The Gamer's Dilemma challenges us to find a distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Without such a distinction, we are forced to conclude that either both are morally acceptable or that both should be morally illicit. This paper argues that the best way to solve the dilemma is, in one sense, to dissolve it. The Gamer's Dilemma rests on a misunderstanding in the sense that it does not distinguish between the form of a simulation and its surface content. A (...) greater appreciation of the way structural features of a simulation affect subject experience will help us see why only simulations of murder and pedophilia generating virtually real experiences are likely to be seen as wrong. I argue that a simulation’s structural elements powerfully affect how subjects experience simulated content and hence is an important, and previously neglected, variable necessary to dissolve the Gamer's Dilemma. Properly understood, virtually real simulations of murder and pedophilia are both likely to be treated by players as morally wrong. Similarly, virtually unreal murder and pedophilia will be less likely to be judged as wrong. Subject judgments are thus consistent once a simulation’s structural variables are accounted for. The Gamer's Dilemma dissolves as a dilemma once we acknowledge these structural features of simulations and how they affect experience and moral judgment. (shrink)

Section 1 contains a survey of options in constructing a formal system of dialogue rules. The distinction between material and formal systems is discussed (section 1.1). It is stressed that the material systems are, in several senses, formal as well. In section 1.2 variants as to language form (choices of logical constants and logical rules) are pointed out. Section 1.3 is concerned with options as to initial positions and the permissibility of attacks on elementary statements. The problem of ending a (...) dialogue, and of infinite dialogues, is treated in section 1.4. Other options, e.g., as to the number of attacks allowed with respect to each statement, are listed in section 1.5. Section 1.6 explains the concept of a chain of arguments.From section 2 onward four types of dialectic systems are picked out for closer study: D, E, Di and Ei. After a preliminary section on dialogue sequents and winning strategies, the equivalence of derivability in intuitionistic logic and the existence of a winning strategy (for the Proponent) on the strength of Ei is shown by simple inductive proofs. (shrink)

The notion of epistemic coherence is interpreted as involving not only consistency but also stability. The problem how to consolidate a belief system, i.e., revise it so that it becomes coherent, is studied axiomatically as well as in terms of set-theoretical constructions. Representation theorems are given for subtractive consolidation (where coherence is obtained by deleting beliefs) and additive consolidation (where coherence is obtained by adding beliefs).

We argue that moral judgment studies currently conducted utilizing virtual reality (VR) devices must confront a dilemma due to how virtual environments are designed and how those environments are experienced. We begin by first describing the contexts present in paradigmatic cases of naturalistic moral judgments. We then compare these contexts to current traditional (vignette-based) and VR-based moral judgment research. We show that, contra to paradigmatic cases, vignette-based and VR-based moral judgment research often fails to accurately model the situational features of (...) paradigmatic moral judgments. In particular, we compare and contrast six recent VR studies to support our view that only simulations high in context-realism and perspectival-fidelity can produce ‘virtually real experiences.’ After analyzing the constituents of a virtually-real experience, we go on to propose guidelines for the creation of VR studies. These guidelines serve two purposes. First, we aim to increase the ecological validity of such studies in order to advance our understanding of moral judgments. Second, we believe that such guidelines should inform how Institutional Review Boards assess VR research. We show that our guidelines are urgently needed given the current lax review standards in place. (shrink)

Contrary to concerns of some critics, we present evidence that biomedical research is not dominated by a small handful of model organisms. An exhaustive analysis of research literature suggests that the diversity of experimental organisms in biomedical research has increased substantially since 1975. There has been a longstanding worry that organism‐centric funding policies can lead to biases in experimental organism choice, and thus negatively impact the direction of research and the interpretation of results. Critics have argued that a focus on (...) model organisms has unduly constrained the diversity of experimental organisms. The availability of large electronic databases of scientific literature, combined with interest in quantitative methods among philosophers of science, presents new opportunities for data‐driven investigations into organism choice in biomedical research. The diversity of organisms used in NIH‐funded research may be considerably lower than in the broader biomedical sciences, and may be subject to greater constraints on organism choice. (shrink)

The literature of economic theory, like that of philosophy, abounds in prefaces and prolegomena. Methodology and analysis of concepts take an important place in a science which has not found the sure path of development. But there is no sure path for methodology either. The selfconscious methodology of social science has been largely a borrowing from that of physical science, where procedures have developed to a stage of considerable maturity. But the analogy falls down where guidance is most needed, at (...) the points where social science is most likely to develop new concepts and new types of structure. Philosophers have not been lacking, indeed, to belittle the entire enterprise, and to deny the possibility of anything that could strictly be called social science. (shrink)

In this article, we apply the literature on the ethics of choice-architecture (nudges) to the realm of virtual reality (VR) to point out ethical problems with using VR for empathy-based nudging. Specifically, we argue that VR simulations aiming to enhance empathic understanding of others via perspective-taking will almost always be unethical to develop or deploy. We argue that VR-based empathy enhancement not only faces traditional ethical concerns about nudge (autonomy, welfare, transparency), but also a variant of the semantic variance problem (...) that arises for intersectional perspective-taking. VR empathy simulations deceive and manipulate their users about their experiences. Despite their often laudable goals, such simulations confront significant ethical challenges. In light of these goals and challenges, we conclude by proposing that VR designers shift from designing simulations aimed at producing empathic perspective-taking to designing simulations aimed at generating sympathy. These simulations, we claim, can avoid the most serious ethical issues associated with VR nudges, semantic variance, and intersectionality. (shrink)

I argue that psychopathy undermines three common assumptions typically invoked in favor of moderate reasons responsive theories of moral responsibility. First, I propose a theory of psychopathic agency and claim that psychopathic agency suggests that the systems underlying receptivity to reason bifurcate into at least two sub-systems of receptivity. Next, I claim that the bifurcation of systems for receptivity suggests that reactivity is not “all of a piece” but that it too decomposes into at least two subsystems. Lastly, I argue (...) that prior attempts by Fischer and Ravizza to address these concerns contain an appeal to internalism. Since Fischer and Ravizza want their theory to remain agnostic about the nature of reasons for action, this appeal to internalism is problematic for their view. I close by suggesting that if we are to make sense of when and why psychopaths are responsible then a mechanism-based theory of responsibility must be able to explain how different systems of receptivity and reactivity come together to constitute a single mechanism that grounds responsibility ascriptions for action and they must do so without tacitly appealing to implausible forms of internalism about reasons for action. (shrink)

Reactive theories of responsibility see moral accountability as grounded on the capacity for feeling reactive-attitudes. I respond to a recent argument gaining ground in this tradition that excludes psychopaths from accountability. The argument relies on what Paul Russell has called the 'subjectivity requirement'. On this view, the capacity to feel and direct reactive-attitudes at oneself is a necessary condition for responsibility. I argue that even if moral attitudes like guilt are impossible for psychopaths to deploy, that psychopaths, especially the "successful" (...) and "secondary" subtypes of psychopathy, can satisfy the subjectivity requirement with regard to shame. I appeal to evidence that embarrassment and shame are grounded on the same affective process and data that psychopathic judgments about embarrassment are neurotypical. If I am right, then psychopaths ought to be open to shame-based forms of accountability including shame punishments. I conclude by considering why psychopaths rarely self-report shame. I argue that lacking a capacity to see oneself as flawed is a different sort of failure than lacking the capacity to feel. (shrink)

Frege claims that sentences of the form ‘A’ are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘it is true that A’ (The Equivalence Thesis). Frege also says that there are fictional names that fail to refer, and that sentences featuring fictional names fail to refer as a result. The thoughts such sentences express, Frege says, are also fictional, and neither true nor false. Michael Dummett argues that these claims are inconsistent. But his argument requires clarification, since there are two ways The (...) Equivalence Thesis has been formulated, according as the thesis equates the senses or the referents of the relevant sentences. -/- I have two aims in this paper. The first is to demonstrate that a sameness of sense thesis is inconsistent with Frege’s other theses. The second is to argue that a sameness of reference thesis is consistent with them. Thus, all else being equal, Frege ought to endorse a sameness of reference, rather than a sameness of sense thesis. (shrink)

Decision-Making Capacity First published Tue Jan 15, 2008; substantive revision Fri Aug 14, 2020 In many Western jurisdictions the law presumes that adult persons, and sometimes children that meet certain criteria, are capable of making their own medical decisions; for example, consenting to a particular medical treatment, or consenting to participate in a research trial. But what exactly does it mean to say that a subject has or lacks the requisite capacity to decide? This question has to do with what (...) is commonly called “decisional capacity”, a central concept in health care law and ethics, and increasingly an independent topic of philosophical inquiry. -/- Decisional capacity can be defined as the ability of subjects to make their own medical decisions. Somewhat similar questions of capacity arise in other contexts, such as capacity to stand trial in a court of law and the ability to make decisions that relate to personal care and finances. However, the history behind the more general legal notions of capacity to stand trial and capacity to manage one’s life is different and operates somewhat differently in law (Roth, Meisel, & Litz 1977; Zapf & Roesch 2005). For the purposes of this discussion the notion of decisional capacity will be limited to medical contexts only; most notably, those where decisions to consent or to refuse treatment or participation in clinical research are concerned. (shrink)

El autor realiza un paseo por la experiencia artística como creador y amador del arte. Recorre sus impresiones e influencias juveniles, de cómo se aprende arte del paseo por la vida, narra su pasión por formas de arte como el haikú japonés, describe el arte como “todo lo que expresa frescura vital con cierta belleza u horror iluminado por un halo estético”, y roza la Rosa del Ser esencial, entrando al tema de la Esencia, postulando que las obras de arte (...) tocan de algún modo misterioso espacios esenciales del ser humano, constituyendo un ejercicio de libertad. (shrink)

There is a strong appetite in ‘the wild’ (i.e., beyond the academy) for public philosophy. There are myriad forums available, from magazines and online publications to podcasts and YouTube videos, for those who wish to engage in philosophy in a non-academic context. For academic philosophers, this has raised methodological and metaphilosophical questions like: ‘what is the best way to engage in public philosophy?’ and ‘what are our aims when we engage in public philosophy?’ But what do ‘the public’ want? If (...) public philosophy is philosophy written for a public audience, what is it, exactly, that it can or might do for them? Several answers have been proposed by philosophers, but less attention has been paid to how the public themselves might answer that question. The aim of this essay is to try and put together at least the beginning of an answer. In June 2022 we put out a survey in the hope of eliciting views from ‘the public’ on issues relating to the nature and aims of both philosophy (more generally) and public philosophy. In doing so, our aim was to take a ‘democratic’ approach to answering the question: What is public philosophy? (shrink)

Commentators often claim that medical research subjects are coerced into participating in clinical studies. In recent years, such claims have appeared especially frequently in ethical discussions of research in developing countries. Medical research ethics is more important than ever as we move into the 21st century because worldwide the pharmaceutical industry has grown so much and shows no sign of slowing its growth. This means that more people are involved in medical research today than ever before, and in the future (...) even more will be involved. However, despite the pressing need for reflection on research ethics, it is important to carefully identify the concerns we have about research. Otherwise we run the risk that the moral language we use, and which we hear other people use, may do our moral thinking for us. We argue that many recent claims about the occurrence of coercion in medical research are misguided and misuse the word "coercion." We try to identify the real problems, and urge people to attend carefully to the implications of their descriptions of moral problems in research. (shrink)

Antipsychotic medications are sometimes imposed on psychiatric patients deemed dangerous to themselves and others. This is based on the assumption that treatment is safe and effective, and that recovery depends on biological adjustment. Under new laws, patients can be required to remain on these medications after leaving hospitals. However, survivors attest that forced treatment used as a restraint can feel like torture, while the consequences of withdrawal can also be severe.

This paper makes two essential claims about the nature of shame and shame punishment. I argue that, if we properly understand the nature of shame, that it is sometimes justifiable to shame others in the context of a pluralistic multicultural society. I begin by assessing the accounts of shame provided by Cheshire Calhoun (2004) and Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, & Fabrice Teroni (2012). I argue that both views have problems. I defend a theory of shame and embarrassment that connects both (...) emotions to “whole-self” properties. Shame and embarrassment, I claim, are products of the same underlying emotion. I distinguish between moralized and nonmoralized shame in order to show when, and how, moral and non-moral shame may be justly deployed. Shame is appropriate, I argue, if and only if it targets malleable moral or non-moral normative imperfections of a person’s ‘whole-self.’ Shame is unjustifiable when it targets durable aspects of a person’s “whole-self.” I conclude by distinguishing shame punishments from guilt punishments and show that my account can explain why it is wrong to shame individuals on account of their race, sex, gender, or body while permitting us to sometimes levy shame and shame punishment against others, even those otherwise immune to moral reasons. (shrink)

The Handbook of Bioethical Decisions Volume II addresses and analyzes the most important ethical concerns and moral quandaries related to scientific integrity and institutional ethics. It counts on two parts, Part One: Research Ethics, which addresses issues related to Scientific Integrity, Research Misconduct and Conducting Ethical Research, and Part Two: Institutional Ethics and Bioethics Committees, which explores Institutional Ethics issues, Ethics and Bioethics Committees’ roles and scopes, and Bioethical Issues in Institutional Ethics. Consequently, the Handbook, Vol. II, offers a remarkable (...) collection of works by outstanding international experts on institutional and research ethics, in order for bioethics practitioners to obtain better elements to address key issues related to integrity in research as well as to decision-making processes. In this fashion, this volume is a valuable resource for professionals working on different bioethical and biomedical fields, such as, ethics and bioethics committees, health care institutions, biomedical and pharmacological companies, and academic settings, among others. Chapter 26 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com. (shrink)

Al aplicar la ética en la política se desvela un problema fundamental consistente entre su supuesta relación, llegando a entenderse como saberes opuestos, es preciso, pues, reflexionar en torno a su posible aplicación, o si, por el contrario, normatizar éticamente la política es imposible, utilizando la ayuda de métodos analíticos, deductivos e histórico-comparativos que sirvan de marco teórico. A causa de la negación ética en los procederes políticos surge una práctica política amoral, que mediante el sometimiento y la costumbre se (...) termina aceptando como algo políticamente normal, degenerando en una serie de problemas y creencias que imposibilitan cada vez más la aplicación de juicios morales a actuares políticos, es por ello que en la actualidad es normal pensar que lo único importante en la política es únicamente el fin, ignorando el daño que se pueda generar en el proceso. Sin embargo, la ética y política son acciones humanas, por lo tanto, se debe reflexionar sobre ellas con las herramientas brindadas por la ética política, aplicando juicios éticos y morales a los actuares inmediatos y prácticos encontrados en la política. (shrink)

What follows is an attempt to interpret Hegel’s Introduction to thePhilosophy of Rightin a way that explores the thesis of reason’s social character in light of the recent debate on Hegel’s theory of practical normativity. The discussion aims to highlight Hegel’s commitment to a ‘reconstructive’ version of the ‘immanent transcendence’ motive of Critical Theory and, more generally, to a programmatic critique of ‘deficient’ rationality and its effects on practice.

In this paper, we argue that, under a specific set of circumstances, designing and employing certain kinds of virtual reality (VR) experiences can be unethical. After a general discussion of simulations and their ethical context, we begin our argu-ment by distinguishing between the experiences generated by different media (text, film, computer game simulation, and VR simulation), and argue that VR experiences offer an unprecedented degree of what we call “perspectival fidelity” that prior modes of simulation lack. Additionally, we argue that (...) when VR experiences couple this perspectival fidelity with what we call “context realism,” VR experiences have the ability to produce “virtually real experiences.” We claim that virtually real experiences generate ethical issues for VR technologies that are unique to the medium. Because subjects of these experiences treat them as if they were real, a higher degree of ethical scrutiny should be applied to any VR scenario with the potential to generate virtually real experiences. To mitigate this unique moral hazard, we propose and defend what we call “The Equivalence Principle.” This principle states that “if it would be wrong to allow subjects to have a certain experience in reality, then it would be wrong to allow subjects to have that experience in a virtually real setting.” We argue that such a principle, although limited in scope, should be part of the risk analysis conducted by any Institutional Review Boards, psychologists, empirically oriented philosophers, or game designers who are using VR technology in their work. (shrink)

This Article examines ability taxation, which is a tax on a person’s earning ability or potential earnings, rather than earned income. Despite this regime’s longstanding favor as a theoretical ideal for fair and efficient taxation among public finance economists, certain political philosophers, and tax law scholars, insufficient effort has been made to provide an analysis of what ‘potential earnings’ means. This Article explores competing understandings of this notion, and situates them within a multipart taxonomy. In so doing, it unearths a (...) tension at the core of the ability tax program involving a fundamental misalignment between the metaphysics (or correct conceptual analysis) of potential earnings and the economics of its taxation. It concludes that once we correctly understand its requirements, we should reject ability taxation as the first-best normative ideal it has been held out to be on the grounds that it is overly burdensome and unfair to certain individuals. (shrink)

Jesse Prinz's The Emotional Construction of Morals is an ambitious and intriguing contribution to the debate about the nature and role of emotion within moral psychology. I review Prinz's recent claims surrounding the nature of emotional concepts as ?embodied representations of concern? and survey his later arguments meant to establish a form of cultural relativism. Although I suggest that other theories of emotional representation (i.e. prototype views) would better serve Prinz's aims, the underlying meta-ethical relativism that results is well defended (...) and represents a significant advance for constructivist Sentimentalists. (shrink)

This article criticizes what it calls perspectival thought experiments, which require subjects to mentally simulate a perspective before making judgments from within it. Examples include Judith Thomson's violinist analogy, Philippa Foot's trolley problem, and Bernard Williams's Jim case. The article argues that advances in the philosophical and psychological study of empathy suggest that the simulative capacities required by perspectival thought experiments are all but impossible. These thought experiments require agents to consciously simulate necessarily unconscious features of subjectivity. To complete these (...) experiments subjects must deploy theory-theoretical frameworks to predict what they think they would do. These outputs, however, systematically mislead subjects and are highly prone to error. They are of negligible probative value, and this bodes poorly for their continued use. The article ends with two suggestions. First, many thought experiments are not problematically perspectival. Second, it should be possible to carry out “in-their-shoes” perspectival thought experiments by off-loading simulations onto virtual environments into which philosophers place subjects. (shrink)

El presente trabajo, expone los resultados de una investigación sobre la apropiación y desarrollo de saberes docentes del profesorado novel durante sus primeras experiencias de ejercicio profesional en el estado de Sinaloa (México). Las evidencias, permitieron advertir un ambiente alterno de inserción que aportaba saberes constreñidos por un contexto delincuencial endémico de comunidades afectadas por el narcotráfico. De ahí que el posicionamiento teórico atendió las relaciones sociales de violencia y poder ante su valor epistémico re-significante del efecto choque con la (...) realidad, propio de esta etapa donde se experimenta una incipiente socialización profesional. La metodología fue de naturaleza cualitativa con sustento en la etnosociología y la entrevista de tipo relato de vida, recuperando las vivencias de 70 profesores nóveles elegidos mediante una muestra no probabilística, caso típico-ideal. Los resultados se agruparon, según sus recurrencias, en cuatro dimensiones jerárquicas: 1) personal, 2) escolar, 3) comunitaria y 4) delincuencial, acorde con su nivel de afectación. Entre las conclusiones, se advierte que la inserción del profesor novel inmersa en un ambiente dominado por la subcultura del narcotráfico, transfigura el aprendizaje de la profesión con saberes docentes específicos y utilizables para sobrevivir esta contingencia dada su influencia intra e inter-áulica. (shrink)

There is an enduring and widespread perception amongst policy makers and practitioners that certain groups of children, in particular those who find learning difficult, have a detrimental effect on the achievement of other children. Challenging this basic assumption, this award-winning book argues that high levels of inclusion can be entirely compatible with high levels of achievement and that combining the two is not only possible but essential if all children are to have the opportunity to participate fully in education. This (...) fully revised second edition is packed with vivid case studies that explore the benefits and tensions for children and schools, and sets out to answer the following questions: What is the nature of the relationship between the inclusion of some children and the achievement of all? Are there strategies which can raise the achievement of all children, whilst safeguarding the inclusion of others who are more vulnerable? What changes can a school make to ensure high levels of inclusion as well as high levels of achievement for all its children? Achievement and Inclusion in Schools offers a fully up-to-date analysis of current issues in light of recent changes to education policy in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It provides practical guidance for practitioners and policy-makers, and will be of interest to anyone passionate about inclusive education. (shrink)

In popular culture psychopaths are inaccurately portrayed as serial killers or homicidal maniacs. Most real-world psychopaths are neither killers nor maniacs. Psychologists currently understand psychopathy as an affective disorder that leads to repeated criminal and antisocial behavior. Counter to this prevailing view, I claim that psychopathy is not necessarily linked with criminal behavior. Successful psychopaths, an intriguing new category of psychopathic agent, support this conception of psychopathy. I then consider reactive attitude theories of moral responsibility. Within this tradition, psychopaths are (...) thought to be blameless as a result of their pronounced affective deficits. Psychopaths are considered morally blind because they lack the moral emotions that make us sensitive to moral reasons. I argue that, even if they are morally blind, psychopaths remain open to forms of blame stemming from non-moral reactive attitudes. These reactive attitudes remain appropriate because psychopaths can express hateful, disgusting, or contemptible non-moral values in their judgments. (shrink)

In this essay, I attempt to define the 'ethnocategory' mushi in Japanese culture, through a semantic analysis of the Chinese characters bearing the radical "mushi," and fieldwork research in rural Japan. The research offers criteria for an animal's inclusion in the category, reveals the differences in people's perception of mushi according to age and gender, and elicits a structure of the category as a series of concentric circles around a semantic core. The richness and complexity of the findings provide insight (...) into Japanese attitudes towards animals and nature. (shrink)

The paper aims at considering Hegel’s concept of right, as it is presented in the Philosophy of Spirit (1805/06). First I attempt to reconstruct the intersubjective ties which ground the development of Hegel’s concept of right in the above-mentioned project of system. Then I present my interpretation for Hegel’s attempt to reformulate the “naturalistic” premises of the contractualist tradition. As it will be shown, my interpretation differs considerably from that defended by Axel Honneth. Finally the paper attempts to compare the (...) discussion of the concept of right in Philosophy of Spirit (1805/06) with the Philosophy of Right (1821). (shrink)

The paper aims at recovering some epistemological issues in the debate between Putnam and Habermas about the objectivity of values. To begin with, I take up some discussions in philosophy of language and pragmatism in order to develop a framework according to which it is possible a less unilateral comprehension of the relation between naturalism and the normativity of ‘life forms’ (1). This account attempts to contextualize the Habermas /Putnam debate. Then I summarize Putnamt’s positions (2). Thirdly, after pointing out (...) what appears to be the common argumentative position by delineating the boundaries of ethical pragmatism, the paper focuses on its meaning for contemporary issues in practical philosophy (3). Finally, I argue that Habermas is successful at responding to Putnam’s critics, although he thereby adheres in his account of deontological morality to an axiological orientation based on vulnerability (4). (shrink)

This article is a contribution to our understanding of how Archilochean poetics may be situated in the longer poetic tradition. In examining two fragments that have received little attention, I hope to illustrate how Archilochus’ poetry both engaged with its predecessors and was in turn engaged by its successors. Fragment 222W employs a theme that was perhaps already conventional for Hesiod, in which the incompatibility of the sexes is implicated in the cycle of seasons, an idea that also seems relevant (...) to Archilochus’ quarrel with the daughters of Lycambes. Light is shed on 39W by comparing it to later words for skinning that serve as metaphors for cheating someone, the best known example of which is found in Catullus. In the first fragment the text can be elucidated by a look to Archilochus’ forerunners, and in the second by looking to his heirs. (shrink)

Esse estudo objetivou analisar a violência infantil no contexto brasileiro, correlacionando-a com fatores socioeconômicos, socioculturais, geracionais e de gênero, investigando o impacto dos mesmos na saúde das crianças. Realizou-se um estudo epidemiológico descritivo, realizado a partir de dados de artigos científicos e documentos oficiais sobre e violência infantil, além do banco de dados do Sistema de Informação de Agravos de Notificação (SINAN) e da plataforma SciELO e Google Acadêmico. Encontrou-se uma maior prevalência de violência física e negligência, maior índice de (...) violência sexual contra o sexo feminino e negligência no sexo masculino. Os principais agressores identificados foram o pai e a mãe. Acerca da etnia, crianças pardas foram as mais agredidas, bem como as de menor escolaridade. As consequências da violência infantil se estendem para além do momento da agressão, ao perturbar funções cognitivas e mesmo influenciar na gênese de transtornos psiquiátricos. (shrink)

Resumo: Propõe-se uma leitura de três episódios da Odisseia, nos quais há o uso de um phármakon. São Helena, Circe e Hermes as personagens que administram as phármaka. Trata-se de leitura: 1) vinculada a um projeto: o levantamento e a interpretação de discursos que se distanciem e/ou questionem a perspectiva da “guerra às drogas”, algo como um projeto de extração de elementos textuais que possam servir como ferramentas teóricas, na construção de uma perspectiva menos mortífera em relação às substâncias; 2) (...) guiada por três princípios, os quais podem ser ditos anticoloniais e antirracistas. Leitura centrada no phármakon, mas que o articula à comida floral dos lotófagos e à relação de xenía; dela, apresenta-se a proposta segundo a qual, no texto homérico, há a valorização de algo que pode ser chamado de multivalência.: The aim of this paper is to analyze three episodes of the Odyssey in which a pharmakon is used. Helen, Circe and Hermes are the characters that administer the pharmaka. This analysis is linked to a project - the survey of discourses that distance themselves and/or question the perspective of the “war on drugs”, a project that aims to extract textual elements that can serve as tools of thought in the construction of a less deadly path in relation to substances - and guided by three principles - which can be called anti-colonial and anti-racist. From this focus, centered on the pharmakon, also articulating it to the floral food of the lotophagi and the relationship of xenia, a thesis is put forward according to which, in the Homeric texts, one can find something that can be called multivalence. (shrink)

Buscar-se-á no presente trabalho analisar os discursos acerca da formação do Estado em Rousseau e Locke. Os autores compartilham a teoria de uma forma de contrato social – um acordo deliberado entre seres humanos cuja condição selvagem se extingue neste momento decisório. Dessa forma, em ambos os autores, o Estado surge como um agente, ou corpo, protetor. Em contrapartida, os estudos de Pierre Clastres – etnólogo francês – referentes a grupos primitivos contemporâneos demonstram a existência de uma permanente conjuração contra (...) a possibilidade do surgimento de um poder político alienado do controle do grupo como um todo. Ou seja, uma conjuração contra o Estado. Nesse sentido, o objetivo geral desse trabalho é colidir tais ideias, assim como suas possíveis reverberações atuais. (shrink)

Après avoir rappelé ce que Guattari doit au travail théorique de l’américain Gregory Bateson et des argentins Varela et Maturana, l’auteur souligne que pour ces auteurs, il ne s’agit pas de s’adapter à la transformation des systèmes mais de co-évoluer avec eux. Notre survie sur cette planète n’est pas seulement menacée par les atteintes à l’environnement, mais par une dégénérescence du tissu de la solidarité sociale et des modes de vie psychique, qui doivent littéralement être réinventés. Le changement est un (...) processus qui touche chaque fragment subconscient préindividuel, chaque personne, chaque famille, chaque localité, chaque groupe, chaque classe, chaque tribu, chaque public, jusqu’aux niveaux internationaux, avec des lignes transversales qui s’entrecroisent en de multiples réseaux. La bifurcation et l’émergence, autrefois connues sous le nom de révolution, se sont toujours produites lorsque des micro-révolutions ont pu coalescer en nouveaux pôles de valorisation. Guattari tente d’articuler les trois écologies, environnementale, sociale et mentale, en relation les unes avec les autres de manière inséparable, mais aussi comme des domaines autonomes livrés à leurs modes uniques, sans jamais permettre à l’un de dominer et de mettre en danger les autres. (shrink)

In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind, a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, (...) but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy. (shrink)

We aim to generate a dilemma for virtual reality-based research that we motivate through an extended case study of Judith Thomson’s (1985) Bridge variant of the trolley problem. Though the problem we generate applies more broadly than the Bridge problem, we believe it makes a good exemplar of the kind of case we believe is problematic. First, we argue that simulations of these thought experiments run into a practicality horn that makes it practically impossible to produce them. These problems revolve (...) around concepts that we call “perspectival fidelity”and “context realism.” Moral dilemmas that include features present in the Bridge variant will, as a result, be practically impossible to simulate. We also argue that, should we be wrong about the practical impossibility of creating a VR simulation of Bridge, such a simulation must face an ethical horn which renders these simulations ethically impermissible to develop or use. For these reasons, we argue that it is virtually impossible to simulate the bridge problem (and other thought experiments with similar features) both practically and ethically in VR. (shrink)