Abstract: Human rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their moral source. This internal relationship explains the moral content and moreover the distinguishing feature of human rights: they are designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of coercive law. This essay is an attempt to explain this moral-legal Janus face of human (...) rights through the mediating role of the concept of human dignity. This concept is due to a remarkable generalization of the particularistic meanings of those "dignities" that once were attached to specific honorific functions and memberships. In spite of its abstract meaning, "human dignity" still retains from its particularistic precursor concepts the connotation of depending on the social recognition of a status—in this case, the status of democratic citizenship. Only membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, the equal human dignity of everybody. (shrink)

I seek to advance enquiry into the philosophical question of in virtue of what human beings have a dignity of the sort that grounds human rights. I first draw on values salient in sub-Saharan African moral thought to construct two theoretically promising conceptions of human dignity, one grounded on vitality, or liveliness, and the other on our communal nature. I then argue that the vitality conception cannot account for several human rights that we (...) intuitively have, while the community conception can do so. I conclude that, of plausible theories of human dignity with an African pedigree, the field ought to favour a community-based view and critically compare it in future work with the Kantian, autonomy-based view that dominates Western thinking about dignity. (shrink)

This paper is a historical, legal and philosophical analysis of the concept of human dignity in German and Kenyan constitutional law. We base our analysis on decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, in particular its take on life imprisonment and its 2006 decision concerning the shooting of hijacked airplanes, and on a close reading of the Constitution of Kenya. We also present a dialogue between us in which we offer some critical remarks on the concept of (...) human dignity in the two constitutions, each one of us from his own philosophical perspective. (shrink)

Despite criticism that dignity is a vague and slippery concept, a number of international guidelines on bioethics have cautioned against research that is contrary to human dignity, with reference specifically to genetic technology. What is the connection between genetic research and human dignity? In this article, I investigate the concept of human dignity in its various historical forms, and examine its status as a moral concept. Unlike Kant's ideal concept of human (...) class='Hi'>dignity, the empirical or relational concept takes human dignity as something that is affected by one's circumstances and what others do. I argue that the dignity objection to some forms of genetic research rests on a view of human nature that gives humans a special status in nature – one that is threatened by the potential of genetic research to reduce individuals to their genetic endowment. I distinguish two main philosophical accounts of human nature. One of these, the Aristotelian view, is compatible with the use of genetic technology to help humans realize their inherent potential to a fuller extent. (shrink)

In light of recent criticisms of the concept of human dignity, this contribution offers a proposal for the continued relevance of the concept for tertiary chaplaincy. It is important to consider the concept of human dignity in tertiary chaplaincy because: many higher education institutions continue to identify human dignity as a key value; the kinds of ethical issues that tertiary students face will often involve appeals to human dignity; and the religious connotations (...) that have come to be associated with the concept fall within the scope of chaplains. Nevertheless, there have been recent calls for the concept of human dignity to be dismissed from ethical discourse as unhelpful. In ethical debate, dignity can be unhelpful when it leads to ‘dignity talk’, when there is disagreement about whether it is something human beings always already have or something that is realised through human activity, or when it conceals what people think is really at stake. In response to these criticisms, this contribution proposes a model for understanding human dignity that affirms the value of the human person as a multi-dimensional, historically-situated being in relationship to all that is, a being who is faced with difficult moral choices through which he or she makes meaning in his or her life. This model has both descriptive value in helping us to understand why people do what they do, and normative value in helping us evaluate what should be done. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Kant's conception of dignity is commonly misunderstood. On the basis of a few passages in the Grundlegung scholars often attribute to Kant a view of dignity as an absolute inner value all human beings possess. However, a different picture emerges if one takes into account all the passages in which Kant uses ‘dignity’. I shall argue that Kant's conception of dignity is a more Stoic one: He conceives (...) of dignity as sublimity ( Erhabenheit ) or the highest elevation of something over something else. ‘Dignity’ expresses that something is ‘raised above’ all else. What it is raised above, and in virtue of what, depends on the context in which Kant uses ‘dignity’. For instance, he talks about the dignity of a monarch to refer to his rank as the ruler of his subjects. When Kant refers to the dignity of humanity, he expresses the view that human beings have a prerogative over the rest of nature in virtue of being free. What Kant is saying in the famous Grundlegung passage on dignity is that morality is raised above other determinations of will in that morality alone should be valued unconditionally. In unfolding the complicated usage of ‘dignity’ in Kant's works, my reading helps to bring out the coherence of his ethics. (shrink)

Human dignity is a crucial concept in contemporary ethical, political and legal studies. However, people have different, even opposite understandings of human dignity, which has caused lots of confusion in related discourses. The Confucian notion of human dignity provides an important perspective for reflecting various theories of human dignity. In Confucian ethics, the basis of human dignity is the moral potential that every human being naturally has. Moral potential grants (...) everyone universal dignity, while the development of moral potential grants people acquired dignity. Since all human beings have moral potential to the same extent, everyone owns universal dignity equally. Different people develop their moral potential to different extents. One’s acquired dignity is positively associated with the development of her moral potential. Universal dignity is a moral status but acquired dignity is not. To pursue acquired dignity is the moral demand of universal dignity and protects people’s universal dignity. Confucian discussions on human dignity provide not only a way to justify the equality of human moral status, but also a way to justify the moral obligation of protecting and developing human nature, thereby constituting a reliable theoretical basis for coping with ethical issues caused by biomedical technologies today. (shrink)

This paper depicts the meanings of human dignity as they unfold and evolve in the Bible and the "Halakhah". I posit that three distinct features of a Jewish conception of human dignity can be identified in contrast to core characteristics of a liberal conception of human dignity. First, the original source of human dignity is not intrinsic to the human being but extrinsic, namely in God. Second, it is argued (...) that the "dignity of the people" has precedence over personal autonomy and liberty, which are core liberal pillars. The third characteristic pertains to the potential conflict between personal autonomy and liberty, and God's commandments. The theoretical analysis of human dignity is then examined in light of several Supreme Court decisions in Israel during the 1990s. I illustrate that Jewish religious and secular-liberal conceptions pull in different directions in the rulings of liberal and religious Justices in Israel. (shrink)

The need for dignity is frequently mentioned in policy documents relating to the care of the elderly. It is also described as an important value in professional codes. Yet concerns about the standards of care for an important number of elderly people abound, despite global ageing being a challenging phenomenon. Not least among these is how to ensure that the elderly will be able to live out their days with dignity.In the present paper, we begin with an empirical (...) exploration of the meaning of human dignity as experienced by older Europeans and their professional caregivers. Thereafter, we discuss the meaning and relevance of these empirical research findings from a care ethics perspective. (shrink)

This paper depicts the meanings of human dignity as they unfold and evolve in the Bible and the Halakhah. I posit that three distinct features of a Jewish conception of human dignity can be identified in contrast to core characteristics of a liberal conception of human dignity. First, the original source of human dignity is not intrinsic to the human being but extrinsic, namely in God. Second, it is argued (...) that the “dignity of the people” has precedence over personal autonomy and liberty, which are core liberal pillars. The third characteristic pertains to the potential conflict between personal autonomy and liberty, and God's commandments. The theoretical analysis of human dignity is then examined in light of several Supreme Court decisions in Israel during the 1990s. I illustrate that Jewish religious and secular-liberal conceptions pull in different directions in the rulings of liberal and religious Justices in Israel. (shrink)

In this second chapter of the book 'Human Dignity in the Judaeo-Christian Tradition' the case is made that human dignity is a concept which is also rooted outside this tradition, namely in the philosophical and educational tradition of Greek and Roman Antiquity. It was to this tradition that the Renaissance and the Enlightenment appealed with their concept of human dignity, and the commitment to the concept in modern human rights and constitutional legislation too (...) is indebted to it. The chapter traces the concept from early Greek legal sources via early philosophical documents to Plato and Aristotle and the Hellenistic philosophical schools down to Cicero, where it finds its most philosophical and idealistic expression. The presence of the concept in classical Greek and Roman thought calls in question the view, frequently heard today, that human dignity is a faith-based concept without any basis in philosophical reflection. Instead it demonstrates that even a materialistic philosophy such as Epicureanism was unable to speak adequately of the human being and its place in the universe without raising the question of its unique nature and destiny. (shrink)

One of the predominating ethical principles in contemporary western culture is the proclamation of the respect for human dignity. It is emphasized as the universal principle of human relationships, its importance being stressed also in specific relationships concerning human care. The author aims at the conceptualization of the phenomenon of human dignity, seen from two points of view: social and intrasubjective. She defines the concept of dignity on the beckground of various social ideals (...) corresponding various historical periods in western culture. She examnines anthropological and social standards of equality, esteem and respect as the basis od enforcing justice as well as social and individual liberty. On intrasubjective level the stress is put on the selfrespect of the individual as the basis of his or her consciousness of his or her own dignity. (shrink)

The challenges facing the life-worlds of political societies in the Islamic world require a radical shift of perspective that can improve our understanding of the contemporary situation of human rights politics. Not only the classical formulation of secularism, which aims at liberating the public sphere from domination of ‘the sacred’, but also the political-theological approach, which addresses the problems of modernity within the context of a disguised and refurbished dominance of ‘the transcendence’, suffer from and share a basic insufficiency (...) in handling human rights issues. According to these approaches, the basic issue stems from a realignment in relations between logics of the sovereign and the sacred or a redefinition of the position of state against religion. In this article, my object is shifting the scope of discussion concerning the rights beyond this logic of sovereignty by adopting an approach which provides a political ground for discussing the intermingling of religion in the life-world. From my point of view, the first step that should be taken to deepen our understanding of the argument of freedom is to unveil the nature of the sacred within the framework of a power network that longs for control over the whole lives of individuals constituting the society. In this regard, by going beyond the concepts such as fanaticism, fundamentalism or terrorism provided by ‘state mentality’, the significance of lifestyle politics for ‘rights talk’ will become more evident. From this point of view, the detection and critique of a zone of ‘weak citizenship’ constructed through restrictions stemming from the values and norms arising from the perceptions of particular communities organized through family, tradition and justice are essential. Such a critique will pave the way for a radical politicization of lifestyles by way of criteria of the demands for equal respect and dignity. (shrink)

In the practice of social criticism, the concept of human dignity has played and still plays an important role. In philosophical debates, however, we find widely divergent accounts of that concept, ranging from views based on a conception of human needs to religious approaches trying to explain the ‘inviolability’ of the person. The view presented here reconstructs the basic claim of human dignity historically and normatively as resting on the moral status of the person (...) as a reason-giving, reason-demanding and reason-deserving being. The person as holding a basic moral right to justification is the true ground for the claim of having one’s dignity respected: as someone who must not be subjected to norms, rules, or institutions which cannot be properly justified to that person in appropriate practices of justification. To possess human dignity means being an equal member in the realm of subjects and authorities of justification and to be respected as such. This is the moral ground of social criticism, implied in particular social and political demands raised in given historical contexts. Thus, critical theory has to be reoriented towards a critique of the relations of justification in a given social order of justification. (shrink)

Recent advances in the technology of creating chimeras have evoked controversy in policy debates. At centre of controversy is the fear that a substantial contribution of human cells or genes in crucial areas of the animal’s body may at some point render the animal more humanlike than any other animals we know today. Authors who have commented on or contributed to policy debates specify that chimeras which would be too humanlike would have an altered moral status and threaten our (...) notion of ‘human dignity’. This setting offers a productive opportunity to test the notion of human dignity and to emphasize some of its weaknesses as an ethical tool. Limiting chimerism experiments on the basis of whether or not it undermines or challenges human dignity implies a clear demarcation of those characteristics which are typically, and importantly, human. Evidence of our evolutionary ties and behavioral similarities with other animals seem to annul all attempts to define the uniquely human properties to which human dignity may be attributed. Hence, it has been suggested that the particular moral status associated with humans cannot be explained for beyond an intuitive basis. In what follows, we will argue that the difficulties inherent in the notion of human dignity lie not in the impossibility to acquire a list of properties which are unique to humans, but rather in the difficulty to demonstrate the moral relevance of these properties, and particularly the relevance of their being human. We offer an alternative interpretation of the concept of dignity which is not necessarily related to being human. (shrink)

The claim that human dignity is universal is challenged by the particular experience of the horrible things people do to others. If dignity is just a ‘vacuous concept’ then the notion of universal human rights and the claim of cosmopolitism that all human beings for a single moral community are also called into question. A close reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and an analysis the historical development of the text reveals a (...) complex conception of human dignity expressed by the Component Dimensions of Human Dignity model. The model conceives of human dignity in terms of four Component Dimensions – existential, behavioral, cognitive-affective and social- each consisting of a Complementary Duality comprising two facets held in tension along an axis of the Already and the Not Yet. Consequently, human dignity can be understood both as Already a universal truth, and as Not Yet realized in every particular life. (shrink)

This study presents findings from an ontological and contextual determination of the concept of dignity. The study had a caritative and caring science perspective and a hermeneutical design. The aim of this study was to increase caring science knowledge of dignity and to gain a determination of dignity as a concept. Eriksson’s model for conceptual determination is made up of five part-studies. The ontological and contextual determination indicates that dignity can be understood as absolute dignity, (...) the spiritual dimension characterized by responsibility, freedom, duty, and service, and relative dignity, characterized by the bodily, external aesthetic dimension and the psychical, inner ethical dimension. Dignity exists in human beings both as absolute and relative dignity. (shrink)

This study presents findings from an ontological and contextual determination of the concept of dignity. The study had a caritative and caring science perspective and a hermeneutical design. The aim of this study was to increase caring science knowledge of dignity and to gain a determination of dignity as a concept. Eriksson’s model for conceptual determination is made up of five part-studies. The ontological and contextual determination indicates that dignity can be understood as absolute dignity, (...) the spiritual dimension characterized by responsibility, freedom, duty, and service, and relative dignity, characterized by the bodily, external aesthetic dimension and the psychical, inner ethical dimension. Dignity exists in human beings both as absolute and relative dignity. (shrink)

The rise of “dignity talk” has led to the concept of human dignity being criticized in recent years. Some critics argue that human dignity must either be something we have or something we acquire. Others argue that there is no such thing as human dignity and people really mean something else when they appeal to it. Both “dignity talk” and the criticisms arise from a problematic conception of medical ethics as a (...) legalistic, procedural techne. A retrieval of hermeneutical ethics, by contrast, offers a way to overcome both the legalism of contemporary ethics and the abuses and criticisms of the concept of human dignity. Such an ethics affirms both the inherent dignity of a human being as a multi-dimensional, meaning-seeking, historically-situated, relational individual, who desires to live a good life, and the realized sense of his/her own dignity toward which s/he works. As such, human dignity cannot be reduced to one feature of the human, and instead functions as both a descriptive category that avoids moralism, and as a normative category that allows relativity whilst avoiding relativism. Content Type Journal Article Category Article Pages 141-154 DOI 10.1558/hrge.v17i2.141 Authors David G. Kirchhoffer, School of Theology, Australian Catholic University, PO Box 456, Virgina QLD, 4014 Australia Journal Human Reproduction & Genetic Ethics Online ISSN 2043-0469 Print ISSN 1028-7825 Journal Volume Volume 17 Journal Issue Volume 17, Number 2 / 2011. (shrink)

It has been said that human dignity is a vacuous concept that should, therefore, be dismissed as an ethical category. This article seeks to defend the concept of human dignity by suggesting, first, that the flaw in the logic of those who claim that human dignity is a vacuous concept lies in an unjustifiable reductionism that results from the hermeneutic of suspicion that such authors apply to the concept. Second, that human dignity (...) is not an either/or concept, as these authors would suggest, but rather a both/and concept in which the contradictions that they would use for its dismissal are indeed where human dignity’s value as an ethical category lies. This is achieved by applying both a hermeneutic of suspicion and a hermeneutic of generosity to a reading of Gaudium et Spes. The result is a heuristic of human dignity in which dignity is shown to be something that all human beings all already have and, at the same time, still seek to acquire through morally good behaviour. The Component Dimensions of Dignity model addresses this tension in various aspects of the human condition: existential, behavioural, cognitive, and social. In so doing it provides a heuristic tool that can serve both a descriptive and a normative function in ethical discourse, because it can help us to see not only why people may engage in a particular course of action but also the extent to which this action really meets the proviso of the social component dimension of the model, namely, that my dignity is only ever fulfilled if the dignity of all others is brought to fulfilment. (shrink)

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,'' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when (...) appliedto humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of humandignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the rightnot to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have thecognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the caseof nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignityrequires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied totheir abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value isnot absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibitbreeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But itdoes restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard togenetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowedthe uninhibited development of species specific functions, a positionshared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purposeconception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-upposition proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity,as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article. (shrink)

This paper argues that some of the misunderstandings surrounding the meaning and function of the concept of human dignity in bioethics arise from a lack of distinction between two different roles that this notion plays: one as an overarching policy principle, and the other as a moral standard of patient care. While the former is a very general concept which fulfils a foundational and a guiding role of the normative framework governing biomedical issues, the latter reflects a much (...) more concrete and context-specific understanding of the patient as a “person”. The importance of dignity as a policy principle will be described by appealing to the distinction between principles and rules as developed by some legal philosophers. The value of dignity as a standard of patient care will be illustrated with the help of concrete examples and by drawing on the taxonomies of dignity proposed by Jonathan Mann and other scholars. The overall scope of the article is to highlight this double and complementary role of human dignity in bioethics. (shrink)

This handbook provides a systematic overview of the legal concept and the meaning of human dignity for each European state and the European Union. For each of these 43 countries and the EU, it scrutinizes three main aspects: the constitution, legislation, and application of law. The book addresses and presents answers to important questions relating to the concept of human dignity. These questions include the following: What is the meaning of human dignity? What is (...) the legal status of the respective human dignity norms? Are human dignity norms of a programmatic nature, or do they establish an individual right which can be invoked before court? Is human dignity inviolable? The volume answers these questions from the perspectives of all European countries. As a reaction to the barbaric events during World War II, human dignity found its way into international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” The starting point for developing the concept on a national level was the codification of human dignity in article 1, paragraph 1 of the German Grundgesetz. Consequently, the concept of human dignity spread throughout Europe and, in the context of human rights, became a fundamental legal concept. (shrink)

Nicht erst seit Ruth Macklins einflussreichem Aufsatz „Dignity is a useless concept“ ist eine breite Debatte um Sinn und Unsinn des Begriffs der Menschenwürde in der Medizinethik entbrannt. In diesem Beitrag möchte ich mein Augenmerk auf die von Macklin prominent gemachte Substitutionsthese richten. In ihrer einflussreich gewordenen Fassung propagiert diese eine Ersetzung des Menschenwürdebegriffs durch denjenigen der Autonomie. Doch was ist damit genau gemeint? – Ausgehend von einer Analyse von Macklins Argumenten möchte ich zeigen, unter welchen Bedingungen die Substitutionsthese (...) die von ihren Vertretern häufig in den Vordergrund gestellten eleminativen Ergebnisse zeitigt – die Rede von einem eigenständigen begrifflichen Gehalt von „Würde“ sollte aufgegeben werden. Im Verlauf der Untersuchung werden auch die Vorzüge einer solchen Position gegenüber stärker eliminativ auftretenden Standpunkten und Positionen deutlich, die den Ausdruck als berechtigt, aber unanalysierbar betrachten. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article argues that received accounts of the concept of human dignity face more difficulties than has been appreciated, when explaining the connection between human dignity and the duty of respect that dignity is supposed to generate. It also argues that a novel, relational, account has the adequate structure to explain such connection.

The article discusses human dignity in the aspect of modern challenges of technological civilization, which has entered a new stage of its development. Human dignity as a category of ethics remains underestimated, since in the first row of ethical values humanitarians, as a rule, put the categories of freedom and justice. Today, “dignity” acquires a special and higher status, the concept of human dignity is being rethought, going beyond the ethical category itself as (...) a virtue. In the global world, human dignity is a response to such contemporary challenges as the formation of a communicative world community with a focus on digital civilization, the anthropological problem of the future of humanity, the ecological situation on a global scale, the reorientation of the ethical and legal relations of a globalizing world. Human dignity is a problem of national-ethnic and national-state relations in the transition to transnational regulatory interactions. In the interpretation of the nation, the authors do not share the well-known two approaches to understanding the nation, on the one hand ethnocultural, and on the other - national-civil. Both approaches lead, whenever possible or necessary, to the transnational posing of the question, when human dignity becomes a priority regardless of nationality. In this connection, the utopian idea of the possibility of a global ethos is touched upon. The authors focus on the anthropoxy-axiological approach to the understanding of human dignity, where the cosmological principle of human existence is determined by his creative power. The urgency of the problem of human dignity is due to the fact that, as it were, in the modern life world a person did not put the economy above morality, the basis of human dignity in its being is a value moral consciousness, in the depth of which basic human values of transnational nature “work”, contradicting values consumer society driven by practical interests. Human dignity in this regard should be interpreted as an absolute value and at the same time one should take into account the multidimensionality of the problem of dignity in the context of modern globalization processes. Based on the ontological understanding of globalization as megatrends in the self-movement of the natural historical process, the authors substantiate the anthropological value of human dignity, which has universal, transcultural significance. The use of an anthropoxy-axiological approach and interdisciplinary methods reveals the universal value of virtue, based on the anthropo-social moral nature and the creative value of man. The creative transformational activity itself will not be worthy in quality without moral responsibility. The modern concept of human dignity is addressed to the ethics of responsibility, which means responsibility, which highlights the moral and axiological attitude to life, the adoption of responsible decisions in modern conditions of sociocultural interactions. In the context of globalization, the philosophy of human dignity becomes the dominant of all conscious-volitional activities, the core of the moral rethinking of the transnational and national ratio in the light of tolerance, the ability to non-violence. At the same time, the authors indicate in the formulation of the main issue of the philosophy of human dignity the possibility of going beyond the ethical category of human dignity, since the unchanging core of the universal human values of goodness-beauty-truth does not lose its meaning in the global, changing world. (shrink)

In spite of the burgeoning philosophical literature on human dignity, Stephen Darwall's second-personal account of the dignity of persons has not received the attention it deserves. This article investigates Darwall's account and argues that it faces a dilemma, for it succumbs either to a problem of antecedence or to the wrong kind of reasons problem. But this need not mean one should reject a second-personal account. Instead, I argue that an alternative second-personal conception, one I will (...) call relational, promises to solve the dilemma by avoiding both the problem of antecedence and the wrong kind of reasons problem. More generally, distinguishing these two second-personal conceptions of the dignity of persons is important to enrich the available philosophical accounts of human dignity. (shrink)

This book is the first comprehensive study of Plato’s conception of justice. The universality of human rights and the universality of human dignity, which is recognised as their source, are among the crucial philosophical problems in modern-day legal orders and in contemporary culture in general. If dignity is genuinely universal, then human beings also possessed it in ancient times. Plato not only perceived human dignity, but a recognition of dignity is also (...) visible in his conception of justice, which forms the core of his philosophy. Plato’s Republic is consistently interpreted here as a treatise on justice, relating to an individual and not to the state. The famous myth of the cave is a story about education taking place in the world here and now. The best activity is not contemplation, but acting for the benefit of others. Not ideas, but individuals are the proper objects of love. Plato’s philosophy may provide foundations for modern-day human rights protection rather than for totalitarian orders. (shrink)

Human dignity—is it a useful concept in bioethics, one that sheds important light on the whole range of bioethical issues, from embryo research and assisted reproduction, to biomedical enhancement, to care of the disabled and the dying? Or is it, on the contrary, a useless concept—at best a vague substitute for other, more precise notions, at worst a mere slogan that camouflages unconvincing arguments and unarticulated biases?

This essay examines the function of the concept of human dignity (both as an inherent feature of human existence and as an ideal achievement) in the United Nations's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It explains why the key framers of the document affirmed an inherent human dignity in order to provide an explanatory basis for the validity of universal human rights while eschewing any religious or metaphysical justification for this affirmation. It argues (...) that the key framers, while aware of the Christian anthropology informing the modern Western concept of the dignity of the person, grasped (1) that the Declaration, to be ratifiable, would need to be free of religious reference, and also (2) that the notion of inherency suffices to suggest heuristically not only a universal human nature but also, crucially, a transcendent reality in which all persons participate. (shrink)

With robots being introduced into caregiving, particularly for older persons, various ethical concerns are raised. Among them is the fear of replacing human caregiving. While ethical concepts like well-being, autonomy, and capabilities are often used to discuss these concerns, this paper brings forth the concept of social dignity to further develop guidelines concerning the use of robots in caregiving. By social dignity, we mean that a person’s perceived dignity changes in response to certain interactions and experiences (...) with other persons. In this paper, we will first present the concept of social dignity, and then identify a niche where robots can be used in caregiving in an ethical manner. Specifically, we will argue that, because some activities of daily living are performed in solitude to maintain dignity, a care recipient will usually prefer robotic assistance instead of human assistance for these activities. Secondly, we will describe how other philosophical concepts, which have been commonly used to judge robotic assistance in caregiving for the elderly so far, such as well-being, autonomy, and capabilities, are less useful in determining whether robotic assistance in caregiving is ethically problematic or not. To conclude, we will argue that social dignity offers an advantage to the other concepts, as it allows to ask the most pressing questions in caregiving. (shrink)

The article critically analyzes the conservative conception of passive or static human dignity in accordance with which human’s value is seen as value coming from the exterior (from God or from a biological human’s nature), or value seen as existing per se. In opposition to this conception, a conception of active or created dignity is being developed, which aims at treating human’s dignity not like a social relationship, but rather like (...) a person’s individual ability to live properly in the society (participate in barter relations on the ground of equivalence) and using this propriety to create own individual social value (dignity), as a personal contribution towards maintenance of concord and collaboration in the society. (shrink)

The moral acceptability of anonymous gamete donation remains contested. Although the view that the value of parent–child relationships should not depend on genetic ties is “nearly axiomatic” among philosophers and bioethicists, one well-known dissenter remains: David Velleman. I argue that most rebuttals to Velleman have simply talked past him because they have failed to understand his fundamental point—that donor conception is a violation of human dignity and as such is wrong even if it does not harm individuals. (...) I challenge Velleman on his own terms by endorsing his metaphysical picture before showing that donor conception is not necessarily a violation of human dignity. I show this by arguing that gamete donation is held to a double standard of self-knowledge. I develop an account of the self that recognizes that certain kinds of challenges to one's flourishing can contribute to an individual's strength and self-knowledge. I defend my view against objections that genetic knowledge is categorically different from other ways of knowing oneself and I show that donor conception can respect human dignity as long as it meets certain conditions. (shrink)

The moral acceptability of anonymous gamete donation remains contested. Although the view that the value of parent–child relationships should not depend on genetic ties is “nearly axiomatic” among philosophers and bioethicists, one well‐known dissenter remains: David Velleman. I argue that most rebuttals to Velleman have simply talked past him because they have failed to understand his fundamental point—that donor conception is a violation of human dignity and as such is wrong even if it does not harm individuals. (...) I challenge Velleman on his own terms by endorsing his metaphysical picture before showing that donor conception is not necessarily a violation of human dignity. I show this by arguing that gamete donation is held to a double standard of self‐knowledge. I develop an account of the self that recognizes that certain kinds of challenges to one's flourishing can contribute to an individual's strength and self‐knowledge. I defend my view against objections that genetic knowledge is categorically different from other ways of knowing oneself and I show that donor conception can respect human dignity as long as it meets certain conditions. (shrink)

For some decades, the concept of human dignity has been widely discussed in bioethical literature. Some authors think that this concept is central to questions of respect for human beings, whereas others are very critical of it. It should be noted that, in these debates, dignity is one component of a long-lasting and widespread conceptual construct used to support a stance on the ethical question of the moral status of an action or being. This construct has (...) been used from Modernity onward to condemn slavery and torture as violations of human dignity. In spelling it out, we can come to a better understanding of what “dignity” means and become aware that there exists a quite useful place for this notion in our ethical thought, albeit a modest one. (shrink)

Human dignity is an omnipresent current concept exhibiting a seemingly unparalleled normative force and moral authority. However, the recent inflated occurrence of this concept made it subject to harsh criticisms echoing the assertion of it constituting a void quasi-moralistic artifice. In the pursuit of refuting dignity scepticism and highlighting the normative significance of the concept of human dignity, this paper draws on different approaches to human dignity. Firstly, the term “human dignity” (...) shall be approached from a systematic and historical perspective. Secondly, possible justifications of human dignity throughout the history of ideas shall be approached. Thirdly, the emergence of the legal conception of human dignity and its central importance in normative systems shall briefly be touched upon. (shrink)

David Luban argues in this lecture that the moral foundation of the lawyer's profession lies in the defense of human dignity-and the chief moral danger facing the profession arises when lawyers assault human dignity rather than defend it. The concept of human dignity has a rich philosophical tradition, with some philosophers identifying human dignity as a metaphysical property of individuals-a property such as having a soul, or possessing autonomy. Luban argues instead that (...) human dignity is a relational property of "the dignifier" and "the dignified," emphasizing that assaulting human dignity humiliates the victim. Lawyers honor the human dignity of others by protecting them against humiliations, and defile that dignity by subjecting them to humiliations. The lecture develops these ideas through four traditional issues in legal ethics: the right of criminal defendants to an advocate, the duty of confidentiality, paternalism of attorneys toward their clients, and pro bono service. (shrink)

The concept of human dignity is increasingly invoked in bioethical debate and, indeed, in international instruments concerned with biotechnology and biomedicine. While some commentators consider appeals to human dignity to be little more than rhetoric and not worthy of serious consideration, the authors of this groundbreaking new study give such appeals distinct and defensible meaning through an application of the moral theory of Alan Gewirth.

For more than ten years, I have advanced a conception of human dignity informed by ideas about community salient in the African philosophical tradition. According to it, an individual has a dignity if she is by her nature able to commune with others and to be communed with by them. I have argued that this conception of dignity grounded on our communal nature not only helps to make good foundational sense of many characteristically African (...) moral prescriptions, but also constitutes a strong rival to the globally dominant Kantian account in terms of our capacity for autonomy/rationality. In this contribution, I provide a summarizing statement of my position and articulate some reasons why I believe it should be considered philosophically defensible. Of particular interest, I argue that it is able to account for certain human rights better than three other conceptions of human dignity salient in the African tradition, viz., the views that we have a dignity in virtue of our vitality, moral behaviour, or capacity to care for others. (shrink)

Contents 1 Introduction / 2 The Timaeus on dignity: the Demiurge’s speech / 3 Justice as a virtue / 4 The content of just actions / 5 Justice of the law and justice of the state / 6 Equality / 7 Some key issues in Plato’s conception of justice / 7.1 What is more excellent—justice of the soul or justice of action? / 7.2 Which activity is best and what is its best object? / 7.2. Just actions over (...) contemplation / 7.2. The Timaeus and Plato’s teaching on justice / 7.2. The elderly Cephalus on justice: foreword as epilogue / 7.3 The sharing of wives: testing the interpretation on a ‘hard case’ / 8 Conclusions. (shrink)

Adopting an interdisciplinary perspective, this volume explores the reality of the principle of human dignity – a core value which is increasingly invoked in our societies and legal systems. This book provides a systematic overview of the legal and philosophical concept in sixteen countries representing different cultural and religious contexts and examines in particular its use in a developing case law. Whilst omnipresent in the context of bioethics, this book reveals its wider use in healthcare more generally, treatment (...) of prisoners, education, employment, and matters of life and death in many countries. In this unique comparative work, contributing authors share a multidisciplinary analysis of the use of the principle of dignity in Europe, Africa, South and North America and Asia. By revealing the ambivalence of human dignity in a wide range of cultures and contexts and through the evolving reality of case law, this book is a valuable resource for students, scholars and professionals working in bioethics, medicine, social sciences and law. Ultimately, it will make all those who invoke the principle of human dignity more aware of its multi-layered character and force us all to reflect on its ability to further social justice within our societies. (shrink)

The paper examines the current debates regarding the grounding of human rights in a pluralistic, culturally diverse world. It analyses the challenges which come today from certain policies of human rights which instrumentalize them under the pretext of a “global war on terror” and redefi ne them in terms of democracy promotion and regime change, as well as those challenges which come from ideologies which question the core principles of human rights and provoke the so called “crisis (...) of legitimization.” The paper argues for the necessity of restoring the genuine meaning of human rights and of the role of citizens in striving for their implementation. At the heart of the analysis is Kant’s concept of human rights as freedom. With Kant as its backdrop, the paper shows that the claim that religious worldviews provide the only intelligible foundation, as in Nicholas Wolterstorff, faces serious challenges in a pluralistic, culturally diverse world. The paper then analyzes the non-religious philosophical concepts which seek to develop an account of human rights that does not depend upon controversial metaphysical or religious doctrines. It examines an account of human rights from the perspective of discourse ethics as developed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. It also analyses the concepts of human dignity and “emerging morality” by Arturo Roig and the “ethics of liberation” by Enrique Dussel. The analysis shows the ongoing relevance of Kant’s ideas and their recent development by the theorists of discourse ethics and of dialogical and democratic cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

In 1971, Herbert Spiegelberg challenged philosophers to refine and deepen the vivid idea of human dignity to prevent its degeneration. Although philosophers, including Michael Rosen and Jeremy Waldron, have responded with valuable insights, the full moral depth of dignity has remained philosophically elusive. Furthermore, many philosophers still think human dignity a limited ethical concept. By integrating important alienable and inalienable dimensions of human dignity, this essay attempts to do justice to our vivid contemporary (...) experience of dignity's moral depth. It seeks to illuminate the profound, universal worth of all humans, and the ethical force of human rights protections. (shrink)