Alvin Plantinga has recently argued that there are certain propositions which are necessary but known only a posteriori. If Plantinga is correct then he has shown that the traditional view that all necessary truths are knowable a priori is false. Plantinga's examples deserve special attention because they differ in important respects from other proposed examples of necessary a posteriori truths. His examples depend on a certain conception of possible worlds and in particular on his conception of the actual world. It (...) will be argued that these examples of necessary a posteriori propositions can be understood in two different ways. According to one way of understanding Plantinga, the propositions turn out to be contingent a posteriori truths, and according to the other way they turn out to be necessary a priori truths. The plausibility of Plantinga's position is due to a confusion between the two possible interpretations. (shrink)

There is a rather famous “Fitch argument” that not everything that is true is knowable. There is a rather famous “Mary argument” that is often used to argue that reductive physicalism is false. This paper sets out the two side by side as the Fitch Knowability Paradox and the Mary Knowability Paradox. It is found that they have the same logical form and thus the question of validity can be evaluated with the same tools. Likening the two is (...) useful, since it avoids the problem that since the logical forms involved in intentional and experiential contexts are unknown, we cannot be in a position to evaluate whether the Mary is deductively valid without begging questions. (shrink)

In an attempt to improve upon Alexander Pruss’s work (The principle of sufficient reason: A reassessment, pp. 240–248, 2006), I (Weaver, Synthese 184(3):299–317, 2012) have argued that if all purely contingent events could be caused and something like a Lewisian analysis of causation is true (per, Lewis’s, Causation as influence, reprinted in: Collins, Hall and paul. Causation and counterfactuals, 2004), then all purely contingent events have causes. I dubbed the derivation of the universality of causation the “Lewisian argument”. The Lewisian (...) argument assumed not a few controversial metaphysical theses, particularly essentialism, an incommunicable-property view of essences (per Plantinga’s, Actualism and possible worlds, reprinted in: Davidson (ed.) Essays in the metaphysics of modality, 2003), and the idea that counterfactual dependence is necessary for causation. There are, of course, substantial objections to such theses. While I think a fight against objections to the Lewisian argument can be won, I develop, in what follows, a much more intuitive argument for the universality of causation which takes as its inspiration a result from Frederic B. Fitch’s work (J Symb Logic 28(2):135–142, 1963) [with credit to who we now know was Alonzo church’s, Referee Reports on Fitch’s Definition of value, in: (Salerno (ed.), New essays on the knowability paradox, 2009)] that if all truths are such that they are knowable, then (counter-intuitively) all truths are known. The resulting Church–Fitch proof for the universality of causation is preferable to the Lewisian argument since it rests upon far weaker formal and metaphysical assumptions than those of the Lewisian argument. (shrink)

In this paper, I explain the curious role played by the Argument from Absolute Terms in Peter Unger's book Ignorance, I provide a critical presentation of the argument, and I consider some outstanding issues and the argument’s contemporary significance.

Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox (1961, p. 197) arises from considering a fair 1000 ticket lottery that has exactly one winning ticket. If this much is known about the execution of the lottery it is therefore rational to accept that one ticket will win. Suppose that an event is very likely if the probability of its occurring is greater than 0.99. On these grounds it is presumed rational to accept the proposition that ticket 1 of the lottery will not win. Since (...) the lottery is fair, it is rational to accept that ticket 2 won’t win either—indeed, it is rational to accept for any individual ticket i of the lottery that ticket i will not win. However, accepting that ticket 1 won’t win, accepting that ticket 2 won’t win, . . . , and accepting that ticket 1000 won’t win entails that it is rational to accept that no ticket will win, which entails that it is rational to accept the contradictory proposition that one ticket wins and no ticket wins. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Vasconcelos and Essentialist Conceptions of Mestizaje Gloria Anzaldúa: The New Mestizaje María Lugones: Mestizaje and Hybridity The New Mestizaje and Race Mestizaje and Pan‐Hispanic Identity References Further Reading.

Remapping Biology with Goethe, Schelling, and Herder recruits a Romantic philosophy of biology into contemporary debates to both integrate the theoretical implications of ecology, evolution, and development, and to contextualize the successes of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis's gene's-eye-view of biology. The dominant philosophy of biology in the twentieth century was one developed within and for the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis. As biologists like those developing an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis have pushed the limits of this paradigm, fresh philosophical approaches have become necessary. (...) This book makes the case that an organicism developed by the 19th century figures Goethe, Schelling, and Herder offers surprising resources to navigate the contemporary biological and evolutionary terrain. This "metamorphic organicism" resonates with present trends in biological theory that emphasize process, organismal dynamics, ecology, and agency. It also proposes strategies for reintegrating reductive and mechanistic maps of biology, like those of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, into richer theoretical representations of life. Drawing from cutting-edge biology, Romantic history, and perspectival pluralist literatures, this integrated history-and-philosophy-of-biology will be of interest to students and scholars interested in the genesis of current theoretical tensions in evolutionary biology, and to those seeking constructive ways to resolve those tensions, including practicing biologists and educators. (shrink)

Stoicism, a philosophy and set of practices developed in ancient times, commands ever-growing interest. Its present day, students, practitioners, teachers, and scholars adapt it to the challenges of modern life. This third volume brings together fifty pieces previously published in the Stoicism Today blog, ranging from personal essays to conference presentations, from bits of practical advice to history and interpretation, from polemics to symposia grappling with controversies, key issues, and central concepts. There is something for everyone in this volume. The (...) selections in this volume range over a vast array of topics. You will encounter authors applying Stoicism to parenting, medicine, psychotherapy, culinary arts, time-management, exercise and fitness, the emotions, relationships, the workplace, and the environment. Some selections examine useful practices, the nature and scope of the virtues, how to develop equanimity, resilience, and happiness. Comparative studies bring Stoicism into connection with Buddhism, mindfulness, self-help and productivity authors, and modalities of psychotherapy. This book bridges the gaps between philosophical reflection and practical wisdom, between study and interpretation of Stoicism, and its application to present-day issues and problems. The essays in this volume speak to anyone intending to start or to deepen a thoughtful Stoic life in the modern world. (shrink)

ArgumentContrary to common portrayals of social Darwinism as a transference of laissez-faire values, the widely read evolutionism of Japan's foremost Darwinist of the early twentieth-century, Oka Asajirō (1868–1944), reflects a statist outlook that regards capitalism as the beginning of the nation's degeneration. The evolutionary theory of orthogenesis that Oka employed in his 1910 essay, “The Future of Humankind,” links him to a pre-Darwinian idealist tradition that depicted the state as an organism that develops through life-cycle stages. For Oka, laissez-faire capitalism (...) marked the moment when the state began to decline toward extinction due to the orthogenetic overdevelopment of hitherto subordinate individual egos. Because conservative bureaucrat-intellectuals had been drawing upon this same organicist-developmental tradition since the 1880s in an attempt to forestall the social ills of industrialism, Oka's call for statist measures, including eugenics, to lessen and delay the atomizing, enervating, and corrupting influence of capitalism articulated the political vision of officialdom. Statist evolutionism, not social Darwinism, might be the term that best describes Oka's approach. (shrink)

_Evolution and Human Culture_ surveys disciplines of evolutionary studies to posit that hominin evolved moral sentiments have been integral to the development of artistic culture.

The purpose of this article is to explore the close link between technology and death in the philosophical writings of Lewis Mumford. Mumford famously argued that throughout the history of western civilization we find intertwined two competing forms of technics; the democratic biotechnic form and the authoritarian monotechnic form. The former technics were said to be strongly compatible with an organic form of life while the latter were said to be allied to a mechanical power complex. What is perhaps less (...) well known is the extent to which Mumford characterizes the authoritarian technical form as being a technics of death. This article will argue that the connection between death and technics is a key theme in Mumford’s philosophy of technology. In addition to elaborating this theme and detailing how it informs Mumford’s other positions on the nature of technology, this article will also argue that Mumford’s theory of a technics of death bears witness, both implicitly and explicitly, to the influence of Sigmund Freud’s theory of the death instinct. Freud’s account of the death instinct will be outlined briefly and its influence on Mumford’s writings will be explained. Death, in Mumford’s technological writings, has a generally negative function and serves to warn humanity of the perilous course that its technological civilization is set upon. However it also has a positive function in that it encourages man to transcend its biological existence in acts of creativity and purpose. Death, in this positive sense, serves the purpose of life whereas, in the negative sense, it hinders it. The role of death, in both aspects, will be explored and related to Mumford’s overall perspective on technics and life. It is argued that Mumford’s philosophy of technology cannot be fully understood without an awareness of his views on death and its role in the life of technological society. (shrink)

Given its title, one might expect Ayn Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE) to outline her positions on the issues normally covered in introductory courses and texts on epistemology. In particular, one might expect to find discussions of epistemic justification- i.e., "our right to the beliefs we have" (Dancy 2005, 263). Justification and the nature of knowledge are widely regarded as the essential subject matter of the field, and, as we will see, Rand effectively agrees with this consensus. 1 Yet (...) her monograph says little directly on these subjects. Rather, it is devoted entirely to the presentation of a theory of concepts. My subject in this essay is how a theory of concepts can be an introduction to an epistemology. More specifically, I will show how Rand's theory and the view of consciousness that it embodies relate to some concerns about justification that are familiar from the contemporary, analytic literature on epistemology. Though I will present some exegesis of Rand and some arguments in support of her positions and related theses of my own, this essay is not primarily exegetical or argumentative. My aim is, rather, to sketch the outlines of an epistemology in a way that brings out the relations between a seldom studied theory of concepts and some much debated questions about justification. I hope in doing so to shed light both on the theory and on the questions. I hope this paves the way for others to argue in greater detail for (or against) the theses I sketch here, and to do so in a way that engages more substantially with the analytic literature. In my view, the chief obstacle to work of this kind has been the lack of a big-picture account of the relation between the subject matter of ITOE and the central concern of analytic epistemology. This is the lack that I aim to remove. (shrink)

The Nicomachean Ethics is generally thought to be a “dialectical” work, aimed at resolving aporia in a set of endoxa, which it takes as its starting-point. I argue that Aristotle’s aim in the treatise is, rather, to produce definitions of key ethical terms, and that his starting-points are limited to evaluative and discriminative judgments of a certain sort, which are demanded by the nature of the discipline and are not endoxa. I discuss also how the definitions are reached (focusing on (...) the cases of the virtues of character) and the roles that aporiai do play in the process. (shrink)

'Art and Adaptability' argues for a co-evolution of theory of mind and material/art culture. The book covers relevant areas from great ape intelligence, hominin evolution, Stone Age tools, Paleolithic culture and art forms, to neurobiology. We use material and art objects, whether painting or sculpture, to modify our own and other people's thoughts so as to affect behavior. We don't just make judgments about mental states; we create objects about which we make judgments in which mental states are inherent. Moreover, (...) we make judgments about these objects to facilitate how we explore the minds and feelings of others. The argument is that it's not so much art because of theory of mind but art as theory of mind. (shrink)

Recent years have seen increasing attacks on the "deontological" conception (or as we call it, the guidance conception) of epistemic justification, the view that epistemology offers advice to knowers in forming beliefs responsibly. Critics challenge an important presupposition of the guidance conception: doxastic voluntarism, the view that we choose our beliefs. We assume that epistemic guidance is indispensable, and seek to answer objections to doxastic voluntarism, most prominently William Alston's. We contend that Alston falsely assumes that choice of belief requires (...) the assent to a specific propositional content. We argue that beliefs can be chosen under descriptions which do not specify their propositional content, but instead specify the mental actions by which they are formed and maintained. We argue that these actions partially constitute the beliefs and that is it in virtue of resulting from and being partially constituted by such actions that the beliefs are subject to epistemic appraisal,. (shrink)

Volume 1 -- Unit 1: Tragedy as an independent art of musical drama. Chapter 1: Plato's well-educated men, the dancers: Harmonia kai rhuthmos as "music and dance" -- Chapter 2: Tragedy as a necessarily performed "musical" art in the Poetics -- Chapter 3: The irreducibility of tragedy to literature -- Chapter 4: Harmonia kai rhuthmos as "music and dance" in Politics VIII.

This makes three main interpretative points about the progression from perception to universals described in 'Posterior Analytics' II.19: (1) The noun "'aisthesis'" as used in the chapter may refer not to the act of perceiving but to perceptual contents retained in memory. (2) An 'empeiria' (experience) should be understood as a capacity to generate expectations about new members of an unconceptualized kind based on memories of other members of the kind. (3) The famous rout analogy is a metaphor for the (...) perfection of such a capacity into a concept that can underwrite demonstrative knowledge (rather than mere expectation). (shrink)

A comprehensive introduction to current research on the psychology of concept formation and use.

The focus of this book is to explore teachers' evolving personal epistemologies, or the beliefs we hold about the origin and development of knowledge in the context of teaching. The chapters focus on a range of conceptual frameworks about how university and field-based experiences influence the connections between teachers' personal epistemologies and teaching practice. In an earlier volume we investigated ways in which we might change preservice teachers' beliefs and teaching practice (Brownlee, Schraw and Berthelsen, 2011). While we addressed the (...) nature of teachers' personal epistemology, learning and teaching practices, and approaches for changing beliefs throughout teacher education programs, the volume did not address conceptual frameworks for the development of teacher's personal epistemologies. The book is focused on teacher educators, teachers and teacher education programmers in universities with an overall aim of highlighting how we might support students to engage in learning that is challenging and to engage in professional experiences that promote changes in teaching practice. We argue that students need to be encouraged to question their beliefs and develop increasingly sophisticated beliefs about their knowledge and their students' knowledge that facilitate learning and intellectual growth. (shrink)

This chapter aims to make Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (ITOE) more accessible both to students of epistemology without a background in Objectivism and to students of Objectivism without a background in epistemology. It begins with a discussion of some figures and issues in the history of philosophy that helps to appreciate what Ayn Rand meant by the advocacy of reason and why she saw the issue of concepts as central to epistemology. The chapter then considers Rand view of consciousness and (...) sense perception, and also discusses her view of the process by which concepts and a whole system of conceptual knowledge are built upon a perceptual foundation. Next, it looks more closely at Rand's conception of objectivity and how it relates to her theory of concepts. Finally, the chapter considers the standards that follow from Rand's theory for the proper formation and use of concepts. (shrink)