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  1. added 2020-08-11
    Scientismo sugli steroidi: una revisione della Libertà si Evolve ( Freedom Evolves) di Daniel Dennett (2003) (recensione rivista 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Benvenuti all'inferno sulla Terra: Bambini, Cambiamenti climatici, Bitcoin, Cartelli, Cina, Democrazia, Diversità, Disgenetica, Uguaglianza, Pirati Informatici, Diritti umani, Islam, Liberalismo, Prosperità, Web, Caos, Fame, Malattia, Violenza, Intellig. Las Vegas, NV , USA: Reality Press. pp. 92-106.
    "La gente ripete più e più volte che la filosofia non progredisce davvero, che siamo ancora occupati con gli stessi problemi filosofici come erano i greci. Ma le persone che dicono questo non capiscono perché deve essere così. È perché il nostro linguaggio è rimasto lo stesso e continua a sedurrci a fare le stesse domande. Finché continua ad essere un verbo - per essere - che sembra come se funziona allo stesso modo come "mangiare e bere", fintanto che abbiamo (...)
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  2. added 2020-08-01
    स्टे रॉयड पर वै ज्ञानिकता: स्वतं त्रता की एक रे वीडब्ल्यू डै नियल Dennettद्वारा ववकसित (2003) Scientism on Steroids-a Review of Freedom Evolves by Daniel Dennett (िमीक्षा िं शोधित 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In पृथ्वी पर नर्क में आपका स्वागत है: शिशुओं, जलवायु परिवर्तन, बिटकॉइन, कार्टेल, चीन, लोकतंत्र, विविधता, समानता, हैकर्स, मानव अधिकार, इस्लाम, उदारवाद, समृद्धि, वेब, अराजकता, भुखमरी, बीमारी, हिंसा, कृत्रिम बुद्धिमत्ता, युद्ध. Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press. pp. 111-129.
    [लोग बार बार कहते हैं कि दर्शन वास्तव में प्रगति नहीं करता है, कि हम अभी भी एक ही दार्शनिक समस्याओं के साथ कब्जा कर रहे हैं के रूप में यूनानियों थे. लेकिन जो लोग यह कहते हैं, वे समझ नहीं पा रहे हैं कि ऐसा क्यों होना चाहिए। ऐसा इसलिए है क्योंकि हमारी भाषा वही रही है और हमें एक ही सवाल पूछने में seducing रहता है. जब तक कोई क्रिया होती रहती है, तब तक ऐसा प्रतीत होता है (...)
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  3. added 2020-07-24
    Scientism auf Steroiden: eine Überprüfung der "Freiheit Entwickelt Sich" (Freedom Evolves) von Daniel Dennett (Überprüfung überarbeitet 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Willkommen in der Hölle auf Erden: Babys, Klimawandel, Bitcoin, Kartelle, China, Demokratie, Vielfalt, Dysgenie, Gleichheit, Hacker, Menschenrechte, Islam, Liberalismus, Wohlstand, Internet, Chaos, Hunger, Krankheit, Gewalt, Künstliche Intelligenz, Krieg. Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press. pp. 95-111.
    "Die Leute sagen immer wieder, dass die Philosophie nicht wirklich vorankommt, dass wir immer noch mit den gleichen philosophischen Problemen beschäftigt sind wie die Griechen. Aber die Leute, die das sagen, verstehen nicht, warum es so sein muss. Weil unsere Sprache gleich geblieben ist und uns immer wieder dazu verführt, dieselben Fragen zu stellen. Solange es weiterhin ein Verb "zu sein" gibt, das so aussieht, als ob es genauso funktioniert wie "essen und trinken" Solange wir noch die Adjektive "identisch", "wahr", (...)
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  4. added 2020-07-18
    科学はすべてについて良い説明ではありません-「自由は進化する」のレビュー (Freedom Evolves) by Daniel Dennett(2003) (レビュー改訂 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In 地獄へようこそ 赤ちゃん、気候変動、ビットコイン、カルテル、中国、民主主義、多様性、ディスジェニックス、平等、ハッカー、人権、イスラム教、自由主義、繁栄、ウェブ、カオス、飢餓、病気、暴力、人工知能、戦争. Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press. pp. 85-101.
    「人々は、哲学は本当に進歩していない、私たちはまだギリシャ人と同じ哲学的問題に占領されていると何度も何度も言います。しかし、これを言う人々は、なぜそうでなければならないのか理解していません。それは、私 たちの言語が変わらず、同じ質問をするように誘惑し続けているからです。食べたり飲んだりするのと同じように機能しているかのように見える動詞が続いている限り、 私たちがまだ形容詞を持っている限り、時間の川、空間の広がりなどについて話し続ける限り、人々は同じ不可解な困難につまずき続け、説明が晴れることができないものを見つめています。さらに、人々が「人間の理解の 限界」を見ることができると考える限り、彼らはもちろんこれらを超えて見ることができないと信じているので、これは超越への憧れを満たしています。 この引用は、約70年前に哲学を再定義したルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインからのものです(しかし、ほとんどの人はまだこれを見つけていません)。デネットは、彼が約40年間哲学者であったが、そのうちの一つ です。また、彼と彼の主要なアンタゴニスト、ジョン・サールの両方が有名なヴィトゲンシュタイニアン(ジョン・オースティンとサール、ギルバート・ライルとデネット)の下で学んだが、サールは多かれ少なかれポイン トを得て、デネットはしなかった(しかし、それはサールやライル・ヴィトゲンシュテニアンと呼ぶものを伸ばしているが)。デネットは難しい決定論者であり(裏口で現実をこっそり見ようとしますが)、おそらくこれは 有名な本「心の概念」(1949年)が転載され続けているライルによるものです。その本は幽霊を追い出すのに大いに役,立ったが、機械を置き去りにした。 デネットは、ヴィトゲンシュタイン、ライル(およびそれ以来)が詳細に暴露したミスを作ることを楽しんでいます。私たちの言葉の意識、選択、自由、意図、粒子、思考、決定、波、原因、起こった出来事(そして無限に )の使用はめったに混乱の原因ではありませんが、,通常の生活を離れて哲学に入るとすぐに(そして言語が進化した環境から切り離された議論、すなわち言葉が意味を持っていた正確な文脈)カオスが支配します。ほとん どの場合と同様に、デネットは一貫した枠組みを欠いており、サールは合理性の論理的構造と呼ばれています。私はこのレビューを書いて以来、私はこれにかなり拡大しており、私の最近の記事は、ステロイドのScien tism ((説明としての科学の不適切な使用)を呼び出すかもしれない哲学へのデネットのアプローチの何が間違っているかを詳細に示しています。ヴィトゲンシュタインからの別の引用で終わらせましょう - '野心は思考の死です。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .
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  5. added 2020-07-07
    Scientisme sur les Stéroïdes -un examen de la "Liberté Evolue" (Freedom Evolves) par Daniel Dennett (2003) (revue révisée 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Bienvenue en Enfer sur Terre : Bébés, Changement climatique, Bitcoin, Cartels, Chine, Démocratie, Diversité, Dysgénique, Égalité, Pirates informatiques, Droits de l'homme, Islam, Libéralisme, Prospérité, Le Web, Chaos, Famine, Maladie, Violence, Intellige. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 93-109.
    «Les gens disent encore et encore que la philosophie ne progresse pas vraiment, que nous sommes toujours occupés avec les mêmes problèmes philosophiques que les Grecs. Mais les gens qui disent cela ne comprennent pas pourquoi il doit en être ainsi. C’est parce que notre langue est restée la même et continue de nous séduire à poser les mêmes questions. Tant qu’il continue à y avoir un verbe qui ressemble à s’il fonctionne de la même manière que de manger et (...)
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  6. added 2020-06-23
    类固醇上的科学主义:自由进化的里维 (Scientism on Steroids- (A Review of Freedom Evolves by Daniel Dennett (2003)) (回顾修订 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In 欢迎来到地球上的地狱: 婴儿,气候变化,比特币,卡特尔,中国,民主,多样性,养成基因,平等,黑客,人权,伊斯兰教,自由主义,繁荣,网络,混乱。饥饿,疾病,暴力,人工智能,战争. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 90-104.
    人们一再说,哲学并没有真正进步,我们仍然被和希腊人一样的哲学问题所占据。但是说这一点的人不明白为什么会这样。因为我们的语言保持不变,并不断引诱我们问同样的问题。只要继续有一个动词,看起来好像它的作用与 吃和喝一样,只要我们仍然有形容词[相同],[真],[false],只要我们继续谈论时间的河流,在广阔的空间,等等,人们会不断绊倒同样的令人费解的困难,发现自己盯着的东西,似乎无法解释,无法清除。更重要 的是,这满足了对超然的渴望,因为只要人们认为他们能看到"人类理解的极限",他们当然相信他们能看到超越这些。 这句话出自路德维希·维特根斯坦,他在大约70年前重新定义了哲学(但大多数人还没有发现这一点)。德内特,虽然他已经作为一个哲学家约40年,是其中之一。也奇怪的是,他和他的主要对手,约翰·西尔,在著名的维 特根斯坦人(西尔与约翰·奥斯汀,德内特与吉尔伯特·莱尔)下学习,但西尔或多或少得到了这一点,而德内特没有,(虽然它正在拉伸的东西打电话给西尔或莱尔·维特根斯坦人)。丹内特是一个强硬的威慑者(尽管他试图 在后门偷偷摸摸现实),也许这是由于莱尔,他的名著 《心灵的概念》(1949年)继续被重印。那本书在驱除鬼魂方面做得非常好,但它离开了机器。 德内特喜欢犯维特根斯坦、莱尔(以及许多其他人)已经详细揭露的错误。我们使用词的意识,选择,自由,意图,粒子,思维,决定,波,因,发生,事件(等等无休止)很少是混乱的来源,但只要我们离开正常生活,进入哲 学(和任何讨论脱离了语言演变的环境——即,单词含义的确切背景)混乱。和大多数人一样,德内特缺乏一个连贯的框架——西尔称之为理性的逻辑结构。我已经大大扩展了这一点,因为我写了这个评论,我最近的文章详细显 示了什么与Dennett的哲学方法是错误的,这可能称为类固醇的山达主义。让我以维特根斯坦的另一句话结束——野心是思想的死亡。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日(2019年)。.
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  7. added 2020-06-12
    Саентизм на стероидах: Oбзор “свободы Эволюции” ( Freedom Evolves) by Daniel Dennett (2003) (обзор пересмотрен 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In ДОБРО ПОЖАЛОВАТЬ В АД НА НАШЕМ МИРЕ : Дети, Изменение климата, Биткойн, Картели, Китай, Демократия, Разнообразие, Диссигеника, Равенство, Хакеры, Права человека, Ислам, Либерализм, Процветание, Сеть, Хаос, Голод, Болезнь, Насилие, Искусственный интелле. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 94-110.
    "Люди говорят снова и снова, что философия на самом деле не прогресс, что мы по-прежнему заняты теми же философскими проблемами, что и греки. Но люди, которые говорят это, не понимают, почему это должно быть так. Это потому, что наш язык остался прежним и продолжает соблазнять нас задавать те же вопросы. До тех пор, пока по-прежнему существует глагол, который выглядит так, как будто он функционирует так же, как «есть и пить», до тех пор, пока у нас есть прилагательные «идентично», «правда» ( (...)
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  8. added 2020-06-06
    에 의해 진화하는 자유의 스테로이드 검토에 과학 (Freedom Evolves) Daniel Dennett.Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In 지구상의 지옥에 오신 것을 환영합니다 : 아기, 기후 변화, 비트 코인, 카르텔, 중국, 민주주의, 다양성, 역학, 평등, 해커, 인권, 이슬람, 자유주의, 번영, 웹, 혼돈, 기아, 질병, 폭력, 인공 지능, 전쟁. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 103-121.
    사람들은 철학이 실제로 진보하지 않는다고 거듭 말하며, 우리는 여전히 그리스인과 같은 철학적 문제에 몰두하고 있습니다. 그러나 이 말을 하는 사람들은 왜 그렇게 해야 하는지 이해하지 못합니다. 그것은 우리의 언어가 동일하게 유지되고 같은 질문을 우리에게 유혹 유지하기 때문이다. 'to'라는 동사가 계속 있는 한, '먹고 마시는 것과 같은 방식으로 기능하는 것처럼 보이는', 우리가 여전히 형용사를 가지고 있는 한, ', ', ', 'false', ́', '가능한', 우리가 시간의 강, 넓은 공간 등에 대해 계속 이야기하는 한, 사람들은 똑같은 수수께끼의 어려움을 계속 발견하고 설명이 없는 무언가를 (...)
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  9. added 2020-02-12
    Content and Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.Keith Gunderson - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (18):591.
  10. added 2019-06-20
    The Feeling of Embodiment: A Case Study in Explaining Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers - 2019 - Palgrave MacMillian.
    This book proposes a novel and rigorous explanation of consciousness. It argues that the study of an aspect of our self-consciousness known as the ‘feeling of embodiment’ teaches us that there are two distinct phenomena to be targeted by an explanation of consciousness. First is an explanation of the phenomenal qualities – 'what it is like' – of the experience; and second is the subject's awareness of those qualities. Glenn Carruthers explores the phenomenal qualities of the feeling of embodiment using (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness.Kathleen Akins - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):1-43.
    : In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett presents the Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness, a very brief, largely empirical theory of brain function. From these premises, he draws a number of quite radical conclusions—for example, the conclusion that conscious events have no determinate time of occurrence. The problem, as many readers have pointed out, is that there is little discernible route from the empirical premises to the philosophical conclusions. In this article, I try to reconstruct Dennett's argument, providing both the philosophical (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett’s Project.Daniel Hutto - 1995 - The Monist 78 (4):464-479.
    Professor Dennett has recently embarked on what he considers a “demystifying philosophical investigation” with respect to the phenomena of consciousness. In essence the strategy he has employed is one of getting us to “trade in” our ordinary intuitions so as to soften us up for the first phases of a full-fledged “scientific” explanation of consciousness in terms of sub-personal systems and their ontogenetic origins. His hope is that, once we are freed from certain misleading metaphors about the mind we will (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-06
    Caveat Emptor.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):48-57.
    What I find particularly valuable in the juxtaposition of these three essays on my book is the triangulation made possible by their different versions of much the same story. I present my view as a product of cognitive science, but all three express worries that it may involve some sort of ominous backsliding towards the evils of behaviorism. I agree with Baars and McGovern when they suggest that philosophy has had some baleful influences on psychology during this century. Logical positivism (...)
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  14. added 2019-04-24
    Cognitive Approaches to Phenomenal Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2018 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 347-370.
    The most promising approaches to understanding phenomenal consciousness are what I’ll call cognitive approaches, the most notable exemplars of which are the theories of consciousness articulated by David Rosenthal and Daniel Dennett. The aim of the present contribution is to review the core similarities and differences of these exemplars, as well as to outline the main strengths and remaining challenges to this general sort of approach.
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  15. added 2019-01-24
    The Fallacy of the Homuncular Fallacy.Carrie Figdor - 2018 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 31:41-56.
    A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively "stupider" capacities ("homunculi") until the mind is "discharged" by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at subpersonal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires that reflects how (...)
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  16. added 2018-09-07
    Consciousness as an Adaptation. What Animals Feel and Why.Pouwel Slurink - 2016 - In Andreas Blank (ed.), Animals. New Essays. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. pp. 303-332.
    Evolutionary epistemology (Lorenz, Vollmer) and value-driven decision theory (Pugh) are used to explain the fundamental properties of consciousness. It is shown that this approach is compatible with global workspace theory (Baars) and global neuronal workspace theory (De Haene). The emotions are, however, that what drives consciousness. A hypothetical evolutionary tree of the emotions is given – intended to show that consciousness evolves and is probably qualitatively different in different groups of animals.
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  17. added 2018-04-12
    Homunkulismus in den Kognitionswissenschaften.Geert Keil - 2003 - In Wolfgang R. Köhler & Hans-Dieter Mutschler (eds.), Ist der Geist berechenbar? Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. pp. 77-112.
    1. Was ist ein Homunkulus-Fehlschluß? 2. Analyse des Mentalen und Naturalisierung der Intentionalität 3. Homunkulismus in Theorien der visuellen Wahrnehmung 4. Homunkulismus und Repräsentationalismus 5. Der homunkulare Funktionalismus 6. Philosophische Sinnkritik und empirische Wissenschaft Literatur .
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  18. added 2018-03-15
    Daniel Dennett. Reconciling Science and Our Self-Conception. By Matthew. [REVIEW]David Bain - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):369-371.
    Over 35 years, Daniel Dennett has articulated a rich and expansive philosophical outlook. There have been elaborations, refinements, and changes of mind, exposi- tory and substantive. This makes him hard to pin down. Does he, for example, think intentional states are real? In places, he sounds distinctly instrumentalist; elsewhere, he avows realism, ‘sort of’. What is needed is a map, charting developments and tracing dialectical threads through his extensive writings and the different regions of his thought. This is what Matthew (...)
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  19. added 2018-03-11
    Confabulation or Experience? Implications of Out-of-Body Experiences for Theories of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers - forthcoming - Theory and Psychology.
    Difficulties in distinguishing veridical reports of experience from confabulations have implications for theories of consciousness. I develop some of these implications through a consideration of out-of-body experiences (OBEs). Do these variations indicate individual variation in experience or are they post-hoc confabulations, stories told by subjects to themselves in an attempt to make sense of the core phenomenology? I argue that no existent or possible evidence would be sufficient to favour one hypothesis over the other. How such evidence is interpreted depends (...)
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  20. added 2018-02-17
    Toward an Ontological Interpretation of Dennett's Theory.Michael V. Antony - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-369.
    While "Consciousness Explained" has received an enormous amount of attention since its publication, there is still little agreement on what Dennett’s account of consciousness is. Most interpreters treat his view as an instance of one or another of the standard ontological positions (functionalism, behaviorism, eliminativism, instrumentalism). I believe a different metaphysical account underlies Dennett’s view, one that is important though ill-understood. In the paper I attempt to point in the direction of a proper characterization of that account through the use (...)
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  21. added 2018-02-17
    Dennett's Misremenberings.Paul Bloomfield - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (1-2):207-218.
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  22. added 2017-10-05
    Heterophenomenology Versus Critical Phenomenology.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):221-230.
    Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be (...)
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  23. added 2016-12-12
    Unmasking Multiple Drafts.Steven J. Todd - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):477-494.
    Any theoretician constructing a serious model of consciousness should carefully assess the details of empirical data generated in the neurosciences and psychology. A failure to account for those details may cast doubt on the adequacy of that model. This paper presents a case in point. Dennett and Kinsbourne's (Dennett, D., & Kinsbourne, M. (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15, 183-243) assault on the materialist version of the Cartesian (...)
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  24. added 2016-12-08
    Qualifying Qualia Through the Skyhook Test.Tere Vadén - 2001 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):149-169.
    If we are to preserve qualia, one possibility is to take the current academic, philosophical, and theoretical notion less seriously and current natural science and some pre-theoretical intuitions about qualia more seriously. Dennett (1997) is instrumental in showing how ideas of the intrinsicalness and privacy of qualia are misguided and those of ineffability and immediacy misinterpreted. However, by combining ideas of non-mechanicalness used in contemporary natural science with the pre-theoretical idea that qualia are special because they are unique, we get (...)
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  25. added 2016-12-08
    A Defense of Cartesian Materialism.Jonathan Opie - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939 - 963.
    One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in Consciousness Explained is to demolish the Cartesian theater model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or (...)
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  26. added 2016-07-31
    Persons, Virtual Persons, and Radical Interpretation.Michael Bourke - 2015 - Modern Horizons:1-24.
    A dramatic problem facing the concept of the self is whether there is anything to make sense of. Despite the speculative view that there is an essential role for the perceiver in measurement, a physicalist view of reality currently seems to be ruling out the conditions of subjectivity required to keep the concept of the self. Eliminative materialism states this position explicitly. The doctrine holds that we have no objective grounds for attributing personhood to anyone, and can therefore dispense with (...)
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  27. added 2016-03-15
    Curtain Call at the Cartesian Theatre.Krzysztof Dołega & Joe Dewhurst - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):109-128.
    Hobson & Friston (2014) outline a synthesis of Hobson's work on dreaming and consciousness with Friston’s work on the free energy principle and predictive coding. Whilst we are sympathetic with their claims about the function of dreaming and its relationship to consciousness, we argue that their endorsement of the Cartesian theatre metaphor is neither necessary nor desirable. Furthermore, if it were necessary then this endorsement would undermine their positive claims, as the Cartesian theatre metaphor is widely regarded as unsustainable. We (...)
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  28. added 2016-02-11
    Daniel Dennett's Intuition Pumps. [REVIEW]Brendan Shea - 2015 - Reason Papers 37 (2).
    A review of Daniel Dennett's Intuition Pumps (W.V. Norton: 2013).
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  29. added 2016-01-17
    A Naturalistic Perspective on Intentionality. Interview with Daniel Dennett.Marco Mirolli - 2002 - Mind and Society 3 (6):1-12.
    In this interview Dennett is asked to clarify some of the most fundamental and controversial aspects of his theory of Intentionality, and of his philosophy in general, including his mild ontological realism, the relationships between ontology and science, naturalized epistemology, normativity, rationality, and the relation between science and philosophy. At the end of the interview, a critical bibliography points to the most important publications of Dennett up to 2000.
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  30. added 2015-09-27
    The Rationality Assumption.Richard Dub - 2015 - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Springer. pp. 93-110.
    Dennett has long maintained that one of the keystones of Intentional Systems Theory is an assumption of rationality. To deploy the Intentional Stance is to presume from the outset that the target of interpretation is rational. This paper examines the history of rationality constraints on mental state ascription. I argue that the reasons that Dennett and his philosophical brethren present for positing rationality constraints are not convincing. If humans are found to be rational, this will not be because a presumption (...)
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  31. added 2015-03-18
    Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett.Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.) - 2015 - Springer.
    What are the grounds for the distinction between the mental and the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior? Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain? Answers to these and other questions were developed in Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework for views that are now (...)
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  32. added 2014-04-02
    Consciousness Evaded: Comments on Dennett.Colin McGinn - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:241-49.
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  33. added 2014-03-31
    First-Person Operationalism and Mental Taxonomy.David M. Rosenthal - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):319-349.
  34. added 2014-03-31
    Content Meets Consciousness.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):1-22.
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  35. added 2014-03-31
    What Is Dennett’s Theory a Theory Of?Ned Block - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):23-40.
    A convenient locus of discussion is provided by Dennett.
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  36. added 2014-03-31
    Differences That Make No Difference.Fred Dretske - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):41-57.
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  37. added 2014-03-31
    Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology.Georges Rey - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):259-89.
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  38. added 2014-03-31
    Get Real.Daniel Dennett - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):505-568.
    There could be no more gratifying response to a philosopher's work than such a bounty of challenging, high-quality essays. I have learned a great deal from them, and hope that other readers will be as delighted as I have been by the insights gathered here. One thing I have learned is just how much hard work I had left for others to do, by underestimating the degree of explicit formulation of theses and arguments that is actually required to bring these (...)
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  39. added 2014-03-30
    Dennett on Qualia and Consciousness: A Critique.Bredo Johnsen - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):47-82.
    IntroductionIt is at least a bit embarrassing, perhaps even scandalous, that debate should still rage over the sheer existence of qualia, but they continue to find able defenders after decades of being attacked as relics of ghostly substances, epiphenomenal non-entities, nomological danglers and the like; the intensity of the current confrontation is captured vividly by Daniel Dennett:What are qualia, exactly? This obstreperous query is dismissed by one author by invoking Louis Armstrong's legendary reply when asked what jazz was: “If you (...)
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  40. added 2014-03-30
    Is Dennett a Disillusioned Zimbo?Timothy L. S. Sprigge - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):33-57.
    D. C. Dennett propounds a ?multiple drafts? conception of consciousness which is both materialist and anti?realist (in something like Dummett's sense). Thus there is no determinate truth as to what the components of someone's consciousness were over any particular period and the order in which they occurred. In opposition to this an anti?materialist form of psychical realism is defended here. There really is a precise something which it is like to be a conscious individual at each moment. The main difficulty (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-30
    Dennett's Rejection of Dualism.John A. Foster - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):17-31.
    In Consciousness Explained, Dennett elaborates and defends a materialist?functionalist account of the human mind, and of consciousness in particular. This defence depends crucially on his prior rejection of dualism. Dennett rejects this dualist alternative on three grounds: first, that its version of mind?to?body causation is in conflict with what we know, or have good reason to believe, from the findings of physical science; second, that the very notion of dualistic psychophysical causation is incoherent; and third, that dualism puts the mind (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-30
    Living on the Edge.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):135-59.
    In a survey of issues in philosophy of mind some years ago, I observed that "it is widely granted these days that dualism is not a serious view to contend with, but rather a cliff over which to push one's opponents." (Dennett, 1978, p.252) That was true enough, and I for one certainly didn't deplore the fact, but this rich array of essays tackling my book amply demonstrates that a cliff examined with care is better than a cliff ignored. And, (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-30
    Consciousness Avoided.Roger Fellows & Anthony O'Hear - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 ( 1-2):73 – 91.
    In Consciousness Explained, Dennett systematically deconstructs the notion of consciousness, emptying it of its central and essential features. He fails to recognize the self?intimating nature of experience, in effect reducing experiences to reports or judgments that so?and?so is the case. His information?processing model of meaning is unable to account for semantics, the way in which speakers and hearers relate strings of symbols to the world. This ability derives ultimately from our animal nature as experiencers, though culturally supplemented in various ways. (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-30
    What Dennett Can't Imagine and Why.Charles Siewert - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):93-112.
    Woven into Dennett's account of consciousness is his belief that certain possibilities are not conceivable. This is manifested in his view that we are not conscious in any sense in which we can imagine that philosophers? ?zombies? might not be conscious, and also in his claims about ?Hindsight?, and what possibilities this can coherently suggest to us. If the possibilities Dennett denies none the less seem conceivable to us, then if he does not give us reason to think they are (...)
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  45. added 2014-03-30
    Minds, Memes, and Rhetoric.Stephen R. L. Clark - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):3-16.
    Dennett's Consciousness Explained presents, but does not demonstrate, a fully naturalized account of consciousness that manages to leave out the very consciousness he purports to explain. If he were correct, realism and methodological individualism would collapse, as would the very enterprise of giving reasons. The metaphors he deploys actually testify to the power of metaphoric imagination that can no more be identified with the metaphors it creates than minds can be identified with memes. That latter equation, of minds with meme?complexes, (...)
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  46. added 2014-03-30
    Dennett's Mind.Michael Lockwood - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):59-72.
    Drawing on data from contemporary experimental psychology and research in artificial intelligence, Dennett argues for a multiple drafts model of human consciousness, which he offers as an alternative to what he calls Cartesian materialism. I argue that the considerations Dennett advances do not, in fact, call for the abandonment of Cartesian materialism. Moreover, the theory presented by Dennett does not, as he claims, succeed in explaining consciousness; in particular, it fails to do justice to qualia. Illuminating though Dennett's discussion is, (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-30
    Is Consciousness Integrated?Max Velmans - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):229-230.
    In the visual system, the represented features of individual objects (shape, colour, movement, and so on) are distributed both in space and time within the brain. Representations of inner and outer event sequences arrive through different sense organs at different times, and are likewise distributed. Objects are nevertheless perceived as integrated wholes - and event sequences are experienced to form a coherent "consciousness stream." In their thoughtful article, Dennett & Kinsbourne ask how this is achieved.
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  48. added 2014-03-30
    Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
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  49. added 2014-03-29
    Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1968 - Routledge.
    This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent work in the area.
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  50. added 2014-03-25
    Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet?Daniel C. Dennett - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):221-37.
    Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of (...)
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