While the technologies that enable Artificial Intelligence (AI) continue to advance rapidly, there are increasing promises regarding AI’s beneficial outputs and concerns about the challenges of human–computer interaction in healthcare. To address these concerns, institutions have increasingly resorted to publishing AI guidelines for healthcare, aiming to align AI with ethical practices. However, guidelines as a form of written language can be analyzed to recognize the reciprocal links between its textual communication and underlying societal ideas. From this perspective, we conducted a (...) discourse analysis to understand how these guidelines construct, articulate, and frame ethics for AI in healthcare. We included eight guidelines and identified three prevalent and interwoven discourses: (1) AI is unavoidable and desirable; (2) AI needs to be guided with (some forms of) principles (3) trust in AI is instrumental and primary. These discourses signal an over-spillage of technical ideals to AI ethics, such as over-optimism and resulting hyper-criticism. This research provides insights into the underlying ideas present in AI guidelines and how guidelines influence the practice and alignment of AI with ethical, legal, and societal values expected to shape AI in healthcare. (shrink)

In his The Poverty of Historicism 1 K.R. Popper and before him F. Kaufmann2 distinguish two broad classes of epistemological and methodological positions held in the social sciences: Antinaturalistic positions and pronaturalistic positions. These positions are distinguished with respect to their attitude regarding the applicability of the methods of the natural sciences, or rather what the representatives of the anti and pronaturalistic positions assume to be the method of the natural sciences. According to Popper and Kaufmann the representatives of antinaturalistic (...) positions hold that the methods of the natural sciences can not be applied in the social sciences, whereas the representatives of the pronaturalistic positions have the opposite view. This of course raises the question what views the representatives of the anti and pronaturalistic positions embrace with respect to the methods of the natural sciences. It is interesting to note, however, that Popper in his The Poverty of Historicism, indicates those views only briefly, the reasons presumably being the special tasks and aims he set himself in that analysis. These are primarily to show the disastrous political and social consequences of a false social science methodology and the invalidity of the ideas of historical necessity and that of laws of historical development. But it is well known that Popper analysed and discussed the methods and the philosophy of science with great rigour and acumen in his other books and articles and that he triggered a philosophical revolution in that field.3 Before Popper the prevailing. (shrink)

We provide an analysis of the public's having warranted epistemic trust in science, that is, the conditions under which the public may be said to have well-placed trust in the scientists as providers of information. We distinguish between basic and enhanced epistemic trust in science and provide necessary conditions for both. We then present the controversy regarding the connection between autism and measles–mumps–rubella vaccination as a case study to illustrate our analysis. The realization of warranted epistemic public trust in science (...) requires various societal conditions, which we briefly introduce in the concluding section. (shrink)

Although there is universal consensus both in the science education literature and in the science standards documents to the effect that students should learn not only the content of science but also its nature, there is little agreement about what that nature is. This led many science educators to adopt what is sometimes called “the consensus view” about the nature of science (NOS), whose goal is to teach students only those characteristics of science on which there is wide consensus. This (...) is an attractive view, but it has some shortcomings and weaknesses. In this article we present and defend an alternative approach based on the notion of family resemblance. We argue that the family resemblance approach is superior to the consensus view in several ways, which we discuss in some detail. (shrink)

Certain segments of science are becoming increasingly commercialized. This article discusses the commercialization of academic science and its impact on various aspects of science. It also aims to provide an introduction to the articles in this special issue. I briefly describe the major factors that led to this phenomenon, situate it in the context of the changing social regime of science and give a thumbnail sketch of its costs and benefits. I close with a general discussion of how the topic (...) of commercialization of academic science is relevant to science education. (shrink)

Fleeing from the Nazi regime, along with many German refugees, Hans Reichenbach came to teach at Istanbul University in 1933, accepting the invitation of the Turkish government and stayed in Istanbul until 1938. While much is known about his work and life in Istanbul, the existing literature relies mostly on his letters and works. In this article I try to shed more light on Reichenbach's scholarly activities and personal life by also taking into account the Turkish sources and the academic (...) context in which Reichenbach taught and worked. (shrink)

Literature reviews have traditionally been a simple exercise in reporting the current relevant research, both to provide an overview of the current status of the field, and perhaps to draw attention to controversies. From the perspective of positivist research traditions, it was important to neutrally report all the relevant research, which was assumed to be foundational. In this article, written for the Applied Critical Realism special issue of Journal of Critical Realism, I use my own research to illustrate how a (...) literature review might look if it were non-foundational and guided by the principles of immanent critique. Immanent critique is central to Bhaskar’s philosophical methodology but has not been much applied in critical realist empirical research. Following a brief introduction to immanent critique, its history and relation to other ways of grounding knowledge, an excerpt from a literature review is used as backdrop for an extended discussion about various potential applications, and impl... (shrink)

The papers collected in this Synthese special issue are the result of a conference that one of us (ES) casually suggested and the other (GI) organized, which took place at Bo˘gaziçi University in Istanbul, in May 2008, to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the publication of Experience and Prediction. These papers are historical and philosophical in varying degrees. Reichenbach is now often lumped together with the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, but his ideas, especially those in Experience and Prediction, (...) were often developed in opposition to positivism. We hope that the essays collected here will be a resource for philosophers who work on the problems that Reichenbach addressed, and also that these essays will be useful to historians who want to develop a deeper understanding of Reichenbach in his historical context. (shrink)

I examine whether or not it is apt to attribute knowledge to groups of scientists. I argue that though research teams can be aptly described as having knowledge, communities of scientists identified with research fields, and the scientific community as a whole are not capable of knowing. Scientists involved in research teams are dependent on each other, and are organized in a manner to advance a goal. Such teams also adopt views that may not be identical to the views of (...) the individual members of the group. (shrink)

Approximately 400,000 people die outside US hospitals or chronic care facilities each year. While there has been some recent movement towards initiating procedures for prehospital Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders, the most common situation in the US is that emergency medical systems (EMS) personnel are not authorized to pronounce patients dead, but are required to attempt resuscitation with all of the modalities at their disposal in virtually all patients. It is unfair and probably unrealistic for EMS personnel to have to (...) make a determination of the validity of a non-standard prehospital DNR order (for example, a living will or a durable power of attorney for health care). Existing prehospital DNR protocols range from being very restrictive in the scope of patients allowed to participate and in their implementation, to those that are more liberal. Potential benefits of prehospital DNR orders include freeing up vital personnel and material for use by those who would more fully benefit, and alleviating the enormous emotional strain on patients, families, EMS personnel, and hospital medical staffs involved in unwanted resuscitations that only prolong the dying process. Given this, prehospital DNR orders present several legal and moral problems. These include proper patient identification, the nature of the document itself, precautions incorporated into a DNR system to prevent misuse, potential liability for EMS and hospital personnel, and potential errors in implementation. Functioning prehospital DNR systems need to include: 1) specific legislation detailing the circumstances in which such a document could be used, the wording of such a document, and protection from liability for those implementing the document's directives; 2) having the currently valid document immediately available to the EMS personnel or base station doctors; and 3) acceptable means of identifying the patient. Relatively few US jurisdictions as yet have a prehospital DNR order system, although it is an idea whose time is overdue. Society's imperative to use available technology has pushed us into a situation where a technique to save those with a potential to continue a meaningful and wanted existence is being used indiscriminately to prolong the agony of death. (shrink)

Noise in behavior is often viewed as a nuisance: while the mind aims to take the best possible action, it is let down by unreliability in the sensory and response systems. How researchers study cognition reflects this viewpoint – averaging over trials and participants to discover the deterministic relationships between experimental manipulations and their behavioral consequences, with noise represented as additive, often Gaussian, and independent. Yet a careful look at behavioral noise reveals rich structure that defies easy explanation. First, both (...) perceptual and preferential judgments show that sensory and response noise may potentially only play minor roles, with most noise arising in the cognitive computations. Second, the functional form of the noise is both non-Gaussian and non-independent, with the distribution of noise being better characterized as heavy-tailed and as having substantial long-range autocorrelations. It is possible that this structure results from brains that are, for some reason, bedeviled by a fundamental design flaw, albeit one with intriguingly distinctive characteristics. Alternatively, noise might not be a bug but a feature: indeed, we suggest that noise is fundamental to how cognition works. Specifically, we propose that the brain approximates probabilistic inference with a local sampling algorithm, one that uses randomness to drive its exploration of alternative hypotheses. Reframing cognition in this way explains the rich structure of noise and leads to a surprising conclusion: that noise is not a symptom of cognitive malfunction but plays a central role in underpinning human intelligence. (shrink)

My aim is to evaluate a new realist strategy for addressing the pessimistic induction, Ludwig Fahrbach’s (Synthese 180:139–155, 2011) appeal to the exponential growth of science. Fahrbach aims to show that, given the exponential growth of science, the history of science supports realism. I argue that Fahrbach is mistaken. I aim to show that earlier generations of scientists could construct a similar argument, but one that aims to show that the theories that they accepted are likely true. The problem with (...) this is that from our perspective on the history of science we know their argument is flawed. Consequently, we should not be impressed or persuaded by Fahrbach’s argument. Fahrbach has failed to identify a difference that matters between today’s theories and past theories. But realists need to find such a difference if they are to undermine the pessimistic induction. (shrink)

In generations past, it was common practice for doctors to learn lifesaving technical skills on patients who had recently died. But this practice has lately been criticised on religious, legal, and ethical grounds, and has fallen into disuse in many hospitals and emergency departments. This paper uses four questions to resolve whether doctors in emergency departments should practise and teach non-invasive and minimally invasive procedures on the newly dead: Is it ethically and legally permissible to practise and teach non-invasive and (...) minimally invasive procedures on the newly dead emergency-department patient? What are the alternatives or possible consequences of not practising non-invasive and minimally invasive procedures on newly dead patients? Is consent from relatives required? Should doctors in emergency departments allow or even encourage this use of newly dead patients? (shrink)

The anti-realist argument from underconsideration focuses on the fact that, when scientists evaluate theories, they only ever consider a subset of the theories that can account for the available data. As a result, when scientists judge one theory to be superior to competitor theories, they are not warranted in drawing the conclusion that the superior theory is likely true with respect to what it says about unobservable entities and processes. I defend the argument from underconsideration from the objections of Peter (...) Lipton. I argue that the inconsistency that Lipton claims to find in the argument vanishes once we understand what the anti-realist means when she claims that scientists are reliable. I also argue that collapsing the distinction between relative and absolute evaluations, as Lipton recommends, has its costs. Finally, I briefly examine Richard Boyd's influential defence of realism. (shrink)

The covariant Klein-Gordon equation requires twice the boundary conditions of the Schrödinger equation and does not have an accepted single-particle interpretation. Instead of interpreting its solution as a probability wave determined by an initial boundary condition, this paper considers the possibility that the solutions are determined by both an initial and a final boundary condition. By constructing an invariant joint probability distribution from the size of the solution space, it is shown that the usual measurement probabilities can nearly be recovered (...) in the non-relativistic limit, provided that neither boundary constrains the energy to a precision near ℏ/t 0 (where t 0 is the time duration between the boundary conditions). Otherwise, deviations from standard quantum mechanics are predicted. (shrink)

Realists and anti-realists disagree about whether contemporary scientists are epistemically privileged. Because the issue of epistemic privilege figures in arguments in support of and against theoretical knowledge in science, it is worth examining whether or not there is any basis for assuming such privilege. I show that arguments that try to explain the success of science by appeal to some sort of epistemic privilege have, so far, failed. They have failed to give us reason to believe (i) that scientists are (...) prone to develop theories that are true, (ii) that our current theories are not apt to be replaced in the future, and (iii) that science is nearing its completion. (shrink)

Zaman, düşünce tarihinde üzerinde çokça tartışılmış ve muhtelif tanımlamaları yapılmış bir kavramdır. Bu makale de zamanın tanımlamasından ziyade onun üzerinde özellikle an kavramı merkezli bir düşünce etkinliği ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bilhassa zaman ve an kavramları arasındaki farka değinilmiştir. Zamanın hareketin olduğu yerde var olduğunu, anın ise hem hareketin hem de durağanlığın olduğu her yerde karşımıza çıktığını belirterek zamanın akışkan hayatı ölçülebilir kılma çabasında var oluşuyla, anın ise bu akışkanlığın her safhasında var olduğuna temas edilmiştir. Aynı zamanda anın varoluş ile mütemadiyen (...) yan yana olduğu, algılanışının ise bireylerin tecrübeleriyle zuhur ettiği görüşü ortaya konulmuştur. An’ın insan tecrübesiyle anlam kazanması ve insanın anı nasıl değerlendirmesi gerektiği hususunda konu, kanaatimizce Asr Suresi ve Hz. Peygamberin (s.a.v) buyruğu ile temellendirilmiştir. Bahsi geçen konu, çeşitli filozofların görüşleri ile de desteklenmiştir. Daha sonra makalemizde modern düşüncenin insanı anı kaliteli yaşamaktan ziyade daha iyi gelecek vaadiyle kaygı ve huzursuzluğa sevk ettiğini ifade ettik. Makalemizin sonunda ise İslam’ın bu modern düşüncenin aksine insana akışkanlık içerisinde yaşarken anın kendisine sunduğu akışkanlığın her bir aşamasını en güzel şekilde değerlendirmesini emrettiği ve onu değerli bir maden gibi tavında işlemesi gerektiği mesajıyla sonuçlandırdık. (shrink)