It is my contention here that Quentin Skinner’s conception of neo-roman liberty as it is articulated in Liberty Before Liberalism serves to establish two normative premises for human rights philosophy. Those premises are, first, that human rights should offer the strongest protection for those persons who are most vulnerable and liable to social and political discrimination and marginalisation. Second, the objects of human rights should be conceptualised in terms of open-ended goals of justice, predicated on a commitment (...) to structural equality. I will have reason to refer to a reflection that Skinner makes on utopianism and how the “classic liberal case” of liberty can be associated with a critique of utopianism in political theory. By utopianism Skinner means – with reference to William Paley – a political theory that incorporates into its concepts demands that cannot be met without a fundamental change of practice and which moves beyond what it is at present reasonable for most people to expect of life. On this understanding, Skinner points out, John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice is a utopian treatise: it does not adapt to whatever is politically feasible but sets a challenging standard of justice for political institutions. I would qualify this by saying that the challenging nature of Rawls’s theory of justice is connected to the fact that it is systemic rather than utopian. A fear of the charge of utopianism is one of the recurrent features of human rights philosophy as we know it today. This is manifest in an incongruous tendency to join a moral philosophy of the good life with a political theory of basic provisions and life at the subsistence level. I hope to show that there is a consistent neo-roman case to be made for a more politically challenging human rights philosophy. (shrink)

While writers of the English Civil War abstracted from Roman sources a theory of liberty, the original res publica, always under the control of a unified and entrenched oligarchy, presents a threadbare fabric of liberty. Yet an impressive strand of modern republicanism follows this example: Philip Pettit's 'liberty as non-domination' appears to be inimical to notions of government power, overlooking that power is sometimes necessary to protect freedoms. Quentin Skinner sharpens this classical focus on a 'neo- (...) class='Hi'>Roman' theory. In Pettit a republican suspicion of popular government underplays contributions to the history of freedom from the Athenian democracy. (shrink)

In recent years, political theorists have increasingly turned their attention to the past in search of conceptual renovation in the present. While recourse to the past has been a recurring thread throughout the history of political thought, the overlapping concern of recent scholarship has been to revisit seemingly exhausted political concepts with the aim of repurposing them for contemporary political challenges and realities. The three edited collections under review – Positive Freedom, Perfektionismus der Autonomie and Rethinking Liberty Before Liberalism (...) – are distinguished by their thoughtful attempts at retrieving and politicizing the concepts of positive freedom, post-Kantian perfectionism, and neo-Roman liberty in contemporary political thought. These retrievals present promising avenues for theoretical innovation, along with the ever-present risk of diminishing interpretive returns. (shrink)

This article argues that Hayek employed a neo-Roman concept of liberty. It will show that Hayek’s definition of liberty conforms to that provided by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, respectively...

Freedom as a natural right, the importance of consent, defending the idea that government should be in the hands of the most virtuous and reflective citizens, denouncing patronage, the need to link individual and political freedom ? These are some of the characteristics of La Boétie's doctrine that I believe place him within the tradition that Quentin Skinner calls the neo-Roman conception of civil liberty. Of course, La Boétie did not write a positive defence of the rule of (...) law, as Livy did in his History of Rome and as the English republicans do, but the Discourse can easily be read as a legal plea condemning absolute monarchy and any kind of arbitrary regime. (shrink)

Republicanism is an approach within political theory that seeks to secure the values of political liberty and non-domination. Yet, in historical practice, early modern republics developed empires and secured their liberty through policies that dominated others. This contradiction presents challenges for how neo-Roman theorists understand ideals of liberty and political freedom. This article argues that the historical practices of slavery and empire developed concurrently with the normative ideals of republican liberty. Republican liberty does not (...) arise in the absence of power but is inherently connected to the exercise of power. (shrink)

There is long-standing disagreement about how radical Adam Smith should be taken to be. Recently, Jonathan Israel’s work on the enlightenment situates Smith as a moderate enlightenment thinker. This article challenges that assessment. Smith sees aristocrats as largely devoid of competence, wisdom, and virtue and thinks they do not wield significant political power in commercial societies. He is also highly critical of their economic power; and uses a neo-Roman concept of liberty to provide a powerful critique of slavery (...) and feudalism. In so doing, he extends discussions of liberty and focuses them on economic relations in ways that prefigure labour republicanism. Finally, I show how these more radical commitments can be reconciled with his moderate proposals for political reform through his epistemology and realist anti-utopianism. These are aspects of Smith’s thought that are essential for understanding it correctly and have much to teach us today. (shrink)

This article argues that, next to a certain intellectual tradition of Roman liberty, often labelled ‘neo-Roman’ or ‘Republican’, we should also take into account the existence of, at least, two other conceptions of liberty, which have so far remained occluded under the prominence of Cicero’s ideas and the appropriation of them by later thinkers. By analysing the debate in opposition and in favour of sumptuary laws enacted from the 3rd century bc onwards, the article identifies a (...) first notion of liberty which coincided with the absence of any external legal constraints upon the citizens’ private life and was, thereby, incompatible with the rule of law in this sphere. The second intellectual family of concepts equated libertas to the absence of constraints from one’s own passions as well as the possession of the capacity to pursue something worth pursuing for the well-being of the community. According to this view, liberty also resided in the supremacy of the rule of law. The third notion of libertas, elaborated by Cicero in the De re publica and De legibus, identified liberty with the absence of arbitrary domination to achieve one’s own ends and resided in the supremacy of the rule of law. Its preservation depended on the constitutional arrangements of the commonwealth and the related civic status of the individual. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the opportunities it provides, the implementation of some measures of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (EU CAP), including agri-environment-climate measures (AECMs), also generates threats. The study identifies an extremely disturbing process that can be referred to as “internal neo-colonialism”, which has been driven by the technocratic agrarian policy of the EU and transformations in Poland at the turn of the twenty-first century. The associated disadvantageous practices mainly affect areas under threat of marginalisation and peripheralisation, including Poland with its post-Socialist (...) heritage, which has shaped the attitudes and behaviour of society and has consolidated linkages between politics and business. In order to retrace such activities, the study analyses EU funds granted in support of farmers implementing AECMs, with a focus on analysing the place of residence of the “farmer” and the location of the farm. As the research shows, the attractiveness of CAP support causes Polish agriculture and Poland’s countryside, including its natural and financial resources, to be drained by so-called “suitcase farmers”, i.e. people/entities not tied to the place where the agricultural activity is pursued, many of whom live in cities. One common practice is to take over land located in legally protected areas noted for their high quality of natural environment. Not only does the practice of land grabbing strengthen the social exclusion of rural communities and the peripheralisation and pauperisation of these areas, but it also hinders discussion about environmental justice and the ecological integrity of rural areas. (shrink)

Heidegger, like Kierkegaard, has recently been claimed as a narrativist about selves. From this Heideggerian perspective, we can see how narrative expands upon the psychological view, adding a vital teleological dimension to the understanding of selfhood while denying the reductionism implicit in the psychological approach. Yet the narrative approach also inherits the neo-Lockean emphasis on the past as determining identity, whereas the self is fundamentally about the future. Death is crucial on this picture, not as allowing for the possibility of (...) a final meaning to our lives, but as determining Dasein as ‘pure unactualizable possibility.’ Ultimately, therefore, narrative is not what constitutes selfhood – but this does not mean that narrative is not relevant to personal identity, because narrative allows identity to be expressed in action. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 236 - 255 In this article I compare some elements of Eric Gans’s thought with a few aspects of the philosophy of Hermann Cohen—first and foremost, Gans’s concept of the origin and Cohen’s concept of Ursprung—while revealing the deep affinity between these two lines of thinking.

The pinnacle of the Novak’s reflections on possible perspectives for the future of the world and the development of international relations is his vision of “Caritapolis” (“Civilization of love”), which is presented especially in the book The universal hunger for liberty – Why the clash of civilizations is not inevitable (2004a). Novak builds the concept on the religious assumptions and on the minimum level of general belief in basic principles (cultural humility, regulative idea of truth, the dignity of the (...) individual person, solidarity), which he considers to be the key to the world security, prosperity and the democratic future of the globalized world. This “vision for the 21st century” is to contribute to the consideration of a universal civilization that would respect all its internal variations and create a certain unity despite its rich diversity of value and religious ideas. The aim of this paper is to present Novak’s concept of Caritapolis and to evaluate it in terms of context of the social doctrine of the Church, Catholic social thought debates, relevance in the context of debates in the social sciences, especially the theories of international relations. (shrink)

In this article, we discuss Greek and Roman conceptions of liberty. The supposedly ‘neo-Roman’ view of liberty as non-domination is really derived from negative Greek models, we argue, while Roman authors devised an alternative understanding of liberty that rested on the equality of legal rights. In this ‘paleo-Roman’ model, as long as the law was the same for all, you were free; whether or not you participated in making the law was not a (...) constitutive feature of liberty. In essence, this Roman theory was a theory of freedom as the rule of law and the guarantee of equal rights, especially due process rights. For this Roman concept of ‘legal liberty,’ as we call it, political participation was neither necessary nor sufficient. Theorized by Cicero and historicized by Livy, the Roman understanding of freedom flourished in early-modern times, proving important to paradigmatic republican authors such as Machiavelli and Rousseau as well as to Hobbes, whose work we discuss as a helpful point of comparison. (shrink)

This paper is a review of 'Faith and Liberty. The Economic Thought of the Late Scholastics' by Alejandro A. Chafuen.

This provocative, interdisciplinary, and transnational collection delves deeply into the educational and public intellectual hallmarks of Stuart M. Hall, a core figure in the development of the post-War British New Left, of Cultural Studies at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies and later, of the Open University. It opens new vistas on both critical educational studies and cultural studies through interviews with, and essays by, leading writers, shedding light on the under-appreciated public pedagogical and cultural politics of the New Left, (...) of Thatcherism, and of Rightist, neo-colonial, diasporic, and neo-liberal formations in Jamaica, the UK, Australia, North America, and Brazil. Intimate and moving, the contributors describe Hall’s diasporic formation as a courageous ‘artist’ and educator of cultural politics and social movements, showing both the reach and the relevance of his public pedagogies in the construction of alternatives to essentialist racial politics and the despairing cynicism of neo-liberalism. With contributors and interviewees including Leslie G. Roman, Michael W. Apple, Avtar Brah, John Clarke, Annette Henry, Lawrence Grossberg, Luis Gandin, and Fazal Rizvi, _Hallmarks: The Cultural Politics and Public Pedagogies of Stuart Hall_ reveals that neither cultural politics nor public pedagogies are stable or self-evident constructs. Each legitimates and requires the other as part of a longer radical democratic project for social justice. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education. _. (shrink)

In The Course of Recognition, Paul Ricœur pays special attention to Honneth’s social theory, on the one hand, because it is devoted to the important issue of the struggles for recognition and, on the other hand, because Axel Honneth proposes a convincing neo-Hegelian conception of social justice. However, while adhering to Honneth’s project, Ricœur establishes a dialectical relationship between love and justice, in order to correct an inherent defect of Anerkennung. The reference to agápē would provide the only way out (...) of the endless struggle, by demonstrating that human beings are capable of mutual recognition through the social practice of gift/counter-gift. Ricœur presents agápē as a simple add-on to the Honnethian project. The present paper returns to this assertion, and demonstrates that, on the contrary, the use of agápē alters the struggles for recognition, and does not help us to arrive at a conception of social justice, which is capable of revealing experiences of injustice and combatting them. (shrink)

The author analyses the problematic of historical necessity and ethical regularity of socialism, taking the marxist philosophy as a point of departure. He criticizes opinions represented in philosophical and ideological discussions of this problem in the period of the Second International and argues that the above problematic, which results from a confrontation of marxism with a new historical situation and with the current of the neo-Kantian philosophy, was an axis which has brought into focus the theoretical decisions both of revisionists (...) and critics of marxism on one hand and of orthodox marxists on the other hand. (shrink)

Opens up new histories of freedom and republicanism by building on Quentin Skinner's ground-breaking Liberty before Liberalism nearly twenty five years after its initial publication. Leading historians and philosophers reveal the neo-Roman conception of liberty that Skinner unearthed as a normative and historical hermeneutic tool of enormous, ongoing power. The volume thinks with neo-Romanism to offer reinterpretations of individual thinkers, such as Montaigne, Grotius and Locke. It probes the role of neo-Roman liberty within hierarchies and (...) structures beyond that of citizen and state – namely, gender, slavery, and democracy. Finally, it reassesses the relationships between neo-Romanism and other languages in the history of political thought: liberalism, conservatism, socialism, and the human rights tradition. The volume concludes with a major reappraisal by Skinner himself. (shrink)

The urgency of the research is that the conditions for the formation of a creative personality, which are the result of the formation of a creative and knowledge economy, in which the given type of personality is in demand, is presented. Problem statement – the phenomenon of a creative personality as a phenomenon and a basis for formation of a creative and knowledge economy in the conditions of globalization challenges and trends 4.0. It is the information society and social entrepreneurship (...) that are the main factors in the formation and development of a creative and knowledge economy, which requires the formation of a creative personality. Analysis of recent research and publications – we rely on the authors who investigated the "know-how-intelektual" society, which is based on a well-known intellectual-property and personality. These are the works of B.Andrushenko, T.Andrushenko, V.Vashkevich, V.Voronkova, O.Kyvlyuk, V.Melnyk, V.Nikitenko, R.Olexenko, O.Sosnina, S.Sharova. Identification of unexplored parts of the general problem – conceptualization of the concept of a creative personality in the face of globalization challenges 4.0. The research is based on theoretical and practical aspects of the formation of the concept of creative personality as a factor in the formation of a creative and knowledge economy. Setting objectives – the use of socio-acciological and neoaxiological approaches and methods that allowed deeply penetrate into the conditions for the formation of a creative personality in the context of the challenges of globalization 4.0 and the information society. Presentation of the main material. It is at the heart of axiology that the value orientations of a person are necessary for the formation of an information-knowledge economy or neo-economy. It is researched that creativity stimulates the production of innovative material and spiritual goods, promotes acceleration of commercialization and the final consumption of material and spiritual goods. It has been found that Homo economicus is the basis for the formation of creative entrepreneurship and its transformation into the social capital of the nation. The essence of culture as the main dominant and the key factor of formation of creative and valuable competitive specialists is revealed. Conclusions - the evolution of "homo economicus" to "homo creativus" is exposed in the conditions of globalization 4.0 and global rankings of creative economy; Creation of the concept of creative personality as a factor in creative and knowledge economy in the face of globalization challenges 4.0; the integral representation of the creative personality as a factor in the formation of a knowledge-information economy is presented. (shrink)

The concept of self-ownership was first articulated in anglophone political thought in the decades between the outbreak of the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution. This book traces the emergence and evolution of self-ownership over the course of this period, culminating in a reinterpretation of John Locke's celebrated but widely misunderstood idea that "every Man has a Property in his own Person." Often viewed through the prism of libertarian political thought, self-ownership has its roots in the neo-Roman or (...) republican concept of liberty as freedom from dependence on the will of another. As Lorenzo Sabbadini reveals, seventeenth-century writers believed that the attainment of this status required not only a specific kind of constitution but a particular distribution of property as well. Many regarded the protection of private property as constitutive of liberty, and it is in this context that the vocabulary of self-ownership emerged. Others expressed anxieties about the corrupting effects of excessive concentrations of wealth or even the institution of private property itself. Bringing together canonical republican writers such as John Milton and James Harrington, lesser-known pamphleteers, and Locke, a theorist generally regarded as being at odds with neo-Roman thought, Property, Liberty, and Self-Ownership in Seventeenth-Century England is a bold, innovative study of some of the most influential concepts to emerge from this groundbreaking period of British history. "This book is a major achievement, offering a novel and highly original account of property and liberty in seventeenth-century English republican thought. It is a brilliant piece of scholarship that makes an important contribution to the history of early modern political thought." Markku Peltonen, University of Helsinki. (shrink)

The originality of Foucault’s work lies in part in how he reverses the question of power, asking not how power is held and imposed, but how it is produced. In both his discussion of sovereignty and governmentality, though, Foucault skips over the res publica; a form of political organization that fits neither Foucault’s characterization of sovereignty nor the care of the self. I extend Foucault’s discussion to identify a ratio of government around the discipline of ownership by which the res (...) publica was made intelligible, its relations understood, and its logic organized. I end by suggesting some implications for neo-Roman interpretations of liberty as non-domination. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It is fruitless to interpret Constant's modern liberty from the binary perspective of either the negative/positive freedom opposition or the liberal/republican freedom opposition. Both oppositional perspectives reduce the relationally complex nature of modern liberty to one or another component of the relation. Such reduction inevitably results in an incomplete and, therefore, inadequate interpretation of Constant's modern liberty. Consequently, either of these binary frames of interpretation obscures rather than illuminates the full nature of Constant's modern liberty. (...) Boxed into their irreconcilably opposed alternatives, both binary perspectives fail to appreciate that Constant's conception of modern liberty is a complex achievement irreducible without loss to either liberal negative liberty as non-interference or republican freedom as non-domination. Nor does combining liberal negative freedom and positive freedom (in the sense of ancient liberty), as Holmes well establishes, adequately tells the whole story of Constant's modern liberty. As a complex achievement, Constant's conception of modern liberty, I shall argue, blends negative freedom as associated with neo-Roman republican freedom as non-subjection to arbitrary power, negative freedom as non-interference, associated with the liberal tradition, positive freedom in the sense of inner self-development, and positive freedom as collective self-government or civic republican freedom. (shrink)

This article provides an account of what may reasonably be inferred from Sallust’s historical writing about how he understands civil liberty, what he feels is necessary for it to exist in any given political society, why he feels it is important, and the extent to which he feels it is properly enjoyed by the plebeian citizens of Rome. On the basis of this account, the article revises recent arguments presented by Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit and others concerning Sallust’s political (...) thought and how it is related to Aristotelian, republican, ‘neo-Roman’, and liberal traditions of political thought. (shrink)

Tendo em vista o quão é complexo abordar as questões relativas à temática da liberdade, o presente artigo procura tecer apenas algumas considerações sobre a liberdade na concepção de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Para tanto, buscou-se retomar o significado de liberdade preconizado no início do período moderno, uma vez que a acepção concebida por Rousseau se assemelha com a dos teóricos denominados de neo-romanos. Por fim, abordou-se, sucintamente, como aquele filósofo teorizou a respeito da perda da liberdade pelo homem quando este passa (...) a integrar a sociedade civil.: Considering how complex is to address issues relating to the theme of freedom, this paper seeks to make just a few remarks about that in the exposition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Therefore, we sought to regain the meaning of freedom advocated in the early modern period, since the meaning intended by Rousseau resembles the theorists called neo-Roman. Finally, we dealt with briefly, as one philosopher theorized about the loss of freedom for man when he joins the civil society. Keywords: Freedom; Jean-Jacques Rousseau; Society; Political Philosophy. (shrink)

Pettit's and Skinner's stimulating books are open to historically-minded objections. Pettit's reading of Hobbes is Rousseauian, but he rejects the Hobbesian/Rousseauian belief that some modern people are driven by amour-propre/“glory”. If Hobbes is right, there is, in Pettit's sense, no “common good”. Skinner's treatment of the neo-Roman “theorists” over-estimates their self-consciousness and their consistency. Leviathan chapter 21 is not a response to neo-Romanism; it treats civil liberty as non-obligation, not as non-interference.

This article reconstructs Adam Smith’s contribution to the conversation on the nature and value of free government in the eighteenth century. Smith contributes to this conversation in two ways. First, by embedding the idea of free government in a narrative of the progress of government, which traces the interplay between natural progress and social circumstances, and culminates in the establishment of modern free government in Britain. Second, by offering a theory of the form of free government fit for modern commercial (...) states. Drawing on the “rational system of liberty” established in Britain, the Smithian model of free government is based on a “happy mixture” of republicanism and monarchism. Looking beyond the rational system, it merges the traditional concern for constitutional security against arbitrary power with a new science of policy intended to moderate the oppressive inclinations of legislators. The article contests Duncan Forbes’ reading of Smith as questioning the relation between individual liberty and free government, and brings Smith closer to Quentin Skinner’s work on the neo-Roman understanding of liberty. It suggests that Smith’s work may offer insight into some of the ways in which neo-Roman ideas were being creatively reformulated in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

A contribution to the liberalism-republicanism debate from a political historian's point of view, this essay focuses on Britain in the mid-Victorian period—arguably the golden age of modern liberalism. The first part argues that the writings and political ideas of the leading liberal thinkers were imbued with ‘neo-roman’ values, including participatory citizenship, civic virtue and concern for the common good. The second part discusses the dissemination of ‘neo-roman’ ideas among the rank and file of the Liberal party, focusing on (...) popular celebrations of the right to bear arms. The essay concludes that, despite the methodological claims of some scholars, the liberalism-republicanism debate has tended to ignore the context within which ideas and traditions were developed by their leading interpreters. Moreover, it argues that if we really are interested in the context of political thought we must go beyond traditional concerns with the ‘canonical’ texts and look at its social environment. (shrink)

Although Machiavelli is usually considered a pioneer among modern political philosophers, he read deeply in and was greatly influenced by the works of classical Roman thinkers such as Livy. There is thus a fundamental tension between the modern and the ancient within Machiavelli's philosophy; he is both a precursor to the Enlightenment and a throwback to republican Rome. This is the main thesis behind Patrick Coby's innovative study of the neglected Machiavellian classic Discourses on Livy. Coby argues that scholars (...) have been too quick to dismiss the ancient antecedents of Machiavelli's thought, particularly with regard to the modes and orders of the Roman republic. The book seeks to resolve the central paradox of the Discourses, that Machiavelli recommends adoption of Roman modes and orders even though those modes and orders destroyed the virt?, the strength, which Machiavelli would have moderns resuscitate by imitating Rome. A sophisticated, highly engaging book, Machiavelli's Romans will be of special interest to political theorists, Renaissance scholars, and classicists. (shrink)

I reconstruct the civic republican foundations of Eugene Debs’s socialist critique of capitalism, demonstrating how he uses a neo-roman conception of freedom to condemn waged labour. Debs is also shown to build upon this neo-roman liberty in his socialist republican objections to the plutocratic capture of the law and threats of violence faced by the labour movement. This Debsian socialist republicanism can be seen to rest on an ambitious understanding of the demands of citizen sovereignty and civic (...) solidarity. While Debs shares some of the commitments of earlier American labour republican critics of capitalism, he departs from them in his thoroughgoing commitment to common democratic ownership of productive property. His socialist republicanism remains valuable today for its ability to illuminate features of plutocratic control, judicial autocracy, and the regime of property best suited to suppressing economic domination. I conclude that Debs not only deserves a prominent place in an emerging radical republican canon but presents a distinctive contrast with many of his Marxist contemporaries and offers a compelling challenge to recent liberal, plebeian, and socialist forms of republicanism. (shrink)

This Reply first defends the claim that the 'neo-Roman' writers I discuss in my book held shared views about the nature of liberty. They all believe that freedom is taken away not merely by acts of interference but also by relations of domination and dependence. I argue that this commitment leads them to treat diminutions of the security with which we enjoy our liberty as diminutions of liberty itself. I take Hobbes to be opposing this position (...) when he defines freedom as an absence of the kinds of external impediments that render actions within our powers impossible of performance. I question the suggestion that Hobbes has a more extended view of the conditions that undermine liberty. I reaffirm that Hobbes's definition makes freedom an all-or-nothing matter, not a matter of degree. Finally, I restate my central contention that Hobbes's theory constitutes an attempt to challenge and discredit the rival neo-Roman account. (shrink)

How should we use intellectual history to inform our thinking about freedom in the advent of digital technologies? Quentin Skinner argues that prevalent liberal idiom is unable to address the political challenges in the world of big tech. While liberals consider these challenges in terms of invasion of individual privacy, in Skinner's neo-Roman – and once widely accepted – perspective, the growing datafication of contemporary societies should be considered an affront to liberty. By invoking the figure of ‘paths (...) not taken’, the author of Liberty before liberalism shows, how we may learn from the past without abandoning commitments to contextual accuracy of historical investigation. The interview will be published in Polish in ‘Przegląd Polityczny’ [Political Review]. (shrink)

The concept of dependence is central both to the study of modern republicanism and to the study of systemic corruption. Recently, Lawrence Lessig has described American politics as suffering from “dependency corruption,” a type of institutional corruption about which eighteenth-century republican writers were extremely worried. This article examines the use of the concept “dependence” in the current “neo-roman” republican theory stemming from Quentin Skinner, Maurizio Viroli, and particularly Philip Pettit. The article argues that the term dependence has two essentially (...) distinct inflections, one relating to outright domination (subjection to arbitrary power) and the other relating to a condition of material subordinacy (dependency corruption). If liberty is the “the absence of dependence on the will of others,” it is extremely important to determine just what independence entails. This article suggests that dependency corruption was a dominant concern of the modern republican tradition, but it is a concern that is largely ignored in today’s new republicanism. By way of a foray into the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century sources employed by the new republicans, the article attempts to revive a manner of thinking about corruption that risks being lost to view. (shrink)

The paper presents a critical discussion of Pettit and Skinner's recent treatments of Hobbes on republican freedom, in particular situating Hobbes's attack on the republican politicians from The Elements of Law in the contexts, first, of other contemporary suspicion directed against those politicians who struck a distinctively “Roman” pose, and, second, of Hobbes's wider psychology of politics, before concluding with some reflections on the relationship between Hobbes's political theory and the project of egalitarian republicanism.

The aim of this paper is to make it credible that there are feminist reasons for being a republican about freedom. In focus is Quentin Skinner’s conception of republican, or “neo-Roman”, freedom. Republican theory in history has not excelled in making poverty, gender hierarchy, and racism within the republic into main sources of concern. So can there be a radical republican theory of liberty fit for a feminist, to make sense of arbitrary power in the every day life (...) of work, households, and local communities, where power is vague and unorganized? Proceeding from three questions – What does freedom mean? Under what circumstances does the issue arise? Why should we care? – I argue that in a feminist republicanism the lived experience of the unfree will have primary and not, as Skinner now suggests, secondary importance. A feminist republican will be particularly concerned not only with what unfreedom is but with what it is like. (shrink)

This essay examines the political trials through which, according to Machiavelli's Discourses, republics should punish magistrates and prominent citizens who threaten or violate popular liberty. Unlike modern constitutions, which assign indictments and appeals to small numbers of government officials, Machiavelli's neo-Roman model encourages individual citizens to accuse corrupt or usurping elites and promotes the entire citizenry as political jury and court of appeal. Machiavellian political justice requires, on the one hand, equitable, legal procedures that serve all citizens by (...) punishing guilty parties and discouraging retaliatory reprisals, including foreign intervention. On the other hand, frankly acknowledging the power disparities that exist in every republic, Machiavelli outlines how political trials enable pro-plebeian magistrates and populist reformers to thwart patrician-generated smear campaigns and oligarchic conspiracies. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper examines ideas of individual freedom in the Hellenistic city-states. It concentrates on the civic ideas expressed in the laws and decrees of Hellenistic cities, inscribed on stone, comparing them with Hellenistic historical and philosophical works. It places different Hellenistic approaches alongside modern liberal, neo-Roman republican and civic humanist theories of individual liberty, finding some overlaps with each of those modern approaches. The argument is that the Hellenistic Greeks developed innovative ways of combining demanding ideals of civic (...) virtue and the common good with equally robust ideals of individual freedom and ethical choice. They did so not least by adapting and developing traditional Greek approaches close to modern civic humanism, in ways very relevant to modern debates about how to reconcile civic duty, the common good and pluralism. (shrink)

This article, drawing on Marsilius of Padua's Defensor Pacis, discusses Marsilius's theory of dominium, situating that theory within the context of the debate with Pope John XXII and William of Ockham. The author also reintroduces the long unsettled question of the extent of Marsilius's legal knowledge and training. The article closes by calling for a more sustained investigation of Marsilius's knowledge of Roman law, and of his relation to the poverty controversy and especially Ockham.

This essay examines the political trials through which, according to Machiavelli's Discourses, republics should punish magistrates and prominent citizens who threaten or violate popular liberty. Unlike modern constitutions, which assign indictments and appeals to small numbers of government officials, Machiavelli's neo-Roman model encourages individual citizens to accuse corrupt or usurping elites and promotes the entire citizenry as political jury and court of appeal. Machiavellian political justice requires, on the one hand, equitable, legal procedures that serve all citizens by (...) punishing guilty parties and discouraging retaliatory reprisals, including foreign intervention. On the other hand, frankly acknowledging the power disparities that exist in every republic, Machiavelli outlines how political trials enable pro-plebeian magistrates and populist reformers to thwart patrician-generated smear campaigns and oligarchic conspiracies. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to survey the logic behind the Tory ministerial decision to bring a quick end to the hostilities with France in the early 1710s by looking at a tri-weekly journal called The Mercator (1713–14). Founded by Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, then Secretary of State, and his economic advisor Charles Davenant, with a view to justifying their grandiose plan to liberalise the Anglo-French trade relationship as part of a new European order initiated by the Peace (...) of Utrecht, this periodical shows us how the so-called neo-Roman synthesis of libertas and imperium was exploited by the Tory administration not only to defend its isolationist outlook, but more interestingly, to reprove the pro-Dutch policy of the previous Whig government. ☆ I am grateful to both the Acton Institute for the Study of Liberty and Religion and the Institute of the Humane Studies for their generous financial assistances in preparing this paper. (shrink)

In this article, combining the Confucian notion of relationality with the republican principle of non-domination, I will shed new light on the ethics of civil compliance in an emergency situation. More specifically, first, by exploring the culturally biased distinctions between individualism and collectivism in the current debates on ‘pandemic’ nationalism, I will put forward the need for a relationality through which civil cooperation with emergency governance can facilitate the enhancement of both individual freedom and democratic commonality in the long run. (...) Then, by supplementing the moral vision of role-constituted relationality in Confucian role-ethics with the principle of liberty as non-domination in neo-Roman republicanism, I will suggest an ethics of civil compliance which can steer emergency governance toward the consolidation of democratic accountability. (shrink)

The debate following Berlin's famous lecture Two Concepts of Liberty circled around the opposition between negative and positive liberty. Berlin delivered his lecture during the period of the Cold War. Therefore it not only provoked a very technical debate within analytic philosophy on the concept of liberty but also contained an important butdebatable political message: those who endorse positive liberty should be conscious of the fact that the logic of positive liberty leads, if not necessarily (...) at least easily to despotism, paternalism and even totalitarianism. It is no unimportant question then to ask whether no conception of political society can be developed which, without denying pluralism and negative liberty, would show that virtue and law are part of freedom, that freedom entails the exercise of certain actions without this leading up to the imposition of one conception of the good. In this article there is shown in what sense the republican or neo-roman vision of civil liberty can fulfil this requirement. The analysis of the different components of the republican conception of freedom shows that republicanism distinguishes itself from liberalism not so much by the defence of different institutions but by a different legitimation of them which ultimately has its origin in taking serious the proper finality of political society, in taking serious, as the Ancients did, the political and not only social nature of man. (shrink)

In an array of writings stretching over the better part of two decades, Quentin Skinner has repeatedly challenged the modern conception of negative liberty developed by Isaiah Berlin and many other theorists. He has sought to draw attention to some once vibrant but now largely peripheral traditions of thought—especially the civic‐republican or neo‐Roman tradition—in order to highlight what he sees as the limitedness and inadequacies of the currently dominant ways of thinking about freedom. The present essay will endeavor (...) to defend one important aspect of the modern understanding of negative liberty against Skinner's strictures, and will challenge Skinner's reading of Thomas Hobbes. (shrink)

As rapid economic development brings increasing uncertainty in East Asia, interest in a new version of republicanism, termed iscalled neo-Roman republicanism, is growing across the region. Conceptualized as liberty as non-domination, this new form of republicanism has inspired not only Western but also East Asian political theorists. However, neo-Roman republican ideas in Northeast Asian countries continue to face serious conceptual and political challenges, which scholarly literature on both republicanism and on East Asian politics has largely failed to (...) confront. This book addresses these challenges by surveying the latest theoretical contributions to the studies of republicanism in Western countries and the latest interpretations of how republicanism, including both communitarian republicanism and neo-Roman republicanism, has been appropriated in countries in East Asia. In particular, it deals with the key question of whether liberty as non-domination can work in non-Western contexts where the fundamental tenets of liberal democracy, such as moral individualism and value pluralism, do not predominate. Across three sections, the chapters first provide a conceptual overview of republicanism as a global political theory, they then consider how republicanism has historically been received, resisted, and translated into East Asia., and Ffinally, they examine how historically informed possibilities fit with the emergent needs of contemporary Northeast Asian societies. Overall, the contributors show that republicanism is an always-ongoing project, whose terms must be interpreted and translated into the various communities they inform. Normative considerations about whether or how republicanism applies in East Asia cannot be divorced from historical and empirical approaches which consider the various ways in which republican ideals reflect the realities of life there. Dealing with the issue of republicanism from a new, comparative perspective, this book will have broad appeal to students and scholars of Asian studies, comparative political theory, political philosophy, sociology, and history. (shrink)