altruistic. Further, adding stochasticity leads to even larger numbers of altruists, while adding stochasticity to an analogous asexual model leads to more selfish organisms. The (...)
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  46. HeX and the Single Anthill: Playing Games with Aunt Hillary.J. M. Bishop, S. J. Nasuto, T. Tanay, E. B. Roesch & M. C. Spencer - 2015 - In Vincent Müller (ed.), Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 367-389.
    In a reflective and richly entertaining piece from 1979, Doug Hofstadter playfully imagined a conversation between ‘Achilles’ and an anthill (the eponymous ‘Aunt Hillary’), in which he famously explored many ideas and themes related to cognition and consciousness. For Hofstadter, the anthill is able to carry on a conversation because the ants that compose it play roughly the same role that neurons play in human languaging; unfortunately, Hofstadter’s work is notably short on detail suggesting how this magic might be achieved1. (...)
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  47.  22
    Custodians of the Game: Ethical Considerations for Football Governing Bodies in Regulating Concussion Management.Annette Greenhow & Jocelyn East - 2015 - Neuroethics 8 (1):65-82.
    Concussion in professional football is a topic that has generated a significant amount of interest for many years, partly due in recent times to the filing of the class-action litigation and the uncapped compensation injury fund and settlement involving 4,500 retired professional players and the National Football League. The proceedings claimed that the NFL, as the governing body of American football, failed in its duty to protect players’ health during their professional playing careers by exposing players to risks of repetitive (...)
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  48.  19
    On the Emergence of Syntactic Structures: Quantifying and Modeling Duality of Patterning.Vittorio Loreto, Pietro Gravino, Vito D. P. Servedio & Francesca Tria - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (2):469-480.
    The complex organization of syntax in hierarchical structures is one of the core design features of human language. Duality of patterning refers, for instance, to the organization of the meaningful elements in a language at two distinct levels: a combinatorial level, where meaningless forms are combined into meaningful forms; and a compositional level, where meaningful forms are composed into larger lexical units. The question remains wide open regarding how such structures could have emerged. The aim of this paper is to (...)
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  49.  11
    Dynamic Deliberation.William L. Harper - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:353 - 364.
    Skyrms' investigations of dynamic deliberation are traced through his book of 1990 and his subsequent investigation of dynamic deliberation based on inductive rules to his recent results about chaos generated by evolutionary game dynamics. It is argued that the dynamics studied in the book, and the inductive dynamics as well, need to be supplemented to yield the correct recommendation in an example game. Some features about information feedback are pointed out. Finally, it is suggested that (...)
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  50.  50
    Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skilfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing (...)
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