En sus orígenes, el tradicionalismo católico se alimenta del Syllabus de Pío IX y de la Encíclica Pascendi de Pío X y de su juramento antimodernista. El carácter específico del caso español deriva del rol satisfecho por el país como paladín de la Contrarreforma político-religiosa y del arraigo popular del sentimiento contrarrevolucionario engendrado por la invasión francesa y la guerra de la Independencia. Su auténtico mito fundacional es la Reconquista, si bien destaca también la expansión colonial hacia América como misión (...) evangelizadora y la resistencia frente a la Reforma Protestante. Subyace a sus planteamientos una visión maniquea y apologética de la realidad. Desde una lectura agustiniana de la lucha a muerte entre la ciudad de Dios y la ciudad de Satán, el Bien se encarna en la España católica, tradicional, autoritaria, heterónoma y jerárquica y el Mal en la anti-España, filosófica, racional, liberal, autónoma, democrática y pluralista. (shrink)

Hace ya más de una década, Joseph Llobera, en su obra "El dios de la modernidad", trataba de responder con argumentos históricos al interrogante sobre cómo, durante los procesos de modernización de los países occidentales, el nacionalismo se ha convertido en un equivalente funcional de la religión, en una religión secular cuyo Dios es la nación.

In this study, we examine whether, how, and when corporate social responsibility increases promotive and prohibitive voices in accordance with ethical climate theory and multi-experience model of ethical climate. Data from 382 employees at two time points are examined. Results show that CSR is positively related to promotive and prohibitive voices. Other-focused and self-focused climates mediate the relationship between CSR and the two types of voice. Moreover, humble leadership moderates the positive relationship between CSR and other-focused climate. Such leadership moderates (...) the negative relationship between CSR and self-focused climate. Humble leadership also moderates the indirect effect between CSR and the two kinds of voice through other-focused and self-focused climates. The findings of this study provide important insights into how and when CSR influences employee voice. (shrink)

The use of black box algorithms in medicine has raised scholarly concerns due to their opaqueness and lack of trustworthiness. Concerns about potential bias, accountability and responsibility, patient autonomy and compromised trust transpire with black box algorithms. These worries connect epistemic concerns with normative issues. In this paper, we outline that black box algorithms are less problematic for epistemic reasons than many scholars seem to believe. By outlining that more transparency in algorithms is not always necessary, and by explaining that (...) computational processes are indeed methodologically opaque to humans, we argue that the reliability of algorithms provides reasons for trusting the outcomes of medical artificial intelligence. To this end, we explain how computational reliabilism, which does not require transparency and supports the reliability of algorithms, justifies the belief that results of medical AI are to be trusted. We also argue that several ethical concerns remain with black box algorithms, even when the results are trustworthy. Having justified knowledge from reliable indicators is, therefore, necessary but not sufficient for normatively justifying physicians to act. This means that deliberation about the results of reliable algorithms is required to find out what is a desirable action. Thus understood, we argue that such challenges should not dismiss the use of black box algorithms altogether but should inform the way in which these algorithms are designed and implemented. When physicians are trained to acquire the necessary skills and expertise, and collaborate with medical informatics and data scientists, black box algorithms can contribute to improving medical care. (shrink)

Proponemos aprovechar las metodologías computacionales del análisis de conceptos formales para representar y estudiar la estructura conceptual de las teorías axiomatizadas. Este ejercicio se practicó al comparar los atributos de más de 44 modelos teóricos de teorías del espacio-tiempo y la gravitación. Los retículos pueden explorarse en visualizaciones interactivas conocidas como macroscopios que resaltan relaciones de especialización y teorización, ordenamientos jerárquicos, agrupaciones y clases de componentes. En este texto ejemplificamos con la reconstrucción de la mecánica clásica de partículas, las teorías (...) del espacio-tiempo y la gravitación. (shrink)

Through a series of provocative conversations, Frederick Luis Aldama and Herbert Lindenberger, who have written widely on literature, film, music, and art, locate a place for the discomforting and the often painfully unpleasant within aesthetics. The conversational format allows them to travel informally across many centuries and many art forms. They have much to tell one another about the arts since the advent of modernism soon after 1900—the nontonal music, for example, of the Second Vienna School, the chance-directed music (...) and dance of John Cage and Merce Cunningham, the in-your-faceness of such diverse visual artists as Francis Bacon, Pablo Picasso, Willem de Kooning, Egon Schiele, Otto Dix, and Damien Hirst. They demonstrate as well a long tradition of discomforting art stretching back many centuries, for example, in the Last Judgments of innumerable Renaissance painters, in Goya’s so-called “black” paintings, in Wagner’s Tristan chord, and in the subtexts of Shakespearean works such as King Lear and Othello. This book is addressed at once to scholars of literature, art history, musicology, and cinema. Although its conversational format eschews the standard conventions of scholarly argument, it provides original insights both into particular art forms and into individual works within these forms. Among other matters, it demonstrates how recent work in neuroscience may provide insights in the ways that consumers process difficult and discomforting works of art. The book also contributes to current aesthetic theory by charting the dialogue that goes on—especially in aesthetically challenging works—between creator, artifact, and consumer. (shrink)

In recent years, few areas of research have advanced as rapidly as cognitive science, the study of the human mind and brain. A fundamentally interdisciplinary field, cognitive science has both inspired and been advanced by work in the arts and humanities. In _Conversations on Cognitive Cultural Studies: Literature, Language, and Aesthetics,_ Frederick Luis Aldama and Patrick Colm Hogan, two of the most prominent experts on the intersection of mind, brain, and culture, engage each other in a lively dialog that (...) sets out the foundations of a cognitive neuroscientific approach to literature. Despite their shared premises, Aldama and Hogan differ—sometimes sharply—on key issues; their discussion therefore presents the reader not with a single doctrine, but with options for consideration—an appropriate result in this dynamic field. With clarity and learning, Aldama and Hogan consider five central topics at the intersection of literature and cognitive science. They begin with the fundamental question of the nature of the self. From here, they turn to language, communication, and thought before moving on to the central issue of the structure and operation of narrative. The book concludes with thought-provoking explorations of aesthetics and politics. Illustrating their arguments with work that ranges from graphic fiction and popular cinema to William Faulkner and Bertolt Brecht, Aldama and Hogan leave the reader with a clear sense of what cognitive cultural studies have already achieved and the significant promise the discipline holds for the future. (shrink)

Introduction: a new humanism -- Self, identity, and ideas -- Revisiting Derrida, Lacan, and Foucault -- Derrida gets medieval -- Imaginary empires, real nations -- Edward said spaced out -- Modernity, what? -- Teachers, scholars, and the humanities today -- Translation matters -- Can music resist? -- The "cultural studies turn" in Brown studies -- Pulling up stakes in Latin/o American theoretical claims -- Fugitive thoughts on justice and happiness -- Why literature matters -- Interpretation, interdisciplinarity, and the people.

The general objective of this essay is to systematize Jean-Luc Nancy’s post- deconstructive reflections on the concept of evidence. A general claim of this paper is that the post-deconstructive concept of evidence is genuinely an epistemic concept of evidence insofar as it refers to structures involved in verification processes. Evidence is the presentation of a state of affairs that relates the presentation not only to what we claim about this state of affairs but also to the singular circumstances of its (...) production. Verification (the production of a claim’s truth) results directly from the singularities involved in the production or presentation of evidence. This means that evidence is never exhausted in the truth it produces or the knowledge it validates but remains a priori exposed or available to produce and validate unknown knowledge about unknown states of affairs. (shrink)

This article aims to develop a new account of scientific explanation for computer simulations. To this end, two questions are answered: what is the explanatory relation for computer simulations? And what kind of epistemic gain should be expected? For several reasons tailored to the benefits and needs of computer simulations, these questions are better answered within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Unlike previous efforts in the literature, I submit that the explanatory relation is between the simulation model and the (...) results of the simulation. I also argue that our epistemic gain goes beyond the unificationist account, encompassing a practical dimension as well. (shrink)

Many philosophical accounts of scientific models fail to distinguish between a simulation model and other forms of models. This failure is unfortunate because there are important differences pertaining to their methodology and epistemology that favor their philosophical understanding. The core claim presented here is that simulation models are rich and complex units of analysis in their own right, that they depart from known forms of scientific models in significant ways, and that a proper understanding of the type of model simulations (...) are fundamental for their philosophical assessment. I argue that simulation models can be distinguished from other forms of models by the many algorithmic structures, representation relations, and new semantic connections involved in their architecture. In this article, I reconstruct a general architecture for a simulation model, one that faithfully captures the complexities involved in most scientific research with computer simulations. Furthermore, I submit that a new methodology capable of conforming such architecture into a fully functional, computationally tractable computer simulation must be in place. I discuss this methodology—what I call recasting—and argue for its philosophical novelty. If these efforts are heading towards the right interpretation of simulation models, then one can show that computer simulations shed new light on the philosophy of science. To illustrate the potential of my interpretation of simulation models, I briefly discuss simulation-based explanations as a novel approach to questions about scientific explanation. (shrink)

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify (...) self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery. (shrink)

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...) argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance. (shrink)

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and (...) correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert you are at self-control, the less likely you are to use it. (shrink)

The hardest part of replicating a genome is the beginning. The first step of DNA replication (called “initiation”) mobilizes a large number of specialized proteins (“initiators”) that recognize specific sequences or structural motifs in the DNA, unwind the double helix, protect the exposed ssDNA, and recruit the enzymatic activities required for DNA synthesis, such as helicases, primases and polymerases. All of these components are orderly assembled before the first nucleotide can be incorporated. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of (...) the discovery of the DNA structure, we review our current knowledge of the molecular mechanisms that control initiation of DNA replication in eukaryotic cells, with particular emphasis on the recent identification of novel initiator proteins. We speculate how these initiators assemble molecular machines capable of performing specific biochemical tasks, such as loading a ring‐shaped helicase onto the DNA double helix. BioEssays 25:1158–1167, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.

We propose a view of identity beyond the individual in what we call interpersonal interidentities (IIIs). Within this approach, IIIs comprise collections of entangled stabilities that emerge in recurrent social interaction and manifest for those who instantiate them as relatively invariant though ever-evolving patterns of being (or more accurately, becoming) together. Herein, we consider the processes responsible for the emergence of these IIIs from the perspective of an enactive cognitive science. Our proposal hinges primarily on the development of two related (...) notions: enhabiting and coenhabiting. First, we introduce the notion of enhabiting, a set of processes at the individual level whereby structural interdependencies stabilise and thereafter undergird the habits, networks of habits, and personal identities through which we make sense of our experience. Articulating this position we lean on the notion of a tendency towards an optimal grip, though offering it a developmental framing, whereby iterative states of selective openness help realise relatively stable autonomous personal identities with their own norms of self-regulation. We then extend many of the notions found applicable here to an account of social coenhabiting, in particular, we introduce the notion of tending towards a co-optimal grip as central to the development of social habits, networks of habits, and ultimately IIIs. Such structures, we propose, also emerge as autonomous structures with their own norms of self-regulation. We wind down our account with some reflections on the implications of these structures outside of the interactions wherein they come into being and offer some thoughts about the complex animations of the individual embodied subjects that instantiate them. (shrink)

El tratado exegético ort. et obit. de Isidoro incluye la presentación detallada de tres mujeres que representan, cada una según su historia, las virtudes femeninas más destacadas en la Escritura. Isidoro presenta sus perfiles basándose en el texto bíblico y en la tradición teológica que ya en su época si había ido configurando y asentando. Una atención especial merece el capítulo dedicado a María que no solamente sintetiza la reflexión mariológica anterior, sino que constituye una de las bases para su (...) desarrollo posterior. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to (...) avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample. (shrink)

Several philosophical issues in connection with computer simulations rely on the assumption that results of simulations are trustworthy. Examples of these include the debate on the experimental role of computer simulations :483–496, 2009; Morrison in Philos Stud 143:33–57, 2009), the nature of computer data Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013; Humphreys, in: Durán, Arnold Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013), and the explanatory power of (...) computer simulations :277–292, 2008; Durán in Int Stud Philos Sci 31:27–45, 2017). The aim of this article is to show that these authors are right in assuming that results of computer simulations are to be trusted when computer simulations are reliable processes. After a short reconstruction of the problem of epistemic opacity, the article elaborates extensively on computational reliabilism, a specified form of process reliabilism with computer simulations located at the center. The article ends with a discussion of four sources for computational reliabilism, namely, verification and validation, robustness analysis for computer simulations, a history of successful implementations, and the role of expert knowledge in simulations. (shrink)

This book addresses key conceptual issues relating to the modern scientific and engineering use of computer simulations. It analyses a broad set of questions, from the nature of computer simulations to their epistemological power, including the many scientific, social and ethics implications of using computer simulations. The book is written in an easily accessible narrative, one that weaves together philosophical questions and scientific technicalities. It will thus appeal equally to all academic scientists, engineers, and researchers in industry interested in questions (...) related to the general practice of computer simulations. (shrink)

En este trabajo defiendo que la distribución desigual de bienes que los individuos piensan que objetivamente debieran distribuirse de modo igualitario genera un cierto tipo de envidia o resentimiento que es característico de la igualdad democrática. Dado que esta formulación suena como una objeción en contra de las distribuciones igualitarias, mi principal defensa aquí será el revindicar un sentido de envidia o resentimiento que es específicamente social y político en su naturaleza. Argumentare que el ben social del autorrespeto une la (...) igualdad democrática con ese tipo de envidia. En efecto. Este tipo de envidia emerge en casos en que la inequidad amenace el mutuo reconocimiento que los ciudadanos se deben los unos a los otros. (shrink)

We would like to thank the authors of the commentaries for their critical appraisal of our feature article, Who is afraid of black box algorithms?1 Their comments, suggestions and concerns are various, and we are glad that our article contributes to the academic debate about the ethical and epistemic conditions for medical Explanatory AI. We would like to bring to attention a few issues that are common worries across reviewers. Most prominently are the merits of computational reliabilism —in particular, when (...) promoted as an alternative to transparency—and CR as necessary but not sufficient for delivering trust. We finalise our response by addressing concerns about the place and role of artificial intelligence in medical decision-making and the physician’s responsibilities. We understand the concerns and reservations that some of the reviewers express regarding the epistemic merits of CR. We believe that, in part, this is due to a practice too deeply rooted in transparency. But on …. (shrink)

This article asks the question, ``what is reliable machine learning?'' As I intend to answer it, this is a question about epistemic justification. Reliable machine learning gives justification for believing its output. Current approaches to reliability (e.g., transparency) involve showing the inner workings of an algorithm (functions, variables, etc.) and how they render outputs. We then have justification for believing the output because we know how it was computed. Thus, justification is contingent on what can be shown about the algorithm, (...) its properties, and its behavior. In this paper, I defend computational reliabilism (CR). CR is a computationally-inspired off-shoot of process reliabilism that does not require showing the inner workings of an algorithm. CR credits reliability to machine learning by identifying reliability indicators external to the algorithm (validation methods, knowledge-based integration, etc.). Thus, we have justification for believing the output of machine learning when we have identified the appropriate reliability indicators. CR is advanced as a more suitable epistemology for machine learning. The main goal of this article is to lay the groundwork for CR, how it works, and what we can expect as a justificatory framework for reliable machine learning. (shrink)

L a distribució n parlamentari a qu e ha n a r rojad o lo s resultado s d e la s pasada s elecciones generale s de l dí a 2 0 d e n o viembre , d e 2011 , h a ocasionado , sobr e tod o po r pa r t e d e la s fo r - macione s política s má s s e v erament e afectadas , tod a un a (...) cascad a d e crítica s a nuestr o sistema electoral , y pa r ticula r ment e sobr e l a fó r mul a idead a po r e l matemátic o belg a Vícto r D’Hont. Lo s distinto s pa r tido s tiende n a un a v aloració n sesgad a e n vi r tu d de l bene f ici o obtenido d e l a fó r mul a el e gid a po r e l L e gislado r e n un a etap a históric a dete r minada . ¿Cóm o afecta l a l e y D’Hon t a l a calida d d e l a democraci a española ? ¿E l pro b lem a resid e e n l a fó r mula D’Hont ? Co n l a f inalida d d e contribui r a l debat e abie r t o sobr e nuestr o sistem a electoral, m e centrar é e n alguna s modi f cacione s d e l a LORE G qu e todo s podría n acepta r , junt o a l a propuest a d e do s modelo s electorales , a cost e cero , d e do b l e pro r rate o y d e aplicación inmediata. (shrink)

La racionalidad de la globalización está basada en la relación instrumental mediobeneficio. La planificación económica para la obtención de mayores ganancias cada vez en los distintos mercados parece exigir una incesante no-intervención del Estado. Sin embargo, la dinámica de la acumulación y reproducción del capital precisa de una neo-planificación de las estrategias económicas con el consentimiento del Estado en negociación con agentes transnacionales a nivel tanto estrictamente nacional y regional como global. Dicha delineación de los parámetros económicos alumbra ciertos efectos (...) en sectores antaño regulados en exclusiva por el Estado-Nación: a saber, el derecho, la sociedad y las relaciones internacionales. De igual forma, la democracia como sistema de gobierno sufre los avatares de la economización creciente de la política, consentida por los poderes públicos. Por tanto, los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, consagrados en las cartas constitucionales como derechos fundamentales, junto al subsidiario modelo de Estado Social, son puestos en tela de juicio de manera continua por parte de la racionalidad económica, que observa en los mismos un obstáculo a salvar para la maximización de los beneficios. (shrink)

In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...) the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories. (shrink)