This is a new edition of Joseph Fletcher's 1966 work that ignited a firestorm of controversy at the time of its publication.

Pediatric psychopharmacology is a relatively new science. Although the use of psychotropic medications in children has risen in the past decade, there are few standard treatments for serious psychiatric or developmental disorders of childhood. The relative absence of standard treatments is further complicated by the fact that many of the agents used in pediatric psychopharmacology have been adapted from other fields. Therefore, investigators have a responsibility to make incremental progress from concept through pilot studies and large-scale, multisite efficacy and safety (...) trials. Thus, although there is a pressing need to conduct medication trials that can guide clinical practice, there are scientific and ethical considerations to bear in mind when designing clinical trials in pediatric psychopharmacology. This article reviews essential ethical and scientific issues that are relevant to designing clinical trials in children with psychiatric and developmental disorders. Using examples from recently published literature, the article describes the challenges and pitfalls of various clinical trial study designs. The application of sound ethical and scientific principles is necessary to ensure that clinical trials are properly conducted and to guard against ambiguous results that can not guide practice. (shrink)

Taking a critical look at some of the recent controls over human life, health, and death, Fletcher draws a vivid picture of contemporary biological needs and ethical responsibility. Genetic engineering, fetal research, abortion, suicide, human experimentation, infanticide, and euthanasia are some of the issues explored.

It is generally agreed that the method of explication consists in replacing a vague, presystematic notion (the explicandum) with a precise notion (the explicatum) formulated in a systematic context. However, Carnap and others who have used this and related terms appear to hold inconsistent views as to what constitutes an adequate explication. The central feature of the present explication of 'explication' is the correspondence condition: permitting the explicandum to deviate from some established "ordinary-language" conventions but, at the same time, requiring (...) that the explicatum correspond (via an effective translation) to the chosen "definitive intension" of the explicandum. (In effect, the first stages of an explication provide an informal characterization of a vague and possibly inconsistent language convention.) The present account of explication contrasts sharply with that sketched by Quine in Word and Object (although Quine accepts a correspondence condition of a sort). The terms `explication 1 ' and `explication 2 ' are used to indicate these quite different senses of the term. In Kaplan's terminology, explication 1 is intended to remedy "external vagueness" while explication 2 is intended to remedy "internal vagueness.". (shrink)

In the past four or five years I have been especially dependent on Aristotle's writings as I have initiated a series of experiments that can legitimately be called empirical efforts to prove Aristotelian conceptions to be true. In actuality, of course, I am trying to prove my own theory to be true—that is, worthy of consideration because it is consistent with observed human actions. However, by extension, I am surely seeking evidence for Aristotle's image of human cognition. There are two (...) Aristotlelian conceptions that underwrite my theoretical and empirical efforts: predication and opposition. When we speak of a "predication" in cognition we refer to a process that is fundamentally creative. Predications deal in meanings; and the way in which we align meanings, lending the meaning of one concept to another is what predication is all about. Predication is the act of affirming, denying, or qualifying certain patterns of meaning in relation to other patterns of meaning. The second Aristotelian conception that I have been employing theoretically and investigating empirically is "opposition." Although association through frequent contact was recognized by Aristotle , he also appreciated that there is often an intrinsic tie of opposite meanings to be seen in human reason. In my own interpretation of Aristotle, I believe that we can see the ultimate necessity of predication stemming from the opositional ties of meanings like this. If I am cognizing within a congerie of interlacing meanings which relate to and, indeed, delimit the definitions of their opposite meanings, then it is up to me as a cognizer to continually "take a position" on just what I am going to affirm—or not! 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Many scientists proclaim that consciousness is an illusion, a mere byproduct of chemical activity in the brain. In the computer age, scholars have further conceptualized consciousness as the software that regulates human functions, reducing our foibles and feats to complex but ultimately predictable robotics.

As I view theorizing to be identical to thinking and have offered extensive discussions elsewhere of the nature and function of "a" theory, I would like to address the question of what I look for in a psychological theory from the adjectivial side of the phrase 'psychological theory." The term "psychological" means to me a point of view, descriptive account, formal explication, etc., of human behavior encompassing introspective terminology, based on final causation, as framed in dialectically generated and evaluated premises (...) that incorporate predication. I think that if we can have a psychological theory of this type we will come a lot closer to the understanding of human beings. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Comments on the views on free will offered by B. D. Slife , M. Gergen , R. N. Williams , M. S. Richardson , and G. S. Howard in light of the classical definition of FW as being capable of doing otherwise. It is argued that FW interpretations differ markedly depending on whether they are viewed as due to a process or to contents within some process. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

D. Hume's analysis of causation is critically analyzed in light of certain assumptions that he made regarding the classical Aristotelian causes. Using his widely cited analysis of billiard balls colliding and moving about as an example of how efficient causation is supposedly learned, the argument is made that Hume has overlooked the functioning of final causation in this learning. Thus, in order to understand how a learner might reason back from the presumed "effect" to the "cause" in efficient causation, we (...) must appreciate that the learner is actually employing a final-cause process of predication-that is, of reasoning "for the sake of" precedents extending sequaciously to targets. As final causation underwrites telic description, it is concluded that there is an unrecognized teleology in Hume's analysis of causation. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Questions of both a theoretical and methodological nature are raised concerning Harcum's interesting paper on the resolution of the free will issue. The theoretical questions deal with the meaning of "free" as the supposed capricious disregard of environmental circumstances, the theoretical perspective from which agency is construed, the sort of causation that is involved, the choice of a predication model rather than a mediation model, and the role of opposition in framing alternatives. Methodological questions raised center on the role of (...) the experimental instruction, manipulation of the independent variable, and the reliance on randomness or error variance in the validation of free will conceptions. It is concluded that Harcum's findings are consistent with human agency, but that his theoretical account requires some rethinking. (shrink)

Twentieth-century political philosopher Eric Voegelin is best known as a severe critic of modernity. Much of his work argues that modernity is a Gnostic revolt against the fundamental structure of reality. For Voegelin, “Gnosticism” is the belief that human beings can transform the nature of reality through secret knowledge and social action, and he considered it the crux of the crisis of modernity. As Voegelin struggled with this crisis throughout his career, he never wavered in his judgment that philosophers of (...) the modern continental tradition were complicit in the Gnostic revolt of modernity. But while Voegelin’s analysis of those philosophers is at times scathing, his work also bears marks of their influence, and Voegelin has much more in common with the theorists of the modern continental tradition than is usually recognized. _Eric Voegelin and the Continental Tradition: Explorations in Modern Political Thought _evaluates this political philosopher—one of the most original and influential thinkers of our time—by examining his relationship to the modern continental tradition in philosophy, from Kant to Derrida. In a compelling introduction, editors Lee Trepanier and Steven F. McGuire present a review of the trajectories of Voegelin’s thought and outline what often is portrayed as his derisive critique of modernity. Soon, however, they begin to unravel the similarities between Voegelin’s thought and the work of other thinkers in the continental tradition. The subsequent chapters explore these possible connections by examining Voegelin’s intellectual relationship to individual thinkers, including Hegel, Schelling, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Gadamer. The essays in this volume go beyond Voegelin’s own reading of the modern philosophers to offer a reevaluation of his relationship to those thinkers. In _Eric Voegelin and the Continental Tradition_, Voegelin’s attempt to grapple with the crisis of modernity becomes clearer, and his contribution to the modern continental tradition is illuminated. The book features the work of both established and emerging Voegelin scholars, and the essays were chosen to present thoughtful and balanced assessments of both Voegelin’s thought and the ideas of the other thinkers considered. As the first volume to examine the relationship—and surprising commonalities—between Voegelin’s philosophy and the continental tradition as a whole, this text will be of interest not only to Voegelin disciples but to philosophers engaged by continental modernism and all disciplines of political philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: first to sketch a framework for classifying a wide range of conceptions of scientific objectivity and second to present and defend a conception of scientific objectivity that fills a neglected niche in the resulting hierarchy of viewpoints. Roughly speaking, the proposed ideal of scientific objectivity is effectiveness in the informal but technical sense of an effective method. Science progresses when "higher levels of communicative discourse" are reached by transforming subjective judgments regarding the generation (...) and reduction of data or the testing of theories into objective decision procedures that are automatic or mechanical. (shrink)

The audit profession’s technical and ethical standards require the application of professional skepticism throughout the financial statement audit process, as auditor skepticism is essential for detecting financial statement fraud and protecting the investing public. However, recent research suggests that audit supervisors often punish staff for exercising skepticism, presenting auditors with an ethical conflict between acting in their own self-interest and acting in a way that improves audit quality and protects the public. This research also suggests that supervisors who reward appropriate (...) skeptical behavior, regardless of the outcome, appear to develop staff that are more likely to detect and convey fraud red flags to their superiors. Building on this research, we use a case-based survey to identify the characteristics of audit supervisors (audit seniors and managers) who are more likely to reward appropriate skepticism, even if it ultimately does not identify a misstatement. We find that trait skepticism, especially suspending one’s judgment, positively drives the evaluations of professional skepticism in our setting. Also, we observe that when supervisors believe that their own audit partner will view the skepticism favorably, they “pay it forward” by rewarding their own staff who engage in skepticism. Our findings identify the characteristics that audit firms may want to develop and foster in auditors rising to supervisory levels. (shrink)

It is argued that current attempts to model human learning behavior commonly fail on one of two counts: either the model assumptions are artificially restricted so as to permit the application of mathematical techniques in deriving their consequences, or else the required complex assumptions are imbedded in computer programs whose technical details obscure the theoretical content of the model. The first failing is characteristic of so-called mathematical models of learning, while the second is characteristic of computer simulation models. An approach (...) to model building which avoids both these failings is presented under the title of a black-box theory of learning. This method permits the statement of assumptions of any desired complexity in a language which clearly exhibits their theoretical content.Section II of the paper is devoted to the problem of testing and comparing alternative learning theories. The policy advocated is to abandon attempts at hypothesis testing. It is argued that, in general, we not only lack sufficient data and sufficiently powerful techniques to test hypotheses, but that the truth of a model is not really the issue of basic interest. A given model may be true in the sense that on the basis of available evidence we cannot statistically reject it, but not interesting in the sense that it provides little information about the processes underlying behavior. Rather, we should accept or reject models on the basis of how much information they provide about the way in which subjects respond to environmental structure. This attitude toward model testing is made precise by introducing a formal measure of the information content of a model. Finally, it is argued that the statistical concept of degrees-of-freedom is misleading when used in the context of model testing and should be replaced by a measure of the information absorbed from the data in estimating parameters. (shrink)

A technological revolution with first order implications is undeniable and underway. That is the permeation of society by computers and telecommunications technology. For western society, committed to a social, economic, and value structure premised upon an industrial society, the move to an information society is more than disruptive; it is transformational. Current changes are so rapidly paced in relation to business planning that it creates major challenges and opportunities to reach out, influence, and guide the change.The telematics revolution will affect (...) every aspect of our society since it will affect every aspect of our world which involves the generation, production, storage, or handling of information. Many ethical issues are touched upon. To sum them up, the new immorality is to choose to act in ignorance of future consequences. (shrink)

Offering an alternative to the theories of Skinner and other behaviorists, Rychlak draws upon recent research to support his belief that people can alter the grounds for their behavior and assume greater responsibility for it.

This volume asks how and why the concept of nature has changed its meaning in modernity and whether a rearticulation of premodern ideas about nature is possible. Building on the work of Voegelin, Strauss, Lonergan, Finnis, and others, the book compares and contrasts classical, medieval, and modern conceptions of nature.

The distinction between explanation and prediction has received much attention in recent literature, but the equally important distinction between explanation and description (or between prediction and description) remains blurred. This latter distinction is particularly important in the social sciences, where probabilistic models (or theories) often play dual roles as explanatory and descriptive devices. The distinction between explanation (or prediction) and description is explicated in the present paper in terms of information theory. The explanatory (or predictive) power of a probabilistic model (...) is identified with information taken from (or transmitted by) the environment (e.g., the independent, experimentally manipulated variables), while the descriptive power of a model reflects additional information taken from (or transmitted by) the data. Although information is usually transmitted by the data in the process of estimating parameters, it turns out that the number of free parameters is not a reliable index of transmitted information. Thus, the common practice of treating parameters as degrees-of-freedom in testing probabilistic models is questionable. Finally, this information-theoretic analysis of explanation, prediction, and description suggests ways of resolving some recent controversies surrounding the pragmatic aspects of explanation and the so-called structural identity thesis. (shrink)

This paper contrasts two information-theoretic approaches to statistical explanation: namely, (1) an analysis, which originated in my earlier research on problems of testing stochastic models of learning, based on an entropy-like measure of expected transmitted-information (and here referred to as the Expected-Information Model), and (2) the analysis, which was proposed by James Greeno (and which is closely related to Wesley Salmon's Statistical Relevance Model), based on the information-transmitted-by-a-system. The substantial differences between these analyses can be traced to the following basic (...) difference. On Greeno's view, the essence of explanation lies in the relevance relations expressed by the conditional probabilities that relate the explanans variables to the explanandum variables; on my view, in contrast, the essence of explanation lies in theories viewed as hypothetical structures which deductively entail conditional probability distributions linking the explanans variables and the explanandum variables. The explanatory power of a stochastic theory is identified with information (regarding the values of explanandum variables) which is "absorbed from" the explanans variables. While other information which is "absorbed from" the explanandum variables (through the process of parameter estimation, for example) reflects descriptive power of the theory. I prove that Greeno's measure of transmitted information is a limiting special case of the E-I model, but that the former, unlike the latter, makes no distinction between explanatory power and descriptive power. (shrink)

It remains the case that economic ethics is still an underdeveloped specialization within the discipline of religious ethics. Contemporary commentators have lamented the still emergent status of economic ethics and recently some have begun to point out new directions for this area of moral reflection. Part of the problem has been the historical fact that not many religious ethicists have taken the time to acquire the required specialization competence in economics, economic theory, and history. Religion and Economic Ethics presents nineteen (...) readings that illuminate the economic side of religious ethics. Contributions include: Economic Justice and the Common-wealth of Peoples, by Douglas Sturm; Economic Systems and the Sacramental Imagination, by Joseph La Barge; Common Moral and Religious Grounds for Uncommon Economic Times, by James F. Smurl; Liberation Theology and the Vatican, by Arthur F. McGovern. Co-published with the College Theology Society. (shrink)

First and 2d ed. published under title: Philosophical psychology. Includes bibliographies.

Aeschylus' constant metrical practice shows that either Ag. 404/5 in the strophe, or 421/2, correspondingly in the antistrophe, is corrupt in the manuscript tradition..

The relationship of words to the things they represent and to the mind that forms them has long been the subject of linguistic enquiry. Joseph Graham's challenging book takes this debate into the field of literary theory, making a searching enquiry into the nature of literary representation. It reviews the arguments of Plato's Cratylus on how words signify things, and of Chomsky's theory of the innate "natural" status of language (contrasted with Saussure's notion of its essential arbitrariness). In the (...) process, Graham explores the issues of meaning and intentionality in representation, and questions of how the mind represents the world. Graham's use of linguistic theories and models leads him to a new response to Wimsatt's notion of the verbal icon, Stanley Fish's concept of literature as self-consuming artifact, and de Man's idea of its function as an allegory of reading. In showing them in fact to be complementary, he transcends the current controversies among literary theorists, arguing that the solution lies not in epistemology or philosophy, but in psychology and the study of how literature teaches and why humans learn best by example. (shrink)