Results for 'Daniel C. Henrich'

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  1.  5
    IV. Hegel: Ursprünge des habermasschen Naturalismus und mögliche Alternativen.Daniel C. Henrich - 2007 - In Zwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas. Transcript Verlag. pp. 205-214.
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  2.  10
    Zwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas.Daniel C. Henrich - 2007 - Transcript Verlag.
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  3.  6
    Einleitung.Daniel C. Henrich - 2007 - In Zwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas. Transcript Verlag. pp. 9-18.
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  4.  8
    I. Der Metaphysikbegriff bei Jürgen Habermas.Daniel C. Henrich - 2007 - In Zwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas. Transcript Verlag. pp. 19-36.
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  5.  3
    III. Metaphysische Letztbegründung?Daniel C. Henrich - 2007 - In Zwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas. Transcript Verlag. pp. 97-204.
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  6.  2
    II. Naturalisierung des Selbstbewusstseins.Daniel C. Henrich - 2007 - In Zwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas. Transcript Verlag. pp. 37-96.
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  7.  24
    Jürgen Habermas: Philosoph ohne metaphysische Rückendeckung?Daniel C. Henrich - 2007 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 55 (3):389-402.
    Jürgen Habermas behauptet, keine metaphysische Rückendeckung für seine Philosophie in Anspruch zu nehmen. Was aber versteht er unter ‚Metaphysik’, und mit welcher Strategie versucht er, diese zu eliminieren? Der Aufsatz versucht, eine Antwort auf diese Fragen zu entwickeln und gleichzeitig einen Ausblick auf die systematischen Konsequenzen der von Habermas vorgeschlagenen Strategie zu geben. Diese stehen nach Auffassung des Autors in einem Widerspruch zu spezifischen Grundannahmen der Diskursethik.
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  8.  3
    Literaturverzeichnis.Daniel C. Henrich - 2007 - In Zwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas. Transcript Verlag. pp. 225-241.
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  9.  6
    V. Metaphysische Implikationen in der Diskursethik?Daniel C. Henrich - 2007 - In Zwischen Bewusstseinsphilosophie Und Naturalismus: Zu den Metaphysischen Implikationen der Diskursethik von Jürgen Habermas. Transcript Verlag. pp. 215-224.
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  10.  27
    Moral parochialism and contextual contingency across seven societies.Daniel M. T. Fessler, H. Clark Barrett, Martin Kanovsky, Stephen P. Stich, Colin Holbrook, Joseph Henrich, Alexander H. Bolyanatz, Matthew M. Gervais, Michael Gurven, Geoff Kushnick, Anne C. Pisor, Christopher von Rueden & Stephen Laurence - 2015 - Proceedings of the Royal Society; B (Biological Sciences) 282:20150907.
    Human moral judgement may have evolved to maximize the individual's welfare given parochial culturally constructed moral systems. If so, then moral condemnation should be more severe when transgressions are recent and local, and should be sensitive to the pronouncements of authority figures (who are often arbiters of moral norms), as the fitness pay-offs of moral disapproval will primarily derive from the ramifications of condemning actions that occur within the immediate social arena. Correspondingly, moral transgressions should be viewed as less objectionable (...)
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  11.  28
    Moral parochialism misunderstood: a reply to Piazza and Sousa.Daniel M. T. Fessler, Colin Holbrook, Martin Kanovsky, H. Clark Barrett, Alexander H. Bolyanatz, Matthew M. Gervais, Michael Gurven, Joseph Henrich, Geoff Kushnick, Anne C. Pisor, Stephen P. Stich, Christopher von Rueden & Stephen Laurence - 2016 - Proceedings of the Royal Society; B (Biological Sciences) 283.
  12.  88
    Embodiment and self-ownership: Daniel C. Russell.Daniel C. Russell - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):135-167.
    Many libertarians believe that self-ownership is a separate matter from ownership of extra-personal property. “No-proviso” libertarians hold that property ownership should be free of any “fair share” constraints, on the grounds that the inability of the very poor to control property leaves their self-ownership intact. By contrast, left-libertarians hold that while no one need compensate others for owning himself, still property owners must compensate others for owning extra-personal property. What would a “self” have to be for these claims to be (...)
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  13. From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds.Daniel C. Dennett - unknown
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  14. Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
    This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will.
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  15. Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.
    Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.
  16.  48
    Daniel C. Dennett Autobiography Part 3.Daniel C. Dennett - 2008 - Philosophy Now 70:24-25.
  17. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):384-389.
  18. Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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  19.  42
    Intuition pumps and other tools for thinking.Daniel C. Dennett - 2013 - New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
    One of the world’s leading philosophers offers aspiring thinkers his personal trove of mind-stretching thought experiments. Over a storied career, Daniel C. Dennett has engaged questions about science and the workings of the mind. His answers have combined rigorous argument with strong empirical grounding. And a lot of fun. Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking offers seventy-seven of Dennett’s most successful "imagination-extenders and focus-holders" meant to guide you through some of life’s most treacherous subject matter: evolution, meaning, mind, (...)
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  20. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Daniel C. Dennett (ed.) - 1978 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford Books.
    Intentional explanation and attributions of mentality -- International systems -- Reply to Arbib and Gunderson -- Brain writing and mind reading -- The nature of theory in psychology -- Skinner skinned -- Why the law of effect will not go away -- A cure for the common code? -- Artificial intelligence as philosophy and as psychology -- Objects of consciousness and the nature of experience -- Are dreams experiences? -- Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness -- Two approaches to mental (...)
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  21. Real patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
    Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the (...)
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  22. Quining qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & Edoardo Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
    " Qualia " is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the (...)
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  23. Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  24. Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1968 - New York: Routledge.
  25. Will AI Achieve Consciousness? Wrong Question.Daniel C. Dennett - 2019 - Wired 1 (19.02.2019).
    We should not be creating conscious, humanoid agents but an entirely new sort of entity, rather like oracles, with no conscience, no fear of death, no distracting loves and hates.
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  26. Conditions of personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
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  27. Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The 'panglossian paradigm' defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
    Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable data - is sketched. The (...)
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  28.  15
    XIII*—Styles of Mental Representation.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83 (1):213-226.
    Daniel C. Dennett; XIII*—Styles of Mental Representation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 213–226, https://doi.o.
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  29. Practical intelligence and the virtues.Daniel C. Russell - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or "phronesis"--an excellence of deliberating and making choices--which ...
  30. Kinds of Minds.Daniel C. Dennett - 1996 - Basic Books.
  31. Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
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  32. Facing Up to the Hard Question of Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences 373.
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  33. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (238):547-550.
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  34.  77
    Happiness for humans.Daniel C. Russell - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    1. Happiness, then and now -- Happiness, eudaimonia, and practical reasoning -- Happiness as eudaimonia -- Happiness and virtuous activity -- New directions from old debates -- 2. Happiness then: the sufficiency debate -- Aristotle's case against the sufficiency thesis -- 3. Happiness now: rethinking the self -- Socrates' case for the sufficiency thesis -- Epictetus and the stoic self -- The Stoics' case for the sufficiency thesis -- The embodied conception of the self -- The embodied conception and psychological (...)
  35. Getting over Atomism: Functional Decomposition in Complex Neural Systems.Daniel C. Burnston - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (3):743-772.
    Functional decomposition is an important goal in the life sciences, and is central to mechanistic explanation and explanatory reduction. A growing literature in philosophy of science, however, has challenged decomposition-based notions of explanation. ‘Holists’ posit that complex systems exhibit context-sensitivity, dynamic interaction, and network dependence, and that these properties undermine decomposition. They then infer from the failure of decomposition to the failure of mechanistic explanation and reduction. I argue that complexity, so construed, is only incompatible with one notion of decomposition, (...)
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  36.  73
    Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
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  37. True believers : The intentional strategy and why it works.Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - In Anthony Francis Heath (ed.), Scientific explanation: papers based on Herbert Spencer lectures given in the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 150--167.
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  38. Styles of mental representation.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83:213-226.
    Daniel C. Dennett; XIII*—Styles of Mental Representation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 213–226, https://doi.o.
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  39. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 2005 - MIT Press.
    In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in ...
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  40. Kinds of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):883-890.
     
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  41. The User-Illusion of Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (11-12):167-177.
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  42.  80
    Interface problems in the explanation of action.Daniel C. Burnston - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):242-258.
    When doing mental ontology, we must ask how to individuate distinct categories of mental states, and then, given that individuation, ask how states from distinct categories interact. One promising proposal for how to individuate cognitive from sensorimotor states is in terms of their representational form. On these views, cognitive representations are propositional in structure, while sensorimotor representations have an internal structure that maps to the perceptual and kinematic dimensions involved in an action context. This way of thinking has resulted in (...)
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  43. Cognitive penetration and the cognition–perception interface.Daniel C. Burnston - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3645-3668.
    I argue that discussions of cognitive penetration have been insufficiently clear about what distinguishes perception and cognition, and what kind of relationship between the two is supposed to be at stake in the debate. A strong reading, which is compatible with many characterizations of penetration, posits a highly specific and directed influence on perception. According to this view, which I call the “internal effect view” a cognitive state penetrates a perceptual process if the presence of the cognitive state causes a (...)
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  44. How to think about higher‐level perceptual contents.Daniel C. Burnston - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (5):1166-1186.
    The standard assumption for what perception must do in order to represent a “higher level” content—say, tiger—is that it must represent the kind as such. I argue that this “as such condition” is not constitutive of what it means for a content to be “higher‐level”, and that embracing it produces a range of unfortunate dialectical consequences. After offering this critique, I give an alternative construal, the “extended perceptual space” view of higher‐level contents. This view captures the phenomena targeted by the (...)
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  45. The self as a center of narrative gravity.Daniel C. Dennett - 1992 - In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 4--237.
    What is a self? I will try to answer this question by developing an analogy with something much simpler, something which is nowhere near as puzzling as a self, but has some properties in common with selves. What I have in mind is the center of gravity of an object. This is a well-behaved concept in Newtonian physics. But a center of gravity is not an atom or a subatomic particle or any other physical item in the world. It has (...)
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  46.  29
    Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior.Daniel C. Dennett - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):540-543.
  47. Beliefs about beliefs [P&W, SR&B].Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):568-570.
  48. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - Mind 95 (377):127-129.
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  49. The logical geography of computational approaches: A view from the east pole.Daniel C. Dennett - 1986 - In Myles Brand (ed.), The Representation Of Knowledge And Belief. Tucson: University Of Arizona Press.
  50.  47
    The Fantasy of First-Person Science.Daniel C. Dennett - 2018 - In Wuppuluri Shyam & Francisco Antonio Dorio (eds.), The Map and the Territory: Exploring the Foundations of Science, Thought and Reality. Springer. pp. 455-473.
    A week ago, I heard James Conant give a talk at Tufts, entitled “Two Varieties of Skepticism” in which he distinguished two oft-confounded questions.
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