The systems approach and systems research as a whole are currently experiencing a period of intensive development, which is due both to widening of their areas of application and incorporation into this area of various kinds of practical activity connected with science and technology and to a more intensive treatment of certain aspects of this approach. All of this inevitably demands further development of the philosophical range of inquiry into the systems approach.

This article argues that in Pindar's epinicians first-person statements may occasionally be made in the persona of the chorus and the athletic victor. The speaking persona behind Pindar's first-person statements varies quite widely: from generic, rhetorical poses—a laudator, an aoidos in the rhapsodic tradition (the “bardic first person”), an Everyman (the “first person indefinite”)—to strongly individualized figures: the Theban poet Pindar, the chorus, the victor. The arguable changes in the speaker's persona are not explicitly signalled in the text. This can (...) lead to significant ambiguities concerning the identity of the speaker (“blurred quotation,” “indeterminate speech boundaries”). The lack of a concern always to distinguish clearly the primary from the secondary narrators relates to a desire to confuse diegetic and mimetic forms; the practice of the fifth-century choral lyric poets in this regard is compared to that of other ancient Greek writers. The main challenge is to indicate how it is possible, in theory and in practice, for the athletic victor to be identified as the speaker when this is not explicitly signalled in the text; and, if this is possible, to suggest how it is possible for an audience to recognize when the speaking persona subsequently reverts to laudator or poet. An attempt is made to consider whether any formal, structural, or thematic tendencies can be observed in those passages in choral lyric where the chorus or the victor are tacitly introduced as speaking personae: such effects, it is argued, occur especially when links of ritual or genealogy enable the ode to “zoom” from the mythical past to the present occasion of the performance. The main passages discussed in the article are Pind. P.8.56–60, P.9.89–92, N.7.85, Pae. 2.73–79, and Bacch. 3.84–85. But the phenomena discussed are related broadly to other phenomena in Greek literature, in Latin poetry, and, especially, in Cicero's forensic oratory. (shrink)

'Stress' is a widely used word in clinical practice, the biological sciences and everyday life; but one which has little real value, serving mainly to confuse and confound rational thought. Whether it is described in terms of stimulus, response, or a combination of the two the definitions of stress are invariably found to be circular. We should stop using the word 'stress' and instead discuss specific stimuli or responses as appropriate. The author suggests that 'pressure' and 'tension' might provide suitable (...) substitutes for everyday clinical practice. (shrink)

Do we remember what pain feels like? Investigations into this question have sometimes led to ambiguous or apparently contradictory results. Building on research on pain memory by Rohini Terry and colleagues, I argue that this lack of agreement may be due in part to the difficulty researchers face when trying to convey to their study's participants the type of memory they are being tasked with recalling. To address this difficulty, I introduce the concept of 'qualitative memory', which, arguably, is the (...) sort of memory we have of what red looks like yet lack with respect to pain. I also briefly address a number of consequences the acknowledgment of qualitative memory would potentially have for philosophy, arguing that if we fail to have qualitative memories of certain sensations, such as pain, the standard philosophical accounts of experience, rational choice, and the sources of moral action may all need revision. (shrink)

An implication is a proposition, a consequence is a relation between propositions, and an inference is act of passage from certain premise-judgements to another conclusion-judgement: a proposition is true, a consequence holds, whereas an inference is valid. The paper examines interrelations, differences, refinements and linguistic renderings of these notions, as well as their history. The truth of propositions, respectively the holding of consequences, are treated constructively in terms of verification-objects. The validity of an inference is elucidated in terms of the (...) existence of a chain of immediately evident steps linking premises and conclusion. (shrink)

The problem of finding irreducible representations of a simple Lie group that decompose into just pure replications of a representation of a subgroup is considered. Replications involving tensor representations of the orthogonal groups are studied in detail using counting groups whose representation dimensions correspond to branching multiplicities. Replications involving spinor and mixed tensor representations are briefly considered.

Susan Schneider argues that physicalism must be false if abstracta are part of the physicalist's dependence base. In opposition to her view, here I set out some reasons to think that abstracta in general, including abstracta that are woven into the dependence base, are something physicalists can countenance with consistency.

This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X.