Decision-Theoretic Puzzles

My topic is how to make decisions when you possess foreknowledge of the consequences of your choice. Many have thought that these kinds of decisions pose a distinctive and novel problem for causal decision theory (CDT). My thesis is that foreknowledge poses no new problems for CDT. Some of the purported problems are not problems. Others are problems, but they are not problems for CDT. Rather, they are problems for our theories of subjunctive supposition. Others are problems, but they are (...) not new problems. They are old problems transposed into a new key. Nonetheless, decisions made with foreknowledge illustrate important lessons about the instrumental value of our choices. Once we've appreciated these lessons, we are left with a version of CDT which faces no novel threats from foreknowledge. (shrink)

Since Kenneth Arrow showed the general possibility theorem, a number of social choice theorists have provided alternative proofs of it. In a recent article, Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 26:211–215, 2005) has constructed a new proof of the theorem. The present article provides alternative proofs of various Arrovian impossibility results from the 1960s to the 1970s by utilizing Geanakoplos’s method. We prove semi-order impossibility theorems, the quasi-transitive veto theorem, the quasi-transitive dictatorship theorem, the triple acyclic veto theorem, and the impossibility theorem without (...) the Pareto principle. (shrink)

Recall that B is PA relative to A if B computes a member of every nonempty $\Pi ^0_1(A)$ class. This two-place relation is invariant under Turing equivalence and so can be thought of as a binary relation on Turing degrees. Miller and Soskova [23] introduced the notion of a $\Pi ^0_1$ class relative to an enumeration oracle A, which they called a $\Pi ^0_1{\left \langle {A}\right \rangle }$ class. We study the induced extension of the relation B is PA relative (...) to A to enumeration oracles and hence enumeration degrees. We isolate several classes of enumeration degrees based on their behavior with respect to this relation: the PA bounded degrees, the degrees that have a universal class, the low for PA degrees, and the ${\left \langle {\text {self}\kern1pt}\right \rangle }$ -PA degrees. We study the relationship between these classes and other known classes of enumeration degrees. We also investigate a group of classes of enumeration degrees that were introduced by Kalimullin and Puzarenko [14] based on properties that are commonly studied in descriptive set theory. As part of this investigation, we give characterizations of three of their classes in terms of a special sub-collection of relativized $\Pi ^0_1$ classes—the separating classes. These three can then be seen to be direct analogues of three of our classes. We completely determine the relative position of all classes in question. (shrink)

A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major obstacles to the modelling (...) of de minimis risk. The key move is to introduce, into decision theory, a non-probabilistic conception of risk known as normic risk. (shrink)

This article examines the prisoner's dilemma paradox and argues that confessing is the rational choice, despite this probably entailing a less-than-ideal outcome.

In Richard Bradley’s book, Decision Theory with a Human Face, we have selected two themes for discussion. The first is the Bolker-Jeffrey theory of decision, which the book uses throughout as a tool to reorganize the whole field of decision theory, and in particular to evaluate the extent to which expected utility theories may be normatively too demanding. The second theme is the redefinition strategy that can be used to defend EU theories against the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, a strategy (...) that the book by and large endorses, and even develops in an original way concerning the Ellsberg paradox. We argue that the BJ theory is too specific to fulfil Bradley’s foundational project and that the redefinition strategy fails in both the Allais and Ellsberg cases. Although we share Bradley’s conclusion that EU theories do not state universal rationality requirements, we reach it not by a comparison with BJ theory, but by a comparison with the non-EU theories that the paradoxes have heuristically suggested. (shrink)

We present a formal measure of argument strength, which combines the ideas that conclusions of strong arguments are (i) highly probable and (ii) their uncertainty is relatively precise. Likewise, arguments are weak when their conclusion probability is low or when it is highly imprecise. We show how the proposed measure provides a new model of the Ellsberg paradox. Moreover, we further substantiate the psychological plausibility of our approach by an experiment (N = 60). The data show that the proposed measure (...) predicts human inferences in the original Ellsberg task and in corresponding argument strength tasks. Finally, we report qualitative data taken from structured interviews on folk psychological conceptions on what argument strength means. (shrink)

David Gauthier argues that it can be rational to perform a non-maximizing cooperative act, since there are certain situations in which it is rational to adopt an intention to perform a non-maximizing cooperative act, and since if it is rational to adopt an intention to do something, then it is rational to do that thing. An important objection to this argument focuses on the move from the rationality of adopting intentions to the rationality of acting on them. Gregory Kavka argues (...) that there are other situations – involving deterrence rather than cooperation – in which it is rational to adopt an intention to perform an irrational retaliatory action, that these situations and the cooperative ones are relevantly similar, so that, in the original cooperative situations, it is rational to adopt an intention to cooperate but irrational actually to cooperate. In this paper, I examine one way in which the argument for cooperation may be reformulated to circumvent this particular objection. (shrink)

This paper presents a new kind of problem in the ethics of distribution. The problem takes the form of several “calibration dilemmas,” in which intuitively reasonable aversion to small-stakes inequalities requires leading theories of distribution to recommend intuitively unreasonable aversion to large-stakes inequalities. We first lay out a series of such dilemmas for prioritarian theories. We then consider a widely endorsed family of egalitarian views and show that they are subject to even more forceful calibration dilemmas than prioritarian theories. Finally, (...) we show that our results challenge common utilitarian accounts of the badness of inequalities in resources. (shrink)

This paper argues that instrumental rationality is more permissive than expected utility theory. The most compelling instrumentalist argument in favour of separability, its core requirement, is that agents with non-separable preferences end up badly off by their own lights in some dynamic choice problems. I argue that once we focus on the question of whether agents’ attitudes to uncertain prospects help define their ends in their own right, or instead only assign instrumental value in virtue of the outcomes they may (...) lead to, we see that the argument must fail. Either attitudes to prospects assign non-instrumental value in their own right, in which case we cannot establish the irrationality of the dynamic choice behaviour of agents with non-separable preferences. Or they don’t, in which case agents with non-separable preferences can avoid the problematic choice behaviour without adopting separable preferences. (shrink)

In the dynamic choice literature, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that, on the one hand, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally irrational for her to give into temptation. On the other hand, resisting temptation also requires her to (...) act contrary to the preferences she has at the time of temptation. But that seems to be instrumentally irrational as well. I here consider the two most prominent types of argument why resisting temptation could nevertheless be instrumentally rational, namely two-tier and intra-personal cooperation arguments. I establish that the arguments either fail or are redundant. In particular, the arguments fail under the pervasive assumption in both decision theory and the wider literature on practical rationality that the agent’s preferences over the objects of choice are themselves the standard of instrumental rationality. And they either still fail or they become redundant when we give up that assumption. (shrink)

This article argues that Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, undermines the theory’s claim to capturing a steady choice disposition in the (...) face of risk. I argue that this poses a challenge to alternatives to expected utility theory more generally. (shrink)

Cerreia-Vioglio et al. :341–375, 2011) have proposed a very general axiomatisation of preferences in the presence of ambiguity, viz. Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean preference orderings. This paper investigates the problem of Arrovian aggregation of such preferences—and proves dictatorial impossibility results for both finite and infinite populations. Applications for the special case of aggregating expected-utility preferences are given. A novel proof methodology for special aggregation problems, based on model theory, is employed.

Standard decision theory, or rational choice theory, is often interpreted to be a theory of instrumental rationality. This dissertation argues, however, that the core requirements of orthodox decision theory cannot be defended as general requirements of instrumental rationality. Instead, I argue that these requirements can only be instrumentally justified to agents who have a desire to have choice dispositions that are stable over time and across different choice contexts. Past attempts at making instrumentalist arguments for the core requirements of decision (...) theory fail due to a pervasive assumption in decision theory, namely the assumption that the agent’s preferences over the objects of choice – be it outcomes or uncertain prospects – form the standard of instrumental rationality against which the agent’s actions are evaluated. I argue that we should instead take more basic desires to be the standard of instrumental rationality. But unless agents have a desire to have stable choice dispositions, according to this standard, instrumental rationality turns out to be more permissive than orthodox decision theory. (shrink)

Human agents happen to judge that a conjunction of two terms is more probable than one of the terms, in contradiction with the rules of classical probabilities—this is the conjunction fallacy. One of the most discussed accounts of this fallacy is currently the quantum-like explanation, which relies on models exploiting the mathematics of quantum mechanics. The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical adequacy of major quantum-like models which represent beliefs with quantum states. We first argue that they (...) can be tested in three different ways, in a question order effect configuration which is different from the traditional conjunction fallacy experiment. We then carry out our proposed experiment, with varied methodologies from experimental economics. The experimental results we get are at odds with the predictions of the quantum-like models. This strongly suggests that this quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy fails. Future possible research paths are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the decision-theoretic status of risk attitudes. I start by providing evidence showing that the risk attitude concepts do not play a major role in the axiomatic analysis of the classic models of decision-making under risk. This can be interpreted as reflecting the neutrality of these models between the possible risk attitudes. My central claim, however, is that such neutrality needs to be qualified and the axiomatic relevance of risk attitudes needs to be re-evaluated accordingly. Specifically, (...) I highlight the importance of the conditional variation and the strengthening of risk attitudes, and I explain why they establish the axiomatic significance of the risk attitude concepts. I also present several questions for future research regarding the strengthening of risk attitudes. (shrink)

The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility. However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees (...) of belief and full knowledge of all a priori truths. Ordinary subjects do not look very rational when compared to the kinds of agents usually talked about in decision theory. In this paper, I will develop an expected utility representation theorem aimed at the representation of those who are neither probabilistically coherent, logically omniscient, nor expected utility maximisers across the board—that is, agents who are frequently irrational. The agents in question may be deductively fallible, have incoherent credences, limited representational capacities, and fail to maximise expected utility for all but a limited class of gambles. (shrink)

C onsider two contrary conditionals 1 about two envelopes, Ali and Baba: (a) If Ali has more money than Baba, the difference between the amounts in them is $5. (b) If Ali has more money than Baba, the difference between the amounts in them is $10. Can these both be true? The answer is a resounding yes on the standard account of conditionals, which identifies indicative con- ditionals with material conditionals. It is not the same with many other contemporary accounts (...) of c onditionals. They yield a quali- fied negative answer: (a) and (b) are not compatible 2 unless their common antecedent cannot be true. I think this is a wrong answer. The conditionals can both be true while their antecedent states a possibility. This is what I aim to show in this paper. In doing so, I present a solution to Raymond Smullyan’s intriguing version of the two-envelope paradox. (shrink)

This article sets out to propose some characteristic features of the intellectual and ethical attitudes which, in the popular belief and scholarly communities alike, stand for ideals worthy of promoting as ones which could underpin a modern society where both believers and unbelievers can feel at home. The “ethos” is construed to be about the sort of behaviour logically stemming from a tolerant outlook on the one hand, and an intellectual commitment to a noble cause worthy of one’s efforts, on (...) the other. (shrink)

David Gauthier; XII*—In the Neighbourhood of the Newcomb-Predictor (Reflections on Rationality), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1.

We use probability-matching variations on Ellsberg’s single-urn experiment to assess three questions: (1) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to changes from a gain to a loss frame? (2) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to making ambiguity easier to recognize? (3) What is the relation between subjects’ consistency of choice and the ambiguity attitudes their choices display? Contrary to most other studies, we find that a switch from a gain to a loss frame does not lead to a switch from ambiguity (...) aversion to ambiguity neutrality and/or ambiguity seeking. We also find that making ambiguity easier to recognize has little effect. Finally, we find that while ambiguity aversion does not depend on consistency, other attitudes do: consistent choosers are much more likely to be ambiguity neutral, while ambiguity seeking is much more frequent among highly inconsistent choosers. (shrink)

Ambivalence of desire and action in light of it are ordinary human engagements and yet received conceptions of desire and action deny that such action is possible. This paper contains an analysis of the possibility of fertile ambivalent compromises conjointly with a reconstruction of (Davidsonian) basic rationality and of action-desire relations. It is argued that the Aristotelian practical syllogism ought not to be conceived as paralysing the ambivalent agent. The practical syllogism makes compromise behaviour possible, including compromise action in the (...) strong sense of acting to satisfy both of one's contrary desires at once. One's action can to a certain extent fulfil both desires by not exactly satisfying either. In showing this, attitudes including desires are analysed in terms of a soft identity, according to which they are both defined by concrete interlinkages with other attitudes and actual and possible behaviour, and transcend any such connections. In particular, not only do desires have a range, but rather the relation of desire and fulfilment is such that to want something allows a wider range as to what counts as fulfilment. (shrink)

Among recent objections to Pascal's Wager, two are especially compelling. The first is that decision theory, and specifically the requirement of maximizing expected utility, is incompatible with infinite utility values. The second is that even if infinite utility values are admitted, the argument of the Wager is invalid provided that we allow mixed strategies. Furthermore, Hájek has shown that reformulations of Pascal's Wager that address these criticisms inevitably lead to arguments that are philosophically unsatisfying and historically unfaithful. Both the objections (...) and Hájek's philosophical worries disappear, however, if we represent our preferences using relative utilities rather than a one-place utility function. Relative utilities provide a conservative way to make sense of infinite value that preserves the familiar equation of rationality with the maximization of expected utility. They also provide a means of investigating a broader class of problems related to the Wager. (shrink)

In the Newcomb problem, the standard arguments for taking either one box or both boxes adduce what seem to be relevant considerations, but they are not complete arguments, and attempts to complete the arguments rely upon incorrect principles of rational decision making. It is argued that by considering how the predictor is making his prediction, we can generate a more complete argument, and this in turn supports a form of causal decision theory.

Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) present and analyse the sequential decision problem of an “absentminded driver”. The driver's absentmindedness (imperfect recall) leads him to time-inconsistent strategy evaluations. His original evaluation gets replaced by a new one under impact of the information that the circumstances have changed, notwithstanding the fact that this change in circumstances has been expected by him all along. The time inconsistency in strategy evaluation suggests that such an agent might have reason to renege on his adopted strategy. As (...) we shall see, however, this danger is only apparent. There is no serious problem of dynamic inconsistency in this case. My diagnosis of the case under consideration is in many respects similar to the one provided by Aumann, Hart and Perry (1997), but the analysis leading to this diagnosis is not quite the same. (shrink)

This paper describes a scenario in which a person in his afterlife will with probability 1 spend twice as many days in Heaven as in Hell, but, even though Heaven is as good as Hell is bad, his expected utility for any given day in that afterlife is negative.

Richard Jeffrey said that Newcomb’s Problem may be seen “as a rock on which... Bayesianism... must founder” and the problem has been almost universally conceived as reconciling the science-fictional features of the decision problem with a plausible causal analysis. Later, Jeffrey renounced his earlier position that accepted Newcomb problems as genuine decision problems, suggesting “Newcomb problems are like Escher’s famous staircase”. We may interpret this to mean that we know there can be no such thing, though we see no local (...) flaw in the puzzle. In this paper, I develop the critique of Slezak to show that Jeffrey’s analogy is apt for a puzzle whose logical features can be precisely articulated and I propose an easily realizable experiment that convincingly supports this analysis. I suggest that these real-life analogs of Newcomb’s Problem have diverted attention from the essential function of the science-fiction of a predicting demon. Following Eells, similarities with realistic problems such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and common cause cases have suggested that Newcomb’s Problem may be given a coherent description and realized in some way consistent with classical causation. However, the peculiarity of the apparent link between one’s choice and the previously determined contents of the second box is the central, defining feature of Newcomb’s Problem. I argue that the predictor may not be merely a fiction providing insufficient “extra information” as both McKay and Levi suggest. Rather, I suggest that the decision problem permits a precise specification revealing the source of the notorious perplexity. Notwithstanding efforts to rescue the coherence of Newcomb’s Problem and a classical causal account, a simulation of the decision problem establishes the correctness of my analysis and, thereby, hopefully ending the debate. (shrink)

_The face of American education is evolving—and the roadmap is clear_ _On the Rocketship: How Top Charter Schools are Pushing the Envelope_ examines the rise and expansion of leading charter school network Rocketship, revealing the "secret sauce" that makes a successful program. A strong narrative with a timely message, the book explores how Rocketship started and the difficulties encountered as it expands. Designing schools for children who have been failed by traditional schools is extremely challenging work. Setbacks are inevitable. Later (...) in the book the narrative shifts to the national picture, exploring how high performing charter schools are changing the education landscape in cities such as Denver, Memphis, and Houston. The book emerges just as charter schools are running into stiff political opposition in New York City and elsewhere. Even in San Jose, Rocketship's home base, the pushback against charter schools is gaining speed. _On the Rocketship_ becomes a valuable resource for explaining what's at stake in this battle. Lose these schools, in New York, San Jose and other cities, and low-income and minority students lose their best shot at a quality education. Written by a veteran journalist who followed Rocketship through a school year, the book explores some of the factors that make Rocketship and other charters successful, including the blended learning that was pioneered at charter schools, especially Rocketship. Many schools around the country are looking to Rocketship as a model for implementing blended learning. The interplay between charter schools and blended learning is setting a change in motion, and the American education system is ready to evolve. _On the Rocketship_ details this phenomenon, providing insights for educators across the nation. (shrink)

Both dilation and non-conglomerability have been alleged to conflict with a fundamental principle of Bayesian methodology that we call \textit{Good's Principle}: one should always delay making a terminal decision between alternative courses of action if given the opportunity to first learn, at zero cost, the outcome of an experiment relevant to the decision. In particular, both dilation and non-conglomerability have been alleged to permit or even mandate choosing to make a terminal decision in deliberate ignorance of relevant, cost-free information. Although (...) dilation and non-conglomerability share some similarities, some authors maintain that there are important differences between the two that warrant endorsing different normative positions regarding dilation and non-conglomerability. This article reassesses the grounds for treating dilation and non-conglomerability differently. Our analysis exploits a new and general characterization result for dilation to draw a closer connection between dilation and non-conglomerability. (shrink)

We study the Hausdorff lower semicontinuous envelope of the length in the plane. This envelope is taken with respect to the Hausdorff metric on the space of the continua. The resulting quantity appeared naturally as the rate function of a large deviation principle in a statistical mechanics context and seems to deserve further analysis. We provide basic simple results which parallel those available for the perimeter of Caccioppoli and De Giorgi.

Newcomb's Problem is a hypothetical situation wherein you are called upon to choose between two possible but mutually exclusive acts for both of which there are seemingly compelling, if not conclusive, arguments. As such it is a challenge to those who would construct a coherent and complete theory of rational decision. After introducing and clarifying the problem I suggest, following Robert Nozick, that the conflict, if there be such, is between a policy of choosing a dominant act and an policy (...) of maximizing expected utility. Both of these policies are discussed and strengthened. I then argue that if Newcomb's Problem is interpreted in one way, the result is that we have conclusive reasons for choosing both acts because one act is dominant while the other maximizes utility. I criticize and reject the view of Alan Gibbard and William Harper that the dominant act is also the utility maximizing act. The upshot is that the problem itself must be rejected because it requires either that the agent hold to an inconsistent set of beliefs or that the agent does not have the choice of acts that the problem postulates. If Newcomb's Problem be reinterpreted so as to avoid both of these results, then it ceases to be paradoxical. Hence, the challenge is met by rejecting the problem or interpreting it in a way that allows for a solution within the confines of an already available theory of rational decision. (shrink)