Theories of reciprocity have been surprisingly gender-blind. We develop a gendered account of reciprocity using qualitative data from Russia. We focus on gifts of unpaid task assistance, where gender differences are particularly visible. In our data, women’s gifts of labor involve greater time and effort than men’s, but women report nonreciprocation, while men do not. Paradoxically, the most onerous gifts are those least likely to be reciprocated. We show how this puzzling finding relates to the gendering of reciprocity. We define (...) four stages of the gift cycle—giving, recognition, reciprocation, and givers’ responses to reciprocation—detailing how each is gendered. We argue that reciprocity is a socially embedded phenomenon that cannot be considered in isolation from gender norms. This insight has implications for research employing reciprocity as a framework, and for debates in relation to issues such as care work and family relations. (shrink)

Kant criticizes Plato for his interest in positing ideas that are entirely purified from any sensible elements, but which, nonetheless, exist in some supra-sensible reality. I argue that Kant’s criticism can be repositioned and even countered if, in our assessment of Plato, we assign a wider scope of significance and greater value to the senses. In order to lend focus to my article, I analyze Socrates’ presentation of what I translate as the “look of the Good” (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, 508e) (...) in the Republic so as to show the proximity between Plato and Kant on the question of sensibility. I also draw on the Phaedo and extant literature that goes against the traditional view regarding the status of Ideas or Forms, including the Idea of the Good. I further discuss an affinity between the Good that is “beyond being” (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, 509c) in the Republic and Kant’s view of God as an Ideal of Reason. Given my articulation of the importance of the sensible dimension in Plato, there is a continuity between Kant and Plato on the question of the illegitimacy of certain ideas. In other words, in my reading (and contrary to Kant’s view of Plato), Kant does not so much overturn Plato’s metaphysics, but develops further the view that is already inscribed in Plato. (shrink)

Higginbotham argued that certain linguistic items of English, when used in indirect discourse, necessarily trigger first-personal interpretations. They are: the emphatic reflexive pronoun and the controlled understood subject, represented as PRO. PRO is special, in this respect, due to its imposing obligatory control effects between the main clause and its subordinates ). Folescu & Higginbotham, in addition, argued that in Romanian, a language whose grammar doesn’t assign a prominent role to PRO, de se triggers are correlated with the subjunctive mood (...) of certain verbs. That paper, however, didn’t account for the grammatical diversity of the reports that display immunity to error through misidentification in Romanian: some of these reports are expressed by using de se triggers; others are not. Their IEM, moreover, is not systematically lexically controlled by the verbs, via their theta-roles; it is, rather, determined by the meaning of the verbs in question. Given the data from Romanian, I will argue, the phenomenon of IEM cannot be fully explained starting either from the syntactical or the lexical structure of a language. (shrink)

The notion of epistemic responsibility applied to memory has been in general examined in the framework of the responsibilities that a collective holds for past injustices, but it has never been the object of an analysis of its own. In this article, I propose to isolate and explore it in detail. For this purpose, I start by conceptualizing the epistemic responsibility applied to individual memories. I conclude that an epistemic responsible individual rememberer is a vigilant agent who knows when to (...) engage in different kinds of mental and non-mental actions in order to monitor and update her memories, and who develops and nurture different kinds of virtuous attitudes that guide those actions. These (epistemic) virtuous attitudes are oriented not only towards herself but also towards others. Whereas this conception of epistemic responsibility does not pose a problem to understand shared memories of family members and friends, it may seem suspicious when applied to large-scale collective memories. These memories, which I name historical memories, are memories of events that have a traumatic impact for the community, are permeated by unequal relations of power, keep a complex relationship with historical science, and present other characteristics that distinguish them from individual memories. But despite these differences, the analysis undertaken in this work shows that the general principles that govern the epistemic responsibility of individual and (large-scale) collective rememberers are similar, and are based on similar grounds: pragmatic considerations about the consequences of misremembering or forgetting and a feeling of care. The similarities at the individual and collective scale of the epistemic vigilant attitude that is and should be taken toward our significant past may partially justify the use of the same epithet—“memory”—to refer to these different kinds of representations. (shrink)

Phantasmagoria explores ideas of spirit and soul since the Enlightenment; it traces metaphors that have traditionally conveyed the presence of immaterial forces, and reveals how such pagan and Christian imagery about ethereal beings are embedded in a logic of the imagination, clothing spirits in the languages of air, clouds, light and shadow, glass, and ether itself. Moving from Wax to Film, the book also discusses key questions of imagination and cognition, and probes the perceived distinctions between fantasy and deception; it (...) uncovers a host of spirit forms--angels, ghosts, fairies, revenants, and zombies--that are still actively present in contemporary culture. It reveals how their transformations over time illuminate changing ideas about the self. Phantasmagoria also tells the accompanying story about the means used to communicate such ideas, and relates how the new technologies of the Victorian era were applied to figuring the invisible and the impalpable, and how magic lanterns (the phantasmagoria shows themselves), radio, photography and then moving pictures spread ideas about spirit forces. As the story unfolds, the book features the many eminent men and women--scientists and philosophers--who in the Society of Psychical Research applied their considerable energies to the question of other worlds and other states of mind: they staged trance seances in which mediums produced spirit phenomena, including ectoplasm. The book shows how this often embarrassing story connects with some of the important scientific discoveries of a fertile age, in psychology and physics. Over a sequence of twenty-eight chapters, with over thirty illustrations in color and black and white, Phantasmagoria thus tells an unexpected and often uncomfortable story about shifts in thought about consciousness and the individual person, from the first public waxworks portraits at the end of the eighteenth century to stories of hauntings, possession, and loss of self as in the case of the zombie, a popular figure of soulessness, in modern times. (shrink)

It seems natural to think that emotional experiences associated with a memory of a past event are new and present emotional states triggered by the remembered event. This common conception has nonetheless been challenged at the beginning of the 20th century by intellectuals who considered that emotions can be encoded and retrieved, and that emotional aspects linked to memories of the personal past need not necessary to be new emotional responses caused by the act of recollection. They called this specific (...) kind of memories “affective memories” and defended their existence. My aim here is to expound the historical background of this debate as well as the characterization and development of the notion of affective memory since its first inception. I aim to show that although the debate was left unresolved and the term disappeared from academy around 1930, many of the characterizations of the nature of emotions and memory done by the advocates of affective memory have reappeared in the scientific agenda and been further developed during the last decades. (shrink)

This paper develops a largely neglected parallel between prudence and population ethics. Prudence is generally understood to be concerned with the balancing of well-being over time. How, precisely, well-being ought to be balanced over time, however, is a fervently debated question. I argue that developing a standard guiding such evaluations is exceedingly challenging. This is due to an often overlooked fact about prudence, namely that it shares a structural similarity with population ethics: In both contexts, we assess the comparative value (...) of populations of personstages/people, which may vary in number and level of well-being. Based on this analogy, I show that the development of an adequate theory of prudence runs into very similar impossibility results as obtain in population ethics. In particular, I prove that Arrhenius’ fifth impossibility theorem can be applied to prudence. I develop and compare four possible answers to this challenge. First, I discuss the possibility of accepting the very repugnant conclusion intrapersonally. Second, I present and further develop Donald Bruckner’s Minimax Regret approach, which gives up Transitivity. Third, I apply Jacob Nebel’s Lexical Threshold View to prudence and critically evaluate it. Lastly, I introduce what I call the Negative Lexicality View, which is based on Lexical Threshold View but overcomes some of its problems. (shrink)

The philosophical nature of the two versions of paraphrasing the Gorgias’ treatise On Non-Being — the skeptical version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an anonymous author — are discussed. The paper gives a comparative analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating Gorgias’ thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, which Gorgias considered, judging by the reports of his speech, and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms of philosophical issues. The (...) work provides insights as to how Gorgias modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the Gorgias’ teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the paraphrasing versions impoverishes our understanding of the Gorgias’ teaching considerably, while the joint analysis of both versions demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues raised by Gorgias, in the philosophical and, particularly, the epistemological paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy. (shrink)

Nadie sabe lo que quiere la Justicia porque la justicia no se deja escribir. Cuando digo escribir, digo instituir. La Justicia no se deja instituir. Con ello debe lidiar la actividad judicial, con el límite mismo, con la propia imposibilidad. Límite que exhibe oculto que hay algo allí que no hace cuerpo. Que hay algo que el orden de lo simbólico no logra apresar. Legendre decía: en occidente, instituir es escribir. Instituir a los hombres es ante todo, escribirlos, inscribirlos, ¿marcar (...) sus cuerpos? Kafka lo sabía bien. La democracia enfrenta también un desafío similar: asumir que el signo de lo ilimitado la acompaña en el regazo mismo que la dialéctica de la modernidad le ofrece. Los escritores, señala Milner, han descripto lo ilimitado para condenar sus consecuencias y sustraerse a ellas, como el caso de Rousseau, o para constatarlas y combatirlas mediante estrategias de inversión, de Baudelaire a Brecht.Arrasar con la diferencia es no soportar el límite, aquello que hace borde, aquello que no se deja decir. En otras palabras no aceptar la falta en el lenguaje. El presente trabajo pretende mostrar que es, precisamente, el punto de cruce que constituye el límite mismo, el lugar que aloja un encuentro posible entre justicia y democratización. El límite, lejos de clausurar, posibilita aquel enlace, lo augura. Es a nivel del lenguaje que esta relación requiere ser situada. Democratizar la lengua supone horizontalizarla, en otras palabras, abogar por la apertura y circulación del sentido. Son las teorías críticas del derecho las que aportan las herramientas necesarias para pensar esta articulación. Como señala Cárcova, es en el campo del sentido en donde el derecho adquiere su especificidad y produce los efectos que le son propios. Profundizar la democracia desde el campo jurídico exige, ante todo, democratizar al derecho mismo. (shrink)

Die Hauptthese dieses Buches ist es, Krankheit und Gesundheit mit Nietzsche auf zwei verschiedenen Ebenen zu denken, nämlich als Ereignisse des Willens zur Macht in einem zirkulär-relationalen Modell, in dem sie sich gegenseitig behaupten, sowie die Metaebene der Konzeptualisierung anzuerkennen. Es behandelt die Schwierigkeit des begrifflichen Denkens, diese Ereignisse einzuholen, und diskutiert kritisch Modellbildungen, die darauf hinauslaufen, dass Krankheit zu überwinden und als lineares singuläres Ereignis zu verstehen sei. In Nietzsches Spätwerk wird die Figur des "dionysischen Künstlers" als Idealisierung der (...) Gesundheit gemäß seiner interpretierenden Sichtweise der Welt dargestellt. Die Relevanz des Buches liegt darin, eine Analyse der Begriffe von Gesundheit und Krankheit (tragischer und schlechter Pessimismus) in direkter Beziehung zu leiblichen Vorgängen vorzulegen, die sich von metaphysisch-dialektischen Voraussetzungen befreit. Zu diesem Zweck widmet die Untersuchung sich einer intertextuellen Lektüre der fünf Vorreden, die Nietzsche 1886/87 zu seinen früheren Schriften verfasste, und verknüpft sie mit der Interpretation des Nachlasses und weiterer Veröffentlichungen aus seiner letzten Schaffensphase. (shrink)

The idea of aporia, according to the author, leads to the transformation of Derrida’s philosophy on the basis of a new kind of universalism. This new universalism is based on the principles of relation and difference; it involves the concept of“radically Other” (in particular, in the modes of particularity and singularity) into the field of the Universal. As an essential factor of binarism’s deconstruction, an aporia leads to undermine a paradigm of choice. Derrida substitutes this paradigm with an attitude to (...) “impossible” interdependence of concepts, which, according to traditional approach, are treated as incompatible. -/- The author proves that universalistic potential of Derrida’s thought reveals itself in application of transcendental approach to the problem of universal. Nevertheless, in case of Derrida it is quasi-transcendentalism that unites in itself moments of critics and radicalization of Kantian and Husserlian types of transcendental approach. -/- The paper proves that the idea of aporia has fundamental significance for constituting quasi-transcendental universalism. Interconnectedness (up to identity) of concepts of aporia and experience is evinced, as well as fundamental link between the concept of aporia and basic quasi-transcendental structure of “conditions of possibility/conditions of impossibility”. Within the problem of aporia, as is shown, inherently transcendental overlap between theoretical and practical dimensions is taken place. As is detected, in the discourse of aporia there appears a rethinking of Universal/Particular (Singular) relation: traditional contraposition is transformed into oscillation and overlapping (this rethinking is proper for the transcendental approach). -/- The results of the study, set forth in the article, allow historico-philosophical conclusion about presence, significance and peculiarity of the motive of universality in Derrida’s quasi-transcendentalism. Often remaining implicit, this motive, however, appears to be the driving force for deconstructive thinking. (shrink)

Los escenarios de inequidad y exclusión que exhibe nuestra contemporaneidad agudizados por las complejidades sanitarias y habitacionales producidas por la pandemia, el lastre de los discursos xenófobos, el racismo persistente, las violencias sacrificiales que producen día a día más cuerpos desechables, la explotación creciente del medio ambiente, la crisis del capitalismo depredador expuesta con gran nitidez en este último 2020 en el mundo, nos demandan con urgencia desde el campo jurídico pero también académico y docente el intercambio colectivo de aportes (...) formativos críticos que posibiliten desarticular las racionalidades instrumentales que han venido a regazo de la modernidad misma. En ese marco, el presente trabajo pretende aportar dos conceptos para repensar la enseñanza y el lenguaje jurídico: una crítica del signo desde y con una crítica del ritmo, situada por Benveniste y retomada por Meschonnic. Y una lectura del concepto de Tiempo-ahora (Jetztzeit) de Walter Benjamin, que interroga el tiempo homogéneo y vacío propio del paradigma del progreso moderno; proponiendo una praxis ya no del proyecto por venir, sino de la interrupción como modo de acción. (shrink)

The paper addresses the problem of the place of deconstruction in the history of transcendental philosophy. J. Derrida’s project is considered as one of the most representative and consistent realizations of theoretical foundations of transcendentalism along with prominent conceptions such as Kant’s critique and Husserl’s phenomenology. The author suggests a number of attributes of transcendental thinking that allow historical reconstruction of the transcendental paradigm. Derridian approach is considered as a turn towards this tradition, conceived as a transcendental tradition par exellence, (...) guided by the attitude of «turning. Historical legacy of deconstructive «turning» is analyzed with respect to Husserlian Rückfrage: return-inquiry as method, idea and attitude, reproducing in deconstructive strategy of interpretative critique. A concept of hyperbolic transcendentalism is introduced in order to (1) define a deconstructive version of transcendental philosophy and (2) indicate an immanent tendency in the transcendental thought, constitutive for both Kantian critical project and Husserlian strive towards intellectual radicalism extending from methodological hyperboles (reduction and epoche) to radicalization of «transcendental motive». The author relies upon the concept of quasi-transcendental (thematized by Derrida himself), which defines a mode of de-dogmatization, critical purifying and preservation of proper transcendental foundations of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

We explore different ways in which the human visual system can adapt for perceiving and categorizing the environment. There are various accounts of supervised (categorical) and unsupervised perceptual learning, and different perspectives on the functional relationship between perception and categorization. We suggest that common experimental designs are insufficient to differentiate between hypothesized perceptual learning mechanisms and reveal their possible interplay. We propose a relatively underutilized way of studying potential categorical effects on perception, and we test the predictions of different perceptual (...) learning models using a two‐dimensional, interleaved categorization‐plus‐reconstruction task. We find evidence that the human visual system adapts its encodings to the feature structure of the environment, uses categorical expectations for robust reconstruction, allocates encoding resources with respect to categorization utility, and adapts to prevent miscategorizations. (shrink)

The article is devoted to historico-philosophical investigation of the grounds of universalism of special type. This universalism, inherent in transcendental thinking, was radicalized in quasi-transcendental discourse of Jacques Derrida. It is established that explicit critique of universalism in deconstructive philosophy is aimed at “logo-centric” paradigm of universality which is questioned by (quasi)transcendental philosophy. Constitutive function of difference and otherness in establishment of transcendental and especially quasi-transcendental universality was brought to light. It was shown that in (quasi)transcendental discourse singularity is involved (...) into the sphere of universal, whereas “dogmatic” universalism brought singularity and/or particularity outside, thus questioning its own claims. Tracing transcendentalist tendency to balance status and significance of universal and particular (singular), the author concludes that relation between them makes possible constituting hyper-universality of special type. Universal implications of the Derrida’s notion “quasi-transcendental” are defined. It was determined that one of the main factors constituting universalism of quasi-transcendental type is the deconstruction of binary thinking, accomplished first of all with the help of principles: differance, insolvability (aporia) and trace. Among them insolvability implies universality revealing the overlap and mutual conditioning of alternative (at a glance) elements. Instead, the trace conditions superiority of logo-centric alternatives “primary-secondary” and “presence-absence”. (shrink)

Abstract: In this paper, I respond to James Sterba’s recent book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’ I show that Sterba concludes that God is not logically possible by ignoring three important issues: (a) the different functions of leeway indeterminism (and the political freedom presupposed by it) and autonomy (the two are very different things, even though both go under the name of freedom), (b) the differences in the conditions of agency in God and in creatures, (there is non-parity in (...) how each must apply the single moral law), and (c) the non-parity between our knowledge and God’s. I provide a brief summary of Sterba’s arguments, and I develop the following points: 1. Sterba’s argument against a Free-Will Defense hinges on his conflation of political freedom and autonomy; 2. Sterba’s crucial premise for his argument against soul-making theodicies (namely, that the “Pauline Principle” should be applied univocally across God and creatures) is false; 3. Sterba’s arguments against skeptical theism depend on his assumption that our knowledge is comparable to that of God. In each case, Sterba either does not recognize non-parity between God and creatures or does not recognize the difference between the profane (e.g., political matters) and the sacred, (e.g., spiritual matters having to do with the inner nature of the soul’s development). (shrink)

How are we to understand religion? It is undeniable that religion, and religious motivations, have played a very large role in shaping world events. As such, the question of how to understand religion has become increasingly urgent. At one extreme are those who adopt a comprehensive scientific naturalism. They approach religious beliefs and practices in such a way as to reduce them to nonreligious social or psychological factors; for them religion is part of an ideology or an infantile wish projection (...) that must be outgrown. At the other extreme are many of the religious believers themselves, who take their own religion as absolute truth and take themselves to be in a privileged epistemic position to apprehend it. Both extremes are dangerous: the first because it fails to take both religion and the religious drive seriously, and so ignores an integral facet of human life; the second because it is exemplary of the dangers of religion itself, which can take absolutist and Manichean forms. When religion does take such a form, it degenerates into idolatry, for it mistakes what must always remain a finite and conditioned apprehension of the transcendent for the transcendent ground itself. Often coupled with such a mistake comes a failure to recognize the validity of other perspectives, as well as a violent exclusion of everything that is other or unfamiliar. (shrink)

Marina McCoy explores Plato's treatment of the rhetoric of philosophers and sophists through a thematic treatment of six different Platonic dialogues, including Apology, Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic, Sophist, and Phaedras. She argues that Plato presents the philosopher and the sophist as difficult to distinguish, insofar as both use rhetoric as part of their arguments. Plato does not present philosophy as rhetoric-free, but rather shows that rhetoric is an integral part of philosophy. However, the philosopher and the sophist are distinguished by (...) the philosopher's love of the forms as the ultimate objects of desire. It is this love of the forms that informs the philosopher's rhetoric, which he uses to lead his partner to better understand his deepest desires. McCoy's work is of interest to philosophers, classicists, and communications specialists alike in its careful yet comprehensive treatment of philosophy, sophistry, and rhetoric as portrayed through the drama of the dialogues. (shrink)

When we dream, we feel emotions in response to objects and events that exist only in the dream. What should we say about these emotions? One key question is whether these emotions can be said to be ‘fitting’, that is, appropriate to the evoking scenario. However, how we evaluate these emotions for fittingness may depend on the nature of dreams. According to the imagination model, dreamers do not believe that dream objects are real or that dream events are really happening. (...) In contrast, the hallucination model suggests that we falsely believe dream events are real and many of these beliefs are irrational. Under these conditions, an interesting possibility arises: dream emotions may be “essentially unfitting”, or in other words, feeling emotions in response to dream events is always unfitting. If fittingness requires a match between emotion and evaluative properties of objects or events, it is prima facie plausible that dream emotions could fail to fit under the imagination model because it is unfitting to have an emotion towards an object we do not believe to be real. Further, under the hallucination model, dream emotions could be unfitting because their objects do not exist even if we believe them to be real, or alternatively, because of the irrational nature of dream beliefs. More nuance, however, is required. By comparing dream emotions to the emotions we experience while imagining, engaging with fiction, and hallucinating, we evaluate the possibility of essential unfittingness of dream emotions. We conclude that although there are compelling arguments in support of the claim that dream emotions are essentially unfitting, these arguments are not entirely convincing, and it is more plausible that particular dream emotions can be assessed for fittingness under either model of dreaming. (shrink)

What, if anything, do the ‘square’ protests and ‘occupy’ movements of 2011 bring to contemporary democratic theory? And how can we, as political theorists, analyse their discourse and do justice to it? We address these questions through an analysis of the Greek and Spanish protest movements of the spring and summer of 2011, the so-called aganaktismenoi and indignados. We trace the centrality of the critique of representation and politics as usual as well as the ideas about horizontality and autonomy in (...) the protesters’ discourse. These ideas are not only important to their critique of the contemporary liberal democratic regimes in the two countries, but also important to the way in which the protesters organise themselves. Nonetheless, as we shall argue, the protesters are caught within a tension between horizontality and verticality, between autonomy and hegemony, or between moving beyond representation and accepting representational structures. Given this tension, we examine how the protesters negotiate it in three key areas: politics, representation and organisation. Drawing on Jacques Rancière, we further argue that the protesters can be seen as making a claim to equal voice. This is what Rancière refers to as politics proper, and the question is then whether such a politics is possible without falling back into traditional forms of politics. (shrink)

White lies, lies that are beneficial to the addressee and uttered out of concern for them, are pervasive in daily life. This raises a prima facie question: if white lies are so common, are they still lies? I tackle this question from the perspective of speech act theory, using the case of white lies to shed light on the broader question of whether lying itself can be considered a type of speech act. Adopting Sbisà’s (Uptake and Conventionality in Illocution. Lodz (...) Papers in Pragmatics 5 33–52. Reprinted in Marina Sbisà (forthcoming), Essays on Speech Acts and Other Topics in Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) neo-Austinian approach that places the emphasis on the achievement of certain conventional effects, I claim that malicious lying cannot be a type of speech act. However, white lies are a type of speech act, a claim which finds support in three types of evidence: the conventionality of means by which white lies are performed, their online processing, and their acquisition. Moreover, the existence of a continuum between white (harmless) lies (which are a type of speech act) and malicious (harmful) lies (which are not) suggests that whether an utterance performs a certain type of speech act or not can be a matter of degree. In other words, the property itself of being a speech act of a certain kind, an utterance’s speech-act-hood, so to speak, may be graded. This is an interesting result, which applies to speech acts more generally, beyond lying. (shrink)

Criticism is a staple of the scientific enterprise and of the social epistemology of science. Philosophical discussions of criticism have traditionally focused on its roles in relation to objectivity, confirmation, and theory choice. However, attention to criticism and to criticizability should also inform our thinking about scientific pursuits: the allocation of resources with the aim of developing scientific tools and ideas. In this paper, we offer an account of scientific pursuitworthiness which takes criticizability as its starting point. We call this (...) the apokritic model of pursuit. Its core ideas are that pursuits are practices governed by norms for asking and answering questions, and that criticism arises from the breach of these norms. We illustrate and advertise our approach using examples from institutional grant review, neuroscience, and sociology. We show that the apokritic model can unify several indices of criticizability, that it can account for the importance of criticizing pursuits in scientific practice, and that it can offer ameliorative advice to erstwhile pursuers. (shrink)

Canguilhem’s contemporary relevance lies in how he critiques the relation between knowledge and life that underlies Kantian rationality. The latter’s Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment represent life in the form of an exception: life is simultaneously included and excluded from understanding. Canguilhem’s critique can be grouped into three main strands of argument. First, his reference to concepts as preserved problems breaks with Kant’s idea of concepts regarding the living as a ‘unification of the manifold’. Second, Canguilhem’s vital (...) normativity represents life as the potential to resist normative orders that judge the living, relegating Kant’s ‘lawfulness of the contingent’ to a ‘mediocre regularity’. Third, Canguilhem’s introduction of the environment as a ‘category of contemporary thought’ decentres the living/knowing subject and introduces contingency. His idea of the ‘knowledge of life’ leads to the conclusion that life is the condition of possibility of rationality, rather than rationality’s ‘blind spot’. (shrink)

The article introduces readers to the current state of Slovak studies in Russia. The fate of Slavic studies in Russia is complicated and it has had its ups (late 19th and early 20th century) and downs (1920s and 1930s), but until now there has been a multidisciplinary tradition of studying all Slavic peoples, their languages, literature, history and culture. The article focuses on the study of Slovak language, literature, history and culture at Moscow State University, the Institute for Slavic Studies (...) in Moscow, and Saint-Petersburg State University. It deals with the main researchers and their work and publications. The article is based on general research into the history of Slavic studies carried out by leading Russian scientists. (shrink)

The philosopher Lev Shestov aimed to establish a new free way of thinking, which manifested itself as a struggle against the delusion that we have a rational grasp of the necessary truths on matters that are of the greatest importance to us, such as the questions of life and death. Philosophy, as the Russian philosopher understood it, is not pure thinking, but ‘some kind of inner doing, inner regeneration, or second birth’ (Shestov in Lektsii po Istorii Grecheskoi Filosofii [Lectures on (...) the history of Greek philosophy], YMCA-PRESS, Moscow, 2001, p. 53). Having adopted the notion of the ‘regeneration of one’s convictions’ from Dostoevsky’s vocabulary in his earlier works, Shestov developed the idea of ‘awakening’ further in his mature thought, in which the motif of ‘awakening’ comprised one of the main ideas of his philosophy: the fight for the individual’s right to freedom and to creative transformation at a time when she is in despair or on the brink of death. In this article, I analyse Shestov’s idea of ‘awakening’ as one of the key tropes and developmental characteristics of his philosophical vision. In particular, I argue that, having stemmed from Shestov’s earlier interpretations of Dostoevsky, Shakespeare and Plotinus, in his later writings, the notion of ‘awakening’—the possibility of a fundamental, inner transformation of one’s worldview (probuzhdenie, pererozhdenie)—marked the beginning of a new salvific mode in his writing. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the historical-philosophical analysis of the problem of ambivalence as a fundamental principle of Derrida’s philosophical thinking. It shows how such primordial philosophical questions as ones of limits of philosophies and of limits of philosophy define the basic problem dimensions of Derridean conception. It consideres the correlation of the theme of marginality with both the problem of Derrida’s cultural self-identification and the idea of the metaphoricity of language as the initial premise of différance logic. Also the (...) article examines the role of transcendentalistic implications in Derridean thought that determine a his-torical and philosophical context of Derrida’s philosophy. The analogy between quasi-transcendental and metaphorical aspects of deconstructive thinking is drawn. The identifica-tion of Jewish and metaphorical in Derrida’s conception is demonstrated. The author introduces the concept of "literal metaphor" as the quintessence of Derrida’s philosophical thought which structures its basic forms, namely: aporia, hyperbole, question, commentary. (shrink)

We offer a new account of the role of values in theory choice that captures a temporal dimension to the values themselves. We argue that non-epistemic values sometimes serve as “inquiry tickets,” justifying scientists’ pursuit of certain questions in the short run, while the answers to those questions mitigate transient underdetermination in the long run. Our account of inquiry tickets shows that the role of non-epistemic values need not be restricted to belief or acceptance in order to be relevant to (...) hypothesis choice: the relevance of non-epistemic values to a particular cognitive attitude with respect to h vary over time. (shrink)

Observer memories, memories where one sees oneself in the remembered scene, from-the-outside, are commonly considered less accurate and genuine than visual field memories, memories in which the scene remembered is seen as one originally experienced it. In Remembering from the Outside (OUP, 2019), Christopher McCarroll debunks this commonsense conception by offering a detailed analysis of the nature of observer memories. On the one hand, he explains how observer and field perspectives are not really mutually exclusive in an experience, including memory (...) experiences. On the other hand, he argues that in observer memories there is no additional explicit representation of oneself experiencing the event: the self-presence is transparent and given by the mode of presentation. Whereas these are two lines of strategic and original argumentation, they are not exempt of problems. In this critical notice, I focus on the problematic aspects of McCarroll’s account. I show that it presents some issues that affect the internal coherence of the overall framework, and that some aspects and central notions would have needed more development to offer a precise picture of the nature of observer memories. (shrink)

Drawing from a multi-sourced data corpus gathered from high-net-worth social media influencers, this article explores how these individuals reconcile ethicality and living a luxury lifestyle through the enactment of three types of personas on Instagram: Ambassador of ‘True’ Luxury, Altruist, and ‘Good’ Role Model. By applying the concepts of taste regimes and social moral licensing, we find that HNW social media influencers conspicuously enact and display ethicality, thereby retaining legitimacy in the field of luxury consumption. As these individuals are highly (...) influential, they could leave a potentially significant mark on public discourse and, consequently, on their audiences’ construction of ethically responsible luxury consumption. In this vein, this article offers significant managerial insights into professional influencers and discusses ethical managerial practices to ensure ethical collaborations between influencers and managers. (shrink)

Статтю присвячено дослідженню альтернативних можливостей інтерпретації Декартової концепції cogito: як авто-референтної структури і як авто-афекційності. Контекстом аналізу виступає трансцендентально-феноменологічний ракурс погляду на картезіанську філософію як на засновок трансцендентального мотиву. Визначено роль принципу авто-референтності в трансцендентальному дискурсі. На ґрунті розгляду перспектив тлумачення картезіанського підходу, запропонованих М. Анрі й Ж.-Л. Марйоном, виявлено моменти іррелевантності авто-афекційної настанови вимогам трансцендентального мислення і втомивовано адекватність авто-референтної моделі його засадам. Авторка доходить висновку, що, попри позірну пріоритетність авто-афекційності для трансцендентального дискурсу, пов’язану насамперед з притаманною їй радикалізацією (...) функціонального аспекту свідомості й усуненням небезпеки субстантивації cogito, закладеної в структурі авто-референтності, остання видається відповіднішою вимогам трансцендентального мислення, оскільки передбачає збереження принципу відношення-відмінності, конститутивного для трансцендентальної думки – який в умовах авто-афекційності виявляється редукованим. (shrink)

У статті досліджуються форми і особливості виявлення ідеї свободи в теоретичному вимірі кантівського трансценденталізму. Аналізуючи ґрунтовні праці Л. У. Бека і М. Коля з проблеми свободи в кантівській філософії, в яких артикулюються проблеми множинності значень Кантового поняття свободи (Бек) та свободи емпіричного мислення (Коль), авторка звертає увагу на необхідність підважування жорсткої опозиції між царинами природи і свободи та можливість тлумачення в термінах свободи судженнєвої активності розсуду. Акцентується значущість концепту спонтанності як такої форми втілення ідеї свободи, що характеризується певною універсальністю через (...) застосовність як до теоретичного, так і до практичного дискурсів. Встановлено важливість «методологічного повороту» у Кантовому тлумаченні проблеми свободи, який, деконструюючи онтологію «двох світів», дозволяє мислити елементи дистинкції «феноменальне / ноуменальне» як контекстуально зумовлені аспекти, а не відмінні онтологічні домени. Показано зв’язок між чинниками свободи і помилковості, розрізнено «позитивний» і «негативний» модуси свободи в рамках теоретичного мислення. В рамках теоретично-трансцендентального дискурсу виявлено апоретичний зв’язок свободи і зумовленості, встановлено його стосунок до базової апорії трансценденталізму: апріорної «вписаності» принципів іншості та відмінності до царини суб’єктивності, яка характеризується єдністю, автономністю, спонтанністю тощо. (shrink)

В статті аналізується значення концепту чистоти в трансцендентальному дискурсі філософської думки і розкриваються його основні характеристики. Розглядається відношення між поняттями чистоти та пустоти в опозиції «форма–зміст», котра зазнає суттєвого перегляду в рамках трансцендентальної традиції. Деталізується аспект функціювання ідеї та поняття чистоти у трьох панівних концепціях трансценденталізму: філософських проектах Канта, Гуссерля та Дерріда, в кожному з яких чистота характеризує фундаментальні царини філософської проблематизації – відповідно, розуму, свідомості та мови. Показується, яку роль відіграє поняття чистоти як принципово предикативний концепт (і як синонім (...) поняття трансцендентального) в реалізації парадигмального «зсуву», пов’язаного з антисубстантивістською орієнтацією трансцендентального мислення. Це призводить до зміни акцентів у філософському запитуванні з догматико-метафізичного «Що» на критично-трансцендентальне «Як». У статті визначаються різні способи тлумачення чистоти в трансцендентальному дискурсі: ейдетична чистота, чистота сингулярності, чистота структури та інтенційна чистота. (shrink)

В статті аналізуються засади феноменологічної традиції тлумачення Декартової філософії як одного з найбільш значущих проектів сучасних картезіанських досліджень. Зокрема, розглядається інтерпретаційний підхід Ж.-Л. Марйона, що унаочнює основні тренди сучасного феноменологічного картезіанства. Виявлено два основні проблематичні моменти, що спричиняють феноменологічну критику Декарта, а саме її гусерлівську версію: нелегітимність переходу між іманентним і трансцендентним порядками («картезіанське коло» в розумінні Гусерля) та наявність опосередковувальної ланки у цьому переході, що суперечить феноменологічній вимозі безпосередньої даності. Визначаються способи подолання цих перешкод в рамках феноменологічної філософії, що (...) загалом розглядає картезіанський спадок як фундаментальну складову у розбудові власного проекту. Введення концепту Іншого до феноменологічного дискурсу розглядається як один з таких способів і аналізується на прикладі марйонівських тлумачень Декартових позицій. Феноменологію Іншого розглянуто як джерело критичних ресурсів, що, опонуючи Гусерлевій критиці картезіанського підходу, сприяє виявленню автентичних характеристик останнього, які залишалися прихованими під тиском історико-філософських стереотипів і підлягають розкриттю крізь призму феноменологічних інтерпретацій. (shrink)

The article deals with the problem of phenomenological interpretation of Cartesian idea of evidence. The author demonstrates that implicit but constitutive characteristic of evidence is a property of excessiveness. The analysis of its conceptual versions and methodological representations in Husserl, Marion and Derrida’s philosophies deconstructs some stereotype interpretations of evidence as an attribute of I-centric philosophical systems and also as a carrier of qualities of fullness and presence. The author claims that excessiveness of evidence has two main aspects: (1) non-belonging (...) to the system assured by this very evidence and (2) tendency to self-surpassing (hyperbolization). The excessiveness of evidence is shown in particular with regard to the system of thinking governed by the “truth-falsehood” opposition. The author brings to light a trend to the increasing of degrees of evidence as a consequence of phenomenological critique and deconstruction as methodological hyperbolizations of Cartesian doubt. The common ground between Marionian and Derridian critiques of Husserl’s conception of evidence is found that is inconsistency between the principle of fulfillment of intention and the unrealizable regulative of the “Idea in Kantian sense” as two main ways of representation of evidence idea in Husserlian phenomenology. It is shown that in accordance with the paradigm of possibility as the common denominator of phenomenological attitude in general the very same criticized evidence becomes assimilated in Marion’s conception of “saturated phenomena” (a principle of hyperbolical givenness) and in Derridian deconstruction (hyperbolicity-excessiveness as heterogeneity and impossibility within the framework of his critique of presence). The author uncovers the essential connection between the idea of evidence and basic elements of deconstructive discourse, such as the metaphorical concept of secret and the quasi-concept différance. (shrink)

The article examines the peculiarities of the relationship between phenomena of freedom and tradition in the discourse of deconstruction. In this case, the tradition stands primarily as philosophical tradition, a critical questioning about which underlies Derridian thought. The latter in a great measure is a philosophical reflection on just the philosophical heritage ("philosophy of philosophy"). The author carries out her own analysis of the relationship between deconstruction and philosophical tradition in connection with the problem of freedom. In this respect, she (...) uses the Derridian concept-metaphor of translation (passage), drawing on Mark Crepon’s historico-philosophical findings. Considering the peculiarities of the thematization of concepts of freedom and tradition in deconstructive discourse, the author reveals a connection between the problems of (a) limits of philosophy (as one of the cornerstone issues of Derridian discourse) and (b) the specific correlation between the phenomena of freedom and tradition. It has been established that it is the ideas of other and translation (passage) that stand as links enabling such a connection. For the history of philosophy of the second half of the 20th century, it is important to correctly understand the Derridian concept of tradition. The article proves that Derrida's interpretation of this concept (1) is significantly determined by the factor of other, (2) is based on the paradoxical interaction of tradition and freedom, (3) causes and enables deconstructing of the opposition between freedom and violence. As a result, it is established that deconstruction, which is apparently guided by the goal of liberation from tradition, in essence turns out to be a freedom for tradition, if the latter is interpreted in the semantic context set by the concepts of translation (or transition), other and limit. (shrink)

У статті досліджується кантівська концепція вільної гри пізнавальних спроможностей – виображення і розсуду – в ракурсі проблеми трансцендентальної універсальності. Відзначається універсалізуючий потенціал третьої «Критики», одним із визначальних сюжетів якої є проблема вільної гри, щодо Кантової філософської системи в цілому. Викладаються базові параметри авторської тематизації трансцендентального універсалізму як такого, що ґрунтується на принципах відношення і відмінності і є пов’язаним із конституюванням порядку гіпер-універсальності. Оприявнено й проаналізовано параметри універсальності, імпліковані концепцією вільної гри. Показано, яким чином вихідна універсальність трансцендентального виображення виявляється в рамках (...) вільної гри водночас підваженою і гіперболізованою. Досліджено амбівалентну позицію вільної гри у відношені до пізнання; з метою схоплення універсалістичних імплікацій релевантного вільній грі модусу пізнання – «пізнання взагалі» – введено концепт «пізнання als ob». Встановлено певну асиметрію в рамках вільної гри між статусами виображення і розсуду, а саме – пріоритетність останнього. Проаналізовано специфіку властивої вільній грі суб’єктивної універсальності, виявлено її інтерсуб’єктивні та квазі-об’єктивні засновки; застосовано поняття «als ob-об’єктивності», що характеризує певну тенденцію до універсалізації самої універсальності, позначаючи універсальний вимір на межі суб’єктивного й об’єктивного. (shrink)

The Extent of the Literal develops a strikingly new approach to metaphor and polysemy in their relation to the conceptual structure. In a straightforward narrative style, the author argues for a reconsideration of standard assumptions concerning the notion of literal meaning and its relation to conceptual structure. She draws on neurophysiological and psychological experimental data in support of a view in which polysemy belongs to the level of words but not to the level of concepts, and thus challenges some seminal (...) work on metaphor and polysemy within cognitive linguistics, lexical semantics and analytical philosophy. (shrink)

“Older than Language Is the Mimicking of Gestures”: The Body as the Origin of Language. Nietzsche’s early philosophical ideas about language and its origin occupy a central place in scholarly discussions of his work. In order to examine Nietzsche’s interpretation of the constitution of human language, this article focuses not only on his early writings, but also on the first volume of Human, All Too Human as well as on his later period, in particular his work in 1887 and 1888. (...) The central claim of this article is that Nietzsche begins to view the body, with its gestures and movements, as the site of origin for instinctive unconscious language and the subsequent emergence of conceptual language. Already in 1872, and with the influence of contemporary scientific ideas, he begins to conceive the movement and gesture of the human body as the foundation for the origin of language. Strengthened in Human, All Too Human, this idea appears again in his later writings in 1887, when Nietzsche connects it to Charles Féré’s theories of “psychomotor induction” and “mental suggestion.” Finally, it is the Dionysian artist of 1888 who enjoys par excellence the capacity for suggestion, affect and immediate representation, and who thus becomes the master of communication. (shrink)