The paper has outlined a broad perspective of references for the (particular and general) theory of relativity to various domains of human knowledge and to technique. These references are presented both in their current and historical dimension. The following issues are discussed: 1) the place of the theory of relativity in the development of physics and cosmology, 2) its contribution to the development of mathematics, 3) the significance of the theory of relativity in the development of technique, and 4) the (...) role of the theory of relativity in the development of philosophy. The theory of relativity is – aside to quantum mechanics – one of the two basic paradigms (relativistic paradigm) of contemporary physics. Likewise it plays a fundamental role in further development of physics, astronomy and cosmology, contributing at the same time to the development of mathematics and philosophy. The author indicates that it is groundless to refer to the theory of relativity in the efforts to relativise and subjectivise cognitive and axiological questions. The theory of relativity does not relativise all its concepts of magnitudes, but it even confers the absolute status on certain magnitudes, which have been deemed relative before. (shrink)

In this essay I shall try to offer an outline of an answer to the question of which subject matter and which methodological peculiarities of cosmology caused cosmology only in this century to be transformed into one of the scientific branches of physics in spite of the fact that cosmological considerations on the Universe, and particularly on its origin, are present in the most archaic cultures and so belong to some of the oldest springs of human thought.

This contribution responds to the ongoing discussion about the narrativity of history and looks at some differences between fictive and historical narrative. The objective of this contribution is to further elaborate on the ideas of narrative transformations developed by Wolf Schmid, focusing particularly on historical narratives. The authors see differences between both kinds of narrative, especially on the level of reference (which is in line with the views of D. Cohn, P. Ricouer and L. Doležel). The problem of fiction and (...) reference is illustrated by Schmid's four tiered narratological model, especially on the level of happening. In fiction, this tier (of happening) is inferred backwards based on the presentation of the narration. This tier is positioned (excluded in absentia) so the elements of the narrative can be selected. In historical narrative happening has a different status and precedes both the story and the text. Although the shape of the past is related to the presentation of the narrative, it is not determined by nor reduced to it. The authors of this contribution describe the specific character and aspects of narrative transformation in the writing process. (shrink)

The harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis of "disorder" holds that disorders are harmful failures of "designed" (that is, naturally selected) functions. Murphy and Woolfolk (2000) present a series of proposed counterexamples to the HD analysis to support their claim that it fails to provide a necessary condition for disorder. They argue that disorder can exist where there is no failed function, as in failed spandrels and inflamed vestigial organs, and that there can be disorders when everything is working as designed, as (...) in environment--design mismatches and disorders acquired through normal learning processes. They also argue that the HD analysis suffers from methodological problems, including value-ladenness of dysfunction judgments and unwarranted assumptions about the nature of internal mechanisms and their functions. -/- In this paper, each of these objections is critically evaluated. Reanalysis of the proposed counterexamples is argued to reveal strong support for the HD analysis. For example, failed spandrels are considered disorders when and only when they imply failures of designed functions; dysfunctions of vestigial organs involve failures of function at the tissue level, not the organ level; mechanism-environment mismatches are not considered disorders; and conditions acquired through normal learning processes can involve dysfunctions and are considered disordered only when they do. Murphy and Woolfolk's methodological objections are found to be based on a misinterpretation of the HD analysis. It is concluded that Murphy and Woolfolk fail to offer a cogent objection to the HD analysis. (shrink)

People are often offended by beliefs, expect apologies for beliefs, apologize for their own beliefs. In many mundane cases, people are morally criticized for their beliefs. Intuitively, then, beliefs seem to sometimes wrong people. Recently, the philosophical literature has picked up on this theme, and has started to discuss it under the heading of doxastic wrongdoing. In this paper we argue that despite the strength of such initial intuitions, at the end of the day they have to be rejected. If (...) it can be ever truthfully asserted that beliefs wrong, this is always derivative – beliefs wrong only in virtue of other things (like evidence-gathering actions) wronging. We distinguish between modest and ambitious doxastic wrongdoing theories (the former deny, while the latter accept, the possibility of a morally wrong yet epistemically permissible belief); we argue that each of these options faces insurmountable problems; and we offer partly debunking explanations of the intuitions purportedly supporting doxastic wrongdoing. (shrink)

Im zehnten Buch seiner Confessiones befaßt sich Augustinus mit der Frage der Selbsterkenntnis oder mit der "Suche nach dem wahren Leben". Obwohl er davon ausgeht, daß jeder Mensch sich selbst besser kennt, als andere ihn kennen, hält er dafür, daß diese Selbstsicherheit kein Garant sein kann für das Gelingen eines guten Lebens, das für ihn - wir schreiben das Mittelalter - nur dann seine Erfüllung erlangt, wenn der Handelnde die moralischen Vorgaben einhält, die Gott dem Menschen gesetzt hat. Denn Augustinus (...) ist sich dessen bewußt, daß die Selbsteinschätzung des einzelnen unsicher und fehlerhaft sein kann und er eigentlich nicht in der Lage ist, sein eigenes Sein ganz erfassen zu können. Thema ist in 'Confessiones 10' daher die Suche nach der Antwort auf die Frage, wie der einzelne, dessen Würde gerade darin besteht, aus Freiheit und in eigener Verantwortung zu handeln, dazu gelangt, in seinem Handeln nicht rein egoistischen Interessen zu folgen, sondern das hohe Ziel zu erreichen, aus eigener Einsicht und eigenem Antrieb ein gottgefälliges Leben zu führen, will sagen: den von Gott gesetzten Geboten zu genügen. Nach Augustinus können lediglich die Menschen die göttliche Vollendung, auf die hin alle geschaffen sind, erlangen, die trotz ihrer Endlichkeit den Weg wohlwollender, nichtegoistischer Liebe suchen. Christus gilt ihm als Brücke, die von Gott zu den Menschen führt, sobald sie diesen - trotz ihrer Bedürftigkeit, Schwäche und Endlichkeit - den Weg zu einem Leben der "Heiligkeit" bahnt. (shrink)

Vom Hildegardis-Fest am 17. September 1997 bis zum September des darauffolgenden Jahres erstreckten sich im Gebiet zwischen Bermersheim und Eibingen und von Bingen bis Mainz die Feierlichkeiten zum 900-jahrigen Geburtsjubilaum Hildegards von Bingen. Die Verehrung der Volksheiligen aus dem Raum zwischen Nahe und Rhein hat auch in unserer Zeit zu vielfaltigen Veranstaltungen angeregt. Der Kongress stand unter dem Thema, das jetzt auch den Titel dieses Bandes hergibt, und fand vom 16. bis 21. Marz 1998 im Erbacher Hof statt.".

People who suffer survivor’s guilt reason that, if they survived while others didn’t, then this must be because of the choices that they made, and that others did not make. People with survivor’s guilt feel just the way they would feel if they did not really believe in luck.

Many philosophical views have the surprising implication that, within the boundaries of each human being, there is not just one mind, but many: anywhere from two (the person and their brain, or the person and their body) to trillions (each of the nearly-entirely-overlapping precise entities generated by the Problem of the Many). This is often treated as absurd, a problem of ‘Too Many Minds’, which we must find ways to avoid. It is often thought specifically absurd to allow such a (...) multiplication of conscious subjects, even if we could accept it for physical objects. I consider metaphysical, phenomenological, and moral arguments for this asymmetry, and show that they all fail: many overlapping conscious minds is no more problematic than many overlapping physical objects. Theories that imply such a multiplicity may or may not be true, but they cannot be rejected simply for implying it. (shrink)

Despite the bombardment of AI ethics frameworks (AIEFs) published in the last decade, it is unclear which of the many have been adopted in the industry. What is more, the sheer volume of AIEFs without a clear demonstration of their effectiveness makes it difficult for businesses to select which framework they should adopt. As a first step toward addressing this problem, we employed four different existing frameworks to assess AI ethics concerns of a real-world AI system. We compared the experience (...) of applying the AIEFs from the perspective of (a) a third-party auditor conducting an AI ethics risk assessment for the company, and (b) the company receiving the audit outcomes. Our results suggest that the feel-good factor of doing an assessment is common across the AIEFs that can take anywhere between 1.5 and 20 h to complete. However, each framework provides different benefits (e.g., issue discovery vs. issue monitoring) and is likely best used in conjunction with one another at different stages of an AI development process. As such, we call on the AI ethics community to better specify the suitability and expected benefits of existing frameworks to enable better adoption of AI ethics practice in the industry. (shrink)

It is frequently alleged that a round plate viewed from an oblique angle looks elliptical, and that when one tree is in front of another that is the same intrinsic size, the front one looks larger than the rear one. And yet there is also a clear sense in which the plate viewed from an angle looks round, and a clear sense in which the two trees look to be the same size. According to the Dual Content Theory (DCT), what (...) explains these and other similar phenomena is that perceptual experiences present us with two different sorts of spatial properties: intrinsic and perspectival spatial properties. I will argue that the Dual Content Theory is false because it rests on flawed phenomenological descriptions of the experience of spatial properties. The only conditions under which a plate tilted away and an ellipse look alike, or two objects which are different in size look the same size, is when at least one of the objects being compared is misperceived. I will consider several responses to the arguments I present, and conclude by suggesting that abandoning DCT would constitute an improvement upon Noë’s enactive theory of perception. (shrink)

In an era when much of what passes for debate is merely moral posturing--traditional family values versus the cultural elite, free speech versus censorship--or reflexive name-calling--the terms "liberal" and "politically correct," are used with as much dismissive scorn by the right as "reactionary" and "fascist" are by the left--Stanley Fish would seem an unlikely lightning rod for controversy. A renowned scholar of Milton, head of the English Department of Duke University, Fish has emerged as a brilliantly original critic of the (...) culture at large, praised and pilloried as a vigorous debunker of the pieties of both the left and right. His mission is not to win the cultural wars that preoccupy the nation's attention, but rather to redefine the terms of battle. In There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, Fish takes aim at the ideological gridlock paralyzing academic and political exchange in the nineties. In his witty, accessible dissections of the swirling controversies over multiculturalism, affirmative action, canon revision, hate speech, and legal reform, he neatly eviscerates both the conservatives' claim to possession of timeless, transcendent values, and the intellectual left's icons of equality, tolerance, and non-discrimination. He argues that while conservative ideologues and liberal stalwarts might disagree vehemently on what is essential to a culture, or to a curriculum, both mistakenly believe that what is essential can be identified apart from the accidental circumstances to which the essential is ritually opposed. In the book's first section, which includes the five essays written for Fish's celebrated debates with Dinesh D'Souza, Fish turns his attention to the neoconservative backlash. In his introduction, Fish writes, "Terms that come to us wearing the label 'apolitical'--'common values', 'fairness', 'merit', 'color blind', 'free speech', 'reason'--are in fact the ideologically charged constructions of a decidedly political agenda. I make the point not in order to level an accusation, but to remove the sting of accusation from the world 'politics' and redefine it as a synonym for what everyone inevitably does." Fish maintains that the debate over political correctness is an artificial one, because it is simply not possible for any party or individual to occupy a position above or beyond politics. Regarding the controversy over the revision of the college curriculum, Fish argues that the point is not to try to insist that inclusion of ethnic and gender studies is not a political decision, but "to point out that any alternative curriculum--say a diet of exclusively Western or European texts--would be no less politically invested." In Part Two, Fish follows the implications of his arguments to a surprising rejection of the optimistic claims of the intellectual left that awareness of the historical roots of our beliefs and biases can allow us, as individuals or as a society, to escape or transcend them. Specifically, he turns to the movement for reform of legal studies, and insists that a dream of a legal culture in which no one's values are slighted or declared peripheral can no more be realized than the dream of a concept of fairness that answers to everyone's notions of equality and jsutice, or a yardstick of merit that is true to everyone's notions of worth and substance. Similarly, he argues that attempts to politicize the study of literature are ultimately misguided, because recharacterizations of literary works have absolutely no impact on the mainstream of political life. He concludes his critique of the academy with "The Unbearable Ugliness of Volvos," an extraordinary look at some of the more puzzing, if not out-and-out masochistic, characteristics of a life in academia. Penetrating, fearless, and brilliantly argued, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech captures the essential Fish. It is must reading for anyone who cares about the outcome of America's cultural wars. (shrink)

There have been two recent strands of argument arguing for the pro tanto impermissibility of fully autonomous weapon systems. On Sparrow's view, AWS are impermissible because they generate a morally problematic ‘responsibility gap’. According to Purves et al., AWS are impermissible because moral reasoning is not codifiable and because AWS are incapable of acting for the ‘right’ reasons. I contend that these arguments are flawed and that AWS are not morally problematic in principle. Specifically, I contend that these arguments presuppose (...) an incoherent conception of an AWS as somehow making genuine decisions but not being morally responsible for those very same decisions. Rather than conceiving of AWS in this way, I argue that an AWS is either a socially-constructed institution that has been physically instantiated or it is a genuine agent. If it is the former, then we should treat AWS as we do any other collective action problem. If it is the latter, then we should treat AWS as responsibility-bearers, but also as bearers of rights and/or interests. To reject this disjunction is not only conceptually incoherent but also potentially morally dangerous. (shrink)

Bei der Suche nach dem Geist handelt es sich seit Jahrhunderten um ein zentrales Unterfangen in der Philosophie, das u.a. durch die folgenden Fragen charakterisiert ist: Was sind Merkmale des Geistes? Welche Arten geistiger Zustände lassen sich unterscheiden? Ist eine naturwissenschaftliche oder physikalische Erklärung des Geistes möglich? Lässt sich das Geistige auf das Physikalische reduzieren? Ist das Physikalische kausal abgeschlossen? Was heißt es eigentlich, dass etwas physikalisch ist? Wie kann der Geist Handlungen bewirken? Können wir denn so handeln, wie wir (...) wollen? Ist unser Wille frei? Welche Rolle spielen neurowissenschaftliche Ergebnisse für die Entwicklung einer guten Theorie des Geistes? Und welche Rolle spielen philosophische Gedankenexperimente? Was macht überhaupt eine gute Theorie des Geistes aus? Dieser Band, der auch an Einsteiger gerichtet ist, versammelt Beiträge zur Suche nach dem Geist von Andreas Hüttemann, Holger Lyre, Jan G. Michel, Gernot Münster, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Achim Stephan und Henrik Walter. (shrink)

Though the word "atonement" does not appear in King Lear, the concept is present, along with related ones, like sin, justice, redemption, and sacrifice. Like other plays, Lear alludes to various atonement theories, setting them in dramatic conflict or cooperation and subjecting some to critique. Besides revealing the inadequacy of models based on payment or punishment, the play reinterprets the sacrificial theory of atonement by presenting sacrifice (especially that of Cordelia) as gracious and redemptive self-offering, not as a punishment or (...) payment that satisfies anger or offended honor. Though the play’s religious references, including to Christ, are pervasive, ultimately atonement takes place at a human level, in the healing of relationships and inner maladies. Yet such atonement involves what may be called “ethical transcendence,” a transcendence consisting not in an ascent beyond the human condition, but rather in the offering of oneself in relationship and service to others. (shrink)