We investigate sequent calculi for the weak modal (propositional) system reduced to the equivalence rule and extensions of it up to the full Kripke system containing monotonicity, conjunction and necessitation rules. The calculi have cut elimination and we concentrate on the inversion of rules to give in each case an effective procedure which for every sequent either furnishes a proof or a finite countermodel of it. Applications to the cardinality of countermodels, the inversion of rules and the derivability of Löb (...) rules are given. (shrink)

Tout récemment, Y. Kalliontzis et Chr. Müller ont publié sept nouveaux catalogues militaires de Chorsiai. Le présent article part du constat que la chronologie des archontes fédéraux béotiens adoptée pour ces nouveaux documents soulève des difficultés. En confrontant la série de textes de Chorsiai aux autres séries documentaires existantes, notamment celle d’Aigosthènes, il est possible de proposer de nouvelles hypothèses chronologiques qui font disparaître ces difficultés. Sur la base de la série d’archontes fédéraux attestés dans les nouveaux textes de Chorsiai, (...) une séquence chronologique alternative est proposée pour le dernier quart du iiie siècle av. J.‑C., et sa plausibilité est testée à partir des données prosopographiques d’Akraiphia et de Hyettos. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to evaluate the Moist Canons from the point of view of logic, as a system of definitions. We concentrate more specifically on the formal organization of the upper part of the Moist Canons. This method leads us to a globally positive evaluation of the system of definitions but also to the less expected conclusion that a few very basic concepts are undefined and form the background of the Moist concrete, realist, and pragmatic philosophical system: (...) ran, to be so; de, to obtain; ming, illumination; zuo, to initiate; and wei, to act. (shrink)

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, EarlyView.

Le texte des comptes de l’hipparque thébain Pompidas (IG VII, 2426) a suscité de nombreux commentaires depuis son édition, sans que soient pleinement élucidées les questions qu’il soulève. On propose ici de relier deux éléments du texte qui ont toujours été étudiés séparément, à savoir la vente de deux chevaux à bas prix par l’hipparque d’une part, et la distribution de sommes d’argent plus ou moins importantes à sept personnes d’autre part, pour fournir une nouvelle interprétation du texte. Celui-ci concernerait (...) la remonte de la cavalerie thébaine : les deux chevaux sont des bêtes réformées, et l’argent fourni par l’hipparque à leurs deux propriétaires et à cinq autres personnes pourrait être une indemnité destinée à faciliter l’achat d’une monture par les cavaliers. Une comparaison est proposée avec ce qu’on sait des systèmes de remonte dans les cavaleries grecques et hellénistiques. (shrink)

I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in the absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.

Sets are central to mathematics and its foundations, but what are they? In this book Luca Incurvati provides a detailed examination of all the major conceptions of set and discusses their virtues and shortcomings, as well as introducing the fundamentals of the alternative set theories with which these conceptions are associated. He shows that the conceptual landscape includes not only the naïve and iterative conceptions but also the limitation of size conception, the definite conception, the stratified conception and the graph (...) conception. In addition, he presents a novel, minimalist account of the iterative conception which does not require the existence of a relation of metaphysical dependence between a set and its members. His book will be of interest to researchers and advanced students in logic and the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on transmission and failure of transmission of warrant. We identify three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for transmission of warrant, and we show that their satisfaction grounds a number of interesting epistemic phenomena that have not been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. We then scrutinise Wright’s analysis of transmission failure and improve on extant readings of it. Nonetheless, we present a Bayesian counterexample that shows that Wright’s analysis is partially incoherent with our analysis of (...) warrant transmission and prima facie defective. We conclude exploring three alternative lines of reply: developing a more satisfactory account of transmission failure, which we outline; dismissing the Bayesian counterexample by rejecting some of its assumptions; reinterpreting Wright’s analysis to make it immune to the counterexample. (shrink)

Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem (...) and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToIS’s advocates. (shrink)

Translation of passages of Aristotle's De Anima into Portuguese. The passages are these: I.1, I.4 (the 'Rylean passage'); II.1-6; III.1-8. The translation is preliminary.

Liang Shuming, considered to be the Last Confucian, was a Buddhist.

Crispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to (...) acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper I show that Wright’s responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that Moruzzi’s argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright cannot answer Moruzzi’s challenge without weakening the support available for his conception of the architecture of perceptual justification. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2003/4, was preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory holds that we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type––which Wright calls “cornerstones”––that enables us to acquire justification for believing other propositions––those that we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. Entitlement theory is meant by Wright to deliver a forceful response to the sceptic who argues that we cannot justify ordinary beliefs. I initially focus on strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described (...) in more detail. I suggest that it is dubious that we are strategically entitled to accept cornerstones. After this, I focus on entitlement in general. I contend that, in important cases, non-evidential justification for accepting cornerstones cannot secure evidential justification for believing ordinary propositions. My argument rests on a probabilistic regimentation of the so-called “leaching problem”. (shrink)

In Posterior Analytics 71b9 12, we find Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression “kata sumbebekos”. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s definition paying due attention to this contrast (...) and to the way it interacts with the two conditions presented in the definiens. I claim that the “necessity” condition ammounts to explanatory appropriateness of the cause. (shrink)

Etudier le probleme de la personne, c'est s'interesser a un probleme qui traverse a peu pres tous les domaines de la philosophie, depuis la psychologie jusqu'a la theologie en passant par l'ethique et par le droit, mais dont le denominateur commun est la definition du soi-meme. Etudier ce probleme chez Maimonide, c'est voir comment un philosophe juif du Moyen-Age pouvait elaborer une representation coherente de l'homme en s'appuyant a la fois sur la pensee greco-arabe et sur la tradition hebraique. Ce (...) livre espere contribuer a une meilleure comprehension d'un philosophe dont on a trop souvent fragmente la pensee, apparemment dechiree entre des sources contradictoires. En fait, Maimonide a su developper un dialogue critique entre deux heritages qui demeurent aux fondements de la civilisation occidentale. C'est ce qui donne a sa pensee son caractere eminemment actuel. (shrink)

Le droit court derrière la "révolution numérique". Les algorithmes nous espionnent et restreignent les libertés publiques, ils calculent les indemnités au service des compagnies d'assurance. La diminution lente et continue des services chargés de veiller à l'application du droit affaiblit et parfois anéantit l'efficacité de ces lois. L'échec de la loi Hadopi est significatif à cet égard. Le mal est en fait bien plus profond et ne date pas d'hier. Nous vivons une époque de démolition des codes établis. Si le (...) droit est partout, en définitive il n'est nulle part... (shrink)

Cet ouvrage porte sur l'auto-comprehension de l'homme moderne dans son rapport a la dimension de l'animalite. L'auteur part du statut paradoxal des discours philosophiques de la Renaissance et de l'Age Classique sur la nature des animaux. Ce caractere paradoxal a ete bien caracterise par Pierre Bayle qui, dans l'article Pereira de son Dictionnaire, place son lecteur devant une alternative inconfortable entre les deux positions extremes que sont l'opinion tres dangereuse de Montaigne (qui affirme la superiorite des animaux sur les hommes) (...) et l'opinion absurde de Descartes (celle des animaux-machines). L'auteur propose une analyse minutieuse des deux textes seminaux que sont l'Apologie de Raimond Sebond de Montaigne et la cinquieme partie du Discours de la methode de Descartes, en s'attachant tout particulierement aux deplacements operes dans ces textes sur le fonds legue par la litterature zoologique antique, d'Aristote a Pline, Plutarque et Elien. Il montre ainsi le lien des paradoxes du discours zoologique des Modernes a un paradoxe philosophique plus fondamental par lequel l'anthropologie moderne se trouve degagee des ontologies scalaires traditionnelles pour constituer une champ autonome d'investigation. Cette liberation a une consequence importante pour les temps modernes: l'unite de l'homme n'est plus donnee dans un ordre predefini de l'etre, mais constitue une tache que l'homme doit accomplir, a la fois sur le plan ethique et sur le plan technique, en affrontant, dans une perspective d'immanence, le dualisme de la vie et de la pensee, du biologique et du noetique. (shrink)

Ce livre cherche à montrer comment l'eau, à la fois réalité et symbole, nourrit la pensée de Platon. Quelle est l'origine de cette thématique et quelles en sont les finalités? A travers ces interrogations, il s'agit de mettre en lumière la fonction de cette matière particulière dont les aspects sont déclinés de manière originale dans l'ensemble de son oeuvre. En rassemblant la multiplicité des images de l'eau, l'auteur interroge la nature et la valeur des images en s'efforçant de montrer comment (...) Platon, écrivain et poète, met en oeuvre avec inventivité métaphores, allégories et mythes. De quoi alimenter un questionnement sur le réel, auquel l'eau donne un fil directeur. On y voit aussi se défaire une certaine idée du platonisme. Critique à l'égard de la rhétorique et des arts, Platon vise dans le miroir les effets illusoires de l'image et de l'imitation, mais Socrate utilise lui-même les images et les reflets tout au long des dialogues, et on en découvre avec étonnement toutes les variations. La métaphore hydrique conditionne l'univers de la parole et de la science, reflète le mouvement de la pensée et ses dérives. Dans les images métaphysiques et morales, ce sont les flux, les fleuves et le monde marin qui reflètent la nature et la qualité des âmes ; mythes et allégories déplient les symboles de la corruption, de l'oubli et de l'incontinence, où se jouent une idée de la matière et la valeur de l'existence. Sur le plan ontologique, l'eau dénoue les figures de l'instable qui mettent en oeuvre la réfutation des «liquides» - théoriciens du flux - et l'intelligibilité du devenir. Enfin, dans l'ordre politique, la critique de la thalassocratie, les mythes (l'Atlantide, la mer de la dissemblance) et les images nautiques suivent les lignes fluctuantes de l'histoire athénienne, mais tracent aussi les contours de la Cité juste et le visage du vrai gouvernant. Dans le scintillement des eaux, à la croisée du sensible et de l'intelligible, se construit l'iconologie platonicienne. L'eau figurée, transfigurée dans le fil liquide de la poésie, forme les multiples reflets de ce qu'il faut vraiment voir pour se libérer du spectacle des ombres et penser le chemin d'une sagesse, qui ne renonce jamais au monde. (shrink)

Formal topology aims at developing general topology in intuitionistic and predicative mathematics. Many classical results of general topology have been already brought into the realm of constructive mathematics by using formal topology and also new light on basic topological notions was gained with this approach which allows distinction which are not expressible in classical topology. Here we give a systematic exposition of one of the main tools in formal topology: inductive generation. In fact, many formal topologies can be presented in (...) a predicative way by an inductive generation and thus their properties can be proved inductively. We show however that some natural complete Heyting algebra cannot be inductively defined. (shrink)

Valorising the biocultural heritage of common goods could enable peasant farmers to achieve socially and economically inclusive sustainability. Increasingly appreciated by consumers, peasant heritage products offer small farmers promising opportunities for economic, social and territorial development. Identifying the obstacles and levers of this complex, multi-scale and multi-stakeholder objective requires an integrative framework. We applied the panarchy conceptual framework to two cases of participatory research with small quinoa producers: a local fair in Chile and quinoa export production in Bolivia. In both (...) cases, the “commoning” process was crucial both to bring stakeholders together inside their communities and to gain outside recognition for their production and thus achieve social and economic inclusion. Despite the differences in scale, the local fair and the export market shared a similar marketing strategy based on short value chains promoting quality products with high identity value. In these dynamics of biocultural heritage valorisation, the panarchical approach revealed the central place as well as the vulnerability of the community territory. As a place of both anchoring and opening, the community territory is the privileged space where autonomous and consensual control over the governance of common biocultural resources can be exercised. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates (...) of emotion wrong, it isn't able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren't emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology. (shrink)

I discuss what Aristotle means when he say that scientific demonstration must proceed from necessary principles. I argue that, for Aristotle, scientific demonstration should not be reduced to sound deduction with necessary premises. Scientific demonstration ultimately depends on the fully appropriate explanatory factor for a given explanandum. This explanatory factor is what makes the explanandum what it is. Consequently, this factor is also unique. When Aristotle says that demonstration must proceed from necessary principles, he means that each demonstration requires the (...) principle that is the necessary one for the fully appropriate explanation of its explanandum. This picture also provides a key to understand Aristotle's thesis that scientific explanation depends on essences: it is the essence of the attribute to be explained that should be stated as the fully appropriate explanatory factor. (shrink)

This root-and-branch reevaluation of Darwin's concept of sexual selection tackles the subject from historical, epistemological and theoretical perspectives. Contributions from a wealth of disciplines have been marshaled for this volume, with key figures in behavioural ecology, philosophy, and the history of science adding to its wide-ranging relevance. Updating the reader on the debate currently live in behavioural ecology itself on the centrality of sexual selection, and with coverage of developments in the field of animal aesthetics, the book details the current (...) state of play, while other chapters trace the history of sexual selection from Darwin to today and inquire into the neurobiological bases for partner choices and the comparisons between the hedonic brain in human and non-human animals. Welcome space is given to the social aspects of sexual selection, particularly where Darwin drew distinctions between eager males and coy females and rationalized this as evolutionary strategy. Also explored are the current definition of sexual selection (as opposed to natural selection) and its importance in today's biological research, and the impending critique of the theory from the nascent field of animal aesthetics. As a comprehensive assessment of the current health, or otherwise, of Darwin's theory, 140 years after the publication of his Descent of Man, the book offers a uniquely rounded view that asks whether 'sexual selection' is in itself a progressive or reactionary notion, even as it explores its theoretical relevance in the technical biological study of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive (...) imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content, while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content : More of P!Less of U! If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me! (shrink)

I examine Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge in Posterior Analytics 71b 9-12 and try to understand how it relates to the sophistical way of knowing and to "kata sumbebekos knowledge". I claim that scientific knowledge of p requires knowing p by its appropriate cause, and that this appropriate cause is a universal (katholou) in the restricted sense Aristotle proposes in 73b 26-27 ff., i.e., an attribute coextensive with the subject (an extensional feature) and predicated of the subject in itself (an (...) intensional feature). Kata sumbebekos knowledge, on the other hand, can occur even when the predicate of a conclusion is coextensive with its subject and is proved by a convertible meson which is not the most appropriate from an explanatory standpoint. (shrink)